

THE SYMBOLOGY OF SWASTIKA IN THE GONBAD-E-SORKH TOMB

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Abstract. *The Swastika was used on many of Iran's monuments dating from pre-Islamic and post-Islamic times. It cannot be said that the Swastika sign has always had only one meaning, for if it was so, it would lose its mystery and become merely a word. In addition to being a beautiful image with deep and prominent notions, the Swastika is a key element in the art and creation of various pleasing motifs, especially in Islamic art. It appeared on the pre-Islamic Iranian artworks and remained visible on those of the Islamic era, indicating an inextricable link between the visual presentation and the past. Therefore, this research, which is an applied research of the qualitative approach, investigates the Swastika array in the Gonbad-e-Sorkh Mausoleum or Red Dome in Maragheh and analyses this sign printed in brick from a symbolic point of view. The results show that the Swastika is associated with the deceased soul in the tomb buildings and the reason for its creation must be related to this spiritual relationship.*

Keywords: Swastika, Gonbad-e-Sorkh, Maragheh, Iran, Symbology.

Rezumat: *Simbolistica svasticii în mormântul Gonbad-e-Sorkh. În epocile pre-Islamică și post-Islamică semnul svasticii a fost folosit în arhitectura monumentelor din diferite părți ale Iranului. Nu se poate spune despre semnul svasticii că a avut întotdeauna o singură semnificație pentru că, dacă ar fi astfel, și-ar pierde misterul și ar deveni un simplu cuvânt. În afară de faptul că reprezintă o imagine frumoasă cu semnificații adânci și importante, svastica este un element cheie în domeniul artistic și în crearea unor motive estetice, în special în arta islamică. Semnul svasticii a apărut pe operele de artă iraniene pre-islamice și a rămas vizibil pe cele din epoca islamică, ceea ce arată legătura indestructibilă dintre reprezentarea vizuală și trecut. Prin urmare, această lucrare, care reprezintă o cercetare aplicată cu abordare calitativă, investighează dispunerea svasticii în Mausoleul sau Mormântul roșu Gonbad-e-Sorkh din orașul Maragheh și analizează semnul imprimat în cărămidă din punct de vedere simbolic. Rezultatele arată că svastica este asociată în clădirile*

funerare cu sufletul decedaților, iar motivul utilizării sale trebuie pus în legătură cu această relație spirituală.

INTRODUCTION

Revered in various rituals and beliefs, the Swastika has generated various discussions and opinions on its origins and symbolic significance. Regardless of its name – "the cross",¹ "the sun-wheel"², "the Swastika"³ – it represents two intersecting lines, perpendicular to each other⁴ or a branch with 90 degrees to the right or left. It can be said that, throughout the history of mankind, the Swastika has appeared illustrated in various ways among different ethnic groups⁵ symbolizing good fortune, good things, and good wishes, the sun and the goddess of the sun, religious mystery, etc.⁶ It occurs in Egyptian, Trojan, Roman, Teutonic and Celtic stone carvings, as a symbolic motif of the American Indians, throughout North, Central and South America, and in Persian, Central Asian, Indian, Chinese, Japanese and Southeast Asian art. In ancient Greece, the Swastika was known as a "Greek Cross" or a gammadion formed by four clockwise-rotating Greek gamma letters. In early Christianity, the Greek letter gamma symbolize the cornerstone; therefore, it became a symbol for Christ as 'the cornerstone of the New Temple or Church'. Later, the gammadion or fylfot appeared as a geometric pattern in the lower areas of the stained-glass windows in cathedrals and churches.⁷ This symbol has been also discovered in Europe in one of its most beautiful forms as a

¹ Ernest Herzfeld, ایران در شرق باستان [Iran in the Ancient East], Translated by Homayoun Sanatizadeh, Tehran: Publications of Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies of Shahid Bahonar University of Kerman, 2002, p. 21.

² Malihe Keshtgar, بررسی تطبیقی چلیپا به عنوان نماد دینی در تمدن‌های ایران باستان، هند و چین، بین النهرین [The Comparative Study of Cross as a Religious Sign in Iran, Mesopotamia & Indochina Civilizations], "Naghsh Mayeh", Vol. 5, 2012, No. 12, p. 63.

³ Nusratullah Bakhturash, گردونه خورشید یا گردونه مهر [Sun or Mehr Wheel], Tehran: Atai Publications, 2001, p. 148.

⁴ Mohammad Ja'far Yahaghi, فرهنگ اساطیر و اشارات داستانی در ادبیات فارسی [Culture of Mythology and Fiction in Persian Literature], Tehran: Soroush, 1996, p. 278.

⁵ Reza Rezalou, Yahya Iramloo, Asadollah Mirza Aghajani, مطالعه سیر تحول نقوش چلیپایی در تزئینات معماری دوره اسلامی ایران و زیبایی شناسی و نماد شناسی آن [A Study of the Evolution of the Swastika's Motifs in the Decoration of Iranian Islamic Architecture and its Aesthetics and Symbolism], "Journal of Fine Arts – Visual Arts", Vol. 18, 2013, No. 1, p. 16.

⁶ Nusratullah Bakhturash, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

⁷ Robert Beer, *The Encyclopedia of Tibetan symbols and motifs*, Boston, Shambhala Publications, 1999, p. 343.

horse's head.⁸ If in the Buddhist art the Swastika indicates the stability of the element "earth", in the Nazi ideology it became a symbol of racial extremism.⁹

The word 'swastika' derives from Sanskrit ('swastika').¹⁰ The motif of a "+" sign was engraved on some earthenware vessels from around 5,000 BC that have been found in Khuzestan province. The sun and moon depicted on potteries are placed between the horn of a cow and on the back of a goat along with a broken Swastika.¹¹ Rectangles and cross are the most common shapes of the signs which in some cases seem to represent birds.¹² A distinctive feature of pottery art in Tel-Bakun is that the cross, including its random additions, is not placed in a crowded design, but constitutes the main and predominant symbol.¹³ The Swastika is painted on the objects discovered in a few Parthian (**Arsacid**) graves.¹⁴ **Naqsh-e Rostam**, the tomb of the Achaemenid kings was shaped like a Swastika. In the Sassanid era, this sign was used as the main symbol in palaces decoration. It can be seen among the niches of the ruined palaces in Bishapur and the Kish area¹⁵ (See **Figure 1**).

There are various theories about the graphic simplicity of this sign, which is indicated by the two-barred or broken-lines cross. Some interpretations of Islamic art cannot be considered correct since many of these concepts in Islamic art are still obscure words. For example, the broken type is considered to be a symbol of motion, a rotating sun, or a chariot.¹⁶ The sign of Swastika continued in the Islamic period, taking on various other forms. Gonbad-e-Sorkh of Maragheh represents one of the earliest examples of the Swastika pattern engraved in brickwork. This

⁸ Radu Petcu, *Swastika-shaped fibulae with horse-head decorations (Almgren 232) from the Roman period in Dobrudja (Moesia Inferior)*, "Studia Antiqua et Archaeologica", Vol. 25, 2019, No. 1, p. 115.

⁹ D. N. Jha (Ed.), *Contesting Symbols and Stereotypes. Essays on Indian History and Culture*, Dehli, AAKAR BOOKS, 2013, p. 103.

¹⁰ Micah Issitt, Carlyn Main, *Hidden Religion. The Greatest Mysteries and Symbols of the World's Religious Beliefs*, Santa Barbara – Denver – Oxford, ABC-CLIO, 2014, p. 160.

¹¹ Nusratullah Bakhturash, *op. cit.*, p. 148-150.

¹² Ali Sajjadi, هنر گچبری در معماری ایران [The Art of Plastering in Iranian Architecture], "Journal of Work", 1988, No. 25, pp. 194-214.

¹³ Ernest Herzfel, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

¹⁴ Seifollah Kambakhshfard, گورخمره‌های اشکانی [Parthian Tombs], Tehran: Academic Publishing Center, 2015.

¹⁵ Malihe Keshtgar, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

¹⁶ Jane Cooper, فرهنگ مصور نمادهای سنتی [Pictorial Culture of Traditional Symbols], Translated by Malihe Karbassian, Tehran: Farshad 2001, p. 145; دایره المعارف، روهین پاکباز، هنر: نقاشی، پیکره سازی و هنر [The Encyclopedia of Art: Painting, Sculpture and Graphic Art], Tehran: Contemporary Culture. 2008, p. 342.

paper seeks to answer the question: why was the Swastika sign used in the construction of Gonbad-e-Sorkh's tomb?

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Much research has been done on the Gonbad-e-Sorkh's building so far. For the first time in his travelogue, James Morier named it as "the tomb of one of the descendants of the Genghis Khan Mongol" and painted an image of it.¹⁷ Robert Byron is also one of the travelers who briefly mentioned this building.¹⁸ Walter Harris visited Maragheh in the 19th century. In his journey, he referred, in short, to the structure of the tomb towers at Maragheh.¹⁹ Antoin Sevriugin, a Russian-Georgian photographer who saw the Gonbad-e-Sorkh during the Qajar period, took some pictures of the monument.²⁰ Like him, Abdul Hussein Mirza Farmanfarma arrived in Maragheh in 1891, capturing images of the city's historic buildings, including the Gonbad-e-Sorkh; based on these, he wrote *The tomb of Minister Holako khan outside Maragheh*.²¹ André Godard, a French architect, and archaeologist described some of the architectural features of Gonbad-e-Sorkh.²² Other scholars, such as Hylen Brand, Arthur Pope, and Christie J. Wilson referred to this historical monument in their works. Isa Behnam, Nosratollah Moshkuti, Ismail Dibaj, Gholam Ali Hatam, Mohammad Ali Mokhlesi, Mohammad Yousef Kiani, and Sirus Kheiri are some of the Iranian scientists who have studied its structure and function. In 2001, in research on the towers of Maragheh's tombs, Manouchehr Arian underlined the astronomical use and purposes of these buildings. In 2008, Mehran Bahartash, one of Maragheh's scholars, published a book entitled *The Gonbad-e-Sorkh of Maragheh as a Symbol of the School of Architecture of Azerbaijan*.²³

¹⁷ James Morier, *A second journey through Persia, Armenia, and Asia Minor, to Constantinople, between the years 1810 and 1816; with a journal of the voyage by the Brazils and Bombay to the Persian Gulf: together with an account of the proceedings of His Majesty's embassy under His Excellency Sir Gore Ouseley*, London: Printed for Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1818, p. 290.

¹⁸ Robert Byron, *Road to Oxiana*, London, 1936, p. 68.

¹⁹ Walter Harris, *From Batum to Baghdad: Viâ Tiflis, Tabriz, and Persian Kurdistan*. Edinburgh – London, William Blackwood and Sons, 1896, p. 143-144.

²⁰ Asghar Mohammadzadeh, مراغه دار الملک [Dar al-Molk Maragheh], Tehran: Ouhadi Publications, 2018, p. 347.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Andre Godard, *The Art of Iran*, New York – Washington: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965, p. 300-303.

²³ Mehran Bahartash, گنبد سرخ نمادی از مکتب معماری آذربایجان [Gonbad-e-Sorkh is the Symbol of Azarbaijan School of Architecture], Tabriz: Azar Abadegan, 2008.

However, beyond the considerations and analysis developed by the specialists in the field²⁴, there is still no comprehensive study on the reasons for decorating the bricks of the Gonbad-e-Sorkh tomb with the Swastika symbol. Consequently, this research can be considered the first scientific step in this direction.

THE BUILDING OF GONBAD-E-SORKH

Maragheh is situated in the north-western part of Iran and the southern part of East Azerbaijan Province. Its famous historical monuments and especially the towers of the ancient tombs made it known as "the city of domes". The oldest remaining brick building in the city is the Gonbad-e-Sorkh. This dome has been recorded on the National Iranian Monuments List on 15 January 1931, No. 1310.²⁵ The Gonbad-e-Sorkh is located on Arjmandi Street, and 400 meters from Aghalar's Garden (See **Figure 2**). The area was considered to be one of the historic cemeteries of the town and the main burial area of the followers of the Tariqat Haidari in Maragheh. According to the remaining pictures of the Qajar period, the tomb and monuments (including the White Tomb) were formerly placed there, but no trace of them is visible today. The Gonbad-e-Sorkh is the oldest and most exquisite of the four tombs in Maragheh (See **Figure 3**). It derives its name from the red colour of the bricks used on the building's facade.²⁶ The monument has a quadrilateral layout and two floors. The inner chamber of the tomb consists of a square plan, each side measuring 5.95 meters. The main floor is covered with large rectangular slabs, over which is currently superimposed a layer of ordinary brick²⁷ (**Figure 3**).

Each of the Maragheh's towers has underground floors, which could be the burial places. While the memorial tombstone is in the upper room,²⁸ the lower part forms a square-shape basement (cellar), with a size of 5.55 meters.²⁹ In the middle of the **Dakhma** (Tower of Silence) stands a base of 65 cm wide and 90 cm

²⁴ Reza Rezalou, Yahya Iramloo, Asadollah Mirza Aghajani, مطالعه سیر تحول نقوش چلیپایی در تزئینات معماری دوره اسلامی ایران و زیبایی شناسی و نماد شناسی آن [A Study of the Evolution of the Swastika's Motifs in the Decoration of Iranian Islamic Architecture and its Aesthetics and Symbolism], "Journal of Fine Arts - Visual Arts", Vol. 18, 2013, No. 1, pp. 15-24.

²⁵ Ismail Dibaj, آثار و ابینه تاریخی آذربایجان [Works and Historical Background of Azerbaijan], Tehran: Imperial Publications, 1967, p. 88.

²⁶ Robert Hillenbrand, معماری اسلامی [Islamic Architecture], Translated by Iraj Etesam, Tehran: Urban Planning and Processing Company, 2000, p. 277.

²⁷ Gholam Ali Hatam, معماری اسلامی ایران در دوره سلجوقیان [Islamic Architecture of Iran during the Seljuks], Tehran: Academic Jihad Publications, 2000, pp. 132-133.

²⁸ Arthur Pope, Ackerman Phyllis, سیری در هنر ایران [A Survey of Iranian Art], Vol. 3, Tehran: Cultural and Scientific Publications, 2008, p. 1231.

²⁹ Mehran Bahartash, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

high, with brick arches on one side and sidewalls on the other, on which appear square or star-shaped signs. On the west side of the **Dakhma**, along its entrance, it can be seen as a window that opens to the outside, providing the enclosure with a flow of air and light.³⁰ The main front of the building faces North; its opposite side consists of a staircase with five, six, and seventh steps inside the doorway. The front is supported by strong half columns that adorn the corners of the building, creating a wide, luxurious border to the front door. The door itself is placed in a beautiful vault decorated with geometric engravings. The inscription is encircled by the Kufic script, as is the one at the top of the arch.³¹ The side and rear corners, between half columns, are decorated with two arches and the same inscription at the top of the main façade, surrounding the entire building. The lower parts of the building, above the half-columns, the angles, and above the pillars on which the arches are placed, are all of stone. The rest of the bricks are finely clad in delicacy, and their red colour reflects a few pieces of turquoise blue tile.³² The porch was also adorned with blue tiles, this practice of decorating the exterior wall with coloured tiles becoming popular.³³ It should be noted, however, that this porch has a special appearance in terms of decorating with blue tile, fine brickwork and stucco, Kufic brick inscriptions, and various paintings (See **Figure 4**). Gonbad-e-Sorkh is a miracle that lasts, like several other tombs from the early Middle Ages³⁴ and a reminiscence of the great political figures of the past.

BRICK DECORATION

Brick is one of the most important materials in the history of Iranian architecture and the main material in its Islamic era. Mehdi Makinejad drew attention to the important role played by climatic conditions in the erecting of edifices and preserving the beauty of architecture.³⁵ The buildings of the Seljuk period make it clear that the estimation of all structural problems, such as tensile, compressive, and even shear forces, have been done with such precision that the transfer of power in the bricks has resulted in a standstill.³⁶ Brick was mentioned as the dominant material

³⁰ Gholam Ali Hatam, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

³¹ Andre Godard, *op. cit.*, p. 301; Robert Byron, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

³² Andre Godard, *op. cit.*

³³ Christie J. Wilson, تاریخ صنایع ایران [The History of Iranian Industries], translated by Abdullah Faryar, Tehran: Farhangsara Publications, 1987, p. 160.

³⁴ Robert Hillenbrand, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

³⁵ Mehdi Makinejad, تاریخ هنر ایران در دوره اسلامی (تزیینات معماری) [History of Iranian Art in the Islamic Period (Architectural Decoration)], Tehran: Samt Publications, 2008, p. 94.

³⁶ Mahmood Golabchi, Dizaji Javani Aydin, فن‌شناسی معماری ایران [Iranian Architecture Technology], Tehran: Tehran University Publications, 2013, p. 346.

for all constructions such as caravansaries, ditches, royal, and public buildings, mosques, tombs, and tall bars of the mosques, in some cases forming their skeleton-frame. It was used also as a separate cover, proving, in different combinations, the good taste, and creativity of the builders.³⁷ The laying capacity of the bricks provided decorative facades, appropriate to the shape of the buildings.

The Gonbad-e-Sorkh of Maragheh and especially its columns on the front corners are recognized as the best example of brickwork in Iran³⁸ and the most beautiful in the world.³⁹ Inside the monument, the Swastika was widely used, especially the broken Swastika, which is specific to the architecture of the Seljuk period.⁴⁰ The brickwork of the building is decorated with the Swastika and is visible on the walls on all four sides. However, the Swastika on the south and west facades is particularly attractive and can rightly be considered as a masterpiece of the creation of this sign (See **Figure 5**). The columns of the Gonbad-e-Sorkh, which are located at the four corners of the building to provide its structural strength constitute also very beautiful brickwork. In the Red Dome, the angular columns consist of ten shapes of brick of which at least eight moulds perfectly aligned with the curved profile of the columns. The brickwork of the Red Dome columns bears some resemblance to the Brick Dome monument of Qazvin (See **Figure 6**). However, the designs implemented in the Red Dome are more elaborate and finer-grained than the Kharqan ones. The combination of a cross with a dome and the way they are composed and repeated reveal the uniqueness and accuracy of the work.

THE SWASTIKA AS SYMBOL OF DEATH AND IMMORTALITY

The architecture of the Islamic era contains many ornamental patterns, each of which has been used in most Islamic art proportional to the location and compatibility with the type of materials. Some of these motifs or signs are not limited to a particular period or place and do not apply to particular materials. Rather they can be seen on all buildings of the Islamic era, at different times and materials.⁴¹ The Swastika is the part of those pre-Islamic designs used in various buildings in the Islamic era. It could be found especially in tomb decorations, implying a special connection between the material and the spiritual. The application of the Swastika in these edifices is seen with significant complexity and in a variety of geometric

³⁷ Hussain Zomorshidi, مصالح‌شناسی سنتی [Traditional Meteorology], Tehran: Azadeh Publications, 2005, p. 16-17.

³⁸ Mahmood Golabchi, Dizaji Javani Aydin, *op. cit.*, p. 348.

³⁹ Christie J. Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

⁴⁰ Reza Rezalou, Yahya Iramloo, Asadollah Mirza Aghajani, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

patterns. Artists of the Islamic era were keen to use this sign in the brickwork decoration of tombs (See **Figure 7**).

The reason for using this sign in the tombs may be attributed to the thinking of ancient people. The Swastika was identified in the archaeological excavations of the hot area of Ardebil province inside the gravestone⁴² (See **Figure 8**). Thus, there is a meaningful relationship between the sign of the Swastika and the life after death.

In some religious, philosophical, and mythological traditions, the human soul after death is visualized as a bird flying through the sky. As the bird was depicted as a Swastika, this sign becomes a symbol of the soul. Based on the Islamic teachings, God is the Light of Being ("Allah is the light of the sky and earth"). Since the Swastika is a symbol of the sun and resuscitation – thus explaining the widespread use of the Swastika on the walls of tombs – the spiritual connection between the deceased soul with divine light and life is re-established. In Qur'an, verse 97 of Surat al-Nahl refers to the pure life that the righteous and faithful servants will receive after death by the permission of God who possesses the light and existence. It seems that in the Islamic era the architectural or carving artists decorated the tombs with the Swastika as a symbol of the soul, believing that the deceased will receive life again.⁴³

CONCLUSION

Tombs or tomb-buildings have been mentioned as an eternal home in some religious beliefs, especially in Islamic teachings. In these edifices, the deceased soul ascends to heaven and will be restored to life by God who is the light of existence. Such beliefs have been shared and strongly accepted by the Iranians from ancient times to the present day. Therefore, since the Swastika is a symbol of the spirit and reincarnation, a meaningful connection has been established between the deceased and their eternal life. The Gonbad-e-Sorkh is one of the Seljuk tomb building in Maragheh city, where the architect has attempted to make a spiritual tie between the spirit and revitalization of the Seljuk prince buried in the building, by making extensive use of the Swastika in brickwork.

⁴² Seifollah Kambakhshfard, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

⁴³ Mehdi Hassan, (چلیپا و چلیپا شکسته؛ نماد روح (نمونه‌ای در هم تنیده از این دو نقش در ایران) [The Swastika and the broken Swastika; the Symbol of the Soul (An Intertwined Example of these Two Motifs in Iran)]), Translated by Ahmad Hob Ali Mosvani, "Journal of Archeology and History", 1989, No. 2, p. 46-49.



Figure 1. The sign of Swastika in the pre-Islamic works of Iran⁴⁴




Figure 2. Geographical location of Gonbad-e-Sorkh by breaking down the map of Iran and East Azerbaijan Province⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Nusratullah Bakhturash, *op. cit.*, p. 150-160.

⁴⁵ P. Najafi, H. Navid, B. Feizizadeh, I. Eskandari, *Object-based satellite image analysis applied for crop residue estimating using Landsat OLI imagery*, in "International Journal of Remote Sensing", Vol. 39, 2018, No. 19, p. 6121.




Figure 3. *Gonbad-e-Sork of Maragheh*⁴⁶




Figure 4. *The porch of the Gonbad-e-Sork entrance*⁴⁷.

⁴⁶ Robert Hillenbrand, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

⁴⁷ Somayeh Khodaei, *بررسی و مقایسه تزیینات برج مقبره‌های سرخ و کبود مراغه* [Study and Comparison of Decorations on Maragheh's Red and Blue Tombs], an MA thesis in Visual Communication, Al-Zahra University, 2016, p. 95.





Figure 5. Executed Swastika in the brickwork of the western and southern facades of Gonbad-e-Sorkh⁴⁸.



**Figure 6. a) Brickwork with Swastika sign of the tomb tower of Kharghan
b) Brickwork part of Gonbad-e-Sorkh's column⁴⁹**

⁴⁸ Somayeh Khodaei, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

⁴⁹ **A)** Reza Rezalou, Yahya Iramloo, Asadollah Mirza Aghajani, *op. cit.*, p. 18; **B)** Somayeh Khodaei, *op. cit.*, p. 46.




Figure 7. The sign of Swastika in a number of monuments in Iran⁵⁰



Figure 8. Graves of Parthian period and cloths adorned with the sign of Swastika⁵¹

⁵⁰ Reza Rezalou, Yahya Iramloo, Asadollah Mirza Aghajani, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

⁵¹ Seifollah Kambakhshfard, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH AND THE CONCEPT OF WAR IN PREACHING TRADITIONS (THE EARLY 18th CENTURY)

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Abstract: *The paper describes the use of the concept of war in the works of the Russian Orthodox Church preachers using its imaginative and valuable characteristics. The authors reveal the essence and role of this concept in the Russian language culture in the context of ecclesiastical journalism of the early 18th century. Particular attention is paid to artistic means. The preachers used them to express their views on the events of the Great Northern War. The paper provides extensive coverage of the use of church propaganda to justify the causes of hostilities following the official position of the Russian government.*

Keywords: *Russia, Orthodox Church, concept, war, feat, political sermon, Great Northern War, Battle of Poltava, Peter the Great.*

Rezumat: *Biserica Ortodoxă Rusă și conceptul de război în tradiția predicilor (începutul secolului al XVIII-lea). Articolul analizează modul în care conceptul de război și caracteristicile sale imaginative și de valoare au fost utilizate în creațiile predicatorilor Bisericii Ortodoxe Ruse. Autorii dezvăluie esența și rolul acestui concept în cultura de limbă rusă în contextul publicisticii bisericești de la începutul secolului al XVIII-lea. O atenție deosebită este acordată mijloacelor artistice. Predicatorii le-au folosit pentru a-și exprima opiniile privitoare la evenimentele Marelui Război Nordic. Articolul prezintă o amplă descriere a felului în care a fost folosită propaganda bisericească pentru a justifica cauzele ostilităților, reflectând fidel poziția oficială a guvernului rus.*

INTRODUCTION

The socio-political phenomenon of war plays a significant role in Russian culture. The concept of war is one of the culturally significant concepts of the

Russian language. It is an important component of cultural knowledge, which is a complex formation of the mental level with specific characteristics. The intensive use of the concept of war is linked to the historical course of formation and development of the Russian state. Constant wars in Russia were the norm. Subsequently, this was the result of the completion of national texts by military vocabulary. The concept of war is voluminous and poly-structural. It is displayed in different language units. It has ethnic specificity and figurative, conceptual, and value characteristics. This concept structures the folklore discourse when it denotes social and ideological values. It also performs a discursive function.¹

The Russian Orthodox Church has shown a religious appreciation of the value component of the concept of war. A unique genre phenomenon that reveals the essence of the concept of war is the political sermons of the early 18th century. They were created during the reign of Peter the Great. They served to propagate military events and were rhetorical strategies for providentialism and the sacralisation of the monarch. The Russian Orthodox Church has often been called the "second power." The Emperor perceived Orthodoxy as a tool to support his absolute power and promote the Great Northern War. Peter the Great used a religious resource in world politics because it supported the Church. The Church was grateful for such support and justified the wars waged by the state.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Modern scholars such as Petr Shafirov², Maria Smorzhevskikh-Smirnova³,

¹ Юлия Эмер, *Фольклорный концепт: жанрово-дискурсивный аспект* [The Folklore Concept: the Genre and Discourse Aspect], in "Вестник Томского государственного университета", 2010, №1(9), p. 96.

² Пётр Шафиров, *Рассужденіе, какіе законные причины его царское величество Петръ Первыи, царь и повелитель Всероссійскій... къ начатию войны противъ Короля Карола 12, Шведского в 1700 имѣлъ...* (Адаптированный текст. Фрагменты оригинала. Комментарии) [Reasoning. What Legitimate Reasons his Royal Majesty Peter the Great, the Tsar and Sovereign of All-Russia, had to start the War against King Charles XII of Sweden in 1700: Adapted Text. Fragments of the Original. Comments], Москва, Пепеляев Групп, 2016, 248 с. <https://rarebook.mgimo.ru/book/073818/073818.pdf>

³ Мария Сморжевских-Смирнова, *Концепция войны у Феофана Прокоповича и официальная идеология Петровской эпохи* [The Concept of War according to Theophan Prokopovich and the Official Ideology of the Petrine Era], in *Лотмановский сборник: Международный конгресс "Семиотика культуры: культурные механизмы, границы, самоидентификации"*, Москва, О. Г. И., 2004, с. 899-911.

Savelyi Dudakov⁴ formulated the concept of war related to Peter the Great's figure. In his treatise "Reasoning. What Legitimate Reasons Peter the Great Had to Start the War against King Charles XII of Sweden in 1700", Petr Shafirov described the history of the Russian-Swedish relations. He outlined the official concept justifying the causes of the Great Northern War.

The paradigm of the cultural-linguistic concept belongs to several scientific disciplines. Therefore, the concept of war is reflected in the works of experts in various social sciences. The essence and role of this concept in different genre contexts have been studied by Russian philologists such as Oleh Golovan⁵, Lyudmila Venediktova⁶, Valentina Khoruzhenko⁷, Maria Potapchuk⁸, and Alexey Vishnyakov⁹. Foreign researchers, such as the British law scholar Christopher Greenwood¹⁰, Canadian political scientist Noemi Gal-Or and German political scientist Giesen¹¹, discussed the concept of war legally and politically. British researcher Peter Cooper¹² reviewed it in psychological terms.

⁴ Савелий Дудаков, *Петр Шафиров и другие...* [Petr Shafirov and Others...], Иерусалим-Москва, 2011, 432 с.

⁵ Олег Головань, *Семантико-ассоциативная структура концепта "война" (На материале произведений Р. Олдингтона и В. М. Гаршина)* [Semantic-Associative Structure of the Concept of War (Based on the Works by R. Aldington and V. M. Garshin)]: Автореф. дис. ... канд. филол. наук: 10.02.19, Барнаул, 2003, 19 с.

⁶ Людмила Венедиктова, *Концепт "Война" в языковой картине мира: Сопоставительное исследование на материале английского и русского языков* [The Concept of War in the Linguistic View of the World (a comparative study of English and Russian languages)]: Автореф. дис. ... канд. филол. наук: 10.02.20, Тюмень, 2004, 19 с.

⁷ Валентина Хоруженко, *Концепты "Война" и "Враг" в современной русскоязычной публицистике* [The Concepts of War and Enemy in Modern Russian-Language Journalism]: Автореф. дис. ... канд. филол. наук: 10.01.10, Москва, 2010, 20 с.

⁸ Мария Потапчук, *Концепт "война" в русском языке и культуре* [The Concept of War in the Russian Language and Culture], in "Челябинский гуманитарий", 2011, №4 (17), с. 48-52.

⁹ Алексей Вишняков, *Концепт войны и насилия во французском Новом Романе* [The Concept of War and Violence in French New Novel] in "Вестник военного университета", 2010, №1(21), с. 109-114.

¹⁰ Christopher Greenwood, *The Concept of War in Modern International Law*, in "International and Comparative Law Quarterly", 1987, Vol. 36, no. 2, p. 283-306.

¹¹ Noemi Gal-Or, Klaus-Gerd Giesen, *The Concept of War*, in "Peace Review: Journal of Social Justice", 2007, no. 19, p. 149-156.

¹² Peter Cooper, *The development of the Concept of War*, in "Journal of Peace Research", 1965, no. 1, p. 1-16.

Researchers Marina Kiseleva¹³, Alexander Grushkin¹⁴, and Apollon Kuz'min¹⁵ analysed the military aspect in the church sermons of the early 18th century in Russian science. Russian researcher Petr Morozov¹⁶, the American historians James Cracraft¹⁷, Gregory Freeze¹⁸, and Gary Marker¹⁹ have covered the activity and oeuvre of Theophan Prokopovich in the context of the ecclesiastical and political history of the Russian state.

METHODS AND SOURCES

A comprehensive approach to research is to consider the concept of war by combining data from various literary sources for its detailed and varied characterisation. The article deals with the texts of sermons of church authors such as Theophan Prokopovich, Gabriel Boužinskij, Stefan Yavorsky, and Dimitri Rostovsky. Works of Russian and foreign researchers are analysed.

The methodological basis of the study relies on the general scientific principles of complexity, consistency, and objectivity, which are implemented through the use of several methods. The study uses general scientific (analysis and synthesis) and unique research methods.

¹³ Марина Киселева, *Священная и гражданская история в контексте книжной барочной проповеди: к вопросу об истоках исторического знания в России* [Sacred and Civil History in the Context of the Baroque Book Sermon: on the Issue of the Origins of Historical Knowledge in Russia], in "VOX: Электронный философский журнал", 2014, №17, с. 1-24.

¹⁴ Александр Грушкин, *Публицистика Петровской эпохи* [Petrine Era Publicism], in "История русской литературы, т. III: Литература XVIII века. Ч. 1", Москва, Ленинград, Издательство АН СССР, 1941, с. 75-96.

¹⁵ Апполон Кузьмин, *Северная война в проповедях Феофана Прокоповича* [The Northern War in the Sermons of Theophan Prokopovich], in "От "Слова о полку Игореве" до "Тихого Дона". Сборник статей к 90-летию Н. К. Пиксанова", Ленинград, Наука, 1969, с. 274-281.

¹⁶ Петр Морозов, *Феофан Прокопович как писатель: очерк из истории русской литературы в эпоху преобразования* [Theophan Prokopovich as a Writer: Essays from the History of Russian Literature in the Era of Translocation], Санкт-Петербург, Типография В. С. Балашева, 1880, 402 с.

¹⁷ James Cracraft, *Did Theophan Prokopovich Really Write Pravda Voli Monarshei?*, in "Slavic Review", Vol. 40, 1981, No. 2, p. 173-193.

¹⁸ Gregory Ly Freeze, *Handmaiden of the State? The Church in Imperial Russia Reconsidered*, in "Journal of Ecclesiastical History", Vol. 36, 1985, Issue 1, p. 82-102.

¹⁹ Gary Marker, *Casting Mazepa's Legacy: Pylyp Orlyk and Theophan Prokopovich*, in "The Slavonic and East European Review", Vol. 88, 2010, No. 1/2, p. 110-133.

Linguistic and cultural analysis is the primary method of research. This approach made it possible to study the sermon texts carefully in the context of cultural linguistics. The historical-genetic method made it possible to study the linguistic-cultural concept of Peter the Great's war in the context of its development. The method of comparative analysis became ancillary to the study of the sermons of the Orthodox clergy. The use of the methods mentioned above and of the method of generalising historical findings made possible the presentation of materials consistently and clearly.

CULTURAL SITUATION "BETWEEN GOD AND TSAR"

At the beginning of the 18th century, the religious impact was still influential on Russian political culture. It coexisted with the intellectual innovations of Europe. Religion as an element of culture is a necessary condition in human life alongside others²⁰. Peter the Great's policy was aimed at softening the influence of the Orthodox Church on the public consciousness. He used this method of government to prevent social protests against authority.²¹ The central imperative for the citizen was a duty not only to the state, but also a commitment to God. The state authorities suggested the following actions intended to bring pride in the country's success: it instilled the Western culture, opened parochial schools, formed secular culture, established a focus on state values, and created a state emblem in the Baroque style. The culture of the states of Western Europe had it as a specific goal.²²

Peter the Great considered the Protestant maritime countries of Sweden, Netherland, and England as particularly useful models for Russia.²³ He renewed

²⁰ Евгения Хилтухина, *Идея "Всеединства" в контексте проблемы "Восток-Запад"* [The Idea of "Over Unity" in the Context of "East-West" Problem]: Дис. ... докт. филос. наук: 09.00.11, Санкт-Петербург, 2002, с. 112.

²¹ Александр Ростокинский, *Преступления экстремистской направленности как проявления субкультурных конфликтов молодёжных объединений: уголовно-правовые и криминологические проблемы* [Extremist crimes as manifestations of subcultural conflicts of youth associations: criminal law and criminological problems]: Автореф. ... дис. докт. юрид. наук: 12.00.08, Москва, 2011, с 38.

²² Руслан Мазаев, *Церковно-полемическая деятельность Стефана Яворского в контексте петровских преобразований* [Church-Polemical Activity of Stefan Yavorsky in the Context of Peter's Reforms], in "Вестник ПНИПУ. Культура. История. Философия. Право", 2018, №3, с. 86.

²³ Martin Aust, *Russland und Europa in der Epoche des Zarenreiches (1547–1917)*, in

the army on the European model, which made it possible to show Europe the excellent military capabilities of the state during the Great Northern War, in particular the Battle of Poltava.

Protestant teaching contained the idea of salvation through faith, not through action. Therefore, many monarchs of that time of war embraced it, and Peter the Great was no exception. The dogma of salvation through faith was created to legitimise the position of Protestants and their theology in Russia. Thus, Peter the Great attracted foreign experts into a country and justified the primacy of spiritual authority over secular.²⁴

Special attention was focused on the formation of the Russian diplomatic mission abroad. The main one was the permanent missions and consulates.²⁵ Russian diplomats played a significant role in establishing intercultural communication during the beginning of the Enlightenment. They were cultural mediators²⁶ because they had the opportunity to learn about new books, scientific and technical inventions, latest trends, they bought works of art, organised the resettlement of foreign colonists and talented artisans in Russia. Such international business visits had influenced public opinion in Russia and abroad.

Thus, the political message was successfully embodied in the genre of church preaching. Previously, the sermon was an oral text that solemnly spoke to the highest church hierarchy in front of the elite of the Russian Empire. In the early 18th century, it was transformed into a published text of mass use, combining biblical imagery and panegyric praise of the monarch. Despite the excellent analogies used, the eulogy was read literally. They were an additional source of sacralisation of the ruler.

The most famous preacher of the Petrine era was Theophan Prokopovich, theologian, author of over 70 nonfiction works and one of the most important historical and literary figures of his time. The sermon language of Archbishop Theophanes is a combination of Russian and Church Slavonic. It contains foreign

<http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/europe-and-the-world/knowledge-transfer/martin-aust-russia-and-europe-1547-1917> (Accessed on 15.02.2020).

²⁴ Руслан Мазаев, *op. cit.*, с. 92.

²⁵ Мария Петрова, *Международные отношения и дипломатия XVIII века в современной российской историографии* [International Relations and Diplomacy of 18th Century in Contemporary Russian Historiography], in *25 лет внешней политике России: сб. материалов X Конвента РАМИ*, Москва, 2017, Т. 3, с. 98-113.

²⁶ Евгения Хилтухина, *Человек – как явление востока и запада* [Human as a Phenomenon of East and West], in “Большая Евразия: развитие, безопасность, сотрудничество. Ежегодник”, 2018, Вып. 1, Ч. 1, с. 552-553.

words due to the influence of Latin prose.²⁷ As an ideologist of the reforms of Peter the Great, he authored the concept of reforming the Church and State into a unified system of power, governed by the Russian monarch.²⁸ Theophan Prokopovich laid the foundations of the propaganda doctrine of God's choice of tsars²⁹ in his sermon "About the power and honour of the tsar, which is established by God in the world, and how people should honour and obey tsars."

Theophan also had his theory of war. He believed that war was a disease. If someone gets sick, one should address it reasonably. The preacher used a medical metaphor. He compared the fighting in his country to a disease that struck internal organs. Theophanes said it was more challenging to treat an internal illness than "damage the upper body."³⁰ Therefore, he recommended an offensive tactic, suggested fighting in the enemy's territory. The theologian warned that in the event of a win, there should be no rest because the enemy always wants to reclaim what he lost. He reinforced his words with proverbs: "To save the vanquished is no less glorious than to conquer it."

Theophan Prokopovich, Stefan Yavorsky, and Gabriel Buzhinsky represented the position of the Russian Orthodox Church. They had their opinions on the Northern War. For example, in *The Word of Commitment to the Birthday of Grand Duke Peter Petrovich*, Theophan claimed that the Swedes had taken the shores of Ingria and Karelia from Russia. In a sermon on the Nystad Treaty, he stressed that Russia had previously been isolated from the maritime routes, from "honest communication with the better world."³¹ As a result of this war, it received land and water routes to other states.

Preachers paid great attention to moral factors in explaining the cause of the war in the sermons. Theophan spoke about the 'pride' of the Swedes, who "boast and humiliate the peoples" to arouse listeners' anger, filled with religious

²⁷ Анатолий Кашеваров, *Церковная проповедь в XVIII – первой половине XIX века: особенности эволюции* [Church Sermon in 18th – first half of 19th Century: the Features of Evolution], in "Научно-технические ведомости", 2019, Т. 10, №1, с. 11.

²⁸ Антон Карташев, *Очерки по истории Русской Церкви. В 2-х томах* [Essays on the History of the Russian Church. In 2 volumes], Москва, Терра, 1992, с. 117

²⁹ Joachim Klein, *Похвала властителю: Панегирическая поэзия и русский абсолютизм, Praising the Ruler: Panegyric Poetry and Russian Absolutism*, in "Slověne", Vol. 2, 2015, No. 42, p. 42.

³⁰ Игорь Еремин, *Феофан Прокопович. Сочинения* [Theophan Prokopovich. Works], Москва-Ленинград, Издательство Академии наук СССР, 1961, с. 116. http://elibrary.gnpbu.ru/text/prokopovich_sochineniya_1961/go,76;fs,1/

³¹ *Ibid.*, с. 107.

humility. According to Theophan Prokopovich, the Swedes considered the Russians weak and primitive: "...our neighbours cannot apologise for pride, because they have suffered from their arrogance (...) Moreover, they treated us as weak and barbaric."³²

Russian theologians attached great importance to the army. For example, Theophan Prokopovich noted that the old rifle troops had turned from defenders to ferocious enemies. If they had not been eliminated, it "would have been some gangrene that would have harmed her own body and not that of another."³³ Theophan called for the creation of a modern army with the latest weapons: "regular army, monstrous artillery, and navy."³⁴ He thanked God that he had inspired the king to create naval forces. In *A commendable word ...* Theophan Prokopovich spoke about the victory of the Russian fleet on the island of Grenham. He stated "...as the monarchy is contiguous to the united sea, how is it not dishonourable for her not to have a fleet? No village in the world stands over water and has no boats. Furthermore, a great and strong monarchy, taking hold of the sea in the midday and midnight and having no ships, even if there is no need for them, is dishonourable and reproachful".³⁵

Theophane used metaphors widely, calling 'wise commanders' and 'invincible warriors' as 'strong pillars' and 'adamantine shields'. "They are not worth a short word, but eternal glorification. The old man should bless you, and the youth should look at your image, and you should honour the present generation and glorify the last family,"³⁶ he noted about the heroes of the battles on Grenham Island. These words of the preacher help the reader gain a deep philosophical understanding of heroism and the mechanism of how ideas about the immortality of the state's deed of glory develop.

The concept of war in the *Praiseworthy Word ...* is closely intertwined with the concept of a feat characterised by such features as a present danger, lack of fear, and mode of action. Lyudmila Venediktova³⁷ proposes to consider the feat as a compulsory element for different situations. For example, the most common situation for people is their duty to save someone or something. A person ignores the danger and even despises it during the deed for the sake of his native land.

³² *Ibid.*, c. 51.

³³ *Ibid.*, c. 116.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, c. 51.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, c. 124.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, c. 112.

³⁷ Людмила Венедиктова, *op. cit.*

Sometimes this action becomes a significant risk to one's own life. Sometimes people lose their lives. At the same time, positive features such as nobility, power, wisdom, self-confidence, and admiration are revealed.

Modern Russian society has an evolving attitude toward heroism. Roman Krasilnikov³⁸ suggested that changes in value systems be considered. Nowadays, the change leads to the priority of some topics and loss of interest in others. A peculiar feature of the modern Russian mentality is the disregard for heroism as a cultural phenomenon. The author notes that this phenomenon is now gradually disappearing from the arts (including literature) and quite often becomes a subject of debate in science. However, twenty years ago, it was considered one of the pillars of ideology despite the efforts of the state.

The lexeme 'victory' was particularly often mentioned in the sermons by the bishop Stephan Yavorsky. He praised the triumph of the Russian army in the Battle of Poltava by delivering three sermons. They had a poetic form, were created according to outdated rules of scholasticism, and contained abstractions and allegories. The meaning of the lexeme "victory" according to Stephan Yavorsky extends the conceptual scope and includes allegorical comparisons and metaphors. For example, the sermon *"The stone that crushed the idol of Nebuchadnezzar, that is, Peter the Great, Tsar of All-Russia, who defeated the King of Sweden victoriously"* expands the meaning of the lexeme 'victory' by allegorically comparing one of the biblical texts to the word 'stone' (i.e. Peter the Great). The Swedish army represented the idol of Nebuchadnezzar (the head of the idol represents the king, the arms and muscles represent the Swedish ministers, the copper belly denotes generals and officers, and the iron legs were the infantry).

Stephan Yavorsky's sermon *The Word of Victory in Poltava* consists entirely of allegorical comparisons and metaphors. The speech describes a story in which winter (the metaphor of war) gave way to an auspicious time, summer (a victory given by God). The preacher's semantic field of victory involves seems of the humiliation of the vanquished enemy and the praise of the victor. The author described Charles XII as "a brutal beast, the King of Sweden, who travels with his mouth open and wants to capture Russia". Peter the Great was described as "Samson, our sovereign king, blocked the lion's mouth and tore the Swedish lion."³⁹

³⁸ Роман Красильников, *К проблеме героического в теории и истории литературы* [On the Problem of Heroism in the Theory and History of Literature], in "Вестник Московского университета. Серия 9. Филология", 2010, №2, с. 70-80.

³⁹ Апполон Кузьмин, *op. cit.*, с. 276.

Gabriel Boužinskij, the Bishop of Ryazan, one of the most famous bishops of the first third of the 18th century, a writer and translator,⁴⁰ proposed a similar attitude to the Great Northern War. He paid particular attention to the lexeme 'victory'. For example, in *Word about the seizure of Nöteborg ...*, G. Boužinskij wrote that "the Swedish lion was stricken the same as David struck Goliath with a stone". This analogy means a confrontation between Peter the Great and the King of Sweden. The Russian monarch "breaks the lock with this stone without a key" and opens the door to "precious treasures": Karelia, Ingria, Livonia, Estonia, and Finland.⁴¹

Other church authors claimed that he was the God who won the battle. This allegation contradicted Teophan's view. They proposed the Old Testament idea of the struggle of good and evil, the struggle of God-elect men (in this case, the Russians) with wicked 'tribes'. The Swedes were not enemies because they seized the land, but because they were 'dishonest', 'proud', "trumpeted about capturing the holy church."⁴²

In one of the *Words ...*, Theophan Prokopovich compared the Swedes with a bear, who tasted blood and became even fiercer, while Russia was compared to the endless sea in which the Swedish army sank.⁴³ There are a large number of epithets (attribution phrases) in the works: sad deck, sweet hopes, cruel war, the fire of war, adamant shield, trembling escape, icy hearts, dumb traitor and the rest.

The language of Theophan Prokopovich's sermons was characterised by great originality, for example, biblical idioms ('high muscle', 'blood is crying' combined with famous proverbs "kick against the pricks", "Krakow was not built at once", "not ugly by the body, but marvellous by deeds"). If the religious preachers previously had often compared the church to a ship, Theophan was the first who compared new Russia, not the church, to a ship. At the same time, Theophan's helmsman was not Christ, but Peter the Great.⁴⁴ Gabriel Boužinskij

⁴⁰ Алексей Бландов, *К биографии епископа Гавриила (Бужинского) – проповедника и переводчика первой трети XVIII в.* [On the Biography of Bishop Gabriel (Boužinskij), Preacher and Translator of the First Third of the 18th Century], in "Христианское чтение", 2013, №1, с. 8-24.

⁴¹ Евгений Петухов, *Проповеди Гавриила Бужинского (1717-1727) (Продолжение)* [The Sermons of Gabriel Boužinskij (1717-1727) (Continued)], in "Ученые записки Императорского Юрьевского университета", 1900, №4, с. 464-465.

⁴² Игорь Еремин, *op. cit.*, с. 35.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, с. 35.

⁴⁴ Апполон Кузьмин, *op. cit.*, с. 274-281.

also used the same metaphor in *Word about the seizure of Nöteborg ...*, calling Peter the Great "the pious monarch" and "the wisest helmsman."⁴⁵

Demetrius, Metropolitan of Rostov, another preacher of the Peter the Great era, made a significant contribution to the development of the concept of war. Demetrius Rostovsky believed that war and weapons were contrary to God's commandments. He classified wars as "righteous" and "unjust." He noted that the war was justified historically and is righteous from the state's point of view. The war is waged with good intentions, not so much to defend itself, but to protect all the native land from the oncoming enemies. Demetrius Rostovsky described Russia's war with Sweden exactly like this type of conflict.⁴⁶

However, the number of court sermons increased around the second half of the 18th century during the reign of Elizabeth Petrovna.⁴⁷ Publication of court sermons on political topics became obligatory. Political issues only confirmed the 'cult' of Peter the Great as a political constant in the Russian political mindset.⁴⁸ Preachers formed the Russian exception to Western reforms. The reforms were presented as a manifestation of the sacred wisdom of the monarch.

CONCLUSIONS

The authors of religious sermons used a wide variety of linguistic tools to include the concept of war in the linguistic picture of the world. Preachers actively utilised various metaphors, allegories, epithets, proverbs, and idioms, which allowed a clearer revelation of their attitude towards the phenomenon of war in the example of the Battle of Poltava.

For example, in metaphorical terms, the concept of war is represented in church sermons as metaphors for animals and nature. This approach is one of the characteristic features of the Russian-speaking culture. The preachers of the age of Peter the Great did not explain the emergence of wars by the mystical manifestations of the 'will of God' but used concrete economic and political reasons.

⁴⁵ Евгений Петухов, *op. cit.*, с. 465.

⁴⁶ Марина Киселева, *op. cit.*, с. 10.

⁴⁷ Ekaterina Kislova, *Sermons and Sermonizing in 18th-Century Russia: At Court and Beyond*, in "Slovene", 2014, No. 2, p. 175-193.

⁴⁸ Константин Бугров, *Религия и политика в Российском XVIII веке. Сквозь призму жанра церковной проповеди* [Religion and politics in Russian 18th century. Through the prism of genre of church sermon], in *Пивоваровские чтения. Синтетическая парадигма: наука, философия, религиоведение: сборник материалов конференции*, Екатеринбург, Деловая книга, 2019, с. 160-162.

Thus, the sermons of the early 18th century played a significant role in changing the value component of war. The Orthodox Church has formed the notion of 'justice of war' and 'sacred heroism' for the sake of the Motherland. In this way, the Church has contributed to the formation of the Russian national consciousness.*

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BUKOVINIAN UKRAINIANS IN THE PAGES OF THE BIWEEKLY MAGAZINE THE “DNIEPER WAVES” (1910-1913)

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Abstract. *The study reveals the importance of the illustrated biweekly magazine “Dnieper Waves” (1910-1913) for the national revival of Ukraine, at the beginning of the 20th century. The pages of the magazine hosted materials related to the complex history of Bukovina, the socio-economic, political and cultural evolution of the province. The authors of this study analyze aspects of identity, the education and prints regarding the Bukovinian Ukrainians, civic, professional, scientific or cultural societies. Moments from the evolution of the school system, the electoral campaigns, the involvement of young people in public life, the activities of the leading figures of the province are also presented. The articles published in the biweekly “Dnieper Waves” reflect the relations between the Ukrainians of Dnieper Ukraine (part of the Russian Empire) and the Ukrainians in Galicia and Bukovina (countries of the Austro-Hungarian Empire). The authors point out that the periodical “Dnieper Waves”, although published in the city of Ekaterinoslav of Dnieper Ukraine, placed the illustration of everyday life in Bukovina at the center of its editorial policy.*

Keywords: *Ukrainian press, the “Dnieper Waves”, Bukovina, national life, Chernivtsi.*

Rezumat: *Ucrainenii bucovineni în paginile bilunarului ucrainean „Valurile Niprului” (1910-1913). Studiul relevă importanța bilunarului ilustrat „Valurile Niprului” (1910-1913) pentru renașterea națională a Ucrainei, la începutul secolului al XX-lea. Paginile revistei au găzduit materiale legate de istoria complexă a Bucovinei, de evoluția socio-economică, politică și culturală a provinciei. Autorii acestui studiu analizează aspecte ale identității, educația și tipăriturile privitoare la ucrainenii bucovineni, societățile civice, profesionale, științifice sau culturale. De asemenea, sunt prezentate momente din evoluția sistemului școlar, campaniile electorale, implicarea tinerilor în viața publică, activitățile liderilor de marcă ai provinciei. Prin prisma articolelor publicate în bilunarul „Valurile Niprului” sunt reflectate relațiile dintre ucrainenii din Ucraina nipreană (parte a Imperiului Rus) și ucrainenii din Galiția și Bucovina (țări ale Imperiului Austro-Ungar). Autorii evidențiază faptul că, deși publicat în orașul Ekaterinoslav din*

Ucraina nipreană, periodicul „Valurile Niprului” a pus în centrul politicii sale editoriale ilustrarea vieții cotidiene în Bucovina.

INTRODUCTION

Ukrainian culture developed just before the First World War in contradiction to the anti-Ukrainian policy of the Russian autocracy.¹ Due to the efforts of an advanced and nationally conscious intellectual class, Ukrainian culture is currently accelerating certain progress on the difficult path to national renewal. The revolutionary upsurge at the beginning of the twentieth century, the growth of the level of political and national self-awareness of the population greatly contributed to the development of Ukrainian culture, the intensification of spiritual life, the emergence of new newspapers and magazines.²

The “Дніпрові Хвилі” [Dnieper Waves] magazine has become a unifying factor among the Ukrainian intellectual class, discussing several issues of Ukrainian studies on its pages. It was the publications of the materials on the history of Ukraine, the national liberation movement, Ukrainian language and literature that led to the closure of the magazine.

The “Dnieper Waves” is a Ukrainian illustrated magazine that has been published from October 1, 1910, to December 25, 1913, in Ekaterinoslav/Katerynoslav (now Dnieper). During this period 72 issues of the edition had been printed. The official editor-in-chief of the “Dnieper Waves” was Kuz’ma Kotov (1855-1938), a cultural and public figure, writer, and member of the Prosvita society. Mykola Bykov, Kost’ Hay-Shkoda, Oleksiy Hladchenko, Dmytro Doroshenko, Liubov Zhyhmaylo, Andrian Kaschenko, Kuz’ma Korzh, Kuz’ma Kotov, Tryphon Krasnopil’sky, Tykhon Mitrus, Ivan Nechuy-Levytsky, Petro Perekyd’ko, Sofiya Rusova, Vasyl’ Stepovy, Ivan Truba, Dmytro Yavornytsky and many more have contributed to the pages of the publication. The magazine reflected a national cultural life of Ukrainians, published literary and historical works.

In the first issue of the “Dnieper Waves” (1910), in the appeal to readers, it

¹ Анатолій Коцур (ред.), *Історія України: Курс лекцій* [History of Ukraine. Course of Lectures], Корсунь-Шевченківський, 2020, с. 365; Григорій Казьмирчук (ред.), *Історія України: Курс лекцій* [History of Ukraine. Course of Lectures], Київ, Логос, 2010, с. 339-340.

² Володимир Литвин, В’ячеслав Мордвінцев, Анатолій Слюсаренко, *Історія України* [History of Ukraine], Київ, Знання, 2008, с. 630.

is emphasized that there is an urgent need to launch a magazine "in the native language which would ... awake consciousness of local Ukrainian people and make them aware of why their native land is joyful or feels sorrow and what happens in the home land, that would unite fellow countrymen in the name of work for the good of the native land."³

The magazine editors clearly defined the main task, which was "to invest its share in the great work on the cultural revival of our people. We believe that a national basis, a ground of a wide free development of the spiritual forces are a key that will enable our Ukrainian people to embark on a path of genuine progress and join the world's family of educated and cultural nations. Therefore, we will assert and defend the right of our people to attend school to study science in a mother tongue ... we will defend the rights of our language to be widely used in public life..., our people earned this right, having been perpetuating our language for many centuries amidst all the misfortunes of historical calamity".⁴

The key tasks to cover were "the past of our land ..., so that the memory about glorious knights who stood up for native land, and at the same time for the whole Christian European world, protecting from invasions..."⁵ lives on.

The editorial board assured readers that the publication would put the most effort to ensure that "the magazine could carry the national flag, streamed to mark our national identity, and therefore, every conscious Ukrainian should regard it as a sacred duty to support and distribute our single magazine on Dnieper Ukraine".⁶

In the appeal to readers, authors emphasize the significance of "Ukrainian word and writing", the importance of the "Dnieper Waves", which should become "the swallow that heralds a national revival of our Steppe Ukraine and a lush flowering of its enlightenment and culture."⁷

Among the main thematic areas of publications there were the following: "1) articles on public affairs; 2) poems and stories; 3) popular scientific articles (about agriculture, industry, old times in Ukraine, monuments of our antiquity, etc.); 4) articles about Ukrainian literature and education; 5) recent news from Ukrainian life in our country and Galicia; 6) news of our literature; 7) contributions; 8) editorial correspondence."⁸

³ Катеринослав 1 Жовтня 1910 р. [Katerynoslav October 1, 1910], in "Дніпрові хвилі", Катеринослав, 1910, № 1, с. 1.

⁴ *Ibid.*, с. 2.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Приймається передплата на 1912 рік "Дніпрові Хвилі" [Subscriptions to the "Dnieper

Within a short time, the biweekly publication had gained the sympathy and support of the wide Ukrainian audience, being one of the best regional Ukrainian publications.

Among the significant thematic range of materials published on the pages of the “Dnieper Waves”, the topic of Ukrainians from Austrian Galicia and Bukovina occupied a prominent place. While Galicia was seen as Galician Ukraine, Bukovina was observed as a land inhabited by Ukrainians (along with other ethnic groups) who led an active national life, although the magazine, as previously mentioned, was issued in Katerynoslav and was aimed at readers of Dnieper Ukraine, that is, sub-Russian Ukraine.

CULTURE AND SPIRITUALITY

The cultural life of Bukovina is reflected in the pages of the “Dnieper Waves”. In one of the fundamental articles No. 22 (1911), it is noted that in every village there is a reading hall with libraries where magazines are received, books are read.⁹ Reading halls are mostly attended by the older generation.

The magazine draws readers' attention to the fact that “it is very easy to enter the gymnasium in Chernivtsi because the curriculum of rural schools is the same as the urban ones. In addition, there are preparatory classes for rural pupils in Kitsman, where children are accepted after the third grade of a public school. After completing six grades in the countryside, one can go to a teacher's seminary.”¹⁰

Later in the article, we read that most of the rural boys study in vocational institutions of Chernivtsi, Kitsman, Vyzhnytsia, and Siret. Most of the students, who are over 200, attend Chernivtsi vocational institution. They are all supported by the society “People's House”. Children's education is also financed by independent societies such as “School Education”. The state assists pupils of teacher's gymnasium; in return “they are obliged to work as a national teacher for 6 years. There are 30 out of 40 students in a class who receive assistance. The assistance is distributed in such a way that no one is offended so that everyone will get it equally, both Moldovans, Ukrainians and Germans.”¹¹

We learn from the article what is the most difficult in the church field of

Waves” are accepted], in “Дніпрові хвилі”, 1911, № 23-24, с. 328.

⁹ *Дещо про Буковину та про життя буковинських українців* [Some things about Bukovina and life of Bukovinian Ukrainians], in “Дніпрові хвилі” 1911, № 22, с. 295-298.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, с. 296.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

Bukovina. There is a lack of priests. A boy, who wants to become a priest, has to finish gymnasium, graduate from the theological faculty (theological academy). It is noted that at the theological faculty of Chernivtsi University, "there are two theological departments, one of which has the Ukrainian language of teaching, and the other has the Moldovan".¹²

The article by Nechuy-Levytskyi, *Nationalists' Fabrications about Ukrainians*,¹³ presents the discussion on Ukrainian culture and language with a Russian politician, professor Peter Struve. It is known that Peter Struve considered Galicia and Bukovina to be a space for "moral conquests" that would form the basis for the annexation of these lands to "Great Russia". He appealed to a "firm policy of bringing the region closer to Russia," "to establish education in Russian at schools," and others. He named the Ukrainian movement on these lands "cultural separatism". In contrast to the interpretation of Peter Struve, Ivan Nechuy-Levytsky wrote: "In Austria, the government is not afraid of national identity among many nations of their state and they are not in terror of their lives."¹⁴ He uses Bukovina and Chernivtsi as an example, where representatives of different nationalities live tolerantly, where Ukrainian, German, and other languages are used in schools, gymnasiums, "just like any other language in the world, even languages of small nations, like Portuguese, Serbian, or languages of non-state nations, such as Irish, Celtic, and Occitan; literature will not be an obstacle for them, but rather it will contribute to the wide development of culture."¹⁵

In this controversy, Bukovina is also mentioned in the context of Peter Struve's imposing on the idea that "all-Russian culture captured Ukraine to such an extent that Ukraine is said to exist and live high and dry in the world only by virtue of the Russian trade, capital and money that dominate everywhere."¹⁶ The examples of Chernivtsi, Suceava, Lviv, the villages of Bessarabia prove as such.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

The magazine does not remit its attention to the political life of the region. Hence, in the publication, it is written: "Elections to the regional diet are now taking place in Bukovina. This is the first election to this diet on the basis of an

¹² *Ibid.*, с. 297.

¹³ Іван Нечуй-Левицький, *Вигадки націоналістів про українців* [Nationalists' Fabrications about Ukrainians], in "Дніпрові хвилі", 1912, № 13-14, с. 189-197.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, с. 197.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, с. 190.

equal, general, and secret ballot. A quantity of embassy mandates in Bukovina is fairly divided among all the nations of the region. On the first day of the elections, 6 Ukrainian deputies to the Diet were elected. On 15 April, another 6 Ukrainian members will be elected.”¹⁷ The results of these elections are discussed in No. 13-14 for 1911. The magazine notes that the Ukrainians “had the biggest difficulty to compete with local ‘true Russian people’, Moscophiles. Ukrainians received all the 16 deputies’ mandates. Neither of Moscophiles was selected anywhere. 15 belong to the National Democratic Party and 1 is the Social Democrat out of the Ukrainian deputies.”¹⁸ The same edition explains that “the Moscophiles are a very harmful party. They stand for Moscow and they seek Ukrainian people of the West (Galicia and Bukovina. – A/N) to neglect their mother tongue and start using the Moscow language. These are traitors who sell their conscience and soul for money ... No matter how hard Moscophiles tried, they threw away their money, drank much vodka to appease voters, yet they failed.”¹⁹

When speaking of a multiparty system in Bukovina, the “Dnieper Waves” emphasized that each of the parties had its newspaper. The national democratic party issues the “Народний голос” [People’s Voice], the radical party issues the “Громадянин” [Citizen], the socialist party issues the “Боротьба” [Fight], etc. Besides, teachers of the region publish their newspaper “Каменярі” [Stonemasons], preceptors issue the “Ранок” [Morning], high school teachers issue “Наша школа” [Our School].”²⁰

On the front page of № 22 of the “Dnieper Waves” in 1912, the editorial revealed that the youth of Chernivtsi and Lviv went to demonstrations against Mos-cophilian institutions, told about the closure of the Ukrainian club in Kyiv, demolition of Ukrainian bookstores by unknown people, destruction of windows and intimidation of Ukrainian figures.²¹

NATIONAL LIFE

The issue 20-21 of the “Dnieper Waves” (1911) contains a voluminous

¹⁷ *На Буковині* [In Bukovina], in “Дніпрові хвилі” 1911, № 12, с. 179.

¹⁸ *На Буковині* [In Bukovina], in “Дніпрові хвилі” 1911, № 13-14, с. 202.

¹⁹ М. Ж., *Галицько-українські справи* [Galician-Ukrainian Affairs], in “Дніпрові хвилі”, 1911, № 16-17, с. 222.

²⁰ *Дещо про Буковину та про життя буковинських українців* [Some things about Bukovina and life of Bukovinian Ukrainians], in “Дніпрові хвилі”, 1911, № 22, с. 298.

²¹ *Недавно всю Україну облетіла звістка* [Recently news have spread around Ukraine], in “Дніпрові хвилі”, 1912, № 22, с. 1.

article on *Some things about Bukovina and life of Bukovinian Ukrainians*.²² The editorial board of the magazine reminded readers of the Bukovinian excursionists' visit to Katerynoslav and decided to "tell something about the region of Bukovina, the lives of our brothers there and the way they achieved what they have now."²³ The publication is based on materials written by the Ukrainian literary critic, historian, folklorist V. Domanytskyi, previously published by Kyiv "Prosvita", and also the narratives of cultural activist, philologist V. Simovych, who was in a delegation to visit Katerynoslav in 1911.

In the article, a total area of Bukovina is equal to two counties of the Katerynoslav governorate. It is home to 800,000 people, 300,000 of whom are Ukrainians. There are also "Moldovans (henceforth on the pages of the magazine it is written «Moldovans», but what is meant here is «Romanians»). This is an imprint of the tsarist rule, which aimed to capture new territories, and the idea was imposed on public opinion that not all the Moldovans are within the Russian Empire (at that time only Bessarabia), they should be «reunited.»– A/N.), Germans, Jews, Poles, Russian Old Believers".²⁴ It is noted that "although many peoples live here, they all have their rights, they all have schools in their language".²⁵ When doing a short excursus to the history, it is noted that in the land that was a part of the Moldavian Principality, "dukes (also called voivodes) wrote charters in Ukrainian, church services were in Slavic with Ukrainian pronunciation, and people in princely courts spoke Ukrainian... And it had lasted from the 15th to the 18th centuries".²⁶ For some time "Bukovina had been united with Galicia, but for all the good it did, yet vice versa it brought bad luck because the Poles began to polonize our cities and villages".²⁷

Attention is drawn to the fact that national life in Bukovina was propelled at the end of 19 – the beginning of 20 centuries due to social and political activist Stepan Smal'-Stotsky: "He stopped by in every village, advised every man whether he was a professor at Chernivtsi University or was elected to the Bukovinian diet".²⁸ Stepan Smal'-Stotsky was notable for his great activity, especially as a deputy in the

²² *Дещо про Буковину та про життя буковинських українців* [Some Things About Bukovina and Life of Bukovinian Ukrainians], in "Дніпрові хвилі", 1911, № 20-21, с. 277-281.

²³ *Ibid.*, с. 277.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*, с. 278.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*

Vienna parliament in 1911-1918. It is noted that in Vienna Bukovina was represented by "14 deputies (5 Ukrainians, 5 Moldovans, 4 Germans and Jews".²⁹

No. 17 of the "Dnieper Waves" (1912) refers to the exhibition of folk crafts in Kolomyia.³⁰ It is reported that Bukovinian Hutsuls brought "splendid folk embroideries, tablecloths, carpets, folk clothing, various carvings, ceramics and many other objects of domestic crafts."³¹ It is noted that many craftsmen from "Russian Ukraine", deputies of the Ukrainian diet and parliament arrived at the exhibition.

SOCIOECONOMIC LIFE

Economic affairs in the villages of Bukovina are described in the No. 22 (1911), in which the article entitled *Some Things about Bukovina and Life of Bukovinian Ukrainians* was published.³² First and foremost, it reveals the Raiffeisen loan and savings cash desk schemes. The article stated that in 1911 more than 300 of them were created in Bukovina. All the cash desks are united in the (on the model of a bank) "Peasant Cashier" in Chernivtsi, which provides cheap loans for peasants. "Peasant cashier" has departments: commodity, dairy, seed (for farmers), etc.³³ Consequently, members of the cash desks buy cheap agricultural machinery through the commodity department, milk, butter, cheese is sold through the dairy department all over the Bukovinian region. People also started to sell dairy products out of Austria for the first time. In Bukovina, they established shops called "Mutual Benefits", grazing societies, *гамазей* [hamazei] (buildings for storing grain, flour. – A/N.)

CIVIL SOCIETY MOVEMENT

In the second issue of the "Dnieper Waves" of 1910, under the heading *From Galician Ukraine*, the material on the creation of the "Ukrainian Medical Society" was published in Lviv, where we find valuable information about the activities of the society committee, in particular its active members from Chernivtsi, Erast Burachynsky and Yevhen Huzar.³⁴ It was they who meticulously formulated a

²⁹ *Ibid.*, c. 280.

³⁰ *З галицької України* [From Galician Ukraine], in "Дніпрові хвилі", 1912, № 17, c. 240.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Дещо про Буковину та про життя буковинських українців* [Some things about Bukovina and life of Bukovinian Ukrainians], in "Дніпрові хвилі", 1911, № 22, c. 295-298.

³³ *Ibid.*, c. 295.

³⁴ *З галицької України* [From Galician Ukraine], in "Дніпрові хвилі", 1910, № 2, c. 37.

statute of the society and managed to achieve an official registration of the society through the Ukrainian Parliamentary Club and the Vice-President of the Austrian Parliament Yulian Romanchuk.

In the same issue, a special place is given to the results of the 25-year teaching and public activity of the professor of Chernivtsi University, Stepan Smal'-Stotsky. In particular, it is said that "in Bukovina, Smal'-Stotsky pioneered in political and economic work.

He travelled around villages and organized *the viches* (public meetings), established reading halls, pawnshops, general shops, the «Sich» societies, issued books, published a great political newspaper «Bukovyna» for a long time; since 1892 he had been a member of the Bukovinian Diet, also became a deputy marshal of the government and managed policy in Bukovina".³⁵

The "Dnieper Waves" staff independently covered the preparation for the 50th obit of a great Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko in Bukovina (No. 5-6 for 1911). On November 22 representatives of all the Chernivtsi non-governmental organizations appealed to the authorities, "with the aim of requesting to cancel studying in all Bukovinian schools on the day of the anniversary, close stores in order to create Shevchenko's portrait, sent it out along with the appropriate brochure around all over the land. All the Bukovinian Siches were to be active assistants of memorable events."³⁶

The issue 7-8 of the magazine, at the border of "Bukovina", reported that "Bukovinian Moscovophiles were ready to establish their own «Russian Bank» in Chernivtsi, in order to harm the union of Ukrainian agriculture societies in Bukovina, the «Peasant Cashier». However, the regional trade court did not approve the charter of the bank, so it cannot be founded."³⁷

The "Dnieper Waves" have continually emphasized that the Bukovinian youth gather around the "Siches". These are fire-gymnastic societies where, in addition to extinguishing fires, patriotic education is pursued; Ukrainian songs and literacy are taught. In 1910, a convention of the Siches was held in Chernivtsi, as many as 160 of them exist in the region (there were two or three in some villages).³⁸

The Sich Union is valid in Bukovina. The authors of the publication summarize that in Bukovina the government does not persecute the Sich, as it takes place in Galicia, but on the contrary, it helps them with work.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Шевченковські свята* [Shevchenko's holidays], in "Дніпрові хвилі", 1911, № 5-6, с. 80.

³⁷ *Буковина* [Bukovina], in "Дніпрові хвилі", 1911, № 7-8, с. 107.

³⁸ *Дещо про Буковину та про життя буковинських українців*, с. 295.

According to the information from the “Dnieper Waves”, among other cultural societies of the region, “Women's Community” had rather a lot of members. This society financially supports a sewing school in Chernivtsi, shelters for poor children in many villages; children, who study at schools and vocational institutions of Chernivtsi, receive food, free rental accommodation and help with literature. Forty girls from the vocational institution in Chernivtsi are fully subsidized by the society called “Orthodox Ukrainian Women”.

Other societies operated in Bukovina. The “Dnieper Waves” mentioned the well-known ones in the region: “Regional Free Organization of Free Teaching”, “Mutual Teacher's Aid” for teachers of people's schools, “Skovoroda Society” for high school teachers, “Dawn” for artisans, “Orthodox Academy” for students-theologians of the university, “Union” and “Zaporozhzhia” for secular people.³⁹ There were also generally available societies “Historical Society”, “Lysenko Music Institute”, singing societies of “Boyany” (in Chernivtsi, Vashkiivtsi, Kitsman, Vyzhnytsia).

In the article *A Few Words About Comrades Stores* (No. 6 for 1912) meant for all peasants in Ukraine, there is an example of “small Bukovina, which has an extensive chain of various societies where people come together to help each other,” “are united on economic grounds.”⁴⁰ The publication emphasizes that artisans should learn from “foreign compatriots of Bukovina, who unite in societies, improve their products, and independently sell them to large foreign companies in Vienna and other major cities, or again independently display their products at exhibitions in big cities as well, thus the general public is interested in them.”⁴¹ In the villages of Bukovina general consumer shops are extensively opened; they make donations for the poor, charity and educational purposes.

No. 8 of the 1912 “Dnieper Waves” published the article by Kyryl Trilovsky *The Sich Holiday in Galician Ukraine*.⁴² It reflects the twelve-year history of Sich activity in Galicia, which has more than 800 members in 1912. It covers the structure of Sich, which is based on the best achievements of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, the composition of the leadership, attributes, and ascension activity. Interesting information is that on the 1st of July 1912 in Sniatyn, on the border of Galicia and Bukovina, the sixth general Sich holiday was conducted. All the guests

³⁹ *Ibid.*, с. 298.

⁴⁰ *Декілька слів про товариські крамниці* [A Few Words About Comrades Stores], in “Дніпрові хвилі”, 1912, № 6, с. 98-99.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, с. 98.

⁴² *Січове свято на галицькій Україні* [Sich Holiday in Galician Ukraine], in “Дніпрові хвилі”, 1912, № 8, с. 129-131.

were met "by an honour guard to the sound of Sich trumpets at the railway station of Sniatyn-Zaluche."⁴³ It is noted that it was attended by "Bukovinian Sich riflemen and riflewomen, representatives of other Slavic gymnasium organizations".⁴⁴ Bukovinians performed exercises with axes, spears, bars, and danced folk dances.

EDUCATION, PUBLISHING AND AWARENESS ACTIVITIES

In the article No. 20-21 (1911) it is carefully described that school education in Bukovina "is provided very well since there is barely any village without school. We discover that "in purely Ukrainian villages lessons are carried out in purely Ukrainian, whereas in those villages with different nations people have their own national schools. As soon as 40 children come together and parents wish to have a Ukrainian school, they immediately open it. Some schools number from 6 to 12 parallels classes. There are villages with up to 5 schools and up to 12 teachers. Each nation has its own regional inspector: Ukrainians have their own inspector, so do Moldavians, Germans, and Poles".⁴⁵

In addition, it is noted that "there are three high schools in Bukovina: one of them is in Vyzhnytsia (Ukrainian) and two others are in Chernivtsi and Kitsman (Ukrainian-German). In 1909, the Ukrainian teachers' seminary was established... In 1908, public schools with the Ukrainian language of education were founded. Chernivtsi supports them at their own expense... There are also societies in the province that support schools at their own cost and do school work. This society is the Ukrainian school. At its own expense, it also keeps a female teacher's seminary, pays salary to teachers, publishes schoolbooks and children's books, and helps poor youth. The society sponsors branches of the «Ukrainian School» in the region. The society has a special fund that is aimed to finance private schools in villages where there are few Ukrainians and children who are unable to attend their own school ... Such private schools are established in the southern part of Bukovina".⁴⁶

The article *New Schools in Oversea Ukraine* tells us about the opening of two Ukrainian high schools in Bukovina: in Vashkivtsi and Hlyniany in 1912.⁴⁷ We learn that the Vashkivtsi gymnasium is fully subsidized by the local community

⁴³ *Ibid.*, c. 130.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Дещо про Буковину та про життя буковинських українців* [Some Things About Bukovina and Life of Bukovinian Ukrainians], in "Дніпрові хвилі", 1911, № 20-21, c. 280.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, c. 281.

⁴⁷ *Нові школи в закордонній Україні* [New Schools in Oversea Ukraine], in "Дніпрові хвилі", 1912, № 17, c. 240.

and surrounding villages. In the village Hlyniany, local intellectuals initially founded an elementary gymnasium course. At the same time, they collected donations which were aimed to build a gymnasium. In the publication, it is mentioned to readers that the first gymnasium in Bukovina was built in 1905 in Vyzhnytsia. It has five classes with 12 departments and over 500 students. There are also German-Ukrainian gymnasiums in Kitsman and Chernivtsi. In the other issue of the "Dnieper Waves", it is mentioned that higher education courses for peasants have been valid for three years in Bukovina.⁴⁸ However, there is a lack of information about the content of these courses and their location.

The *News of Our Literacy and Education* (No. 2, 1910) tells about two high-quality volumes published of a six-volume copy of the correspondence between Ukrainian scientist and public figure Mykhaylo Drahomanov and Mykhaylo Pavlyk, from 1876 to 1895.

On other pages, we find that the book *Dictionary of Borrowed Words* was issued in Chernivtsi in October 1910; it contains 12 thousand loanwords used in the Ukrainian language.⁴⁹ Linguist Zenon Kuzel' (who moved from Vienna to Chernivtsi in the spring of 1909) and mathematician Mykola Tchaykovsky collected and arranged the dictionary.⁵⁰

From the "Dnieper Waves" (No. 16-17, 1911) we discover that it is Chernivtsi where the second edition of the book *Talks about Cossack times in Ukraine* by historian Volodymyr Antonovych is published.⁵¹

Ukrainian weekly reports spoke of a well-published book of poetry *Bunch of Forget-me-nots* by Irma Ostapovna (a pseudonym of the young Ukrainian poet Olga Duchymins'ka from Lviv region) which is very popular with readers in Chernivtsi.⁵² She was a friend of Ol'ha Kobylans'ka and lived in the writer's family in Chernivtsi for some time. It was Ivan Nechuy-Levytsky who wrote a preface to the book of lyric poems by Irma Ostapovna and who praised the publication for "pure Ukrainian folk language with all its forms."⁵³

⁴⁸ *З галицької України* [From Galician Ukraine], in "Дніпрові хвилі", 1912, № 18-19, с. 265.

⁴⁹ *З галицької України* [From Galician Ukraine], in "Дніпрові хвилі", 1910, № 2, с. 38.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Новини нашого письменства* [News of Our Literacy and Education], in "Дніпрові хвилі", 1911, № 20-21, с. 284-285.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, с. 285.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UKRAINIANS OF DNEPER UKRAINE AND BUKOVINA

In the publication *Excursionists from Bukovina*, on July 10, 1911, it is described how "a delegation from Bukovina arrived by a steamer from Kremenchuk to Katerynoslav."⁵⁴ The group of 19 people is named: "director of the Ukrainian teacher's seminary in Chernivtsi, Vasyl Ivasyuk, professor of the same seminary Vasyl Simovych with his wife Sydora, teacher of the higher orthodox girls' school in Chernivtsi and his nephew Mykola, a high school student from Kitsman' and 15 pupils, 10 of whom graduated from a teacher's seminary and are awaiting for teaching positions, other teachers from different villages of Bukovina and another high school student. The excursion started from Kyiv, where the participants arrived from Novoselytsia, Zhmerynka and on June 30 they stayed in the Mykhailivsky Monastery. In Kyiv, they visited the city museum, Lavra, all the churches of Mezhyhirya, the Kolisnychenko Theater, and the city merchant's garden. Kyivans kept a good house everywhere. Bukovinians moved from Kyiv to Shevchenko's grave, admiring the magnificent landscape of the Dnieper. They shifted to Poltava through Kremenchuk. There they attended teacher training courses and met local teachers, went to lectures, where Bukovinians rose in applause. That was how brothers greeted their foreign friends in the field of public education, Ukrainian teachers of Austria. They became acquainted with each other and their professional life until late. Together they visited a museum, a country house, a handicraft exhibition, and were photographed near the monument to Kotlyarevsky. They sang Ukrainian songs together. Then they returned to Kremenchuk. The excursionists floated to Katerynoslav by steamer and stayed at the first commercial school. During their stay, the guests from Bukovina visited the Bryansk plant and the city museum, where they had a thorough tour by Yavornitsky, attended the Sadovskyi Theater three times and had the opportunity to compare it with their own, also they were in Manuilivsti, where they became acquainted with the work of the local organization "Prosvita", went to Nenatets', met with participants of the Katerinoslav teacher training courses, visited the Potiomkin garden. They received the best impressions of our city. On July 15, our friends left the city to reach the border through Elisabeth and Oknitsa."⁵⁵

⁵⁴ *Екскурсанти з Буковини* [Excursionists from Bukovina], in "Дніпрові хвилі", 1911, № 16-17, с. 236.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, с. 237.

In the issue 18-19 (1911) the article *Foreign Fellows in Katerynoslav* covers the trip of Bukovinians and Galicians to Katerynoslav in order to get acquainted with the life of Dnieper Ukrainians.⁵⁶ The guests visited the O. Paul Museum, paid a visit to the Dnieper rapids, visited several suburban villages, listening to local sayings, and recording their peculiarities.⁵⁷

CONCLUSIONS

From those presented above it is clear that the Ukrainian illustrated biweekly magazine called “Dnieper Waves”, published in Katerynoslav from 1910 to 1913, played an important role in the national and cultural revival of Ukraine in the early twentieth century. They published popular scientific articles and literary works, materials from the historical past, local history, about Ukrainian language and education, interethnic relations, etc. The “Dnieper Waves” comprehensively covered the most important events that took place both in Dnieper Ukraine, Bukovina and Galicia.

Various aspects of the multifaceted life of Bukovina were reflected in the pages of the magazine, where, we assume, 23 materials, which either directly or indirectly concern the matter of the Bukovinian region, were published. First of all, these are articles on the socio-political and socio-economic situation of Bukovina. A separate block of material is related to the cultural diversity of the region. The following publications are kept under review: commemoration of the Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko in Bukovina, activities of women's societies, Stepan Smal'-Stotsky and others. As the materials about Bukovina on the pages of “Dnieper Waves” have not been analysed yet, we are pioneers in this work. The articles on Bukovina, published on the pages of the magazine, give an important historical rise, which has not lost its significance nowadays since even today from its pages it is possible to draw valuable insights about the past, the knowledge of which is extremely important for the present.

⁵⁶ *Закордонні земляки у Катеринославі* [Overseas compatriots in Katerynoslav], in “Дніпрові хвилі”, 1911, № 18-19, с. 259.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, с. 298.

SOCIOLOGY OF FAILURE IN THE CONTEMPORARY ARAB THOUGHT (READING ON SYAUQĪ JALĀL'S WORK ON THE ARAB LEFT)

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Abstract: *The Arab world continues to show new social, cultural, and political dynamics. Post the Arab Spring era, Arab countries with a republican system and having a historical memory of pan-Arab nationalism, are still faced with crucial national issues such as political injustice, social welfare, religious conflict, and other critical matters. From the perspective of the Arab intellectuals, the following severe question arises: why the Arab thought since the modern to the contemporary period does not have any significant effects on the progress of the Arab world. Internal and external problems constantly plague the Arab world. One of the crucial causes is the lack of a clear direction for the future projection of the Arab world indicated by the ideological divisions. The non-success of Arab thought since the Nahda era, which culminated in a painful defeat in the six-day Arab-Israeli war in 1967, followed by another Arab crisis such as the Arab Spring, all shows the inflexibility of the Arab intellectual elite. It seems there is no relation between idea and reality. On that basis, Syauqī Jalāl, an Egyptian thinker, tried to reflect and to call into question why did the Arab thought face a dead end. What is the leading cause, and can the Arab thought provide a real solution to the Arab crisis? The paper seeks to answer these questions by exploring the perspectives of Syauqī Jalāl on the Arab thought by taking the leftist Arab wing movement as his analysis.*

Keywords: Sociology, Thought failure, Arab thought, Arab Spring, Leftist movement, Syauqī Jalāl.

Rezumat: *Sociologia eșecului în gândirea arabă contemporană (citind lucrările lui Syauqī Jalāl despre stânga arabă). Lumea arabă continuă să prezinte noi dinamici sociale, culturale și politice. După epoca Primăverii Arabe, țările arabe cu un sistem republican și cu o memorie istorică a naționalismului pan-arab se confruntă încă cu probleme naționale cruciale precum nedreptatea politică, bunăstarea socială, conflictul religios și alte chestiuni critice. Din perspectiva intelectualilor arabi se ridică următoarea întrebare serioasă: de ce gândirea arabă, din perioada modernă până în cea contemporană, nu are urmări semnificative asupra progresului lumii arabe. Problemele interne și externe îmbolnăvesc*

constant lumea arabă. Una dintre cauzele cruciale o reprezintă lipsa unei direcții clare pe care fracțiunile ideologice să o indice pentru viitoarea proiecție a lumii arabe. Insuccesul gândirii arabe începând cu epoca Nahda, care a culminat cu o înfrângere dureroasă în războiul arabo-israelian de șase zile din 1967, urmată de o altă criză precum Primăvara Arabă, arată inflexibilitatea elitei intelectuale arabe. E ca și cum n-ar exista nicio relație între idee și realitate. Pe acest temei, Syauqī Jalāl, un gânditor egiptean, a încercat să reflecteze și să readucă în discuție motivul pentru care gândirea arabă a ajuns într-un punct mort. Care este cauza principală a acestui eșec și oare poate gândirea arabă să ofere o soluție reală la criza arabă? Lucrarea încearcă să răspundă la aceste întrebări, explorând perspectivele lui Syauqī Jalāl asupra gândirii arabe prin analiza aripii stângi a mișcării arabe.

INTRODUCTION

After the 1967 Arab defeat, popularly known as the defeatism or *al-Nakba*, the progressive Arab writers and thinkers did not see the West anymore as the leading cause of the decline of the Arab World. Instead, they take a look at the problems caused by internal factors. This awareness and effort to criticize internal issues is known as self-criticism or self-examination.¹ According to the Arabs thinkers, the Arab world faced the internal crisis caused by the failure of Arab modernism projects. It seems that the projections of modern Arab thought initiated by Mulism modernist such as Muhammad 'Abduh, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Qasim Amin, and others did not have any substantial influence in overcoming the mindset and mentality of the Arabs. It did not only fall into false modernism but even worse, it created a new form of traditionalism.

In patriarchal cultures, for example, when Arabs entered and adopted modern ideas, they no longer applied a system of patriarchy in their social order. However, Arab countries, in general, have created a new patriarchal or neo-patriarchy culture in the form of authoritarianism, pseudo modernism, and distribution of power based on kinship.² The impact of this fact caused the decline of the Arab world and reached its peak during the Arab Spring.

¹ Ibrahim M Abu-Rabi', *Contemporary Arab Thought: Studies in Post-1967 Arab Intellectual History*, London, Pluto Press, 2004, p. 43-48; Hisham Sharabi, *Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Societies*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 111; Yoyo (coord.), *Tren Pemikiran Intelektual Muslim Kontemporer di Timur Tengah Pasca Diftisme 1967* [Trend of Contemporary Muslim Intellectual Thought after the Arab Defeat of 1967], in "Kawistara: The Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities", 2012, Vol. 2, No. 3, p. 229.

² Sharabi, *Neopatriarchy...*, p. 94-99; Yoyo, *Neo-Patriarchy and the Problem of the Arab Crisis: A Critical Study on Hisham Sharabi's Works*, in "QIJIS: Qudus International Journal

One exciting and questionable thing for researchers related to the Arab Spring is why the Arab Spring emerged without being driven by any ideas or ideologies. It was as if there was a disconnect between the ideas of previous Arab thinkers and the realities. Therefore, the Arab Spring became an assertion that Arab thought did not succeed in carrying out the Arab social transformation. In particular, the paper tries to see why the Arab thought has always failed in the process of transforming Arab society. This paper seeks to explore the ideas of Syauqī Jalāl on the causes of failure of the Arab thought by focusing on the Arab left group. Syauqī Jalāl saw the Arab leftist or Arab Marxist as one of the representations of Arab social groups who promoted some solutions to the Arab crisis.

Syauqī Jalāl Ustman was born on October 30, 1931, in Cairo. He earned his bachelor's degree at Cairo University in 1956, majoring in Philosophy and Psychology, Faculty of Humanities. Syauqī Jalāl was a well-known translator and won an award in 2003 for his translation work entitled *al-Tarjamah fī al-‘Ālam al-‘Arabī: al-Waqī’ wa al-Tahaddī*. This book was of great importance to the history of translation in the Arab World. Compared to other Egyptian thinkers during his period, such as Hassan Hanafī and Nasser Hamid Abu Zaid, the popularity of Syauqī Jalāl in the study of Arab thought in the Indonesian context, in particular, was notably lacking. Many factors led to his reputation not being well known; namely, Syauqi was not an academic activist. Besides, the idea of Syauqi Jalal, in general, did not focus on Islamic studies in a specific way. However, Syauqi's survey of the Arab left is significant and important. Among other things, he examines the Arab left thought in the relationship between thought and social context. He seeks to measure the extent to which the conformity between ideas and social reality matches. According to him, the success of a thought depends on people's acceptance of the concept.

The paper, in general, divided into two main discussions. First, it discusses the Arab left group briefly from its historical background and its intellectual representation. Secondly, it explores Syauqi Jalal's ideas about the Arab left group and the causes of their failure as an alternative solution for the future of the Arab World. To achieve this goal, the paper in particular analyses Jalal's book entitled "*al-Fikr al-‘Arabī wa Sūsiyūlūjiā al-Fasyl* [The Arab Thought and Sociology of Failure]." Methodologically, the paper attempts to reconstruct and analyse the text into a new interpreted version.³

of Islamic Studies", 2018, Vol. 6, No. 2, p. 259–260.

³ Norman Fairclough, *Analysing Textual Analysis for Social Research*, London, Routledge, 2003, pp. 21, 39.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ARAB LEFT

Tracing the roots of leftist Arab ideas and movements is not easy, because this movement is considered alien and not popular among Arabs. Nonetheless, the end of Ottoman Turkish rule was seen as an era where the ideas of Marxism appeared. Yet, the Arab left or the new Arab left emerged in 1960 and culminated after the defeat of the Arab-Israeli war in 1967.⁴ It marked a significant change in the arena of Arab ideology. The doctrine of Nasserism or Pan-Arabism is seen as an empty slogan and has shown the Arab military weakness against Israel. The Arab leftists came to the fore after the 1967 defeat, marked by the emergence of the Palestine Liberation Organization that acted not only as a national aspiration of the Palestinian people but also as an expression of regional politics. Other left organizations have emerged, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Communist Party-Political Bureau in Syria, and the Organization of Communist Action in Lebanon. The Arab left sees that conservative nationalist figures can no longer be expected; they must be replaced by leaders who are more open and have the vision to build a modern Arab country.⁵

The primary purpose of the Arab left is to oppose racial, political, and patriarchal domination and economic exploitation. The Arab left sought the need for direct action by confronting any established powers, whether it was a state or social authorities. The response should be taken in a revolutionary movement conducted from the bottom-up, occupy any public spaces, and create alternative life forms.⁶

The glory of the Arab left ideology was between the 1950s and 1970s, after which this ideology was no longer significant because its position replaced by the emergence of Islamic politics as the next dominant ideology.⁷ Although no longer dominant, the Arab left in the politics and practice is not dead. The Arab Left became more inclined as an intellectual movement, especially those of the Arab gen-

⁴ Sune Haugbolle, Manfred Sing, *New Approaches to Arab Left Histories*, in "Arab Studies Journal", 2016, Vol. 24, No. 1, p. 90–97.

⁵ Joel Beinin, *Criticism and Defeat: An Introduction to George Hawi*, in "MERIP Reports", 1983, Vol. 118, p. 16–18.

⁶ Sune Haugbolle, *The New Arab Left and 1967*, in "British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies", 2017, Vol. 44, No. 4, p. 500.

⁷ Haugbolle, Sing, *New Approaches...*, p. 92–93; Michaëlle Browers, *Political Ideology in the Arab World: Accommodation and Transformation*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 7.

eration born around the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, as an era of post-Marxism.⁸

THE ARAB LEFT AND CONTEMPORARY ARAB THOUGHT

On June 5, 1967, Israel attacked and destroyed the Egyptian air force. A few days later, Israel even succeeded in occupying Sinai as well as Suez, Jerusalem, and Palestine parts of Jordan and southern Syria (Golan Heights). The defeat of the Arab-Israeli War in 1967, called the Six-Day War, was seen by Arab-Muslim thinkers as not only a defeat of technology and strategy but also a moral defeat.⁹ For the Marxist / Arab Left (*al-Fikr al-Mārkisī / al-Yasār al-'Arabī*), the 1967 tragedy was not only a result of the practices of corruption and authoritarianism of the Arab regime, but more than that was "backwardness" (*takhalluf*) and "ignorance" (*jahl*) of the Arab community itself. More specifically, they concluded, that Arab society had failed to decide on traditional and conservative tendencies, thus preventing them from internalizing the spirit of modernity in a positive, humanistic, and even revolutionary form.¹⁰

Marxist / Left Arab intellectuals advocated total modernization in line with the revolutionary line and breaking up from traditions. They criticized the contemporary Arab revolution as not entirely and only partially.¹¹ The representative intellectuals of the Arab Marxist / Arab Left are Hussain Muruwwa, Mahdi 'Amil, Fawwaz Tarabulsi, and Karim Muruwwa from Lebanon; Yassin al-Hafiz, Elias Murqus, Sadek Jalal al-mAmm, Tayyib Tizini, and Adonis from Syria; Hisham Sharabi from Palestine; Samir Amin, Lutfi al-Khuli, Ibrahim Sabri 'Abdallah, Fu'ad Mursi, Rif'at al-Sa'id, Ahmad Sadiq Sa'd, Ghali Syukri, from Egypt; Abdallah Laroui from Morocco; Talal Asad from Saudi Arabia; and Hadi al-Ulwi from Iraq.¹²

In an interview in 1997, Sadek Jalal al-zAzm, a representative of Arab Marxist / Arab left intellectuals as well as a philosopher from Damascus, with a doctorate earned from Yale University, stated: "Naturally, the defeat of June 1967 interrupted all plans and revealed the fragility of the modern Arab intellectual Renaissance on which the Arab liberation movement based its hopes. Most of

⁸ Haugbolle, Sing, *New Approaches...*, p. 95.

⁹ Albert Hourani, *A History of The Arab Peoples*, New York, Harvard University Press, 1992, p. 412; Yoyo (coord.) *Tren Pemikiran...*, p. 77.

¹⁰ Stephen Sheehi, *Foundations of Modern Arab Identity*, Gainesville, University Press of Florida, 2004, p. 3.

¹¹ Ali E Hillal Dessouki, *Arab Intellectuals and Al-Nakba: The Search for Fundamentalism*, in "Middle Eastern Studies", 1973, Vol. 9, No. 2, p. 187-195.

¹² Ibrahim M Abu-Rabi', *Contemporary Arab...*, p. 87.

these hopes revolved around the concept of the inspired leader, and when the leader fell, everything crashed with him, leaving nothing behind but emptiness, loss, and confusion. I would not be exaggerating when I say that the defeat hit us like a lightning bolt."¹³

According to him, 1967 defeatism destroyed all projects and hopes of the modern movement and Arab liberation. These hopes depend on the central leadership of the Arab nation (read: Nasser), where when this character is defeated, the projections destroyed and all the ideas about the modern and advanced Arab World. Furthermore, al-'Azm said that: "The 1967 defeat was an exceptional event in every sense of the word, a terrifying explosion which destroyed the foundations of the Arab liberation movement."¹⁴

Most importantly, in his opinion, the defeat of the 1967 Arab Israeli war was a severe blow to the foundations of the Arab liberation movement pioneered, which developed its socialist trends under Nasser's leadership. According to al-Azm, the 1952 Revolution led by Nasser had indeed succeeded in carrying out economic and political transformation by overthrowing the monarchy leader and expanding power utilizing land redistribution and abolishing the feudal system. However, these efforts do not touch the "superstructure" of the essential Arab society, namely a system of thought, value, and belief. According to him, the defeat of 1967 was a result of the strengthening of conservatism.¹⁵

Another disadvantage in al-Azm's view is that Arab society failed to proclaim the scientific and secular nature of the ideology of socialism. The Arab revolution has not dealt with the fundamental problems of society, such as the future of agriculture, land ownership, secularization, and class relations. The consequence of this ideology vagueness is the birth of the attitude of *wasathiyyah* (middle of the path), as the main character of the Arab revolution so far.¹⁶ Secularism in al-Azm's view is a necessity so that Arab society can advance and compete with other developed countries.

For al-Azm, the same secularism or what he called civil government (*hukūmah madaniyyah*) is a pre-condition for democracy. According to him, secularism is a neutral attitude that must be displayed by the state regarding religion, sect, denomination, and ethnic categories, which are often a problem in society.

¹³ Ghada Talhami, *An Interview with Sadik Al-Azm*, in "Arab Studies Quarterly", 1997, p. 116.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

¹⁵ Elizabeth Suzanne Kassab, *Contemporary Arab Thought: Cultural Critique in Comparative Perspective*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2010, p. 74.

¹⁶ Dessouki, *Arab Intellectuals*..., p. 190.

Al-Azm further emphasized that secularism is a historical choice. Islam can accept secularism as long as we can distinguish between a "doctrinaire no" (*allā as-suratiyyah*) and a "historic yes" (*an-na'am at-tārīhiyyah*). The "doctrinaire no" considers that the political system that carried out by the ruler was viewed as not in line with Islam, although in its history, it has been proven to advance of Islam. Meanwhile, the "historic yes" views that Islam, in its historical context, has always been able to adapt to various ideologies that have ever existed.¹⁷

Thus, secularism, as a "historic yes" in modern times, is acceptable to Islam as Islam has succeeded through a series of long histories in interpreting and defining itself. Seen from the doctrine's point of view, Islam will only be compatible with itself, but if Islam is seen as a historical fact, it has been proven to be able to compete in the political, social, and economic organization.

Nevertheless, al-Azm did not agree if religious thinking became the foundation for change. According to him, the religious thinking is only a false consciousness and cannot be in line with an authentic, scientific thinking. This religious thought is perilous because it is sometimes used to support the existing social order and those who are behind it, and to prevent the occurrence of social and political liberation movements.¹⁸ Included in this attitude, al-Azm criticized the position of Adonis or Ali Ahmad Said (born in 1930), as other Marxist intellectuals who tended to sympathize and admire the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran. According to the author, Adonis was born and grew up in the Shiite tradition, so he greatly praised and glorified the revolution. Again, for al-Azm as the most reliable representation of Arab Marxists, the Arab world will only achieve progress when they dare to place religion at the domestic/personal level and prioritize the scientific revolution as the only way for the Arabs to make the growth.

Another prominent exponent of the Arab left is Abdallah Laroui. Born in Azmour, Morocco, he attended elementary and secondary school in Rabat, then graduated from Sorbonne, Paris, earning a BA in political sciences in 1956. Subsequently, in 1958 he completed his master's degree and obtained a diploma in Islamic studies in 1963. In 1976, he managed to defend his dissertation for his Ph.D., with the title *The Social and Cultural Base of the Moroccan nation: 1830-1912*. Moreover, Laroui devoted himself as a professor at the faculty of literature in Rabat, Morocco.¹⁹ Laroui began publishing his work in 1964 with the nickname

¹⁷ Abu Fakhr, *Trends in Arab Thought: An Interview with Sadek Jalal Al-Azm*, in "Journal of Palestine Studies", 1998, Vol. 27, No. 2, p. 68-80.

¹⁸ Albert Hourani, *A History...*, p. 444.

¹⁹ Yoyo, *Pemikiran Arab: Dinamika Intelektual, Ideologi, dan Gerakan* [Arab Thought, Ide-

Abdallah Alrafedy, when he wrote a Roman drama entitled *The Man of Memory*, for a new magazine, "Aqlam". His intellectual works included studies of ideological criticism, the history of ideas and system, and some novels. He collaborated with journals such as "Aqlam" (Rabat), "Mawaqif" (Beirut), "Arabic Studies" (Beirut), "Les Temps modernes", and "Diogène" (Paris).²⁰

The defeat of 1967 marked the maturity of his thought. In that year, his book entitled *Contemporary Arab Ideology* signified the birth of his philosophical project. In 1970, its translation into Arabic appeared through the publisher of Al-Haqeqa. Since then, Abdallah Laroui's name has become essential in the arena of Arab thinkers. The book was intended as a sharp criticism of the dominant Arab thought in his era.²¹

Living in France, in the mid 1950s, he began to study the works of Egyptian thinkers, from Muhammad Abduh to Ali Abdelrazeq, from Rifa'ah Badawi Al Tahtawi to Qasim Amin, from Afghani to Lutfi Al Sayyid, Salama Mousa, and Taha Husein. After he reviewed their perspectives, enriched with an in-depth reading of the Moroccan National Movement literature (such as Allal Al Fassi and Mohammad Hassan), Laroui's works were born, which were very comprehensive and critical. He analysed the reality and facts of the Arabs in intellectual, political, and cultural aspects, by studying and offering alternatives. His intellectual project became more evident after 1973, when he published the book *Arab Nation and History of Thought*, followed by the book *Arab Intellectual Crisis*. The work was written in French, in 1974. Followed later with a series of writings on "various concepts" from the year 1980 to 1996.²²

In particular, Laroui saw the future of the Arabs as dependent on their ability to adopt the Western Modernist thinking with its main categories, namely Rationalism, Criticism, Progress, and Responsibility for humans at the theoretical level, and Secularism, the Marxist social system, and the Centrality of the state, on a practical scale. The mechanism for implementing the transformation model as above is by doing 'epistemological break' or epistemological disconnection from classical Arab / Islamic heritage. The disconnect is the breakdown of the thinking model of the method used in the history of Arab / Islamic culture and replaces it with methods and models of contemporary thought. This idea is at the core of

ology, and Movement], Yogyakarta, Sociality, 2017, p. 92-93.

²⁰ *Ibid...*, p. 93.

²¹ *Ibid...*, p. 94-95.

²² Said Mentak, *Review Essay: Abdellah Laroui's New Conception of Interpreting Islam*, in "Contemporary Islam", 2010, Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 239-245.

Laroui's thinking, which can be found in his entire works.²³

In his famous books, *The Crisis of the Arab Intelligentsia* (1976), Laroui saw that the setbacks faced by Muslims, especially in the context of Arab society, were a reflection of the failure of Arab intellectuals in carrying out the social transformation. According to him, this failure is because Arab intellectuals trapped in two models of thinking, namely traditional (*salafi*), and eclecticism. According to Laroui, these two models of thought fail to see reality because they ignore history. The conventional thinking model trapped in the mindset of medievalism, and the early Islamic era was considered the most ideal. Meanwhile, the second group is too dependent on outsiders. Dependence is not just a loss of independence and pride in the country, but far more dangerous than that is the continuing decline of history.²⁴

RELIGION, SCIENCE, AND ARAB IDENTITY

Syauqī Jalāl's first step in studying the Arab left and the causes of its failure began with his general analysis of the relationship between religion and science as the cause of the retreat of the glory of Islam. Syauqī questioned why primary sciences, which had been developed by Al-Biruni, al-Khawarizmi, and Ibn Rusyd, disappeared in Arab or Islamic countries and developed or globalized in Europe. The ideas of these Muslim scholars became the foundation for the European progress.²⁵ According to Syauqī, it often happens when the Arab world faced with a crisis; they lose their creative minds and the strengthening of emotive power.²⁶ In contrast to the Arab world, Europe, when faced with a dilemma due to World War II – which have triggered the birth of two schools of philosophy, namely the philosophy of doubt (*syak*) and philosophy of the will (*irādah*) – decided to develop a philosophy of intention for its future development. In the Muslim world, the critical role of reason as a driver for the progress of *ummah* has already been introduced by Muslim thinkers such as Ibn Rushd, Ibn Khaldun, and Afghani and Abduh.²⁷ However, this era of rationalism must end with the emergence of people who attack reason and establish religion as the primary source of knowledge and

²³ Abdallah Laroui, *The Crisis of the Arab Intelligentsia: Traditionalism or Historicism*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1976.

²⁴ Abdallah Laroui, *The Crisis of the Arab...*, p. 154.

²⁵ Syauqī Jalāl, *Al-Fikr Al-'Arabī Wa Sūsiyūlūjiā Al-Fasyī* [The Arab Thought and the Sociology of Failure], al-Qāhirah, Maktabah Madbuli, 2002, p. 11.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 25

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 26-31.

truth. This type of thinking begins with the era of Asyariyah, Wahabi, and also Abul A'la Maududi. The modern era in the Arab World precisely characterized by strengthening the flow of Islamism, which negates the role of reason in providing solutions to problems faced by the *ummah*.²⁸

Therefore, Syauqī noted that the reform movement in the Arab World should not always be based on the foundation of religion. When religion considered the main element of identity, it is a false identity. Why is that?, because if there is an Islamic identity, then which Islam is meant? What schools of religion are adopted? Islam with a thinker or Imam who should follow? Identity, therefore, is the existence of an active and creative society that develops dynamically based on a particular place and time. Identity is an expression of certain civilizations as a result of natural social interaction. Religion is only one element that develops in identity. Therefore, identity, in general, cannot be attributed to any particular religion.²⁹

Through the above perspective, Syauqī Jalāl's thoughts on social identity are similar to the ideas proposed by Hassan Hanafi (an Egyptian and Arab leftist scholar) that identity, in general, is very much tied to particular contexts and times.³⁰ This view is a reference for Syauqī Jalāl in looking at Arab movements and thoughts in general by emphasizing the sociological aspects of society's acceptance of an idea.

THE FAILURE OF THE ARAB LEFT

The Arab left, according to Syauqī Jalāl, is any movement of critics who wanted a rapid change of social, political, and economics. However, this group, in his opinion, does not have any historical roots in the Arab tradition³¹. The Arab left is seen as not having the capacity as a movement of criticism because, in general, the Arab left does not have full awareness of the crisis faced by the *ummah*. As a movement, it tends to be an individual movement rather than as a massive social movement. Thus, it is a marginal group that cannot freely integrate with the community.³² Besides, most of the Arab countries except Morocco, ideological and political parties, such as the Arab left, did not have a tradition of

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 36-39.

³⁰ Hasan Hanafi, *Al-Huwiyyah* [The Identity], al-Qāhirah, al-Majlis al-A'lā li al-Tsaqāfah, 2012.

³¹ Syauqī Jalāl, *Al-Fikr Al-'Arabī...*, p. 78.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 83.

any political party activities.³³ Therefore, political parties in the Arab world have minimal support bases amongst those they want to represent.³⁴ Besides, the Arab left theoretically is a dialectical movement between thought and reality. Since the beginning, the Arab left was more ideological rather than as a social movement. The Arab left is not a representation of a combination of theory and comprehensive action. Fundamentally, there are epistemological breaks between the Arab left and the historical reality of the Arab tradition.³⁵

In Jordan, the leftist wing group represented by the National Socialist Party of Sulayman al-Nabulsi, which emerged in 1957, failed to gain broad public support. Thus, opposition groups, including the leftist wing, always experience failures not only due to its difficulties in obtaining mass support. but also because of repression of the ruling regime. Left-wing groups have a problem in conveying their political aspirations through official parties. The pause of the life of political parties in the Arab world fatally occurred in the late 1990s.³⁶ It was also affected by the collapse of the Soviet Union by the early 1990s.³⁷

In Egypt, The Tajammu' or *Hizb Tajammu' al-Watani al-Taqaaddumi al-Wahdawi* (National Progressive Unionist Party) is an official left-wing party founded in 1976. The program of Tajammu' is to reject the policy program of *infitah* [economic and political openness of Egyptian to the West] run by President Sadat and emphasize the importance of rapid economic growth. The Tajammu' party failed to compete with the government party due to allegations that the party was a communist and an atheist organization as the worst devils of the Nasser period. Also, a fundamental factor of the weakness of the leftist movement in Egypt is the absence of political networks or mass support from the countryside.³⁸

In Syria, during the Arab Spring, there is a daily newspaper run by left-wing nationalist activists: *Al-Akhbar*. The split began when a revolutionary wave broke out in Syria in March 2011. The managing editor of *Al-Akhbar* left the paper because of *Al-Akhbar's* content considered to be a lack of support for the

³³ Shadi Hamid, *Political Party Development before and after the Arab Spring*, in Mehran Kamrava (Ed.), *Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 132.

³⁴ Vincent Durac, *Protest Movements and Political Change: An Analysis of the 'Arab Uprisings*, in "Journal of Contemporary African Studies", 2013, Vo. 31, No. 2, p. 183.

³⁵ Syauqī Jalāl, *Al-Fikr Al-'Arabī...*, p. 89-90.

³⁶ Shadi Hamid, *Political Party...*, p. 132-133

³⁷ Haugbolle, Sing, *New Approaches...*, p. 93.

³⁸ Bertus Hendriks, *The Legal Left in Egypt*, in "Arab Studies Quarterly", 1983, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 262-270.

revolutionary movement. On the other hand, in the name of the struggle against Israel and resistance to imperialism, some preferred to remain behind the regime. The main fear of the nationalist left is the vacuum and post-Assad reconciliation that will bring the country closer to a coalition with the US or the Gulf Arab States.

In general, the nationalist left wings, both "revolutionary" and "progressive," want a gradual transition caused by the fear of an uncertain future.³⁹ Another one, the leftist nationalists, saw that the Arab Spring had paved the way for the hegemony of Islamist groups such as happened in Tunisia and Egypt.⁴⁰ Therefore, the failure of the left caused by the weak elements of this group. Besides, from their inner side, they prefer to choose political stability rather than revolutionary actions due to the uncertain future of the political, social, and economic projections of the Arab world.

CONCLUSIONS

Arab thought generally failed due to elitism shown by the Arab intellectuals. Thoughts and criticisms of Arab reality are difficult to be implemented in the real Arab social and political contexts. In particular, according to Syauqī Jalāl, the Arab left became a marginal Arab group because this movement, in its essence, was radical and revolutionary. It means that the Arab left mainly driven by particular individuals rather than public or massive support. Besides, there is a distance or epistemological break of the Arabic left with the real Arab reality. That is, the Arab left has no historical roots in Arab societies because it was imported from the West.

The tendency to deny the Arab "tradition" and prefer to choose revolutionary steps with various consequences is considered dangerous. Therefore, sociologically, the Arab left as a representation of contemporary Arab thought is always faced with the deadlock and has not yet become a solution and accepted as a significant Arab social and intellectual movement. In the new political context, they are also facing the dilemma between standing behind the regime in the name of political stability or supporting the revolutionary action that will pave the way for religious movements to be dominant ideology.

³⁹ Nicolas Dot-Pouillard, *Syria Divides the Arab left*, in "Le Monde Diplomatique (English edition)", 2012, p. 4.

⁴⁰ Nathan J. Brown, *Tracking the "Arab Spring": Egypt's Failed Transition*, in "Journal of Democracy", 2013, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 50-53; Asef Bayat, *The Arab Spring and Its Surprises*, in "Development and Change", 2013, Vol. 44, No. 3, p. 595.

FORMATION OF KAZAKH NATIONAL ELITES IN THE LATE 19TH AND EARLY 20TH CENTURIES

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Abstract: *Elites, as a social group, generate and implement progressive ideas in society. The formation of Kazakhstan's national elite began in the first half of the 20th century, with access to secular education. Kazakhstan's new progressive intelligentsia made significant changes in many areas of science, economy and culture. This article examines the prerequisites for the emergence and development of elites in Kazakhstan and describes their contribution to the political, cultural, and economic spheres.*

Keywords: *Elite, intelligentsia, Kazakhstan, 19th century, 20th century, Russian Empire, government, education.*

Rezumat: *Formarea elitelor naționale kazahe la sfârșitul secolului al XIX-lea – începutul secolului XX. Elitele, ca grup social, generează și implementează în societate idei progresiste. Formarea elitei naționale în Kazahstan a avut loc în prima jumătate a secolului XX, odată cu accesul la educația seculară. Noua intelectualitate progresistă kazahă a realizat schimbări importante în variate domenii ale științei, economiei și culturii. În acest studiu sunt analizate premisele afirmării și dezvoltării elitelor în Kazahstan, fiind descrise contribuțiile acestora în diverse sfere ale vieții politice, culturale și economice.*

INTRODUCTION

Modern political science often employs the term “elite” to emphasize the intellectual and moral superiority of one group of people over others. Numerous

researchers agree that the harmonious functioning of society is possible only with elites. In their opinion, elites play a crucial role in the social and political life of the state, especially during socioeconomic and political crises¹. Such conclusions were drawn by Lal Sharma², Joshua Pryor³, Arpad von Lazar⁴, Dinsha Mistree⁵, and others.

Concerning the development of Kazakh national elites, there are numerous works on various features of the formation of Kazakhs as an independent and culturally diverse nation. Mambet Koigeldiev⁶ considers the repression of the Kazakh intelligentsia as a sign of weakness of the Russian imperial rule. Zhanna Mazhitova⁷ explores the relation of national intelligentsia leaders with the court of *biys* as the traditional-institution of Kazakh society, born of the reforms of the tsarist government in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Gulnar Kendirbay (Kendirbai; Kendirbaeva)⁸ studies the training of the Kazakh intelligentsia in the early 20th century. In the study, the first most prominent representatives of the intelligentsia are mostly related to aristocratic Kazakh families who studied at the first Russian schools. However, G. Kendirbay demonstrates how remarkably the number of the intelligentsia in ordinary Kazakh families has increased with the spreading and democratization of Russian education. The theme of the Kazakh intelligentsia's struggle for independence at the beginning of the 20th century is

¹ Леонид Григорьев, *Элиты и средний класс* [Elites and the middle class], in "Spero", 2010, No. 13, p. 87-88.

² Lal Narayan Sharma, *The theories of elites: impact and relevance*, in "The Indian Journal of Political Science", 1977, Vol. 38, No. 1, p. 65.

³ Joshua Pryor, *Social Change Through Control: How Elites Shape Society*, August 15, 2013, <https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2310417> (Accessed on 28.04.2020).

⁴ Arpad von Lazar, *The role of young educated elites in political development*, in "Il Politico", 1966, Vol. 31, No. 1, p. 76.

⁵ Dinsha Mistree, *How Elites Determine Development*, in "Economic & Political Weekly", 2013, Vol. 48, No. 35, p. 31.

⁶ Mambet Koigeldiev, *The Alash Movement and the Soviet Government: A Difference of Positions*, in Tomohiko Uyama, *Empire, Islam, and Politics in Central Eurasia*, Sapporo, Hokkaido University, 2007, p. 153-184, in http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no14_ses/06_koigeldiev.pdf (Accessed on 28.04.2020).

⁷ Жанна Мажитова, *Полемика вокруг суда биев среди представителей казахской интеллигенции начала XX в. (сравнительно-исторический анализ)* [The controversy surrounding the court of biys among representatives of the Kazakh intelligentsia of the early twentieth century (comparative historical analysis)], in "Гуманитарный вектор. Востоковедение" [Humanitarian vector. Oriental Studies], 2014, Vol. 3, No. 39, p. 89-95.

⁸ Gulnar Kendirbay, *The national liberation movement of the Kazakh intelligentsia at the beginning of the 20th century*, in "Central Asian Survey", 1997, Vol. 16, No. 4, p. 487-515.

also central in the works of Zhandos Kumganbayev and Nazgul Kudaibergenova⁹, Jean-Francois Caron¹⁰, Sattar Kaziev¹¹, and Saule Kenzhebaeva¹².

G. Kendirbaeva¹³ admits the intention of the Russian bureaucratic system to destruct the traditional social structure of Kazakh nomadic society, as well as the Russification of the Kazakhs with subsequent conversion to Christianity. All this had a destructive influence on the identity of the Kazakh intelligentsia. S. Sabol¹⁴ also explores the impact of Russian colonization on the genesis of Kazakh national consciousness. He highlighted that language became for national movements as well as for intelligentsia formation a central feature in their proto-national cohesion. Mary Holdsworth¹⁵ analyzes the problem of Kazakhstan's elite formation under Soviet ruling during 1917–1940. One should also note the work of R. K. Nurmagambetova, who provides a comprehensive synthesis of the historiography of Alash activity¹⁶.

Sally Cummings¹⁷ explores deeply the formation of the Kazakh elite during

⁹ Zhandos Kumganbayev, Nazgul Kudaibergenova, *Kazakh intelligentsia's struggle for independence in the early 20th century*, in "Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences", 2013, No. 89, p. 617-621, in doi: 10.1016/j.sbspro.2013.08.904

¹⁰ Jean-Francois Caron, *Kazakhstan and the Soviet Legacy: Between Continuity and Rupture*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.

¹¹ Саттар Казиев, *Ислам, тюркизм и становление казахской этнонациональной идентичности в начале XX века* [Islam, Turkism and Formation of Kazakh Ethnonational Identity at the Beginning of the 20th Century], in "Вестник Северо-Восточного федерального университета им. М.К. Аммосова" [Bulletin of M.K. Amosov North-Eastern Federal University], 2015, Vol.12, No. 1, p. 75-83.

¹² Сауле Кенжебаева, *Идейно-политическая борьба в области культуры и образования в Казахстане в 20-30 годы XX века* [Ideological and political struggle in the field of culture and education in Kazakhstan in 20–30-s of 20th century], in "Вестник Астраханского государственного технического университета" [Bulletin of the Astrakhan State Technical University], 2011, Vol. 2, No. 52, p. 137-143.

¹³ Gulnar Kendirbaeva, 'We are children of Alash...' *The Kazakh intelligentsia at the beginning of the 20th century in search of national identity and prospects of the cultural survival of the Kazakh people*, in "Central Asian Survey", 1999, Vol. 18, Issue 1, p. 5-36.

¹⁴ Steven Sabol, *Russian colonization and the genesis of Kazak national consciousness*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

¹⁵ Mary Holdsworth, *Soviet Central Asia, 1917–1940*, in "Soviet Studies", 1952, Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 258-277. DOI: 10.1080/09668135208409821

¹⁶ Р. К. Нурмагамбетова, *Движение "Алаш" и Алаш-Орда. Историография проблемы 1920 – 1990-е годы XX века* [Alash movement and the Alash-Horde. Historiography of the problem 1920 - 1990s of the 20th century], Алматы, 2003.

¹⁷ Sally Cummings, *Kazakhstan. Power and the elite*, London – New York, I.B. Tauris, 2005.

the post-Soviet period. It focuses on overcoming the significant Russian minority complex of the national elite which has been inoculated systematically since the nineteenth-century Russian colonization and twentieth-century Sovietization, as a result, and a constant reminder of the political elite's continued vulnerability to external political and cultural influence. Similar views are also expressed in the works of Jean-Francois Caron¹⁸, Dilip Hiro¹⁹, David Christian²⁰, and Bhavna Dave²¹.

Although there are several studies, including the above-mentioned works, on the formation of Kazakh national elites in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, many issues still require systematization and more detailed analysis. In this article, the authors examine the formation of Kazakh national elites during this period and analyze their influence on the country's development.

PREREQUISITES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL ELITES AND INTELLIGENTSIA IN KAZAKHSTAN

Rapid socio-cultural and economic transformations took place during the *fin de siècle* in Kazakhstan that influenced the further development of the state. The rise and growth of productive forces and trade, the development of commodity-money relations that broke the economic and social isolation of Kazakh villages, as well as the development of the capitalist system increased class differentiation in the late 19th and early 20th centuries²². The cultural and ideological shift was facilitated by the emergence of representatives of the social elite, a narrow layer of people with European cultural values²³.

It should be noted that the slowed-down process of national identity formation among the Kazakhs could be associated with their "politically calm nature"

¹⁸ Jean-Francois Caron, *op. cit.*

¹⁹ Dilip Hiro, *Inside Central Asia: A political and cultural history of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Iran*, New York – London, Overlook Duckworth.

²⁰ David Christian, *A history of Russia, Central Asia and Mongolia*, Malden, Wiley Blackwell, 2018.

²¹ Bhavna Dave, *Kazakhstan: Ethnicity, Language and Power*, London – New York, Routledge, 2007.

²² Альбина С. Жанбосинова, Арман А. Кульшанова, Мендыганым Дж. Шаймерденова, *Промыслово-ремесленные занятия казахского населения в середине XIX – начале XX веков* [Handicraft of the Kazakh People in the middle of 19th – early 20th centuries], in "Bylye Gody", 2019, Vol. 51, No. 1, p. 246.

²³ Абдижапар Абдакомов, *История Казахстана (от древних времен до наших дней)* [The history of Kazakhstan (from ancient times to our days)], Том 3, Алматы, РИК, 1994, p. 165.

and isolation from political problems in general, according to some researchers: “[Until] the mid-19th century, it [Kazakh epics and folklore] showed no evidence of political consciousness-or even sub-national loyalties.”²⁴

According to S. Sabol, the history of the intelligentsia as a separate social class within the Russian Empire (which included Kazakhstan, along with other subjugated nations) began in the 1860s. During that time, the term designated “not only the revolutionary opposition to the tsarist regime in whatever manifestation, but independent thinkers, often of aristocratic background, who by virtue of their intellect felt separated from the ordinary, typically uneducated, masses.”²⁵ S. Sabol accents that in the 19th century, the Kazakh intelligentsia operated between the two societies and cultures (Russian and authentically Kazakh), and by the 20th century, they sought to mediate between the state and its subjects and to preserve and promote the cultural and economic development of a people permanently subjugated and impoverished.²⁶ The 20th century was the beginning of a more acute position of the Kazakh intelligentsia with the demands of cultural and religious autonomy and independence. The formation and development of the Kazakh national intelligentsia was not easy and straightforward, but rather a difficult and lengthy process. First of all, it can be measured by an increased number of trained professionals in the national industry, politics, and culture. Eventually, it was some of them who formed the country’s intelligentsia.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, there were two options to get primary education in Kazakhstan: Muslim *mektebs* and Russian-Kyrgyz village schools. Religious schools (*mektebs*) outnumbered secular schools and formed the education system for the local population. *Mektebs* taught primarily religious subjects²⁷. It was not until 1874 that the Ministry of Public Education began to oversee religious Muslim schools in Kazakhstan. Russian language classes were introduced in 1876²⁸.

The Russian tsarist government insisted on limited primary education for the

²⁴ Bhavna Dave, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

²⁵ Steven Sabol, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

²⁷ Самира Мир-Багирзаде, *Система образования и воспитания на мусульманском Востоке* [Education system in the Muslim East], in “Філософія освіти” [Philosophy of education], 2013, Vol. 1, No. 13, p. 362.

²⁸ Пётр Дашковский, Елена Шернёва, *Мусульманское образование в Западной Сибири в XIX – начале XX в.* [Muslim Education in the West Siberia in the XIXth – the Beginning of XXth Centuries], in “Известия Алтайского государственного университета. История и археология” [Proceedings of Altai State University. History and Archeology], 2011, Vol. 7-1, No. 72, p. 69.

Kazakhs and focused on the Russian language and basic arithmetic as school subjects. The tsarist government was not interested in the development of secondary or high education. Various tsarist decrees and the introduction of colonial administration minimized the political influence of the Kazakhs. Thus, only some elite representatives had the opportunity (though very limited) to get an education.

Governor-General von Kaufman of Turkestan believed that the Kazakhs were more receptive to European civilization, which, in the colonial perception, could only be transmitted through the diffusion of the Russian language, culture and religion, and from this perspective, spreading education among the nomadic Kazakhs would allow the Russian state “to fulfill the humanitarian responsibility of drawing them into the family of civilized people [as well as] to distance them from Muslim influence that has already begun to appear among the nomads”²⁹. However, the prospect of controlling educated people seemed more intimidating and dangerous rather than attractive.

The absence of national secondary schools in the late 19th and early 20th centuries forced the Kazakhs to send their children to Russian educational institutions. The first Russian secondary educational institution, which became accessible to Kazakh children, was Orenburg Neplyuev Military School (1825), later renamed Orenburg Cadet Corps. M. S. Babadzhanov, a well-known Kazakh scientist, was among the first Kazakh students of the school.

As regards higher education, the Kazakhs had two options. The first option was to study in higher educational institutions of the Russian Empire. A. B. Aldiyarov and M. M. Chumbalov studied at the Faculty of Medicine of Kazan University. Kh. Dosmukhamedov and N. Ipmagmbetov studied at St. Petersburg Medical Academy. A. Bukeikhanov graduated from St. Petersburg Forestry Institute. S. Appasov, Zh. Dosmukhamedov and S. Nurlykhanov got their degrees at the Faculty of Law of Moscow University. Zh. Akpayev, B. Karatayev, S. Amanzholov and M. Chokayev studied at the Faculty of Law of St. Petersburg University. M. Tynyshpayev went to the St. Petersburg Institute of Railway Transport. A. Ermekov studied at Tomsk Technological Institute.

The second option to getting a higher education was to study in a religious, rather than secular, format – in *madrasas*. These institutions represented higher education and trained pastoral counsellors, mosque rectors, who were professionally versed in Sharia law, the norms of Muslim law, and the holy book of the Koran, as well as teachers of Islamic theological schools. Therefore, the *madrasa* curriculum was distinguished by a combination of the foundations of Muslim the-

²⁹ Bhavna Dave, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

ology and the Arabic language with general education subjects, as well as information on pedagogical disciplines.³⁰

The most prestigious schools of the time were *Galia* in Ufa, *Khusainia* in Orenburg, *Rasulia* in Troitsk, and *madrasas* in the city of Uralsk. Many representatives of the Kazakh intelligentsia, including T. Zhomartbayev, M. Seralin, B. Mailin, M. Zhumabayev, and Kh. Ibrahimov, studied in the *Galia madrasa* in Ufa, founded under the patronage of Emperor Nicholas II in 1906.³¹

In this regard, one should mention the problem of language, which directly influenced the learning process and the formation of the education system as a whole. The above-mentioned Muslim *mektebs* and Russian (or Altynsarin) schools had different approaches to teaching. Teaching in Kazakh *mektebs* proceeded in the Kazakh language written in the Arabic script. It was based on the so-called '*eski zhol*' ['the old way'] method, i.e. influenced by Islamic educational traditions.³² The so-called Altynsarin or Russian schools were first organized by the well-known Kazakh scholar I. Altynsarin, who introduced the Cyrillic alphabet adapted to the Kazakh language.³³ This alphabet was compiled by the Russian orientalist and missionary N. Il'minsky, who was convinced that the Cyrillic alphabet would serve as the first step to the Russification of the Kazakhs with subsequent conversion to Christianity.³⁴ The newspaper *Qazaq* also mentioned a third type of Kazakh primary schools, which used the so-called '*zhana zhol*' ['the new way'] method of teaching. However, these schools were not widely spread.³⁵

Although the quality of education in *mektebs* was significantly worse due to poorly qualified teachers and archaic methods of teaching,³⁶ the Kazakhs preferred to send their children to Kazakh schools as they did not trust Russian-speaking teachers bringing in a foreign culture and contributing to the Russification of the people. This peculiarity created one of the many barriers to education

³⁰ Лазат Динашева, Жахангир Юсуп, *Народное образование в южных областях Казахстана (вторая половина XIX – начало XX вв.)* [Public education in the southern regions of Kazakhstan (second half of the 19th - beginning of the 20th centuries)], in "Universum: Общественные науки: электронный научный журнал" [Universum: Social Sciences: Electronic Scientific Journal], 2015, Vol. 4, No. 14.

³¹ С. В. Захаров, А. С. Муканова, *Формирование казахской интеллигенции* [Formation of Kazakh intelligentsia]; in "Межвузовский вестник" [Inter-University Bulletin], 2012, Vol. 19, No. 2, p. 41-43.

³² Gulnar Kendirbaeva, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

and slowed down the formation of national elites.³⁷

Another thing affecting the formation of the Kazakh intelligentsia was the geographical factor that “slowed down” this process: nomadic settlements were scattered, and there were huge distances between them, no transport infrastructure, and no such geographical center.³⁸

The formation of the Kazakh intellectuals during the *fin de siècle* was a complex process. Kh. Abzhanov emphasized that the intelligentsia was the product of the development of Kazakh society in the early 20th century, and then the national intellectuals awakened the great steppe population. M. Dulatov’s poetic call “*Оян, қазақ!*” [“Wake up, Kazakh!”], captured the critical moment that could most accurately characterize the spirit of that time.

THE INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL ELITES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF KAZAKH SOCIETY

The oppressive colonial policy of the Russian tsar threatened the existence of Kazakhs as a nation. Acute social and economic problems arising from this policy were leading to a critical point.³⁹ The combination of the growing number of educated people and the rapid development of capitalist relations influenced the formation of national consciousness and stirred the desire to participate in the political life of the country.

In 1917, the Alash party was formed consisting of ethnic Kazakhs. The party united the progressive Kazakhs, who saw the destiny of their country free from imperial colonization. They dreamt about achieving Kazakhstan’s prosperity and creating a modern Kazakh nation. The program of the party called for national autonomy with Kazakh courts and army but within a federal, democratic Russia, social equality for all, freedom of speech, justice for the poor, separation of religion and state, free and popular education in the native language, solution of the land question, and putting an end to Russian migration.⁴⁰ In December 1917, at the Second All-Kazakh Congress in Orenburg, the party leaders announced the creation of Alash Orda – a self-proclaimed Kazakh national-territorial entity with its own independent government. However, as far back as in 1920, after the Bolsheviks

³⁷ C. B. Захаров, А. С. Муканова, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

³⁸ Bhavna Dave, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

³⁹ Gulnar Kendirbaeva, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁴⁰ Yunus Gürbüz, *Role of Alash Orda on the Formation of Kazakh SSR*, in “The Proceedings of the European Society for Central Asian Studies Tenth Conference “Central Asia: Sharing Experiences and Prospects”, Ankara, 12-15 September 2007, p. 662.

came to power, the Alash party and Alash Orda were dismissed.⁴¹ Its members faced harassment and repression for many years after that,⁴² and the lives of many prominent political figures and representatives of the national elites were cut short during the Stalinist repressions.

A certain specific feature of the Kazakh liberation movement at the beginning of the 20th century is worth noting: it was led by a political force new to the Kazakh society: the national intelligentsia. Though modest in number, it was extremely active and politically sophisticated.⁴³

Representatives of national elites became the main driving force of political and state changes. Despite numerous difficulties, arrests and imprisonment, they continued to fight for the formation of their own statehood and the awakening of national consciousness. These people left a significant mark in Kazakh history, which is why a brief description of the activities and biographies of some of them is relevant.

Khalil Dosmukhamedov (1883-1939) was interested in the development of the country's political life. He was upset that no party (neither social democrat nor socialist revolutionaries) represented the interests of the Kazakh people and the peoples of the Russian Empire.⁴⁴ He began his active political career in 1905 by establishing and promoting progressive ideas in the newspapers *Uralskiy Listok* and *Fiker*. In 1913-1918, he published several works in the newspaper *Qazaq*. His political merit also included his participation in negotiations with V. I. Lenin and I. V. Stalin on the issues of Kazakh autonomy, membership in the Alash Orda government, creation of the Alash police, as well as participation in the work of the Education Commission under the People's Commissariat for Education of the Republic of Turkestan⁴⁵.

⁴¹ Tomohiko Uyama, *The Geography of Civilizations: A Spatial Analysis of the Kazakh Intelligentsia's Activities, from the Mid-Nineteenth to the Early Twentieth Century*, in Kimitaka Matsuzato, *Regions: A Prism to View the Slavic-Eurasian World. Towards a Discipline of 'Regionology'*, Sapporo, Slavic Research Centre, 2000, p. 80.

⁴² С. Д. Шаймуханова, Ж. С. Ерденбекова, Бибигуль Муратбекқызы, *Вклад Алихана Букейханова в политическую и научно-исследовательскую деятельность Казахстана* [The contribution of Alikhan Bukeikhanov to the political and research activities of Kazakhstan], in "International Journal of Applied and Fundamental Research", 2016, No. 5, p. 332.

⁴³ Mambet Koigeldiev, *op. cit.*, p. 157, in http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no14_ses/06_koigeldiev.pdf (Accessed on 28.04.2020).

⁴⁴ Аскар Даирбек, *Военный врач и видный деятель Алаша Халел Досмухамедов* [Military doctor and prominent figure of Alash Khalel Dosmukhamedov], in <https://sarbaz.kz/history/voenny-vrach-i-vidnyy-deyatel-alasha-halel-dosmuhamedov-161951553/> (Accessed on 27.04.2020).

⁴⁵ Е. Тілешов, Д. Қамзабекұлы, *Алаш қозғалысы. Энциклопедиялық анықтамалық*

His colleague and close associate was Zhahansha Dosmukhamedov (1887-1938), who was also known for his proactive political stance. His interest in the country's socio-political life began during his studies at the Faculty of Law of Moscow University.⁴⁶ He began his career in the Uralsk judicial agency and went deeper into politics, becoming, subsequently, one of the leaders of the national liberation movement of Kazakhstan.⁴⁷ Zh. Dosmukhamedov, as a professional lawyer, played a leading role in shaping the legal concept of Alash. The particular significance of his activity consisted in the unification of the Muslims of Russia. He was elected Deputy Chairman of the All-Russian Muslim Council, a member of the pre-parliament of the Provisional Council formed by the Provisional Government, and a member of a special session to draft a law on the Constituent Assembly. He also took an active part in organizing and conducting Muslim congresses. In the west of Kazakhstan, under his leadership, the Uilsky Olyat government was formed, reorganized later into the Western branch of Alash Orda. He initiated the formation of the Kazakh army, the people's militia, and started two cadet schools for the training of Kazakh officers. Putting into practice his ideas on the formation of national autonomy, Zh. Dosmukhamedov rigidly raised the land issue, believing that the land should be owned by the Kazakh people.⁴⁸

Alikhan Bukeikhanov (1866-1937) was the oldest leading figure of the Kazakh political movement in the first quarter of the 20th century. After graduating from the Faculty of Economics of St. Petersburg Forestry Institute, he began to actively participate in the country's political life. He joined the Constitutional Democratic Party of Russia, took part in anti-colonial speeches, and worked as an editor in the newspapers *Irtys*, *Omich*, and *Golos*, covering important social and political issues.⁴⁹ Later on, he became one of the founders and the leader of the Alash party and the head of Alash Orda.⁵⁰ A. Bukeikhanov was also known as an encyclopedic scientist, the founder of Kazakh local history, and a talented publicist.⁵¹

Another well-known leader of Alash Orda was Mirzhakip Dulatov (1885-1935), who was a poet, writer, journalist, educator, as well as one of the leaders

[Alash movement. Encyclopedic reference book], Алматы, Сардар, 2014, p. 155-156.

⁴⁶ Ш. А. Забих, *Формирование и эволюция политико-правовых взглядов Жаханши Досмухамедова* [Formation and evolution of Zhahansha Dosmukhamedov's political and legal views], in "Право и государство" [Law and State], 2015, Vol. 4, No. 69, p. 95.

⁴⁷ Е. Тілешов, Д. Қамзабекұлы, *op. cit.*, p. 147-150.

⁴⁸ Ш. А. Забих, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

⁴⁹ С. Д. Шаймуханова, Ж.С. Ерденбекова, Бибигуль Муратбеккызы, *op. cit.*, p. 331.

⁵⁰ Yunus Gürbüz, *op. cit.*, p. 673.

⁵¹ С.Д. Шаймуханова, Ж.С. Ерденбекова, Бибигуль Муратбеккызы, *op. cit.*, p. 330-331.

of the national liberation movement of Kazakhstan. His political activity was closely intertwined with the literary one. His works were regularly published in the journal *Ay Qap* and the newspaper *Qazaq*.⁵² He criticized the socio-economic and political situation of the Kazakh people under the oppression of imperial administration. His work *Oïian, Qazaq!* ['Awake, Kazakh!'] about the problem of the unequal position of women in Kazakhstan brought him great fame.⁵³

Akhmet Baitursynov (1873-1937) was a prominent poet, scholar, translator, teacher, reformer, and a political figure of the early 20th century. He did not have a higher education. However, this did not prevent him from taking an active part in political life. He opposed the expropriation of land from the Kazakhs, criticized the tsarist government, and participated in the creation of the Alash party.⁵⁴ During 1913-1917, he served as editor of *Qazaq*, the most popular Kazakh-language newspaper, published in Orenburg⁵⁵. He wrote and published articles on education, literature, and linguistics, introducing readers to the rich cultural heritage of the people and calling for national awakening.

No less significant was the activity of other politically-minded individuals of that time, such as V. Tanachev, B. Kulmanov, M. Tynyshpayev, Y. Omarov, B. Karatayev, K. Kemengerov, S. Sadvokasov, and S. Seifullin.

As can be seen from the biographies of some socio-political figures, the representatives of the intelligentsia were interested not only in politics, but also in many other areas – art, literature, history, and folklore. Often, it was through artistic means that important ideas were conveyed to the people in the most accessible form for perception – songs, plays, novels, or poems.

In the early 20th century, the cultural ties of Kazakhstan strengthened. Progressively-minded poets and writers, turning more and more to Russian and Western European classics, began to translate the works of A. S. Pushkin, M. Yu. Lermontov, L. N. Tolstoy, I. A. Krylov, and other advanced Russian word-painters, including their translations and adaptations from Western European culture.

The genre composition of Kazakh literature also became diverse: it was during this period that the first Kazakh novels, dramas, and stories were written, critical articles and essays first appeared in print, and satire developed. Kazakh literature moved to a qualitatively new stage of development, and the publication of

⁵² *Елім деп соққан ұлы жүрек* [The great heart that beats for my country], Алматы, 2002.
<http://nblib.library.kz/elib/Sait/NauBibUKAZ/Ұлы%20тулғалар.%20PDF-формат.2-версия/Dulatov.pdf> (Accessed on 12.05.2020).

⁵³ Gulnar Kendirbaeva, *op. cit.*, p. 23-24.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁵⁵ Steven Sabol, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

books in the Kazakh language had a huge positive impact on the development of education in the region.⁵⁶

One of the most significant figures of Kazakh literature, S. Toraigyrov, saw the meaning of his life in the enlightenment of his native people, as well as their release from socio-political oppression.⁵⁷ In 1914, he wrote one of the first Kazakh novels – *Kamar Sulu* [*Beautiful Kamar*], in which he exposed the morals of tribal clans and the cruel customs and mores of feudal-patriarchal society, as well as advocated the emancipation of women. This theme was also touched upon in the work *Gulkashima*, written by M. Seralin at about the same period. The main plotlines in the works *Rabiha*, *Kartkozha*, and *Sherniyaz* by Zh. Aymautov are the problems of women's equal rights, morality, and the struggle against remnants of the past.⁵⁸ In M. Zhumabayev's story "Sholpanyn kunasi" ["Sholpan's Sin"], the image of the main character embodies the entire Kazakh people, who found themselves in difficult conditions, tormented by difficulties of the right choice and oppressed by imposed traditions.⁵⁹ Seeing the difficult situation of his people, Sh. Kudaiberdiyev searched for ways out of the crisis and propagated the ideas of education and humanism, exposing the anti-people policy of large feudal lords. He expressed his thoughts in the works *Chronicle of Kyrgyz*, *Turkish*, *Kazakh Khans*, *Conditions of Islam*, and *Enlik-Kebek*.⁶⁰ No less popular are the works of A. Baitursynov, M. Zhumabayev, and Zh. Aymautov, which adhered to universal values and principles of humanism.⁶¹

It should also be noted that the late 19th and early 20th centuries were marked by the beginning of journalism in Kazakhstan. The main prerequisites for the formation of this field were the growth of population and several educated people, as well as the appearance of the first printed editions, post-offices, and telegraph.

The beginning of the periodical press was laid in Tashkent in 1870–1882 with the newspaper *Turkistan ualayatynyn gazeti* [*Turkestan Gazette*], published

⁵⁶ Zhandos Kumganbayev, Nazgul Kudaibergenova, *op. cit.*, p. 620, in doi: 10.1016/j.sbspro.2013.08.904

⁵⁷ Буркитбай Аяган, Мендыганым Шаймерденова, *История Казахстана (Начало XX века – Настоящее время)* [History of Kazakhstan (From the early XX century to present)], Алматы, Атамұра, 2013, p. 56-57.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

⁵⁹ Г. Ақанқызы, *Әйелдер құқығы идеясы және Қазақ әдебиетіндегі әйелдер образы* [Feminism and women's image in Kazakh literature], in "Вестник Казахского государственного женского педагогического университета" [Bulletin of Kazakh State Women's Pedagogical University], 2014, Vol.3, No. 51, p. 5.

⁶⁰ Буркитбай Аяган, Мендыганым Шаймерденова, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

in the form of an addendum to the official press organ of the Turkestan Governor Generalship – *Turkestan Vedomosti*.⁶² *Turkestan Gazette* was the very first Kazakh-language newspaper, which contributed to the emergence of modern Kazakh journalism and publication. The significance of this newspaper lies in the fact that it discussed social, economic, and cultural problems.

Later, in 1905-1907, the newspapers *Serke* ['Leader'] and *Kazakh gazet* ['Kazakh Newspaper'] appeared, and in 1911, the newspaper *Kazakhstan* and the journal *Ay Qap* were established.⁶³ The latter was led by M. Seralin and played an important role in the development of Kazakh written literature.⁶⁴ However, the most famous newspaper was *Qazaq*, the first issue of which was published in Orenburg on February 2, 1913. The newspaper was published until 1918. Its issues were devoted to the transition from nomadism to agriculture, as well as the problems of equality, religion, and international relations. The newspaper circulation ranged from 3 to 8 thousand copies.⁶⁵ From time to time, the press was censored by the tsarist authorities. For example, *Qazaq* was closed down⁶⁶ due to its inconsistency with the colonial policy of the Russian Empire. Nevertheless, such attempts to oppress the print media only strengthened the ideas of the Kazakhs about the importance of forming national identity.

It should be noted that newspapers were best suited for use as a means of disseminating the ideas of the intelligentsia. For instance, the newspaper *Birlik tui*, founded in 1917, protected Kazakh national interests and proved the ideas of national self-determination of the peoples of Turkestan.⁶⁷ The newspaper *Sary-Arka*, which was printed in Semipalatinsk in 1917-1918, covered the problems of the formation of the Kazakh state system and the Alash Orda government. Politicians such as A. Bukeikhanov and Kh. Gabbasov advocated in this newspaper⁶⁸ the idea of prosperity

⁶² Seidulla Sadykov, Marlan Negizbayeva, Gulnar Uzbekova, *Kazakh printed press development in the late 19th-early 20th century*, in "Евразийский Союз Ученых" [Eurasian Union of Scientists], 2018, Vol. 4, No. 49, p. 60.

⁶³ Султан-Хан Аккулы, *Газете, которая отстаивала этническое название казахов, исполняется сто лет* [The newspaper, which defended the ethnic name of the Kazakhs, turns one hundred years old], Радио Азаттык, 2012. <https://rus.azattyq.org/a/newspaper-khazakh-aikhap-baitursunuly-dulatuly/24605595.html> (Accessed on 12.05.2020).

⁶⁴ Буркитбай Аяган, Мендыганым Шаймерденова, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ Seidulla Sadykov, Marlan Negizbayeva, Gulnar Uzbekova, *op. cit.*

of the Kazakhs, national self-determination and statehood. "I live, breathe, exist in the internal affairs of my homeland, for me its fate is above all good... I can't sleep peacefully if I don't know what position it is in," wrote A. Bukeikhanov.⁶⁹

As mentioned above, any form of art could be used to convey an idea to ordinary people, including theatrical productions, operas, performances, and concerts. The beginning of the 20th century was marked by the formation of the first professional Kazakh theater, opened in Kyzyl-Orda in January 1926. One of the first theatrical productions was the tragedy *Enlik-Kebek* by M. Auezov, which raised the problem of the rigidity of Kazakh traditions. A similar theme was covered in the novel *Monument to Suga* by B. Mailin, based on which a popular performance was also staged. The play based on the poem "Ayman Sholpan" by M. Auezov not only raised the theme of the traditional life of society but also highlighted the problem of the internal struggle and ridiculed the politics of the biys and the batyrs. In 1934, for the first time on stage, a work based on a real Kazakh legend was reproduced – the opera *Kyz-Zhibek* by E. Brusilovsky. In *Zhalbyr* E. Brusilovsky (1935) also described the struggle of the Kazakh people against tsarism and feudal lords.⁷⁰ All these productions were a huge success with the public.⁷¹

Last but not least, one should also mention some representatives of the intelligentsia who developed the country's economy. Representatives of the oil industry held a special place among them since this industry was most actively developed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

The development of oil resources was at first associated with the involvement of many foreign specialists from Russia, France, England, Germany, and Sweden, while the Kazakhs initially performed exclusively basic manual work. However, harsh working conditions, poor living conditions, and a hot climate were not suited for foreign specialists. Moreover, over time, with the improvement of production technologies and the creation of new equipment, a need arose for a larger number of highly qualified personnel. In this regard, specialized educational institutions began to arise.⁷² Dossor Factory-Plant School (FZU) became

⁶⁹ Р. К. Нурмагамбетова, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

⁷⁰ Алия Бопежанова, *История театра* [History of the theatre], Казахский государственный академический драмтеатр им. Ауэзова [Kazakh State Academic Drama Theater named after Auezov], 2017. Retrieved from: <https://www.auezov-theatre.kz/ru/about/history> (Accessed on 28.04.2020).

⁷¹ Буркитбай Аяган, Мендыганым Шаймерденова, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

⁷² Leskaly Berdyguzhin, Aldar Sarsenov, Uldai Tulenoba, Amangeldi Zhumabayev, Bulat Nigmatov, Saken Mirbolatov, Maussymzhan Berdigozhina, *The history of the oil industry in Kazakhstan: from the origins to the present day*, in "Man in India", 2017, Vol.

the first training school in oil production, while the second school was established in Guryev.⁷³ By 1926, 2,096 Kazakhs (62.7% of the total number of workers) were employed in the oil industry. During 1931-1932, the two schools trained 720 oil workers, including 510 Kazakhs.⁷⁴

The workers of the newspaper *Zhumyskermili* [*The Voice*] and Guryev Oil Technical College greatly contributed to training national cadres, preparing technical graduates, filling the deficit of professional staff, and developing special vocational education in Kazakhstan as a whole. Guryev Oil Technical College has become a leader in the booming oil industry. It trained geologists, drilling specialists, economists, and others.⁷⁵

Many of the graduates of the Guryev Oil Technical College subsequently became well-known drilling masters, heads of oil exploration companies, directors of oil fields including O. Berdygozhin, S. Mukashev, J. Esenzhanov, U. Utibayev, M. Kushkinbayev, U. Balgimbayev, U. Siranov, B. Bazhbenov, K. Tulin, K. Narembayev, D. Usenov, G. Kozhagulov, Zh. Saliyev, E. Taumanov, O. Bazhybayev, V. Balduyev, M. Matashev, K. Ogay, K. Kudabayev, B. Turaliyev, K. Kuantyrov, A. Ualiyev and others. M. Isenov, S. Utebayev, R. Sagyndykov, A. Suleimenov, S. Yusupov, A. Ilyasov, K. Sariyev and S. Karymsakov were plant workers who graduated in engineering and became major specialists.⁷⁶

CONCLUSIONS

A deep analysis of historical and socio-cultural conditions of Kazakhstan's development during Russian colonization makes it possible to conclude that it was the period of the late 19th and early 20th centuries that was a turning point in the history of Kazakhstan, as political, economic and social factors led to significant changes in the country, namely the formation of the intelligentsia class and considerable activity in the direction of national Kazakh interests and national identity development.

The process of forming national elites as a class was quite long. The main factor preventing its development was the reluctance of the tsarist government to develop

97, No. 4, p. 644.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ *Энциклопедия нефтяной промышленности Казахстана* [Petroleum Encyclopedia of Kazakhstan], Том 1, Алматы, Общественный фонд "Мунайши", 2005, p. 188.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 189.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

the colonial territories, including the Kazakh ones. Control over the poor and uneducated peoples was preferred. However, the search for new markets, natural resources, and labor resources on the outskirts of the empire required, one way or another, interaction with the local population. The Kazakhs gradually began to be involved in local governments, which increased confidence in the local population. But the greatest achievement and factor that influenced the formation of the intelligentsia class in Kazakhstan was the opportunity to receive an education for the Kazakh children. In addition to traditional Muslim *mektebs*, primary education also became available in progressive Russian-language schools. Moreover, immigrants from Kazakhstan also got access to higher education in such large educational centers as Kazan, Moscow, St. Petersburg, Omsk and others. The increase in the number of educated young people contributed to the formation of a new class in the state, which desired better living conditions for its people. The priority of the Kazakh intelligentsia was to bring the Kazakhs to the Russian cultural level. It is obvious, though, that the economic standard of living was no less desirable.

The similarity of the views of many representatives of the intelligentsia contributed to the convergence of like-minded people, which resulted in the formation of the Alash party in 1917. The activities of the party led to the creation of state autonomy – Alash Orda with its own government. Although the party was later dismissed by the Bolsheviks, and most of its members were repressed, this stage became important for the history of Kazakhstan, which demonstrated the strong desire of the people to gain independence.

Promoting the ideas of enlightenment of the native people, as well as their liberation from socio-political oppression, required new tools for communication. This need was met through the development of the printing industry and the publication of newspapers, the most significant of which was *Qazaq*. This period was also marked by the emergence of significant figures in various fields – literature, theater, music, science, and industry. It was through these ways that one could propagate the ideas of education, raise awareness among the indigenous population, as well as expand the system of primary education.

The conducted study makes it possible to conclude that it was due to the efforts of the intelligentsia that the Kazakhs as a nation strongly stood out from other imperial province and Soviet republics and could not be fully assimilated by the colonial authorities, despite numerous decrees and even repressive actions, aimed at suppressing the dissent of the subjugated peoples. Representatives of different elite strata contributed in every possible way to national development along the entire thorny path until independence.

WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN THE UKRAINIAN LANDS (END OF THE 19th – EARLY 20th CENTURY) ON THE EGO-DOCUMENTS OF THE KOSACH AND GRINCHENKO FAMILIES

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Abstract. *The formation of the women's movement in the Ukrainian lands at the end of the 19th – in the early 20th century is a fundamental subject as gender issues provoke discussions among researchers also in the contemporary Ukrainian society. Although the birth of feminism and the emergence of an organised women's movement in the Ukrainian territories have been sufficiently covered by documentary sources, the historians have not yet used the ego-documents. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to present the women's movement of that time, using the ego-documents (mostly correspondence) of Kosach and Grinchenko intellectual families, whose representatives played a prominent role in the fight for women's rights. The ego-documents are regarded as an indispensable source for reproducing not only facts but also reflecting the realities of that time and the epoch features. The research materials demonstrate the difference in the situation of the Dnieper Ukraine (in Russia) and Western Ukraine (in Austro-Hungary), as well as the contrast between the principles of the women's movement and the women's real position in society. The ego-documents reflect the inclusion of the fight for women's rights in the general context of the Ukrainian socio-political movement development caused by the conservative policies of the imperial governments and the preservation of patriarchal traditions in society.*

Keywords: *Women's movement, Dnieper Ukraine, Western Ukraine, ego-documents, women's rights, feminism, patriarchal traditions.*

Rezumat: *Mișcarea femeilor în teritoriile ucrainene (sfârșitul secolului al XIX-lea – începutul secolului XX) pe baza ego-documentelor familiilor Kosach și Grinchenko. Cristalizarea mișcării femeilor în spațiul ucrainean la sfârșitul secolului al XIX-lea și începutul secolului XX este un subiect important din moment ce problematica de gen generează polemici atât în rândul cercetătorilor, cât și la nivelul societății ucrainene contemporane. Chiar dacă geneza feminismului și apariția unei mișcări organizate a*

femeilor în teritoriile ucrainene au fost suficient de bine ilustrate în sursele documentare, istoricii nu s-au folosit până acum de ego-documente. Prin urmare, scopul acestui studiu este de a prezenta mișcarea femeilor din perioada menționată folosind ego-documentele (în special, corespondența) familiilor de intelectuali Kosach și Grinchenko, ai căror reprezentanți au jucat un rol proeminent în lupta pentru drepturile femeilor. Ego-documentele sunt considerate drept o sursă indispensabilă nu numai pentru reproducerea faptelor, ci și pentru reflectarea realităților din acea vreme și a particularităților epocii. Materialele de cercetare demonstrează diferența dintre situația existentă în Ucraina Nipreană (aflată în cadrul Rusiei) și cea din Ucraina de Vest (parte a Austro-Ungariei), precum și contrastul dintre principiile mișcării femeilor și statutul real al acestora în societate. Ego-documentele reflectă încadrarea luptei pentru drepturile femeii în contextul general al dezvoltării mișcării socio-politice a ucrainenilor provocată de politicile conservatoare ale guvernelor imperiale și de păstrarea tradițiilor patriarhale în societate.

INTRODUCTION

The formation of the women's movement at the end of the 19th – in the early 20th century distinguishes explicitly from the starting points of emancipation in Western Europe. It can be attributed to the absence of Ukrainians' statehood and belonging of its territories to the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires, as well as to the conservativeness of the social system and specifics of the Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches' doctrines.¹ At the same time, a fair point of view has been established in the historiography of gender issues assuming that the women's movement in the Over Dnieper (ukr. Naddniprianshchyna) and Western Ukrainian lands emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century under the influence of All-European emancipation, that is, women's longing to achieve equal status with men.

The Ukrainian women's movement of the investigated period has been widely highlighted in the scientific literature. Historiographical studies of the issue are combined into four groups.

The first group comprises works of the women's movement active leaders from the Over Dnieper and Western Ukraine, namely Olena Pchilka, Natalia Kobrynska, Olga Kobylanska, Lesia Ukrainka, Lyudmyla Starytska-Chernyakhivska, Sofia Rusova, Lyubov Yanovska, Valeria O'Connor-Vilinska, Christina Alchevska,

¹ Олена Ковальчук, Лілія Потапюк, *Причини та передумови виникнення жіночого руху в Україні на прикладі жіночих товариств (друга половина 19-го – початок 20-го століття)* [Causes and prerequisites for the emergence of the women's movement in Ukraine on the example of women's societies (second half of 19th – early 20th century)], in *Людинознавчі студії* [Human studies studios], Дрогобич, 2017, с. 60-70.

and others. These authors were contemporaries and also active participants in the struggle for the emancipation. Therefore, their works are filled with interesting and precise historical material supported by the original author's impressions and conclusions.

The second group consists of the historical investigations of the Ukrainian diaspora, in particular Ivan Kuzevich-Berezovskyi, Alexander Lugovyi, Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, Lyubov Volynets, Olena Zalizniak, and others.² Foreign historiography focuses mainly on the role of the Ukrainian women's movement of both empires in national liberation struggles at that time, as well as the influence of international feminism on the self-awareness of Ukrainian womanhood.

The publications of Soviet researchers form the third group of studies. According to Olga Labur, studying the history of the women's movement in Soviet historiography was closely related to the Marxist-Leninist approach to the woman's rights movement.³ As Soviet historiography of the late 1920s – early 1930s became more filled with the communist-party principles, the "labour" theme of the women's movement was gradually pushed out by totalitarian ideologized approaches. For this reason, Soviet literature now seems to be of low importance in accumulating facts and assessing the issue raised.

The fourth group includes a considerable number of scientific works from the time of independent Ukraine. It is worth pointing out the monographs of Lyudmyla Smoliar. The researcher has introduced numerous archival sources that allow determining the main trends and stages of women's social activity. Spreading of emancipation in the Western Ukrainian lands have been thoroughly analysed by Oksana Malanchuk-Rybak, who focused on characterising the main discourses of the women's movement ideology in Western Ukraine.⁴ The research of

² Лілія Романишин, *Український жіночий рух у контексті національного відродження наприкінці ХХ – початку ХХІ ст.: історіографія проблеми* [The Ukrainian women's movement in the context of national revival at the end of XIX – early XX c.: historiography of the problem], in *Україна-Європа-Світ. Міжнародний збірник наукових праць. Серія: Історія, міжнародні відносини* [Ukraine-Europe-World. International collection of scientific works. Series: History, International Relation], 2012, Вип. 10, с. 347-353.

³ Ольга Лабур, *Радянська історіографія про "звільнення жінки" в Україні 1920-1930-х рр.: перетворення ідеї на догму* [Soviet historiography on the "liberation of women" in Ukraine in the 1920s-1930s: turning ideas into dogma], in *Сторінки історії: Збірник наукових праць* [History pages: Collection of scientific works], 2009, Вип. 28, с. 121-129.

⁴ Оксана Маланчук-Рибак, *Ідеологія та суспільна практика жіночого руху на західно–*

Oksana Kis contributed to complex historical and ethnological understanding of the situation in the Ukrainian peasantry based on the gender approach.⁵ Iryna Andrusiak has explored the issue of gender equality in Ukrainian legal thought in the second half of the 19th century.⁶

When studying the women's movement in the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires, Western researchers either did not pay attention to Ukrainian subjects like Richard Stites⁷ or were limited to analysing the activities of women's organisations like Karl Vocelka.⁸ This fact can be attributed to the fact that both official sources and ego-documents were rarely published in foreign languages.

This paper aims at studying the formation of the women's movement in the Ukrainian lands at the end of the 19th – at the early 20th century based on ego-documents of two prominent Ukrainian intellectual families of Kosach and Grinchenko. Their representatives determined the essence of the woman's rights movement at that time. In other words, an attempt was made to reconstruct the women's movement and the impact of emancipation on the everyday practices of Ukrainian womanhood in the late 19th and early 20th centuries based on their letters, diaries, memoirs, notes, drafts, etc. Besides, the authors tried to identify and compare features of the struggle for women's rights in Ukrainian lands under the rule of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires using ego-documents.

The concept of ego-documents was introduced into historiography in 1958 by Professor Jacques Presser from the University of Amsterdam as a neologism

українських землях XIX – першої третини XX ст.: типологія і європейський культурно-історичний контекст [Ideology and social practice of women's movement in the West Ukrainian lands of the 19th – the first third of the 20th century: typology and European cultural and historical context], Чернівці, Книги – XXI, 2006, 500 с.

⁵ Оксана Кіс, *Жінка в традиційній українській культурі (друга половина XIX – початок XX ст.)* [Woman in Traditional Ukrainian Culture (second half of XIX – early XX c.)], Львів, Інститут народознавства НАН України, 2012, 287 с.

⁶ Ірина Андрусяк, *Правовий статус жінки на українських землях в другій половині XIX ст.* [Legal status of women in Ukrainian lands in the second half of the nineteenth century], in *Конституція і державотворення: національні традиції та світовий досвід* [Constitution and statesmaking: national traditions and world experience], Київ, Інститут держави і права ім. В.М. Корецького НАН України, 2014, с. 388-394.

⁷ Ричард Стайтс, *Женское освободительное движение в России: феминизм, нигилизм и большевизм, 1860-1930* [The Women's Liberation Movement in Russia: Feminism, Nihilism, and Bolshevism, 1860-1930], Москва, Российская политическая энциклопедия, 2004, 616 с.

⁸ Karl Vocelka, *Geschichte Österreichs. Kultur – Gesellschaft – Politik* [History of Austria. Culture – Society – Politics, Verlag Heyne, 2002, 408 s.

summarising personal documents like autobiographies, memoirs, letters, diaries, descriptions of journeys, etc.⁹ A new term rose immediate discussions. Researchers Michael Mascuch (California Berkeley Institute), Rudolf Dekker (University of Amsterdam), and Arianne Baggerman (Erasmus University in Rotterdam) reported different approaches to exploring ego-documents in the historical literature.¹⁰

The scientific approach initiated by Kaspar von Greyerz deserves special attention. He believed that personal narratives are deeply embedded in the collective context while creating a particular discourse of the women's movement.¹¹ Broad involvement of the little-researched ego-documents of the Ukrainian intelligentsia representatives along with new feminist readings of Olena Pchilka, Lesia Ukrainka, Borys Grinchenko, Mariya Zagirna, Olga Kobylanska, and other writer's work, will contribute to accepting new facts about past women's movement, as well as understanding the features of its development highlighted by the feelings of its participants.

Ego-documents have not yet been widely used in the Ukrainian historiography of woman's rights movement. Olga Koliastruk points out that they are neglected due to its and are mostly used as additional illustrative material.¹² However, in the history "from below", they play a fundamental role as such sources contribute to understanding the atmosphere of events. This also applies to the ego-documents of the Kosach and Grinchenko families. Although their epistolary and memoir heritage is systematised and published, it has not been widely referred to by researchers when analysing the woman's rights movement in the Ukrainian lands of the late 19th – early 20th centuries. Thus, the attempt has been made to fill this gap in national historiography.

THE STATUS OF A WOMAN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN THE RUSSIAN AND AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRES

In Europe, the women's movement as a social phenomenon emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century during the period of nation-building and

⁹ Kaspar von Greyerz, *Ego-Documents: The Last Word?*, in "German History", Vol. 28, 2010, Issue 3, p. 273-282.

¹⁰ Arianne Baggerman, Rudolf Dekker, Michael Mascuch, *Egodocuments and History: A Short Account of the Longue Durée*, in "The Historian", Vol. 78, 2016, No. 1, p. 11-56.

¹¹ Kaspar von Greyerz, *Ego-Documents...*, p. 273-282.

¹² Ольга Коляструк, *Документи особового походження як джерела з історії повсякденності* [Personal documents as historical sources], in "Український історичний журнал" [Ukrainian Historical Journal], 2008, № 2, с. 146.

progress in the implementation of democratic principles. In the women's organisations of that time important was social reforming with only a few societies striving to challenge the subordination of women to men. In the first decades of the twentieth century, these organisations started to be referred to as feministic after this term was introduced by French suffragist Hubertine Auclert.¹³ Noteworthy is that not all women's movements struggled openly against the gender hierarchy and considered themselves feminists, but all advocated electoral rights and the right to work.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the governments of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires started gradual democratic changes. Many researchers, like Yaroslav Hrytsak¹⁴ and Aleksey Miller¹⁵ considered these states as the most conservative in modernising public life. By addressing the woman's rights movement in mentioned states, researchers usually identify such essential components as the right to education, work, property, marriage, and various political rights and freedoms. In both empires, any efforts of reforming were hampered by the fact that the women's rights movement was closely related to the struggle for national identity in both parts of Ukraine. In particular, active womanhood demanded not only accessible quality education but also the possibility to learn their native language.

The Austrian government compromised earlier than the Russian. Karl Vocelka noted that the fight for women's rights first manifested during the "Spring of Nations" in 1848, when "one of the democratic women's unions protested against the reduction of women's wages."¹⁶ After the revolution of 1848-1849, the women's movement was developing mostly in a "non-political" form as women were prohibited from attending political organisations and meetings. However, the authorities gradually recognised individual women's rights. Thus, the imperial law of 1869 introduced mandatory education for girls. Since then, school education has opened the first area of intellectual work, namely, the profession of a teacher. In 1878, women were allowed to take the matriculation examination, although these certificates lacked the mark "qualified to enter the university." The

¹³ Laure Bereni, *Women's movements in Europe*, in *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements*, Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published, 2013.

¹⁴ Ярослав Грицак, *Нарис історії України. Формування модерної нації XIX–XX століття* [Essay from the history of Ukraine. Formation of the modern nation in the XIX–XX centuries], Київ, Yakaboo Publishing, 2019, 656 с.

¹⁵ *Западные окраины Российской империи* [Western outskirts of the Russian Empire], под ред. М. Д. Долбилов, А. И. Миллер, Москва, Новое литературное обозрение, 2006, 608 с.

¹⁶ Karl Vocelka, *Geschichte Österreichs...*, s. 292.

matriculation certificates granting the right to study at the University appeared only in 1901. Higher education became accessible slowly. Philosophy studying opened in 1897, pharmaceuticals and medicine is available since 1900.¹⁷

According to the civil law of Austria-Hungary, the man and the woman were equally obliged of matrimony and fidelity. Still, at the same time, the husband was recognised as the superior of the family. He determined the place of living for the family and had a powerful voice in household management. The law established the father as the head of the family and prioritised him in determining child custody. Parental authority lost its power only after the lawful age of the children, that is, after the age of 24.¹⁸

Russian imperial family law also enshrined the institute of husband's power when the wife was obliged to live together with him, follow him everywhere when they changed their residence, and to be in love and unlimited obedience to him. The law prohibited married women from signing a personal employment contract, obtaining separate residence permission, enter public services and educational institutions, or participate in civil proceedings while defending their rights without the consent of their husbands.¹⁹

During the 19th century, the social situation has changed. Last but not least, the role played in the economic situation. At the beginning of the 20th century, the share of female employees in factories and crafts had increased significantly due to the mechanisation of production and lower wages compared to that of male ones. This phenomenon revealed an urgent need for legislative regulation of the situation for working women in Russia. At that time, legislative initiatives concerned mainly factory work. The patriarchal nature of the legal policy of the Russian Empire was manifested in limiting women to be engaged in public service and take positions in the administrative decision-making sphere. The admission of women to the intellectual professions was strictly controlled as well.²⁰

The educational sphere remained difficult. In 1875, women were promised by the imperial government to receive the right to higher education. In 1878, the

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, s. 293.

¹⁸ Ігор Бойко, *Правове регулювання цивільних відносин на українських землях у складі Австрії та Австро-Угорщини (1772-1918 рр.)* [Legal regulation of civil relations in the Ukrainian lands within Austria and Austria-Hungary (1772-1918)], in "Вісник Львівського університету" [Bulletin of the University of Lviv], 2013, Вип. 57, с. 95.

¹⁹ С. В. Ворошилова, *Еволюція правового положення жінок в Росії в XIX – початок XX вв.* [The evolution of the legal status of women in Russia in the 19th and early 20th centuries], Саратов, Саратовский источник, 2011, с. 124.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, с. 122.

recruitment of female students for Bestuzhev Higher Female Courses (St. Petersburg) began, but they were chargeable and required certain political reliability. At the same time, the courses opened in Kyiv, Kazan and Tomsk (Siberian courses). According to the imperial decree, all existing Higher Female courses in the empire were closed in 1886 and resumed their work only in 1906.²¹

All these restrictions had an effect on daily life and provoked an emotional response among progressive women. Particularly, the patriarchy of the social system complicated the overall situation. Any attempts to implement the basic idea of the women's movement, including those already enshrined in the legislation, were met with condemnation. This is testified by the ego-documents of the Kosach and Grinchenko families.

WOMEN'S MOVEMENT OF THE DNIEPER UKRAINE IN THE EGODOCUMENTS OF THE KOSACH FAMILY

The Kosach family played a prominent role in the development of public and cultural Ukrainian life in the Over Dnieper. Thanks to Olga Kosach (Olena Pchilka), "intelligent female voice, along with it, a feminist idea" sounded in Ukrainian literature.²² Olena Pchilka and her daughters Larysa (Lesia Ukrainka) and Olga were conscious participants of the national struggle and actively advocated for the women's empowerment.

Researchers have different points of view on the feminist moods in the Kosach family. Some believe that feminism was one of the leading motives of Olena Pchilka's public activity. In turn, she influenced the daughters' interest in the women's rights movement. Others contradicted that the Kosach family had no interest in emancipation. The discussion was likely generated by the difference in understanding the essence of feminism within the family. Referring not only to works but also ego-documents, Lukash Skupeiko believed that feminism comprised a part of a much broader problem like the national self-affirmation of Ukrainians. "The Kosach women" are not likely to be suspected of being fascinated by feminism when it comes to the women's movement itself. In the Autobiography, Olena Pchilka focuses on the development of national sentiment among Ukrainian women, including those from Galicia. During her first trip abroad in 1872, the writer met with the Galicians in Vienna on behalf of Mykhaylo

²¹ *Ibid.*, c. 118.

²² Соломія Павличко, *Дискурс модернізму в українській літературі* [The discourse of modernism in Ukrainian literature], Київ, Либідь, 1999, c. 70.

Drahomanov. Among them was Sofia Okunevska, who impressed her by being a highly intelligent and passionate woman. Olena Pchilka wrote later that also among the Galician women existed the movement of national sentiments.²³ Liliya Sikora believed that "there is another type to embody of the feminist movement in life: not through creativity, but social activity aimed at the mainstream of the national movement."²⁴

Lesia Ukrainka's epistolary heritage sheds light on the specifics of her feminism formed under her mother's influence that instilled love to native word in her children, cared for their comprehensive education and deep knowledge. On the other hand, the uniqueness of Lesia's feminism and her views were highly influenced by her uncle, the famous scientist and public figure Mykhaylo Drahomanov. She emphasised this in a letter to the writer Olga Kobylyanska confessing that she did not have a "broad education" and "... generally studied only until the age of 14, and then went to take a living, that is, I only learned what I liked and read everything without any prohibition. True is, the correction was from the side of my mother and in the letters of uncle Mykhaylo Drahomanov, whom I consider to be a teacher as I am very grateful to him for my views on science, religion, and public life."²⁵ Lesia Ukrainka did not receive a formal education due to severe illness and a mother's unwillingness to allow children studying in Russian-speaking schools.

The correspondence with Olga Kobylyanska contributed mainly to an understanding of Lesia Ukrainka's position in the woman's rights movement. According to Vira Ageeva, the communication between two writers can be interpreted as a unique example of "the frankness of women's self-disclosure exceptional in their intimate sincerity of friendship between women writers, which enabled the break of common and ... style stereotypes". The researcher emphasised that in the letters of Lesia Ukrainka "... it is hard not to notice the belief in creative assertion and the triumph of Olga Kobylyanska's talent despite all the social obstacles that a woman had to face."²⁶

²³ Лукаш Скупейко, *Леся Українка і фемінізм (нефеміністичний погляд)* [Lesia Ukrainka and Feminism (non-feminist view)], in "Урок української" [Ukrainian lesson], 2000, № 1, с. 42.

²⁴ Лілія Сікора, *Феміністичні мотиви в творчості Лесі Українки* [Feminist motives in Lesia Ukrainka's works], in "Молодий вчений" [Young scientist], 2019, № 4.2 (68.2), квітень, с. 208.

²⁵ *Леся Українка. Листи: 1898–1902* [Lesia Ukrainka. Letters: 1898-1902], упоряд. Прокіп (Савчук) В. А., Київ, Комора, 2017, с. 133.

²⁶ Віра Агєєва, *Поетеса зламу століть. Творчість Лесі Українки в постмодерній інтерпретації* [The poet of the turn of the century. Lesia Ukrainka's creativity in

In Ukrainian literary studies, exactly Lesia Ukrainka and Olga Kobylianska were considered true and deep destroyers of the established patriarchal view. Numerous researchers often compared the interpretations of the "women's issue". Despite the common views on many things, both writers had different beliefs about women. One of the reasons for this was the different cultural environments in which they were brought up: "At home in Ukraine, it was difficult for Lesia to understand what means Galician feminism. Behavioural freedom and equality with another gender historically dominated the «Ukrainian» female identity. Women's independence was such an organic part of Lesia's life that didn't even need proof,"²⁷ Nila Zborovska emphasises. Neither education nor own beliefs and literature read by contemporaries were comparable with the struggle for women's independence. Being a "feminist author", Lesia Ukrainka was far ahead of Olga Kobylianska, whose innovation in this sense is measured first and foremost by the "domestic" Ukrainian standard, and could have impressed only the local Galician public', Oksana Zabuzhko is convinced.²⁸

The validity of such a conclusion manifests in many letters of Lesia Ukrainka, which reveals how different the situation in the Over Dnieper Ukraine and Galicia was. Observing the patriarchy of Galician society, Lesia wrote to Olga Kobylianska in 1899: "It used to be the case in Russia that it was not free for a woman "from a good society" to take a human step. Even in the time of Pushkin, writing a letter to the young gentleman meant to compromise yourself forever ("I am writing to you, what's more? What else can I say?" – writes Tatyana to Onegin), and now if anyone said that, people would laugh. I remember once a "sichovyk" (a Ukrainian student, participant of the community called "Sich" which acted in Vienna since 1868) confessed to me that he wanted to "steal" my photo because he didn't think he could just ask for it, being neither my relative nor a bride. Such a small fact but so meaningful."²⁹

Views on women's independence reflected in the letters of Lesia Ukrainka, significantly differ from the position of the Galician writers Olga Kobilyanska, Natalia Kobrynska, and others. The correspondence demonstrated the refusal of Lesia to participate in purely women's publications, which Natalia Kobrynska planned to publish. She explained the reason for this in a letter to Mykhaylo

postmodern interpretation], Київ, Либідь, 1999, с. 83-84.

²⁷ Ніла Зборовська, *Пришестя вічності* [The Coming of Eternity], Київ, Факт, 2002, с. 82.

²⁸ Оксана Забужко, *Notre Dame d'Ukraine. Українка в конфлікті міфологій* [Notre Dame d'Ukraine. Ukrainka in the conflict of mythologies], Київ, Комора, 2014, с. 513.

²⁹ *Леся Українка. Листи: 1898–1902...*, с. 135.

Drahomanov: "... I agree with your position as to women's magazines. But in our opinion, it should not be exclusively a women's magazine, and not at all what Ms Kobrynska wished or wanted to do. As for me, I do not understand what else can be invented in the theory of female issues and which expressive words can be said about her. It looks not boring only when women's life and women's psychology are examined in good form and even with talent, although also this distinguishing looks ridiculous."³⁰ The writer believed that women's publications would only emphasise the subordination and colonial status of female writing as literature of cultural minorities.³¹

In letters to Lesia Ukrainka repeatedly appeared her views on the personal life of womanhood: "I am surprised by Liudia (it is said about the daughter of Mykhaylo Starytskyi). Good God, I cannot understand such psychology that to choose a man for yourself as a hat or boots is already something withstanding our culture!"³²

Lesia Ukrainka's outlook on the woman's rights has undergone complicated challenges in her personal life. The poetess had to deny patriarchal traditions in relationships with men, which in turn led to family conflicts. In 1897, in Yalta, she met Sergiy Merzhinskyi, a representative of the Social Democratic Party in Belorussia, who was treated for pulmonary tuberculosis. Social-Democratic ideology was close for Lesia Ukrainka, and later their friendship grew into cordial goodwill. In the autumn of 1900, his health deteriorated sharply, so on January 7, 1901, Lesia came to Minsk to visit a friend and stayed to look after him until his death on March 3, 1901. Sincere concern about Sergiy Merzhinskyi's health complicated Lesia's relationship with parents.³³ This situation is reflected in letters to relatives (1900–1901). The family worried about the uncertainty in their relationship and the possible consequences for her poor health. Also, the issues of public disfavour bothered her parents, while the poetess herself considered the official marriage a burdensome formality.

The extreme willingness of Lesia Ukrainka to sacrifice herself for others is also evident in her relationship with Klyment Kvitka that was perceived by her parents as a challenge against traditions and social norms. Klyment Kvitka was nine years younger, and they lived in a civil, non-church marriage for several years, contrary to the rules of even the leading Ukrainian intellectuals of that time.

³⁰ *Леся Українка. Листи: 1876–1897* [Lesia Ukrainka. Letters: 1876–1897], упоряд. Прокіп (Савчук) В. А., Київ, Комора, 2016, с. 197.

³¹ Лукаш Скупейко, *Леся Українка і фемінізм...*, с. 42.

³² *Леся Українка. Листи: 1876–1897...*, с. 380.

³³ *Леся Українка. Листи: 1898–1902...*, с. 203–243.

This provoked resistance from Lesia's parents. In a letter to her father, she wrote: "It is very strange that you write to me «do not hold Kvitka, let him go to Switzerland». Am I holding anyone near me? ... I also don't see a reason why I should forbid him to be where I am. [...] I will not say anything to him, let him do what he wants, and I will tell you quite frankly that he does not bother me for a second the way he is now."³⁴

Lesia Ukrainka's relations with her parents became more strained also due to the unwillingness of her younger sister Olga to marry Mykhaylo Kryvnyiuk. Lesia supported Olga's point of view since the Kosach sisters considered the church wedding ceremony humiliating for the woman as it envisioned complete obedience of a woman to a man and the life-long service to him. She tried to defend her views in conversations with her mother, who did not agree to accept the fact of Olga's informal marriage. To some extent, Lesia succeeded. In a letter to Mykhaylo Kryvnyiuk in early January 1905, she informed about many "principled and not principled" conversations with her mother about marriage, weddings, etc. "Then started tears, sobs, annoying and vulnerable things at that time, sometimes whole nights went so as not to mention ... Those nights broke my soul, and because of that someday I may have to make even that from what you and Lily (Olga's family name) were saved happily (formal marriage – Authors). But when you hear something like this about me, don't throw a stone. Mind that heavy wounds, but not my own will can force me to lay down my weapon. In any case, it will be a pleasure for me, when not myself, but help my dearest sister to break the path to a free and honest life; maybe without my struggle, her fight would have been more difficult. ... Anyway, I can still say that I was the first to force my mother to abandon the extremes of her view on unwed marriage, and she said that she no longer considered herself entitled to apply any kind of coercion to Lily in that direction and sincerely gave up her words as if she did not like to have an unmarried daughter with her baby."³⁵

Olena Pchilka was strongly against her daughter's relationship with Klyment Kvitka considering him unworthy to make a couple for her and claiming that he was "a dishonest man who marries Kosach-Drahomanov's money". However, being pressed by her relatives, Lesia Ukrainka and Klyment Kvitka married in a small Church of Ascension in Kyiv, Demiiivka on July 25, 1907. The letters show that the wedding ceremony was a peculiar cession to prevent them from living

³⁴ *Ibid.*, с. 291.

³⁵ *Леся Українка. Листи: 1903–1913* [Lesia Ukrainka. Letters: 1903–1913], упоряд. Прокіп (Савчук) В. А., Київ, Комора, 2018, с. 211–212.

together because they did not imagine themselves differently. Lesia informed her mother: "It's over. We got married today at 1 o'clock in the afternoon. We found a priest who advised a better way himself, without following all the rituals."³⁶

Lesia explains her act to her sister Olga only by worrying about Klyment: "I thought that you would rather condemn me for this step that it would be difficult for you to understand how we could "lay down our weapons" where you hold yours not giving up... (Olga lived in civil marriage with Mykhaylo Kryvnyiuk – Authors). And a big stone came down from my soul when I saw that you accepted our position... if it was only me, maybe I could withstand it, but to inflict Klonya (Klyment Kvitka) further I couldn't, it's too scary. I hope now we will have peace at least from people, if not from anything else. In the meantime, everything is fine, no one is bothering us, and we are going to Crimea."³⁷

As can be seen, the epistolary heritage of Lesia Ukrainka contributes to the understanding of the ideological principles in her works, where the woman's rights movement is leading. She broke patriarchal stereotypes about a woman and her place in society not only through her works but also with her lifestyle.

The Kosach women were active figures in the Ukrainian national movement. A bright testimony to Kosach's authority in public life was their participation in the activities of "Prosvita" (engl. Enlightenment) in Kyiv province in 1906–1910. Olena Pchilka, Lesia Ukrainka, Olga Kosach-Kryvnyiuk, Mariya Grinchenko, and Mariya Starytska-Cherniakhivska actively participated in the work of the organisation along with authoritative men from the community. At a general meeting on June 25, 1906, Olena Pchilka was elected to the Board of "Prosvita" as well as Lesia Ukrainka – as an assistant (deputy) to the Chairman of the Borys Grinchenko Society.

Lesia Ukrainka was offered the position of a librarian in "Prosvita". However, despite the absence of registered political "wrongdoings", which she reported in a letter to Borys Grinchenko, the authorities did not give official permission for her appointment.³⁸ At that time, Lesia and her sister Olga energetically began to collect a library, which by the end of 1906 numbered about 2,000 volumes. In a letter to Olga Kobylinska, she describes "Prosvita" as an extremely important national organisation, "the only clear point on the dark background of Ukrainian life in Russia", "the first legal Ukrainian society in Kyiv since it became a "provincial city of the Russian Empire."³⁹

³⁶ *Леся Українка. Листи: 1903–1913...*, с. 336.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, с. 337.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, с. 284–285.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, с. 290.

The poetess initiated the creation of a library by sending letters to many Ukrainian male and female authors with urgent requests to present works for "Prosvita" and developed various options for delivering the publications to Kyiv.⁴⁰ Her letters contain interesting information about the government's crackdown on Ukrainians during the revolution of 1905-1907, including the so-called "Ukrainian night" from January 17 to January 18, 1907, when mass arrests of Ukrainian figures occupied Kyiv. The Kosach sisters were also arrested.⁴¹ The gendarmes found their apartment in Mariinska-Blagovishchenska Street, and after the arrest, special police surveillance was established after Lesia.

WOMEN'S MOVEMENT OF GALICIA IN THE EGO-DOCUMENTS OF THE GRINCHENKO FAMILY

The specifics of Galician social life are reflected in the memoirs and letters of Kosach and Grinchenko, which left emotional reviews of its conservatism, tradition, or even old-worldness. This was especially true relating to women's social status. After visiting Galicia, Lesia Ukrainka wrote in a letter to Olga Kobylanska that the Galicians had "a strange and difficult attitude towards women, all of them looking at us either from the top down or from the bottom to the top, but never just simple and on equal terms"⁴². The ambiguous attitude towards women was also emphasised by the magazines of the time ("Dilo", "Ruslan"), which characterised womanhood as people who talk empty, think only of balls and evening dresses, new clothes "from a Parisian tailor", and a profitable "party for marriage."⁴³ A similar attitude was broadcast by the conservative style of the Galician environment with the strong positions of the Greek Catholic Church, whose representatives asserted in society the inviolability of patriarchal traditions.

The difference in educational models for men and women affected their attitude and, thus, set particular behavioural patterns of interaction between different members of Galician society. "Total custody" of a girl was considered normal for every decent young lady until the beginning of the twentieth century. Excessive conservatism of Galician public life did not go unnoticed by visitors, including Kyiv citizen Anastasia Grinchenko and her family.

⁴⁰ *Леся Українка. Зібрання творів у 12 тт.* [Lesia Ukrainka. Collected works in 12 vols], Київ, Наукова думка, 1979, т. 12, с. 475-477.

⁴¹ *Леся Українка. Листи: 1903-1913...*, с. 293-295.

⁴² *Леся Українка. Зібрання творів у 12 тт...*, с. 118-119.

⁴³ *Ради для танцюючих пань на вечерицях* [Tips for Dancing Ladies at Evenings], in "Руслан" [Ruslan], 1905, ч. 8.

Anastasia Grinchenko (1884–1908), the daughter of writers and public personalities Borys and Mariya Grinchenko, came with her father from Kyiv to Lviv in the summer of 1903 to study at the University as no opportunity for higher education was available in Kyiv at that time (Kyiv higher women's courses did not work from 1889 to 1906.) The Grinchenko family raised their daughter as an active and self-sufficient personality. Being nobles by origin, the Grinchenko did not have a maid. Their daughter did all the household chores by herself. A trusting relationship was established between Anastasia and her father as her mother Mariya Grinchenko recalled, "her father could have comforted her better than I did."⁴⁴ For Galicia, such a role of a man was not entirely acceptable since women performed this function.

The correspondence between Anastasia and her parents during her studies in Lviv (1903–1905) allows assessing different aspects of Galicia's social life "from the inside" including the behavioural model of a girl who found herself in the "unusual women position". The ego-documents of the Grinchenko family detailed not only the social status of women but also the main features of the women's movement formation in Galicia and Over Dnieper Ukraine.

Lviv, as the capital of the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, impressed a recent high school student Anastasia Grinchenko. On the one hand, the image of "Galicia Piedmont" was created by political organisations, powerful scientific, cultural, and educational institutions. On the other hand, she was amazed by the customs of the Halychyna, especially the status of women who were completely different from the Dnieper. For example, while looking for an apartment for Anastasia Grinchenko's residence, her father refused such kind of service as seeing a girl to the University by the maid. At that time, the landlady did not dare to give Anastasia a room on the conditions of her independent movement through the city streets as it could discredit her daughters. Problems with renting an apartment forced a young girl to look for alternatives. In a letter, Anastasia expressed her hope to rent a hotel room for at least a month. However, she was strongly not advised to do that as "it is not only inconvenient in Lviv but everywhere. The girl is not quite safe, and there are other restrictions in Lviv".⁴⁵ This response of the father gives reason to understand that the woman had no parity with the man, and in Galicia also prevailed certain stereotypes about women's independence. This is confirmed by the case of

⁴⁴ Марія Загірня, *Спогади* [Memoirs], Луганськ, Шлях, 1999, с. 86.

⁴⁵ Інститут рукопису Національної бібліотеки України ім. В. І. Вернадського (*hereinafter* – *ІП НБУВ*) [Institute of Manuscripts of V. I. Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine], F. III, D. 42413, F. 1.

Mariya Grinchenko, who being in Lviv in 1904, did not behave in a "Galician" way. When staying at the hotel, Mariya Grinchenko checked-in with her name, not of her husband. Because of this, strangers knocked on her door all night as they believed that a "lady easy in her morals" (a prostitute) had settled there.⁴⁶

Anastasia Grinchenko sadly describes her first impression of Lviv and complains about local customs: "I do not know what will happen next, but for a while, I can say that if I knew what was waiting for me, I would probably not have gone to Lviv. It is far from not only to Europe but even somewhat to Russia. It is difficult to believe how many old-fashioned traditions and prejudices exist, how much fearful personal enmity is."⁴⁷ When Anastasia got used to these rules, she became involved in the fight for women's rights.

Galician families, good friends of her family, the Pankivskas, the Hnatyuks, and the Shukhevychs took care of the life of Anastasia Grinchenko. With their help, Anastasia settled in the St. Olga dormitory for girls. A rather close friendship appeared between Anastasia Grinchenko and Daryna Shukhevych. The girls went to University together, worked in various community societies sharing their vision on the future of women and society. Although the head of the family, Volodymyr Shukhevych, maintained the local rules: he "picked up and saw" Anastasia to the apartment where she lived, the owner of the rented house was critical of this. Suddenly, she denied Anastasia in renting the apartment, probably due to the girl's "too independent" life. In a letter as a reaction to the circumstances of her daughter's life, Marya Grinchenko advises her to "always be alert and tackle such cases wisely – you need to learn from life."⁴⁸ Thus, unlike the Galician society, the Grinchenkos supported their daughter's desire for free movement, independence, and activity.

Galician customs annoyed Anastasia as in Vienna a young woman could go to the theatre on her own, while in Lviv it was considered the harlotry behaviour. A girl could not appear on the street without her mother, aunt, or maid attached to her, and only the father or the groom could accompany her. Such restrictions made a depressing impression⁴⁹: "... You ask why I want to Kyiv? To understand it, you must visit it and see everything with your eyes and hear with your ears.... At every step, you have to open such Americas that you will only find yourself staying 'with your hands open' and wonder how happened something like this."

⁴⁶ Дмитро Дорошенко, *Мої спогади про давнє-минуле* (1901-1914) [My memories of the past], Вінніпег, Видавнича Спілка "Тризуб", 1949, с. 51-52.

⁴⁷ *ІР НБУВ*, ф. III, D. 36673, F. 2.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, D. 44465, F. 2.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, D. 36722, F. 1-2.

Confirmation of partner and democratic relations of the daughter with her mother is evidenced by the answer of Maria: "You're complaining about outdated traditions and prejudices. We have to adhere to their customs, but in general, it's worth living on your own traditions". She further advises her daughter: "Do not waste your young age on sadness and hopelessness but carefully and boldly go forward to build your life so that your mind and heart were in harmony, and people will benefit from it."⁵⁰

Understanding her daughter's situation, Maria Grinchenko supported her, taught her to find positives in all life circumstances, not to lose the spirit, and to become more familiar with the land. However, the girl's longing to explore the local cultural life restricted her right to self-movement. Anastasia Grinchenko's letters from Lviv (1903) vividly highlighted the outdated patriarchal social norms. In response to her mother's suggestion to study Galician culture, Nastia writes: "... It is impossible to go with Odarka (Daryna Shukhevych) because Odarka will not go either, here are routine customs. Well, what trends are here! I will not go to the Hnatiuks because it will be late. In Kyiv that could be, but in Lviv morals are wild!"⁵¹ Or: "...I didn't go to the Philharmonic, Mrs. Paneiko has never had free time, and I cannot go there alone. Nobody will go with a friend either because this is not allowed here."⁵²

The educational situation was also not an easy one. It is known that the first students of Lviv University faced gender prejudices. The desire of women to study was often interpreted as abnormal or as trespass of family priority. They were suspected of bad intentions. Not only the Galician society, but the male students themselves treated females distrustfully. This situation was illustrated by Anastasia Grinchenko's letter to her parents, in which she complained: "Based on of the attitude to us, all our male students can be divided into three categories: 1) those who understand us and treat as friends; 2) those who look at us ironically, unfavourably and as at emancipated ones, and finally the worst 3) who think that a lady can only make passes and flirt and nothing more, and behaves accordingly."⁵³ "...And we have another friend who said that soon men would have to cook dinner because women started going to the University."⁵⁴ Teachers (usually Polish professors) looked at the female student scornfully considered women's

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, D. 44453, F. 2.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, D. 36673, F. 1-2.

⁵² *Ibid.*, D. 3670, F. 2.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, D. 36683, F. 1.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, D. 36695, F. 1.

education as dangerous for the stability of society. Nastia expressed her feelings and thoughts about this in another letter. "Do not think that national enmity speaks to me, not at all. It is necessary to endure a lot to pass quietly for half an hour between Polish academics under their ironic smiles and sharpness. Sometimes I bite my lips and ready to cry ..."55

Another important issue, as in the life of Lesia Ukrainka so for Anastasia Grinchenko, was her personal life. The correspondence evidenced the concerns of her parents about the uncertainty of her relationship with her husband Mykola Sakharov. Maria Grinchenko writes to her daughter: "If you are planning to marry Dr. S. (Mykola Sakharov – Authors), I would very much recommend him to finish high school. You know, my dear child, when you are young, everything seems as "love makes a cottage a castle", but as the life wind blows, it becomes cold in a "cottage", it is not a palace or just a cosy house. Mind your desires. We are upset, we are worried about your troubled destiny, we sorrow, and we wish to see you already on some more confident path."56

The parents accepted any choice of their daughter, but the older generation, namely, grandfather Dmytro Grinchenko was quite critical about that. In a strict form in his letter, he also expressed his position on the independent departure of his granddaughter to St. Petersburg as a free listener of women's courses. "... Dear Nastia! We have received your letter, we were surprised and amazed at the same time by your stay in St. Petersburg, you will never change, the courses will not give you anything good, unless they get you into active liberation movement, for which you can get to places remote or not quite remote (to the exile – Authors)". The grandfather emphasises that "... due to lack of experience, you will fall into the ranks of dissolute students, who welcome free love and revolutionary depravity, and that for the liberation idea and the success of the revolution... even depravity will not stop you."57

It is worth emphasising that the Grinchenko family supported their daughter in her private life and political activity as follows from letters and public correspondence. When only a few women were involved in political life, Nastia Grinchenko was an active member of the first political party in the Over Dnieper, namely, the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party. Her leadership qualities were manifested in the organisation of "Lubny public self-defence" during the revolution of 1905–1907. That was a political-administrative committee of the Ukrainian na-

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, D.36699, F. 2.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, D. 44346, F. 7.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, D. 44284, F. 2.

tional forces' representation, which acted as a local government of the Lubny city and its environs in Poltava. The main achievement of the Lubny Republic was the effective protection of public order and the prevention of Jewish massacres. Anastasia was imprisoned for political activities. Her negative attitude to the official church marriage formed under the influence of social-democratic ideas. Nastia's parents were understanding of her beliefs, although they adhered to a different ideology.⁵⁸

Borys Grinchenko's father receives an article "Women's Movement in Galicia" written by his daughter in the Russian language, where Anastasia summarises her impressions: "The position of a woman here today (in Galicia) is much more difficult than in Russia. Every step of a woman, and especially of a girl, is bound up by the tangled system of meaningless traditions. The girl can hardly appear on the street, and even in society, without a mother or aunt. Not to mention the fact that the highest point of indecency is when a girl dared to go out with a young man! Along with this, the same girl is absolutely free to attend university lectures with the same young people, and no one will be surprised or see something improper in it. This nonsense catches the eye of every stranger, and one can only wonder how those who are most affected by it do not actually notice it."⁵⁹

Anastasia's mother, Maria Grinchenko, in the early twentieth century translated the plays "Nora" by Henrik Ibsen and "In the birth family" by Hermann Sudermann, which, to her mind, showed how patriarchal traditions restrained a woman in individual development and demonstrated the evolution of a "new woman" able of breaking established restrictions. According to Iryna Yakovleva, these translations have become "a significant part of the purposeful work" of the Grinchenko family in women's emancipation.⁶⁰

CONCLUSIONS

The ego-documents of the Kosach and Grinchenko families were first used to study the women's movement in the Ukrainian lands in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The sources involved allowed reconstructing the wom-

⁵⁸ Марія Загірня, *Спогади...*, с. 120.

⁵⁹ *ІР НБУВ*, Ф. І, Д. 31493, Ф. 1-1v.

⁶⁰ Ірина Яковлева, *Родина Грінченків і "жіноче питання" у загальному соціокультурному контексті початку ХХ ст.* [Grinchenko family and the "women's issue" in the general socio-cultural context of the early XXth], in "Українська біографістика" [Biographistica Ukrainica], 2018, Вип. 16, с. 80.

en's movement in more detail and highlighting features of the woman's rights struggle had not been previously analysed. First of all, it concerns the impact of emancipation on the everyday domestic practices faced by active Ukrainian womanhood, namely relationships with male colleagues, problems of education, personal life, marriage, job search, women's place in social and political life, etc. The use of the unexplored epistolary heritage determines the originality and uniqueness of the author's findings.

The letters of Lesia Ukrainka and Anastasia Grinchenko allowed identifying and comparing the distinctiveness of the struggle for women's rights in Ukrainian lands under the rule of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires. Although the regulation of social relations in Austria-Hungary was more progressive (the adopted right to higher education, broader rights in the field of work, inheritance, etc.) than that of Dnieper Ukraine, the changes in the position of women in Galicia were mostly declarative and not reflected in daily life.

Officials of both empires prohibited and persecuted women's organisations as they reasonably considered them an integral part of the Ukrainian liberation movement. According to Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, the national deal was that special duty uniting all Ukrainian women's organisations, wherever they existed. Their participants "considered their interests not as a part of the feminism tasks, but part of the Ukrainian community."⁶¹ This is evidenced by the ego-documents of the Kosach and Grinchenko families. Their members considered equality of women as a sign of democratisation in public life as free media, education in their native language, freedom of speech, and wide electoral rights.

⁶¹ Марта Богачевська-Хом'як, *Націоналізм і фемінізм: провідні ідеології чи інструменти для з'ясування проблем?* [Nationalism and Feminism: Leading Ideologies or Tools for Troubleshooting?], Львів, ВНТЛ-Класика, 2003, с. 200.

EXTREMES AND EXCEPTIONS: CIVILIAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS JEWS IN BUKOVINA DURING WORLD WAR II

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Abstract: *The pre-war political and social atmosphere, the subsequent regulations imposed by authorities, interests or circumstances, the international context, and the moral principles motivated – together or in part – some of the decisions and actions against the Jews of Bukovina. The authors of this article raise a few questions: When and in what context did the violence occur? Where did the violence happen? Why did people do that? The organization of information in order to obtain the answers contributes to highlighting the responsibility of the actors of the time, other than the army: civilian authorities, the population of towns and villages in Bukovina. Attacks, robberies and murders are most often cited in historical analysis. They were the result of instigations and challenges, some organized at the state level, some manifesting themselves as "improvisations" of the locals. The "social field" of violence was systematically prepared in the interwar period, the ideology of right-wing radicalism and anti-Semitism entering the Romanian society, amid economic difficulties. In addition, the fear of being punished by the military authorities (who coordinated the arrest, deportation and guarding of Jews) is a basic explanation to justify avoiding mutual contact between the Jews and non-Jews. As for non-Jews civilian's solidarity, charity and support, they are less analyzed in the historiography of the problem. That is why their knowledge becomes extremely important, as long as these examples illustrating not only the forms of resistance against government actions but also the human decency and absolute, uncompromising respect for the values of humanity.*

Keywords: Jews, Bukovina, anti-Semitism, World War II, civilian, violence, persecution, solidarity, humanity.

Rezumat: *Extreme și Excepții: Atitudini ale populației civile față de evrei în Bucovina în timpul celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial. Atmosfera politică și socială de dinainte de război, regulamentele ulterioare impuse de autorități, interese și circumstanțe, contextul internațional și principiile morale, au motivat, împreună sau în parte, unele dintre deciziile și acțiunile întreprinse împotriva evreilor din Bucovina. Autorii articolului ridică o serie de întrebări: 1. Când și în ce context s-au produs actele de violență? 2. Unde s-au*

înregistrat acțiunile violente? și 3. De ce au recurs oamenii la asemenea fapte? Organizarea informației – menită să răspundă la aceste întrebări – contribuie, deopotrivă, la evidențierea responsabilității actorilor vremii, alții decât Armata: autoritățile civile, populația orașelor și satelor din Bucovina. Atacurile, jafurile și crimele sunt cel mai adesea citate în analiza istorică. Ele au fost rezultatul instigărilor și provocărilor, unele organizate la nivel de stat, altele manifestându-se ca „improvizații” ale localnicilor. „Câmpul social” al violenței a fost pregătit, în mod sistematic, încă din perioada interbelică, ideologia radicalismului de dreapta și a antisemitismului pătrunzând în societatea românească, pe fondul dificultăților economice. În plus, teama de a fi pedepsit de autoritățile militare (care au coordonat arestarea, deportarea și paza evreilor) este o explicație de bază pentru a justifica evitarea contactului reciproc între evrei și ne-evrei. În ceea ce privește solidaritatea, actele de caritate și sprijin acordate poporului evreu de către civilii ne-evrei și acestea sunt mai puțin analizate în istoriografia problemei. Iată de ce, cunoașterea lor devine extrem de importantă, aceste exemple ilustrând nu doar formele de rezistență împotriva acțiunilor guvernamentale, ci și decența umană și respectul absolut, fără compromis, pentru valorile umanității.

INTRODUCTION

Bukovina – the “Switzerland of the East”¹ – is known for its multi-ethnic and multi-confessional character asserted during the 19th and 20th centuries. The tolerance of Romanians towards foreigners, regardless of their language or religion, the interest of the Moldavian squirearchy in manpower, the concerns of the Habsburg administration to increase the number of taxpayers in the incorporated territory in 1775, as well as the desire of residents of neighbouring regions and countries to move to a province with a less burdensome tax regime were the main factors that led to the agglutination of major ethnic communities. According to the 1930 census, the largest ethnic groups in Bukovina were Romanians (44,50% of the total population), Ukrainians (29,14%), Jews (10,84%), and Germans (8,85%).²

During the 19th and early 20th century, the ethnic and religious communities coexisted without violence, while the potential tension was hampered by the political compromises or the ability of the Austrian administration to resolve it. In the 1930s the situation changed radically, in the context of the establishment of totalitarian,

¹ Oskar Beck, *Bukowina: Schweiz des Ostens?*, “Der Südostdeutsche”, München, 15. März 1978, S. 5.

² Ștefan Purici, *Aspecte ale problemei minorităților naționale în Bucovina istorică între anii 1918 și 1940 (I)* [Aspects of the National Minorities Issue in Historical Bukovina between 1918 and 1940 (I)], in “Analele Bucovinei”, Vol. IV, 1997, No. 1, p. 143.

xenophobic regimes in Germany, Italy and most Eastern and Central European states. In Romania, the phenomenon of the proliferation of anti-democratic political currents asserted on fertile ground, maintained by far-right intellectuals and political leaders, and stimulated by the corruption and failures of the ruling class. The authoritarian regime of Carol II (in February 1938) and the military-legionary administration of Ion Antonescu and Horia Sima facilitated the legislation and the application of norms specific to dictatorships, with a pronounced ethnic character and an undisguised anti-Semitic orientation.³ The territorial losses suffered by Romania in the summer of 1940, as well as the entry into the war by Nazi Germany, created the premises for the application of xenophobic state policy with uncontrolled violence.⁴ If the governments of Carol II (February 1938 - September 1940) adopted measures against the non-Romanian population by restricting the rights of a significant mass of Romanian citizens, under the administration of Ion Antonescu – either *in association* or *alone* – Romania was attracted to the Holocaust and implementation of the policy of displacement of Roma outside the country's borders.

Over the last three decades, research on the Holocaust in Romania has become a growing and increasingly diverse field. The list of the 1990s and early 2000s publications includes a range of ground-breaking works, several source collections, the first comprehensive overviews of the topic, and the *Final Report on the Holocaust in Romania* assembled by an international team of scholars.⁵ These studies not only helped to clarify the basic facts but also drew attention to the issues of denial, minimization or ignorance, asking new interpretive questions: *Who was responsible for the violence and who were the perpetrators?* The answers to these questions proved to be varied: some historians saw the spread of anti-Semitism as key-driver analysis (Jean Ancel)⁶; some pointed to the leadership's aim for national renewal and sovereignty (Dennis Deletant)⁷; others mixed a bit of the two, underlining the role of

³ Ioan Scurtu, *Regimul de autoritate monarhică (februarie 1938 – septembrie 1940)* [The Regime of Monarchical Authority (February 1938 – September 1940)], in Ioan Scurtu, Petre Otu (Eds.), *Istoria românilor* [The History of Romanians], Vol. VIII, *România întregită (1918-1940)* [Reunited Romania], București, Editura Enciclopedică, 2003, p. 391-421.

⁴ In the summer of 1940 and the following months, the first large-scale violent anti-Semitic actions were recorded. See Radu Ioanid, *The Holocaust in Romania. The Destruction of Jews and Gypsies under the Antonescu Regime 1940-1944*. With a Foreword by Elie Wiesel and a Preface by Paul A. Shapiro, Chicago, Ivan R. Dee Publishers, 2000, p. 39-79.

⁵ Tuvia Friling, Radu Ioanid, Mihail E. Ionescu (Eds.), *Final Report*, International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, Iași, Editura Polirom, 2004, 415 p.

⁶ Jean Ancel, *The History of the Holocaust in Romania*, Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press; Jerusalem, Yad Vashem, 2011, 699 p.

⁷ Dennis Deletant, *Hitler's Forgotten Ally. Ion Antonescu and his regime, Romania 1940-44*,

mid-level officials and showing how xenophobia and plans for national purification could lead to ethnic cleansing (Vladimir Solonari)⁸, while others demonstrated how an entire society could become mobilised for the sake of genocide (Armin Heinen).⁹ During the war, one of the most relevant features of the measures adopted against the Jews was related to their geographical dispersion. Unable to recover Northern Transylvania, the attention of the Romanian authorities focused on the Jews of Bukovina and Bessarabia.¹⁰ According to estimates, in 1941, 91,845 Bukovinian Jews were deported to Transnistria. To this figure must be added 4,290 Jews From Bukovina deported in 1942.¹¹

However, the Holocaust in Romania has known different phases, intensities, and degrees of involvement of people in violent actions. From a historiographical perspective, one of the first historical approaches of Bukovina belongs to Matatias Carp¹², who presents the scale of the atrocities committed against the Jews. Along the same line are the works and studies signed by Radu Ioanid¹³, while the analyses and volumes of documents published by Lya Benjamin offer a perspective on the evolution of anti-Semitic legislation in Romania¹⁴. Florence Heymann makes a radiograph of the Jewish community during the war through the case studies¹⁵, and Marianne Hirsch and Leo Spitzer offer a different viewpoint

Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, 379 p.

⁸ Vladimir Solonari, *Purificarea națiunii. Dislocări forțate de populație și epurări etnice în România lui Ion Antonescu: 1940-1944* [Purifying the Nation: Forced Population Displacement and Ethnic Cleansing in Romania of Ion Antonescu: 1940-1944], București, Editura Polirom, 2015, 424 p.

⁹ Armin Heinen, *Rumänien, der Holocaust und die Logik der Gewalt*, München, Oldenbourg Verlag, 2007, 208 p.

¹⁰ Gaëlle Fisher, *Between Liberation and Emigration: Jews from Bukovina in Romania after the Second World War*, in "Leo Baeck Institute Year Book", Vol. 62, 2017, p. 118-119.

¹¹ Tuvia Friling, Radu Ioanid, Mihail E. Ionescu (Eds.), *Final Report...*, p. 177.

¹² Matatias Carp, *Cartea neagră. Fapte și documente. Suferințele evreilor din România, 1940-1944* [Black Book: Facts and Documents. The Sufferings of the Jews of Romania, 1940-1944], București, Libraria Socec Co., Vol. I, 1946; Vol. II, 1948; Vol III, 1947.

¹³ Radu Ioanid, *The Holocaust in Romania...*

¹⁴ Lya Benjamin, Sergiu Stanciu (Eds.), *Evreii din România între anii 1940-1944: Izvoare și marturisiri referitoare la evreii din România* [The Jews of Romania during 1940-1944: Sources and confessions regarding the Jews in Romania], Vol. I, București, Editura Hasefer, 1993; Lya Benjamin (Ed.), *Problema evreiască în stenogramele Consiliului de Miniștri* [The Jewish Problem in the Records of the Council of Ministers], Vol. II, București, Editura Hasefer, 1996, 623 p.

¹⁵ Florence Heymann, *Le Crépuscule des lieux : Identités juives de Czernowitz*, Paris, Stock, 2003, 442 p.

than the historical one¹⁶, exploring concepts such as *memory* and *post-memory*.¹⁷ According to Jan Gross's model of escalating inter-ethnic animosities, Diana Dumitru and Carter Johnson summarize the attitude of the majority towards the Jewish minority in Northern Bukovina¹⁸. The recent research focuses more on Cernăuți (Liviu Cărare)¹⁹, on deportation (Vladimir Solonari)²⁰ or on rescuers such as Traian Popovici (Mariana Hausleitner)²¹. In other words, the documentation on the Jewish community in Bukovina in World War II is diverse, taking the form of specialized studies, journals, interviews, and testimonies of survivors published in collections of documents or virtual archives such as www.inshr-ew.ro or www.survivors-romania.org.

ANALYTICAL CATEGORIES IN APPROACHING THE JEWS-GENTILE CIVILIAN RELATIONSHIPS (1940-1944)

Starting from an interesting analysis of research on the Holocaust in Romania, published by Gaëlle Fisher in 2018²², the relations between Jews and

¹⁶ Liviu Carare, *Jews of Cernăuți. 1941-1944*, Doctoral thesis summary http://www.history-cluj.ro/Istorie/Ro/Doctorate/doctorat_carare/Rezumat.L.Carare.ENG.pdf (Accessed on 14.05.2019)

¹⁷ Marianne Hirsch, Leo Spitzer, *Ghosts of Home: The Afterlife of Czernowitz in Jewish Memory*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2009, 362 p.

¹⁸ Diana Dumitru, Carter Johnson, *Constructing Interethnic Conflict and Cooperation. Why Some People Harmed Jews and Others Helped Them during the Holocaust in Romania*, in "World Politics", Vol. 63, 2011, No. 1, p. 1–42.

¹⁹ Liviu Carare, *Considerații privind ghetoizarea evreilor din Cernăuți (1941)* [Considerations on the Chernivtsi Jews process of ghettoization (1941)], in "Anuarul Institutului de Istorie George Barițiu, Series Historica, 2010, Vol. XLIX, p. 99-107; Idem, *Deportările din Cernăuți (1941). Mărturii pe baza unui raport de anchetă informativă* [Deportations from Chernivtsi (1941). Testimonies based on an informative investigation report], in Vasile Ciobanu, Sorin Radu (Eds.), *Partide politice și minorități naționale din România în secolul XX* [Political parties and national minorities in Romania in the twentieth century], Vol. V, Sibiu, Editura Techno Media, 2010, p. 247-255.

²⁰ Vladimir Solonari, *Purificarea națiunii...*

²¹ Mariana Hausleitner, *Acțiunile de salvare a evreilor prizonieri, în special în Bucovina, 1941-1944* [The rescue actions for persecuted Jews, especially in Bukovina, 1941-1944], in Wolfgang Benz, Brigitte Mihok (Eds.), *Holocaustul la periferie. Persecutarea și nimicirea evreilor în România și Transnistria în 1940-1944* [Holocaust at the Periphery: Persecution and destruction of the Jews in Romania and Transnistria in 1940-1944], Chișinău, Editura Cartier, 2010, p. 173-198.

²² Gaëlle Fisher, *New Research on the Holocaust in Romania*, in "Sehepunkte", 2018, No. 3,

civilians between 1940-1944, can be examined in the light of some analytical categories and specific questions.: 1. Time: *When and in what context did the violence occur?* 2. Space: Where did the violence happen? 3. Reasons: *Why did people do that?* The organisation of data under the first three questions serves to underscore the foremost issue of responsibility of the actors (civilians, authorities, human beings).

1. Time

According to Diana Dumitru, the rampant anti-Semitism had to do with long-term socio-cultural trends rather than the immediate historical circumstances. She stressed that the civilians in Bukovina acted, as the population of Bessarabia, in a context shaped by the state and in special political conditions.²³ From a social standpoint, the escalation of the anti-Semitic climate in Romania characterized the period between the two World Wars. The Iron Guard, the League of Christian National Defence, the ideology, writings and rhetoric of politicians, writers, scholars and reporters paved the road for the penetration and application of fascist ideology. In January 1938, the Government Goga-Cuza promulgated the *Law of citizenship revision* – the first manifestation of racial persecution against the Jews. King Carol II continued to promote an anti-Semitic agenda of varying degrees.²⁴

1.1. Phase A. (June 1940 – May/June 1941)

At the end of June 1941, the Soviet Union annexed Northern Bukovina by the demand of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its additional secret protocol. Marcu Rozen considers that the renunciation, without opposition, of a part of the national territory of Romania, required a scapegoat to be blamed for this loss.²⁵ The Soviets did not respect the conditions of the ultimatum entering earlier in the Romanian territories and triggering terrible persecution against the civilian population. The NKVD agents arrested and investigated a large number of soldiers and civilians, forcing them by terror to sign statements and provide information regarding the location of the Romanian Armed Forces. Some Romanians were detained based on so-called “denunciations made by Jews”, while others were

<http://www.sehepunkte.de/2018/03/30622.html> (Accessed on 18.04.2019)

²³ Diana Dumitru, *The State, Antisemitism, and Collaboration in the Holocaust: The Borderlands of Romania and the Soviet Union*, Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 5

²⁴ Marcu Rozen, *The Holocaust under the Antonescu Government. Historical and Statistical Data about Jews in Romania, 1940 – 1944*, IVth Edition, revised and completed, Bucharest, 2006, p. 9, http://www.survivors-romania.org/pdf_doc/the_holocaust_under_the_antonescu_government.pdf (Accessed on 18.04.2019)

²⁵ *Ibid.*

assaulted by “Judeo-communist bands,” although the *enemies’* names and facts could not be specified in exact terms.²⁶ The “Judeo-Communist” cliché has spread rapidly, while immediately after June 28, 1940, the Jewish communities of the Romanian Kingdom publicly dissociated themselves from the individual behaviour of those who manifested hostility towards the retreating Romanian soldiers. In Southern Bukovina, the anti-Semitic actions intensified in January 1941 and violence, robberies, and crimes occurred in both urban and rural communities during the legionary rebellion. Furthermore, the measures against the Jews expanded and radicalized after the establishment of the Antonescu regime. In the Northern part of Bukovina occupied by the Soviets, drastic actions against the locals also hit hard in the Jewish community (merchants, entrepreneurs, officials, former notabilities, political leaders, etc.). The helping behaviour and the feelings of compassion towards the victims of the communist system became impossible due to the terror regime.

1.2. Phase B. (June 1941 – 1942)

The summer of 1941 coincided with the entrance of the Romanian-German troops into Northern Bukovina, when other extreme local violence broke out, along with the introduction of new discriminatory ordinances aimed at regulating the status and activity of the Jews all over the province. During this phase – which is the most convincing, in terms of documentation, within the context of existing literature – the local people used violence before and in the first days of the reinstatement of the Romanian administration. Immediately after the withdrawal of the Bolsheviks, taking advantage of the power vacuum, ethnic Romanians and especially Ukrainian paramilitary groups resorted to violence and carried out executions among the Jewish population.²⁷ The process of ghettoisation, sortation, and deportation to Transnistria as well as the tragic episodes of 1942 illustrate how the Romanian government implemented the racial policy in Bukovina. The collective culpability of Jews and their transformation into “internal and external enemies” led not only to the stigmatisation of the Jewish population but also to the invention of new ways of monitoring and eliminating “the danger”.²⁸ This stage is one of the most tragic, with only a few of the Bukovina Jews managing to avoid

²⁶ Daniel Hrenciuc, *Dilemele conviețuirii: evreii în Bucovina (1774-1947)* [The Dilemmas of Coexistence: Jews in Bukovina], Iași, Editura Pim, 2013, p. 420.

²⁷ For more details, see Vladimir Solonari, *The Treatment of the Jews of Bukovina by the Soviet and Romanian Administrations in 1940–1944*, in “Holocaust and Modernity. Studies in Ukraine and the World”, 2010, No. 2, p. 163-165.

²⁸ See Radu Ioanid, *The Holocaust in Romania...*, p. 69-70.

deportation, benefiting from the state's decision to keep the indispensable specialists.

1.3. Phase C. (1943 – 1944)

In the second half of 1942, the official attitude towards the Jews has become more ambiguous and more oscillating, reverting to the “traditional” forms of persecution. Unlike the Nazi-controlled areas (where the massacres were systematic and the racist-ideological motivation of the executors ensured a disciplined and relentless application of the Final Solution), in Bukovina, the slow pace of “purification” became questionable. The maltreatment or exploitation of Jews, the rescue initiatives at the discretion of a local leader or commander, and the confusion caused by contradictions in orders left room for greater freedom of action for employers who did not use the Jews “for their own sake,” but “in the interest of the national economy”.²⁹ Moreover, in March/April 1943, the installation of the new Governor of Bukovina, General Dragalina, coincided with a period of relative relaxation of the pressure on the Jews. In the areas controlled by the Romanian authorities, the number of survivors was higher compared to the Jewish population in the territories under German administration. According to a report addressed to the Romanian Government, in November 1943, at least 34,141 deported Bukovinian Jews were in Transnistria³⁰, even though in the summer of that year, officials agreed to return a small number of them. The reintegration of former deportees into the community has been problematic³¹, the acts of hostility intertwining with solidarity and humanity.³²

2. Space

The dismantling of Bukovina in 1940 and the annexation of its Northern part by the Soviet Union gave the events a different rhythm and characteristics.

²⁹ Vladimir Solonari, *Purificarea națiunii...*, p. 204.

³⁰ Ottmar Trașcă, „Chestiunea evreiască” în *documente militare române. 1941-1944* [The “Jewish Question” in Romanian Military Documents. 1941-1944], Iași, Editura Institutul European, 2010, p. 819.

³¹ Vladimir Solonari, *Purificarea națiunii...*, p. 208. Similar attitudes had been recorded since the autumn of 1941 when some residents of Siret demanded in a memorandum – having a typed table with the names of applicants, but without handwritten signatures – that the evacuated Jews “should not be brought back in the locality”. Interestingly, the resolution on this request was the following: “Jews should remain in the town, while the denouncers will be dismissing” in Suceava County Directorate of National Archives (**hereinafter** – DJANS), Fund *Prefectura județului Rădăuți* [The Prefecture of Rădăuți County], F. 145/1941, f. 127-128, 141, 147.

³² <https://www.inshr-ew.ro> (Accessed on 22.02.2020)

2.1. Provincial delimitation: North-South

Most historians justifiably choose to simultaneously analyse the dramatic realities of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, due to the similarities created by the new politico-military framework. However, in the Northern part of the province, the situation became complicated as a result of the violence and atrocities committed by the Ukrainian nationalists and later by Einsatzgruppe Ek 10b. From this perspective, the multitude of sources contributes to a more accurate historical reconstruction, including the relationship between Jews and non-Jews civilians.

2.2. Living area delimitations: cities - small towns and villages

Vladimir Solonari believes that living in separate neighbourhoods of the cities the Jews were easy to be recognised.³³ Therefore, the support of residents was not a crucial requirement for the success of anti-Jewish operations. On the contrary, the participation of local Christians in the villages was necessary, especially to the soldiers and gendarmes. Simon Geissbühler thinks that the Jews could be clearly and immediately distinguished due to their clothing and appearance.³⁴ Yet, in some localities, many Jews were largely assimilated into the community, and only their neighbours could identify them. In small towns or villages, the local perpetrators committed massacres intending to obtain the goods/properties of the Jews or to “expel them ritually”, since the Jews represented the epitome of the “Other”.³⁵ The survivors of pogroms sought refuge in larger towns such as Cernăuți. Even so, the local collaborators – ready to identify the Jewish homes or shops – betrayed the Jews’ hiding places and delivered them to the perpetrators.³⁶ Here is why the exceptions are all the more important as it illustrates the humanity in extreme conditions. One of the examples is given by Shalom Eitan, whose family was rescued during the massacre by a non-Jewish civilian.³⁷

3. Reasons

The comments on the *Final Report on the Holocaust in Romania* highlight the outcome of the Antonescu regime’s antisemitic propaganda, which succeeded in “a kind of neutralization of public reaction” or “de-sensitization of the majority of

³³ Vladimir Solonari, *Purificarea națiunii...*, p. 184.

³⁴ Simon Geissbühler, “He spoke Yiddish like a Jew”: Neighbors’ Contribution to the Mass Killing of Jews in Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, July 1941, “Holocaust and Genocide Studies”, Vol. 28, 2014, No. 3, p. 437.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 436.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 437.

³⁷ Shalom Eitan, *Să supraviețuiești, pentru ca să povestești!* [To survive to tell the story], Boian, 2005, p. 22-24, <http://www.mareleboian.com/wp-content/uploads/Shalom-Eitan-Sa-supravetuiesti-ca-sa-povestesti.pdf> (Accessed on 07.03.2019)

the population towards whatever was happening to the Jews". The compassionate or indignant reactions went hand in hand with the passive acceptance of the crime or even participate in the anti-Semitic mechanism.³⁸

3.1. *Motivation of persecution, violence, and crime*

There are limits to reconstituting the causes that led to the violence. What can be said with certainty is that: a) the reasons were multiple and b) it is impossible to find a general explanation or a single cause for what happened. However, some general patterns of mentalities have undoubtedly influenced the decisions and actions of the civilians.

3.1.1. *Economic motives*

In September 1941, in an informative note sent to the gendarmes the dissatisfaction of the Romanians was mentioned because "all the services in the locality, starting from restaurants, sausages, debts, and other enterprises, all the service personnel are only Jews ... and the Romanians walk the streets, unable to do any kind of service". According to the authorities' reply, the finding was real, but also that "Romanians, although they crave different positions, do not have the qualifications and the training they need to take care of."³⁹ Such a portrait of the economic life of Bukovina reflects the reality of a province where the Jews controlled most of the business, enterprises and trade. During the war, many civilians saw nothing reprehensible in taking the land, houses, or personal items of the murdered or deported Jews.⁴⁰ Corruption and bribery could facilitate easy and rapid enrichment. In many cases, the negative characters were extremely poor or less educated civilians, apparently despised in their community. However, there were some exceptions, such as those noted by the mayor of Cernăuți, Traian Popovici. In his memoirs, he refers to the stage after the creation of the ghetto, when the "broker intellectuals, known to the Cernăuți populations as "decent people from all walks of life and social professions", behaved "like hyenas that sniffed the soul corpses of these miserable".⁴¹ The survivor Scherzer recorded in his memoirs: "In the following days, feeling that the time was right to take

³⁸ *Solidarity and Rescue in Romania*, From the Report of the Elie Wiesel Commission, <https://www.yadvashem.org/righteous/resources/solidarity-and-rescue-in-romania.html> (Accessed on 10.05.2019)

³⁹ Liviu Cărare, *Considerații privind procesul de ghettoizare a evreilor din Cernăuți* [Considerations on the Czernowitz Jews process of ghettoization], „Anuarul Institutului de Istorie «G. Barițiu» din Cluj-Napoca”, Vol. XLIX, 2010, p. 103.

⁴⁰ Simon Geissbühler, *“He spoke Yiddish like a Jew”...*, p. 438.

⁴¹ Traian Popovici, *Spovedania. Biografie. Mărturii* [The Confession. Biography. Testimonies], edited by Dragoș Olaru, Serghei Voronțov, Cernăuți, Editura Rodovid, 2018, p. 110.

advantage of those in despair, Romanian civilians descended in droves into the ghetto. They came like vultures ready for a feast (...) They helped themselves to people's possessions, stole whatever they liked, grabbed whatever they could. They walked away with the goods, knowing well that the Jews were too intimidated to complain. After all, to whom could we complain? ... Stealing from Jews had become legal. I discovered that in the absence of law or fear of punishment, even well mannered, well dressed middle-class people could turn into rapacious predators. They discard the laws of civilized behaviour and replace them with wanton, unscrupulous greed. They steal, they rob and trampled the dignity of defenceless people, who until yesterday had been their neighbours".⁴² Other greedy Gentiles "bought" or stole numerous assets from Jewish homes during or after the owners' relocation to the ghetto. According to Popovici, "if deportation itself was a monstrosity, then the exploitation of despondency overcame all. It was the vilest degradation of human morals. That greed could lower human beings so deeply into the mire seemed unbelievable".⁴³ The avarice and the opportunism become keywords, explaining the desire of some persons to obtain favours from the Romanian authorities after the summer of 1941.

3.1.2. Ideological/political motives

The outbreaks of anti-Semitic propaganda through nearly the entire interwar period and the nationalist and anti-Semitic indoctrination delegitimizing and dehumanizing the Jews clearly added to the "long-term cultural and psychological preparation" of violence against the Jews. Jean Ancel considers that the mass murder of the Jews in Northern Bukovina was nothing more than "the last stage of a long process of anti-Semitic policy development".⁴⁴ This anti-Semitism was only intensified by the convincing theme of "Jews' aim to control the political apparatus of the state", then by the myth of "Jewish treachery" following the cession of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the USSR, in the summer of 1940, as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.⁴⁵ No matter how powerful the German military and SS apparatus was, it could not have made such carnage on its own. The killing of Jews in Europe took place with the support of local collaborators (military, civilians, officials, etc.) among ethnic Germans, Baltic nations, Ukrainians, Poles, Romanians, Hungarians, French, and many others.⁴⁶ However,

⁴² Ștefan Cristian Ionescu, "Californian" Colonists versus Local Profiteers?, in "Yad Vashem Studies", Jerusalem, Vol. 44, 2016, No. 2, p. 129.

⁴³ Traian Popovici, *Spovedania...*, p. 111.

⁴⁴ Jean Ancel, *The History of the Holocaust in Romania...*, p. 216.

⁴⁵ Simon Geissbühler, "He spoke Yiddish like a Jew"..., p. 439.

⁴⁶ Doris L. Bergen, *Rivalry, Indifference or Solidarity? Jews and 'Other Victims' in Studies of*

the violence against Jews, in June-July 1940, was carried out by the Romanian military, who saw in the Mosaic community a literal supporter of the Bolsheviks.⁴⁷ In Bukovina, most of the population was not involved in pogroms or other anti-Semitic actions. The collective culpability of the Jews led to the rapid degradation of their situation culminating in ghettos, deportations and other nightmare events. The return of the Romanian administration determined some of the Bukovinians left in the Soviet-occupied territory to prove their loyalty by reprehensible deeds against the Jews.⁴⁸ The forces that drove the civilian extremists and perpetrators included anti-Semitism, anti-Communism (or rather anti-Russianism), brutality, and sadism.

3.2. Motivation of solidarity

Psychologists Samuel and Pearl Olinery distinguish three groups of social psychological solidarity: a) people with a developed sense of empathy; b) people who proved a superior sense of duty to the “reference group”; c) people who are primarily guided by moral principles, helping anyone who asks for it.⁴⁹

According to Mariana Hausleitner, there is still little evidence on the solidarity actions of non-Jewish civilians in Bukovina concerning the persecuted Jewish population. On the one hand, it can be explained by the small number of rescuers; on the other hand, it is a neglected issue, all over Romania, not just in Bukovina.⁵⁰ The authors of the afore-mentioned *Final Report on the Holocaust in Romania* believe that most acts of support were not recorded in documents, although they remained alive in the minds and hearts of those Jews who were in extreme situations, surviving only due to the “intervention of such Romanians”.⁵¹ Besides, during the war, the odds of meeting a rescuer largely depended on the very different circumstances in which Jewish communities found themselves. The case of Boian pogrom proves that individual initiatives were often successful. Yet, many people who may have otherwise been willing to help were unable to

the Holocaust and Comparative Genocide, in John K. Roth, Elisabeth Maxwell, Margot Levy, Wendy Whitworth (Eds.), *Remembering for the Future. The Holocaust in an Age of Genocide*, Vol. 1, History, New York, Palgrave, 2001, p. 31.

⁴⁷ Radu Ioanid, *The Holocaust in Romania...*, p. 39-40.

⁴⁸ Vladimir Solonari, *Patterns of Violence. The Local Population and the Mass Murder of Jews in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, July–August 1941*, in “Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History”, Vol. 8, 2007, No. 4, p. 749-787.

⁴⁹ Samuel P. Oliner, Pearl M. Oliner, *The Altruistic Personality: Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe*, New York, The Free Press, 1988.

⁵⁰ Mariana Hausleitner, *Acțiunile de salvare...*, p. 173.

⁵¹ Tuvia Friling, Radu Ioanid, Mihail E. Ionescu (Eds.), *Final Report...*, p. 290.

overcome the paralysis stemming from their feelings towards the Jews. Since the anti-Semitic propaganda was so intense during the war, the compassion for Jewish suffering, humiliation, and persecution was construed as socially inappropriate or perceived as evidence of a lack of patriotism and even treason.⁵² The persons who helped the Jews had different ages, various degrees of education and came from the most diverse social categories.

In most cases, the primary motivation of rescuers is the personal relationship with their neighbours, friends or colleagues at work.⁵³ Ideological reasons (belonging to an anti-fascist or religious group) are rare and questionable. In the absence of a personal relationship with the Jews, they are spontaneous human gestures justified by attachment to the values of a code of solidarity (invoking, exceptionally, *love* as total concern for others, or *justice* as interest for others and oneself). For example, on 14 July 1942, Dori Popovici, a political leader of Bukovina and former minister in the Romanian government in the 1920s, in a letter to Mihai Antonescu, vice-president of the Council of Ministers, harshly criticized the deportations of Jews from Bukovina to Transnistria: "These methods are alien to a civilized country, alien to the spirituality of the Romanian population in this region, a population educated for fifty years to respect the law and public morals. These methods were applied without any reason or motivation, and this population was condemned to watch convoys of hundreds and thousands of Jews, many of them lifetime acquaintances or neighbours, being escorted by armed guards in the streets of Cernăuți with only what they could carry on those Sunday mornings when church bells announce the beginning of the mass. This Romanian population had to watch the heart-breaking scene of thousands of Jews crying and yelling with desperation during this pitiful march in the streets of the city".⁵⁴

ARCHETYPES OF THE CIVILIAN

Taking into account the three indicators (time, space, and motivation) and the information extracted from the historical analysis or testimonies of the sur-

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 291.

⁵³ See the motivations and characteristics of the rescuer, in Mary J. Gallant, *Social Dimensions of Rescue in the Holocaust*, in John K. Roth, Elisabeth Maxwell, Margot Levy, Wendy Whitworth (Eds.), *Remembering for the Future. The Holocaust in an Age of Genocide*, Vol. 2, *Ethics and Religion*, New York, Palgrave, 2001, p. 257.

⁵⁴ Tuvia Friling, Radu Ioanid, Mihail E. Ionescu (Eds.), *Final Report...*, p. 298-299.

vivors, some of the behavioural archetypes can be identified among the civilian population of Bukovina. They represent typical motivations, goals and general attitudes of the civilians, showing also how these can change based on their life and war experiences.

A. The "Neighbour"

The archetype does not strictly refer to the word "neighbour" but covers a wide variety of terms (acquaintances, colleagues, friends or community members). It is the most easily identifiable, appearing in a double hypostasis: opponent or rescuer/sympathetic. In Geissbühler's study on Northern Bukovina in July 1941, the neighbours – predominantly rural residents – are not just apathetic, indifferent, and passive, but most violent, materializing their extreme actions in crimes. They beat and stole from the Jews, handed them over to the soldiers, helped search for fugitives and plundered Jewish homes.⁵⁵ Sometimes they organized pogroms, the one in Bănila/Siret being described by Radu Ioanid as "[one] of the most horrible massacres" to take place in Northern Bukovina that July. The slaughter was so brutal that the local priest refused to enter the church for the Sunday liturgy the day after the massacre: "I'm ashamed to step inside the church, while my co-believers lend themselves to crimes. I'm ashamed".⁵⁶ From the perspective of criminals, their actions were spontaneous proof of "vigilance" or "patriotism." From the victims' point of view, the attack by the local population was a surprising and shocking act. The disappearance of the neighbourhood, of a relationship that was sometimes tense or harmonious, structured around mutual (economic) dependence, created perplexity. The myth of tolerance and understanding between national minorities, specific to the human geography of Bukovina had shattered in 1940. Ietti Leibovici, who lived in Vatra Dornei, remembered that "in Bukovina, there were many customs adopted from the Germans and they always came to our holidays. The friends of my mother and the friends of my aunt visited us. We visited them. We got along and, suddenly, the anti-Semitism broke out".⁵⁷ The more incomprehensible was the extreme manifestation of anti-Semitism; the perpetrators were not uniformed security forces with whom the sufferers had no relationship: they were the neighbours of the victims. The Jewish community of Boian refused to take seriously the warning of Eitan, a newcomer: "One of my father's workers, out of gratitude to

⁵⁵ Simon Geissbühler, *"He spoke Yiddish like a Jew"...*, p. 433.

⁵⁶ Radu Ioanid, *The Holocaust in Romania...*, p. 98.

⁵⁷ *Interviu Ietti Leibovici* [Interview Ietti Leibovici], Institutul Național pentru Studierea Holocaustului din România "Elie Wiesel", <http://www.inshr-ew.ro/ro/marturii/222-interviu-ietti-leibovici.html> (Accessed on 05.09.2019)

my father, because he taught him the job of milling, or because he was a good man, advised him to leave immediately, for the night that comes something terrible will happen. My father told this to the local Jews, but they received his words without care and irony. They said that nothing bad can happen to the Jews, because they lived here for hundreds of years, and their relationships with the villagers are warm and friendly. My father listened to the mill's advice but did not take his words seriously. Yet, we climbed into the attic and made a barricade at the door (...). *Goim*, who have lived alongside the Jews for generations, with their hands destroyed the Jewish population of the village. It was not a single killer or an organised pogrom, but voluntary destruction of the villagers' neighbours".⁵⁸ In this passage are found both the hypostases of the "neighbour": the killer and the rescuer. The perplexity also appears in the testimonies of Doctor Landau, who remembered when his former patients treated by him without any payment, entered his house and robbed his family.⁵⁹ In turn, Miriam Korber wrote: "... the neighbours looked at us like we were some monsters; they did not refrain from spit: Look, the kike! Well done, well done! The war is because of them".⁶⁰ Romanian and Ukrainian civilians were the perpetrators of the crimes committed in Bănila/ Ceremuș (170 victims), Stăneștii de Jos (between 80 and 88 victims), Stăneștii de Sus (more than 40 victims).⁶¹ Still another slaughter took place in Milie, where Ukrainians killed nearly the entire Jewish population, somewhere between 110 and 180 people.⁶²

Analysis of the solidarity of Gentiles with the persecuted Jews in Bukovina is still incomplete. Most of the documentary sources illustrate the period 1943-1945 when several families of the survivors of the Transnistrian camps were helped by the locals to rebuild their households.⁶³ In her testimony, Erika Weinstein-Feiler recalls the distribution of family belongings to her father's colleagues or non-Jewish neighbours: "If we returned, we would have recovered something. Otherwise, it would have been a gift from our family". After returning from Transnistria in 1944,

⁵⁸ Shalom Eitan, *Să supraviețuiești...*, p. 22-23.

⁵⁹ Vladimir Solonari, *Purificarea națiunii...*, p. 186.

⁶⁰ *Interviu Miriam Korber-Bercovici* [Interview Miriam Korber-Bercovici], Institutul Național pentru Studiarea Holocaustului din România "Elie Wiesel", <http://www.inshr-ew.ro/ro/marturii/162-interviu-miriam-korber-bercovici.html> (Accessed on 29.03.2020)

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 74.

⁶³ *Interviu Solomon Rauth* [Interview Solomon Rauth], Institutul Național pentru Studiarea Holocaustului din România "Elie Wiesel", <http://www.inshr-ew.ro/ro/marturii/220-interviu-solomon-rauth.html> (Accessed on 14.03.2020)

Erika remembered: "We received a large part of the goods that we entrusted to doctors and neighbours before our deportation".⁶⁴ There are cases of exceptional initiatives such as that of a group of "local Christians" in Vârtecăuți (Northern Bukovina), who found out about the arrest of the 12 Jewish families in their village. They "gathered and waited for the future assassins in the middle of the road, begging on their knees to release the victims. Thus, the Jews were released".⁶⁵ Much more familiar is the case of the church painter George Russu – one of the "rights among nations" – who rescued the family of David Șlacman, a printing artist with whom he collaborated in the printing house of the Metropolitan Church in Cernăuți.⁶⁶ Another "right among nations" is Simion Hîj, a lawyer from Cernăuți. Although he was no longer a prefect of the Storojineț district, using his relations, he managed to obtain the liberation of several Jews from the Vașcăuți ghetto, subsequently saving others from deportation to Transnistria. According to the testimonies of many witnesses, his home in Cernăuți has become a refuge for many Jews, while others received material and financial aid.⁶⁷ Șerban Flondor (son of Iancu Flondor), engineer, large owner, genealogy and heraldry specialist⁶⁸, supplied with food the Jews in the Storojineț camp. Relying on the help of the leaders of the Romanian Railways, he helped several Jews to reach București, locking them in sleeping compartments. Taking advantage of the benefits he enjoyed as a councillor for the Chamber of Agriculture, he used his train car to send Jews from Bukovina to București, where they could be hidden more easily.⁶⁹

B. The Civil Authority/ The Clerk

Some authors have suggested that "local perpetrators and their collabora-

⁶⁴ Erika Feiler, *geb. Weinstein, in Verlorene Kindheit. Copilărie pierdută*, Projektgruppe "Kriegsgräber", 2017, pp. 83-87, http://www.rsg-roev.de/europaschule/dateien/pdf/kg_verloreneKindheit2017.pdf (Accessed on 15.05.2019)

⁶⁵ Vladimir Solonari, *Purificarea națiunii...*, p. 185.

⁶⁶ Csaba István Székely, *The Holocaust of Memories*, Miercurea Ciuc, Editura Alutus, 2011, p. 41-50; <https://www.yadvashem.org/yv/pdf-drupal/romania.pdf> (Accessed on 12.09.2019)

⁶⁷ Dumitru Valenciu, *Încă un uitat: dr. Simion Hîj* [Another Forgotten: Dr. Simion Hîj], „Crai Nou”, 10 august 2017, <https://www.crainou.ro/2017/08/10/inca-un-uitat-dr-simion-hij/> (Accessed on 06.04.2019)

⁶⁸ Mihai Sorin Rădulescu, *Un nobil bucovinean la București și resuscitarea studiilor genealogice românești* [A Bukovinian Nobleman in Bucharest and the Resuscitation of Romanian Genealogical Studies], în „Muzeul Național de Istorie a României”, Vol. XVII, 2005, No. 1, p. 157-173.

⁶⁹ Marius Mircu, *Oameni de omenie în vremuri de neomenie* [Humane People in Inhumane Times], București, Editura Hasefer, 1996, p. 87.

tors were usually individuals on the margins of society who were acting out their frustrations".⁷⁰ This inclination to attribute collaboration to marginal groups, however, falls far short of adequacy. In Bănila/Siret, for example, the town mayor organized the pogrom. A lawyer was responsible for drawing up the list of Jews to be killed in Coțmani.⁷¹ In Suceava, after the departure of all convoys, the mayor of the city summoned the population to a general meeting where he praised the decision to deport the Jews, praised Germany and Marshal Antonescu "and thanked God that Suceava got rid of the Jews".⁷² Due to the intensity of the anti-Semitic propaganda during the war, the measures taken for the aggression, massacre or deportation of the Jews were perceived, by a part of the provincial administration, as a component of a necessary national rescue policy. According to the confession of Traian Popovici, "some leaders of the authorities in all the public compartments, "following the principle *exempla trahunt*", "competed with the government", so that "the whole range of oppression happened sadistically, from top to bottom, not to the degradation of the nation, but of humanity: the removal of Jews from hospitals and sanatoriums".⁷³ Greed made some public servants promise Jews that they would be freed from the ghettos in exchange for money, while others "were eager to sell their goods at heavily inflated prices while devaluing their homes".⁷⁴ Civil servants, hoping to receive the homes of future deportees, protested against the suspension of deportations in November 1941. However, some Bukovinians tried to ignore the inhumane measures adopted by the Romanian military authorities. Thus, the Romanian Petru Bruja, appointed mayor of Storojineț on July 1941, tried to free four thousand Jews whose lives had been spared, who were locked in two school buildings, where they were left for three days without food or clean water. Because Colonel Alexandrescu, who commanded the recruitment district, and the powerful landowner Șerban Flondor opposed him, Petru Bruja resigned. Instead, the new mayor - Dimitrie Rusu - and the deputy mayor Ștefan Tomovici organized the ghetto and forced Jews to clean the city streets daily.⁷⁵

⁷⁰ Simon Geissbühler, *"He spoke Yiddish like a Jew"...*, p. 440.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² *Mărturia președintelui Comunității din Suceava, Meir Teich (din anul 1946) cu privire la pregătirile și executarea deportării* [Testimony of the President of the Community of Suceava, Meir Teich (since 1946) regarding the preparations and execution of the deportation], in Matatias Carp, *Cartea neagră...*, Vol. III, p. 149.

⁷³ Traian Popovici, *Sposedania...*, p. 100.

⁷⁴ Vladimir Solonari, *Purificarea națiunii...*, p. 198.

⁷⁵ Radu Ioanid, *The Holocaust in Romania...*, p. 73.

Unlike them, or those who showed solidarity with the Jewish cause for mercantile reasons (profiteers), Traian Popovici, the mayor of Chernivtsi, is by far an exceptional case⁷⁶. He strongly opposed the ghettoization and deportation of the Jews, against Antonescu's military orders, directly contributing to the salvation of thousands of Jews from deportation and death (17,000⁷⁷ or nearly 20,000⁷⁸). As stated by testimonies, the rescue of the 20,000 Jews from Chernivtsi was the merit of Corneliu Calotescu, Governor-General of Bukovina (02.09.1941 - 20.03.1943), or Fritz Schellhorn, German Consul in Chernivtsi (1934-1944).⁷⁹ In any case, if he had not made an effort to find support, understanding or at least tolerance from other decision-makers, Traian Popovici's approach would have failed. In his *Confession*, the mayor of Chernivtsi declares: "I do not claim the honour of being human. I claim it for the entire office of the mayor, which shared my feelings and, under my leadership, did not surrender to any act of inferiority and proved to have a soul".⁸⁰ He also says that there were other "interventions" of the "leaders in the counties", but that they were "badly credited".⁸¹ Less known is the name of Egon Patac Balmoș, the lawyer who tried to protect the Jews in Rădăuți, requesting the release of the sick.⁸² Constantin Hrehorciuc, chief of the gendarme station in Stăneștii de Jos, mediated for the Jews held hostage in several Bukovinian localities by armed groups of Ukrainians who had set out to execute between ten and fifteen of them every day. He later ignored the order to send Jews to the camps of Storojineț and Văscăuți.⁸³ Then so did the former director of Rădăuți herd, Ion Larionescu, clerk Margulis from the Rădăuți spirits factory, German lawyer Albert Twers of Rădăuți, who all mediated the correspondence between the Transnistrian deportees and the Jews remaining in Rădăuți or

⁷⁶ See Marianne Hirsch, Leo Spitzer, *The Cernăuți Ghetto, the Deportations, and the Decent Mayor*, in Valentina Glajar, Jeanine Teodorescu (Eds.), *Local history, transnational memory in the Romanian Holocaust*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p. 57-76.

⁷⁷ Gaëlle Fisher, *Between Liberation and Emigration...*, p. 119.

⁷⁸ Traian Popovici, *Spovedania...*, p. 124.

⁷⁹ Hartwig Cremers, *Czernowitz 1941/1942 – der Einsatz des deutschen Konsuls Fritz Schellhorn für die Juden*, in "Südost-Forschungen", Band 73, 2014, S. 450-457; Vladimir Solonari, *The Treatment of the Jews...*, p. 170-172.

⁸⁰ Traian Popovici, *Spovedania...*, p. 101.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

⁸² DJANS, Fund *Prefectura județului Rădăuți* [The Prefecture of Rădăuți County], F. 145/1941, f. 85.

⁸³ Marius Mircu, *Oamenii de omenie...*, p. 82-83.

Chernivtsi.⁸⁴ In all cases, it was a conscious, deliberate and well-grounded assumption of the moral duty of the person involved, willingly or unwillingly, in a limiting situation. Acting or remaining passive ultimately depended on the decision to accept or reject participation in committing an abominable crime, even then, or especially when the crime was “legal”.

C. The “Unknown”/ The “Other”

This archetype introduces “the elastic view” of the attitude level of civilians in Bukovina: some people were strongly anti-Semitic, others less so, and others may not fit into either of the categories. “The Unknown” or “The Others” are not part of the “neighbours” or “clerks” categories, although they may share ideals and motivations. They are rather the type of neutral, hostile or compassionate kind towards Jews who have reached the limit. Literature related to Bukovina, whether historical studies or memoirs, presents the “others” as passively accepting the murder, by implicitly participating in the functioning of the anti-Semitic mechanism. In his memoirs, Shalom Eitan remembers the episode of his family’s escape from Boian, after the massacre he witnessed. The attempt to “lease” a horse and a wagon and the meeting with a stranger peasant from Mahala (who seemed willing to help them) could cost their life: “He agreed and brought us into the village, but in the meantime, he told the villagers that we were going to come; they were getting ready to catch us. When we got to the village, some hooligans had begun beating my father, mother and brother; it seemed that they were beating our parents not with malice, but with pleasure as if it were a game they had been waiting for a long time. After deciding they had enough to play with us, they left”.⁸⁵ The same archetypal category includes residents who, “under the pretext of knowing the governor, military commander or mayor”, mock Jews “on a large scale” for their goods; along with them, profiteers from neighbouring villages or, as noted by Popovici, “individuals” from all “corners of the country” to take advantage of that human tragedy⁸⁶. The arrival of colonists brought to *Romanianize* the “abandoned” Jewish (and German) properties triggered tensions with the local would-be profiteers not only in Cernăuți and the surrounding area but also in other parts of Bukovina.⁸⁷ Without exaggerating its dimension, there is also a different perspective on “the others”: the foreigners who, without any

⁸⁴ Dragoș Olaru, *Scrisori din Transnistria (anul 1941)* [Letters from Transnistria (1941)], <http://hauster.de/data/DragosOlaru.pdf> (Accessed on 10.03.2020)

⁸⁵ Shalom Eitan, *Să supraviețuiești...*, p. 25-26.

⁸⁶ Traian Popovici, *Spovedania...*, p. 110-111.

⁸⁷ Ștefan Cristian Ionescu, *“Californian” Colonists...*, p. 134.

previous contact with the refugee, persecuted, *ghettoed* or deported Jews, showed their compassion, solidarity and, in extreme cases, taking risks. Arthur Klinghoffer remembered the ghetto of Storojineț and the non-Jews who helped his family with food: “although many were indifferent, some behaved *friendly* and *right*”.⁸⁸ These evocations of individual cases recorded in documents or testimonies indicate spontaneous human gestures, justified by their attachment to the values of a code of human solidarity, but not systematically researched.

CONCLUSIONS

Because violence is a dynamic and relational process, its trajectories and outcomes cannot be fully understood if the focus is placed solely on one actor: the victim or the perpetrators. Civilians, when they are not targeted by mass violence, but witnessing it, also have choices and strategies to adopt. Civilians across Bukovina reacted differently to the persecution of Jews and the opportunities it brought to victimize or aid them. There were patterns of behaviour that may have gone beyond individual, idiosyncratic differences. Some of them explain why one group provided support and aid to suffering Jewish neighbours, while another group exacerbated the situation, causing deliberate harm, often with gratuitous acts of violence.⁸⁹ Material explanations, opportunism or envy, emotional resentment, as well as empathy, morality, integrity and humanistic principles, reproaches of conscience and demand for labour may be invoked in explaining the extremist or exceptional attitude of civilians towards Jews during the Second World War. Even if the documentary material provides sufficient information to outline the characteristics of the public reaction, from hostility to indifference and compassion, a historiographical re-evaluation of the subject becomes not only useful but also necessary.

⁸⁸ Arthur Klinghoffer, in *Verlorene Kindheit. Copilărie pierdută*, Projektgruppe “Kriegsgräber”, 2017, p. 54, http://www.rsg-roev.de/europaschule/dateien/pdf/kg_verloreneKindheit2017.pdf (Accessed on 15.05.2019)

⁸⁹ Diana Dumitru, Carter Johnson, *Constructing Interethnic Conflict and Cooperation...*, p. 1.

THE ELECTION ATTITUDES AMONG THE POLISH MINORITY INHABITING THE REGION OF ZAOLZIE IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC (1990-2018)

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Abstract. *The paper analyses the election activity of the Polish inhabitants of the Zaolzie region (the Czech Republic) in the 1990-2018 period referring to national elections (Lower Chamber of Parliament, Senate, President of the Czech Republic) as well as local and regional elections. The theoretical section offers analyses of national and ethnic minorities as (collective) political actors. The empirical part provides an in-depth analysis of the votes in particular elections, taking into consideration the communes with a significant rate of Polish inhabitants as well as those communes where the Polish ethnos was rather scarce. The ethnic affiliation has been considered as a vital independent variable of the choices made; however, other variables explaining election behaviour have also been indicated.*

Keywords: Zaolzie, Czech Republic, Polish national minority, elections, politics

Rezumat. *Atitudinile electorale în rândul minorității poloneze din Regiunea Zaolzie a Republicii Ceha (1990-2018).* Articolul analizează problema activității electorale a locuitorilor polonezi din regiunea Zaolzie (Republica Cehă) în perioada 1990-2018, referindu-se la alegerile naționale (Camera inferioară a Parlamentului, Senatul, președintele Republicii Ceha), precum și la alegerile regionale și locale. Secțiunea teoretică prezintă minoritățile naționale și etnice ca actori politici (colectivi). Partea empirică oferă o analiză aprofundată a voturilor la anumite alegeri, luând în considerare comunele cu o pondere semnificativă de locuitori polonezi, precum și acele comune unde etnicii polonezi sunt puțini la număr. Afilierea etnică a fost considerată o variabilă vitală independentă a opțiunilor exprimate. Pe lângă aceasta, au fost luate în calcul și alte variabile care explică comportamentul electoral.

INTRODUCTION

Faced with the growing significance of national and ethnic minorities in domestic and international politics (*vide*: the role of local self-government and civic

diplomacy in multicultural regions, the diplomacy of the diaspora), increasing (self-) awareness among their elites and members of their rights but also of their possibilities of political influence, as well as the development of research in political science on election behaviour of national, ethnic and religious minorities, the Polish national minority in the Zaolzie region, forgotten and “scientifically neglected” in the political science, has turned out to constitute a fascinating area for research.¹

The area of Zaolzie, in the context of the Polish issue, understood in categories of interests, attitudes and behaviours of Poles inhabiting this region, has been the topic of scientific interest among Polish and Czech scientists since the first years it started to function as a social and cultural space (that is, since 1920, when Teschen Silesia was divided between Poland and Czechoslovakia). The subject literature on the ethnic/national issue of Teschen Silesia includes some books written by scientists from outside our region.²

The subject of Zaolzie has not been analysed in political science for various reasons (in contrast to history or ethnography research). Until the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, this was due to obvious reasons. In Czechoslovakia *de facto* there was no political science, whereas in Poland there was an informal ban on analysing the Polish national minorities in neighbouring countries, let alone their political activities. What the author finds surprising is the fact that after the 1989 transformation, we have not seen any in-depth and comprehensive analyses of the election behaviour among the Poles inhabiting Zaolzie in the area of political science. This, in particular, refers to the Polish literature, since we can mention a few attempts made by Czech political scientists at analysing the political behaviour of national and ethnic minorities, including the Polish minority in Zaolzie. The above analyses mostly concern the forms and ways in which the minority managed to organise itself politically, neglecting the issue of political behaviours in the long term, indicating specific trends.³

¹ The paper was written as part of the project entitled: “Právní, historické a společenskovední aspekty nových a tradičních menšin v České republice” [Legal, historical and social aspects of new and traditional minorities in the Czech Republic], kód projektu DG18P02OVV064, in the program of the Czech Republic Ministry of Culture “Národní kulturní identita II”.

² See for example: Kevin Hannan, *Borders of language and identity in Teschen Silesia*, New York, 1996; Kevin Hannan, *Identity and assimilation among the Poles of Zaolzie*, Houston, 1996; Kevin Hannan, *Language and ethnicity among students in Teschen Silesia*, New York, 1999; Kevin Hannan, *Polishness in the borderlands*, Poznań, 2005; Kurt Witt, *Die Teschener Frage*, Berlin, 1935.

³ See: Miroslav Mareš, Martin Strmiska, *Political Participation by Ethnic Minorities in the*

With its nationality problems, Zaolzie should be perceived in a broader – Central European scale, especially concerning the experiences related to the system transformation of the countries forming the Visegrad Group. Of four member states, only Slovakia had a significant percentage of national minorities within its borders, especially 10% Hungarian minority which, in many southern communes, formed a large majority of the population. The authorities in Bratislava, especially in the first five years of the history of independent Slovakia, ran the policy of marginalising the Hungarian population by adopting the election laws aimed at maximally dispersing the votes of the Hungarian voters (for example gerrymandering). The situation of the Hungarian minority at that time caused numerous interventions of the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the European Union. It was only at the end of the 1990s that it was possible to work out some compromise solutions satisfying the representatives of the Hungarian minority. They have been nominated for government positions since that time. Other countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland did not have large national minorities in their territories. In the Czech Republic, which ran a relatively liberal policy towards nationalities, the biggest national minority were the Slovaks (approximately 300 thousand in 1991). Still, it was the Polish national minority, a few times smaller (around 60 thousand people in 1991) that posed the greatest challenge to the governments in Prague (this aspect will be analysed in detail further in the article).

On the other hand, the contemporary ethnic policy of the Hungarian government is a model solution expected by the Hungarians from the neighbouring countries, in which the Hungarians account for a large percentage of the

Czech Republic, in: Tomáš Sirovátka, *The Challenge of Social Inclusion: Minorities and Marginalised Groups in Czech Society*, Brno, 2006; Miroslav Mareš, Lubomír Kopeček, Pavel Pečínka, Věra Stýskalíková, *Etnické menšiny a česká politika. Analýza stranických přístupů k etnické a imigrační politice po roce 1989* [Ethnic minorities and Czech politics. Analysis of political parties' approaches to ethnic and immigration policy after 1989], Brno 2004; Miroslav Mareš (editor), *Etnické a regionální strany v ČR po roce 1989* [and English translation], Brno 2003; Miroslav Mareš, *Etnické a regionální subjekty ve stranickém systému České republiky* [Ethnic and regional entities in the party system of the Czech Republic], Brno, 2003; Lubomír Kopeček, *Study of interest representation development of Polish minority in the Czech Republic*, "Středoevropské politické studie – Central European Political Studies Review", 2002, No 4, <https://journals.muni.cz/cepsr/article/view/3918/5357> (23.10.2019); Lubomír Kopeček, *Coexistencia-Soužití a politická reprezentace polské menšiny na Těšínsku* [Coexistence-Coexistence and political representation of the Polish minority in the Teschen Silesia region], "Středoevropské politické studie – Central European Political Studies Review", 2003, No 5, <https://journals.muni.cz/cepsr/article/view/3941/5312> (23.10.2019).

population (mainly Romania, Slovakia, Serbia). In Poland, the German minority is a relevant political actor representing ethnic and national minorities. This minority densely inhabits several communes in Opolskie province, and thanks to this take advantage of some concessions included in the election ordinance (no election threshold for the minority). This subject occasionally causes some controversies in domestic politics and bilateral relations between Poland and Germany, as it is pointed out that although the Germans enjoy the statutory guarantee of their national minority status, a many times larger group of Poles residing in Germany do not have such status.⁴

THE AIM, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH

The aim of this article, which constitutes a contribution to further, more in-depth quantitative and qualitative research, is to analyse the election activity of the Poles inhabiting the Zaolzie region in the following aspects: **(a)** election (ideological) preferences and the mobilisation of the electorate; **(b)** political effectiveness manifested in gained seats in representative bodies.

Specifying further the **scope** of the conducted analyses, it must be stated that the **subject scope** covers members of the Polish minority inhabiting communes with the highest rate of the Polish population. The **object scope** is the election activity performed by the Poles, understood in categories of “redistributing the power into its particular stages.”⁵ The research focuses on the votes cast in elections to (a) commune councils (commune elections) in 1994-2018; (b) nationwide representative bodies: The Lower Chamber of the Czech Republic Parliament (*Poslanecká sněmovna Parlamentu ČR*) in 1996-2017; the Senate of the Czech Republic in 2000-2017, the office of the President of the Czech Republic (*Prezident republiky*) – 2013, 2018.

The time scope covers the period of 29 years, from 1990 to 2018. In 1990 the first elections were held after the communism collapsed; to the People’s Chamber of Federal Assembly (*Sněmovna lidu Federálního shromáždění*), to the Nations Chamber of Federal Assembly (*Sněmovna národů Federálního shromáždění*) and

⁴ See: Henryk Chałupczak, Radosław Zenderowski, Walenty Baluk (eds.), *Ethnic Policy in Contemporary East Central Countries*, Lublin, 2015, pp. 175-218, 303-348, 399-444, 489-532.

⁵ Michał Wójcicki, *Pojęcie, istota i formy partycypacji społecznej w procesie planowania przestrzennego* [The concept, essence and forms of social participation in the process of spatial planning], „Rozwój Regionalny i Polityka Regionalna”, 2014, Vol. 24, p. 171.

the Czech national Council (*Česká národní rada*), whereas in 1996 – the first parliamentary elections were held in the Czech Republic after the split of Czechoslovakia. In 2018 (the closing point) we observed the election for the office of the President of the Czech Republic (*Prezident republiky*) and the commune elections. However, the elections that took place after the split of Czechoslovakia were of great interest, for two reasons. Firstly, the author decided to perform an analysis of election behaviours within one state organism (instead of two). Secondly, since 1996 we have had a few political parties operating on the Czech political stage, which manage to gain at least 5% of votes in each election, allowing them to be represented continuously in the parliament. **The territorial scope** is the region defined by the Poles as Zaolzie (in Czech language *Zaolší*), whereas the Czechs call it Teschen Silesia, located within the borders of the Czech Republic (in the Czech language: *Těšínské Slezsko v České republice, Těšínsko*).

The term „Zaolzie”, since the division of Teschen Silesia into two parts (Polish and Czechoslovakian), has never been used concerning the whole territory (of Teschen Silesia), which belonged to Czechoslovakia, and which consisted of: the Frydek-Mistek district, inhabited by the Czech population, the Fryštát (Karvina) district, inhabited by Czechs and Poles, and part of the old Teschen district, inhabited mainly by the Polish population. As observed by Krzysztof Szelong, “The Zaolzie area should only incorporate those areas of Teschen Silesia which in 1920 were within the borders of Czechoslovakia, and in which the Polish population had an absolute majority, or at least outnumbered the Czech population (with a significant presence of the German population). In this sense, the western border of Zaolzie coincides with the ethnographic border, which – despite some instability – as late as at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries clearly separated the areas populated by Poles and Czechs in Teschen Silesia.”⁶

Methodology. The conducted research is, in fact, **statistical analysis**. This research aims to determine whether the Polish population inhabiting Zaolzie, first of all – shows specific inclinations (regularities) to vote for particular political parties, and secondly – whether this differentiates them from their Czech neighbours. To analyse the election activity of the members of the Polish minority I referred to various existing data, such as results of particular elections published on websites (www.volby.cz) of the Czech Statistical Office (*Český statistický úřad*). This, however, posed some fundamental difficulty, which consisted in the fact that in

⁶ Krzysztof Szelong, *Zaolzie. Pojęcie, obszar i historia* [Zaolzie. Concept, area and history], <https://openairmuseum.info/pl/dzialy/Zaolzie/Pojecie-obszar-i-historia> (22.10.2019).

the analysed area (Zaolzie), there are no “clearly Polish” or “clearly Czech” election constituencies which could be compared assuming that ethnic identity is the significant independent variable for the political (ideological) choice made. Moreover, it should be remembered that there are numerous co-existing variables which may determine election decisions (for example the socioeconomic status of voters, place of residence – the country or the city, or the fact that an outstanding and popular candidate associated with the region or the commune appeared on the list). Nevertheless, to avoid resigning entirely from the quantitative (statistical) analysis, it was decided to outline the specificity of the region, in particular, the election behaviour of its inhabitants and use the obtained data as a reference point for further qualitative research conducted based on a free interview technique. To this purpose, the detailed analyses of the election behaviour were conducted for:

(a) Inhabitants of three communes, in which Poles constitute the largest percentage of the population and three communes in which they account for the lowest rate of the population (according to the census from 2011). All the above communes, both “Polish” and “Czech”⁷ are located close to one another. Thus, it was decided to choose three communes in which Poles account for approximately 1/3 of the inhabitants. The “Polish” communes – **Gródek/Hrádek** (31.33%), **Miliaków/Milíkov** (30.35%) and **Koszarzyska/Košariska** (27.93%) – are in the southern side of the Zaolzie region and neighbour to each other. For comparison, the author analysed the election results in the “Czech” communes also located in the southern part of Zaolzie, in which the percentage of the Polish population is negligible, namely in **Herczawa/Hrčava** (2.17%), **Toszonowice Dolne/Dolní Tošanovice** (3.74%) and **Dobracice/Dobratice** (0.99%) (see tables: 1 & 2).

(b) Inhabitants of (twenty) communes in which Poles account for the largest percentage of the population (over 15% - the so-called Polish communes) and **inhabitants of (fourteen) communes** where Poles constitute the lowest percentage of the population (up to 5% - the so-called Czech communes) (see tables below) (see tables: 1 & 2).

(c) Inhabitants of northern (industrial and mining, highly urbanised) and **southern** (agricultural and pastoral, rural or small town; without Třinec) part of Zaolzie. The north part covers the area of the Karvina district and includes the following communes with extended competencies: Český Těšín, Karvina, Havířov,

⁷ The terms “Polish” communes and “Czech” communes are only mental shortcuts to describe respectively – communes in which Poles constitute a significant (though not exceeding half of inhabitants) population in a particular commune and communes in which Poles account for a negligible percentage of local population (below 5%).

Orlova and Bohumin. The southern part covers the eastern part of the Frydek-Mistek district, namely two communes with extended competencies: Třinec and Jablunkov (see the map below).

(d) Inhabitants of the so-called **Góralsszczyzna**, which is located in the southern part of Zaolzie (see the map below), composed of the following communes: Boconowice/Bocanovice, Bukowiec/Bukovec, Bystrzyca/Bystřice, Dolna Łomna/Dolní Lomná, Górna Łomna/Horní Lomná, Gródek/Hrádek, Herczawa/Hrčava, Jabłonków/Jablunkov, Koszarzyska/Košariska, Milików/Milíkov, Mosty k. Jabłonkowa/Mosty u Jablunkova, Nawsie/Návší, Nydek/Nýdek, Pioseczna/Písečná, Piosek/Písek. This part of Zaolzie, unlike the northern part, did not experience significant migration movements.

(e) It was also decided to use **the data from the population census of 1921** and on this basis select **(twenty) communes in which the Polish population exceeded 58.8% of all inhabitants** and **(sixteen) communes in which the Czech population accounted for over 59.3% of all inhabitants** (see tables: 3 & 4).

NATIONAL MINORITIES AS POLITICAL ACTORS

Ethnic or national minorities **are generally inclined to have their political representation** on particular levels of public authority – starting from local authorities, through the regional level (for example self-governing regions), to the central level (the parliament, central offices). The more populous the minority, the greater political ambitions it usually reveals. Smaller minorities are traditionally content with securing sufficient representation on the commune, district or regional level. However, larger minorities, especially those concentrated on a specific area, demonstrate at least the ambition to shape the regional politics. It also happens that their political parties join government coalitions or support the government without the coalition agreement in return for some concessions for their national community (the Hungarian minority parties which belong to the government coalitions in Slovakia and Romania, the Turkish party co-forming the government in Bulgaria, the Polish party in Lithuania). One should also mention here the odd case of the Serbian party (Serbian list) which until 2018 co-formed the government coalition in Kosovo. The Belgrade government does not officially recognise this country.

We can observe an increasingly popular conviction that, **thanks to the participation of the representatives of minorities in a given political and party system, it is easier to avoid discriminating practices** from the state (and the majority nation) as far as cultural, social or economic laws are concerned. Rafał

Woźnica points out that „the lack of participation in state institutions, and thus the marginalisation of the minority, may lead to the alienation of this minority towards the state of its residence. As a consequence, minorities often do not feel any sense of belonging to the country which is perceived only as the domain of the majority. One reaction to this might be resorting to non-institutional remedies, covering a broad range of activities, from creating parallel (alternative) institutions or non-parliamentary organisations to military secession movements.”⁸ This usually leads to the process of ghettoization of a particular minority group.

There are two forms in which national or ethnic minorities may possess political representation. Firstly, the minority may strive for building **its political party** – either an ethnic party or an (ethno) regional party operating either exclusively in the local environment or having the ambition to function on the main level of domestic politics. Such a party may be formed by one minority. However, it is also possible that **alliances with other ethnic/national minorities** inhabiting a particular country may be formed to create the most robust possible representation of the interests of the minorities. Secondly, a specific ethnic/national minority **may consider it to be sufficient and desirable to join the political structure and to exert influence on decision processes through the existing nationwide political parties**, often negotiating with them the type of political cooperation, including placing the minority candidates on election lists of the party on such positions that may win them seats. Between these two generally different models of political participation of ethnic/national minorities, there is some sort of a **compromise variant** consisting in developing institutions which, while not being political (ethnic) parties, are to coordinate the efforts aimed at having appropriate political representation (members of parliament, senators, councillors, etc.). One could list here various types of associations and civil movements which continuously or on an *ad hoc* basis try to build a platform of cooperation for various political options operating within a given minority group, to select candidates who will guarantee election success.

It might seem that the possession of a relevant **ethnic party**, operating within the political system of a particular country, is an optimal solution, taking into account the interests of a specific minority. Before this issue is further analysed, we need to specify in a few sentences the concept of an ethnic party. Martyna Wasiuta

⁸ Rafał Woźnica, *Partie polityczne i udział mniejszości w życiu politycznym Macedonii i Bułgarii* [Political parties and the participation of minorities in the political life of Macedonia and Bulgaria], „Studia Środkowoeuropejskie i Bałkanistyczne”, 2016, t. XXIV, p. 187-188.

notices that ethnic parties are not typical political parties, indicating two approaches to understanding their nature. The structural approach “allows us to define them with this name since they are organisations associating members, with their structure (leaders etc.), aiming at obtaining some posts in the state.” The functional approach, on the other hand, allows us to exclude the ethnic party “from the collection of classical political parties, since ethnic parties (...) do not aggregate interests, but emphasise their particularism; they do not integrate the society or create social consensus.” Wasiuta also states that “What weakens their condition as political parties according to some researchers, is perceived by others as an advantage of ethnic parties *in the strict sense*. Their participation in the party system allows them to reflect the interests of the divided society, does not exclude its segments, thus enabling it to institutionally channel ethnic moods, taking away the threat of intractable conflict. It is also a manifest of democratic consociationalism.”⁹

Specialist political literature lists the following variations of an ethnic party: “ethnopolitical parties”, “ethnic or national minority parties”, “regionalist parties” and “ethno regionalist parties”, as well as “multi-ethnic parties.” What they all share is „based on ethnic (regional) criteria membership structure and leadership, electorate and type of appeal, which give rise to specific functions that such parties perform for the ethnic group and its surroundings. These parties are based on socio-political splits between the centre and the peripheries or the ethno-regional division.”¹⁰

While conducting analysis and a synthesis of various definitions of an ethnic party, Martyna Wasiuta writes that according to Donald Horowitz an ethnic party “is a political organisation located between a political party and an interest group.” Paul R. Brass describes it as a specific political organisation dominating in representing demands of a particular ethnic group, as opposed to its rivals.¹¹

⁹ Martyna Wasiuta, *Partie etniczne w Republice Czeskiej* [Ethnic parties in the Czech Republic], „Sprawy Narodowościowe. Seria nowa / Nationalities Affairs. New series”, 2017, No 49, p. 3. See also: Ryszard Herbut, *Teoria i praktyka funkcjonowania partii politycznych* [Theory and practice of political parties functioning], Wrocław 2002, p. 28-31; D.L. Horowitz, *Ethnic groups in conflict*, Berkeley, 1985, p. 296-297; John Ishiyama, *Ethnopolitical parties and democratic consolidation in post-communist Eastern Europe*, “Nationalism & Ethnic Politics”, 2001, No 7(3), 25-45; Heleen Touquet, *Multi-ethnic parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Naša Stranka and the paradoxes of postethnic politics*, “Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism”, 2011, No 11(3), p. 451-467.

¹⁰ Martyna Wasiuta, *Partie etniczne...*, p. 3-4. See also: Seymour M. Lipset, Stein Rokkan, *Party systems and voters; cross-national perspectives*, New York, 1967, p. 16; Lieven De Winter, Huri Türsan, *Regionalist parties in Western Europe*, New York, 2003, p. 1.

¹¹ John Ishiyama, Marijka Breuning, *What is in a name?: Ethnic party identity and democratic*

According to Kanchan Chandra and David Metz, an ethnic party is a party which openly presents itself to its supporters as a defender of interests of one ethnic group or an aggregate of groups, saving them from exclusion by another group or groups, and locates this representation in the heart of its mobilisation strategy.¹²

Donna Lee Van Cott proposes that the term ethnic party should be allocated to an organisation entitled to stand in the election, whose majority of leaders and members identify themselves with a non-dominant ethnic group and whose election manifesto slogans contain demands of ethnic and cultural nature. Wasiuta notices that “the features based on which ethnic parties are classified, include: the size of the election votes received by the party from a particular ethnic group on which the party depends, and whether the party presents itself as a representative of this group. An ethnic party as such would not be ethnic if it did not receive the majority of the support from a particular ethnic group and if it did not define itself in such categories (especially in the name of the party), thus excluding other segments of the electorate.”¹³

As we have already stated, an ethnic party does not necessarily have to represent the interests of one ethnic/national minority. It is possible to create a specific **party alliance of two or more ethnic minorities**. A perfect example of such minority “alliance” is the Political Movement Coexistencia–Wspólnota–Együttélés–Spivžitja–Soužití–Zusammenleben, established in 1989 as Political Movement of National Minorities in Czechoslovakia. “Coexistencia” is a political group which initially operated among national minorities in Czechoslovakia and then in the Czech Republic, aiming at securing the rights of national and ethnic minorities. In the second decade of the 21st century in Serbia, one could find the party called The List of National Communities (Lista nacionalnih zajednica), which took part in parliamentary elections. It associated a few national minorities inhabiting Serbia (Hungarians, Croats and Bosnians).

On the other hand, an ethnic/national minority provided it is big enough, may create **two or more political parties which are *de facto* ethnic parties**, and thus somehow shape the parallel party scenery in a given country (reflecting

development in post-communist politics, “Party Politics”, 2011, No 17(2), p. 225.

¹² Kanchan Chandra, David Metz, *A new cross-national database on ethnic parties*. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwestern Political Science Association, Chicago. <http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/ocvprogram/licep/5/chandra-metz/chandra-metz.pdf> (16.02.2018).

¹³ Martyna Wasiuta, *Partie etniczne...*, p. 4. See also: D. L. Horowitz, *Ethnic groups...*, p. 291; John Ishiyama, Marijke Breuning, *What is in a name...*, p. 223-241; Donna L. Van Cott, *From movements to parties in Latin America: The evolution of ethnic politics*, New York, 2005, p. 3.

ideological divisions inside a particular minority community). **Inter-ethnic political parties**, a rare phenomenon, openly aim at developing some sort of a consensus **between an ethnic/national minority and the nation constituting the majority**, through promoting reconciliation, inter-ethnic cooperation and breaking mutual prejudices and stereotypes. Contrary to other political parties which also promote breaking inter-ethnic barriers, this type of parties is characterised by a strong emphasis placed on ethnic identity and a demand that a separate national identity is preserved.

THE VELVET REVOLUTION AND THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL SELF-ORGANISATION OF THE POLISH MINORITY IN ZAOLZIE

Some Poles were actively involved in the activities of **Civic Forum**, at some point creating its **Polish section**, and then also participated in establishing structures of new political parties, especially **ODS, KDU-ČSL or ČSSD**. On the other hand, some Polish activists, including those initially operating within the Civic Forum, at the beginning of the 1990s were actively involved in establishing a party which was to represent all national and ethnic minorities in the Czechoslovakian state at that time: **Wspólnota – Soužití – Egüttelés (COEX)**. With the splitting of Czechoslovakia, which meant that an overwhelming majority of national and ethnic minorities remained on the Slovakian side of the border, in the new system (the Czech Republic), this party became clearly associated with the Polish national minority. However, since it lost its „Hungarian component”, the party ceased to play any national role (parliamentary elections), and its representatives concentrated their activities on the local dimension of politics (elections to local authority). It must be admitted that the political activities of the representatives of the Polish minority since the beginning of the 1990s had a two-vector nature.¹⁴

On the one hand, there were those who opted for – to simplify things a little – the **“civic principle”** and accomplishment of the interests of the Polish minority based on co-participation with the Czechs in the implementation of various political projects. In this case, it was assumed that the political activity should, above all, have civic, over-ethnic dimension, while the exercise of the rights of the minority was seen in consensus and cooperation with the majority nation (the Czechs). The most prominent figures of this political trend include, inter alia: Marian Siedlaczek, Tadeusz Wantuła, Jan Rusnok, Janusz Klimsza.¹⁵

¹⁴ Lubomír Kopeček, *Study of interest representation...*

¹⁵ Idem, *Coexistentia-Soužití...*

On the other hand, there were those representatives of the Polish minority who opted for the **“national principle”** and clear determination and accomplishment of the interests of the Polish group in the form of parallel social and cultural institutions and, above all, political parties (this policy followed the example of political strategies used by the Slovakian Hungarians). Contrary to their compatriots from the liberal and civic option, who insisted on cooperation with state authorities and the majority nation, the supporters of the second way of accomplishing the Polish interests in Zaolzie focused on close collaboration with representatives of other national and ethnic minorities. Of crucial importance here was the agreement with the half-million Hungarian minority – the largest minority in Czechoslovakia, whose position was similar to the Poles (densely populated areas close to the border with the homeland, long history of settlements, high level of national self-awareness and identity, the existence of religious divisions inside the group, “hushed up” by national interests). Of some significance was also the fact that, at the beginning of the 1990s, Slovakian politicians demanded autonomy or independence of Slovakia, and such requests were politically very influential. The most outstanding politicians of this group included, among others: Stanisław Gawlik, Edwin Macura, Władysław Niedoba¹⁶ (*nota bene* S. Gawlik and W. were candidates to the Czechoslovakian parliament from ... Slovakian constituencies).

LOCAL (COMMUNAL) ELECTIONS IN ZAOLZIE (1994-2018)

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Zaolzie elites have gradually realised how little influence they have on national politics or even regional one – provincial (little chance for appropriate concessions for the Polish minority) and devoted their energy to local, self-government politics. Communal authorities have thus become a testing ground for the political self-organisation of the Polish minority, whose representatives did not have any uniform strategy of promoting Polish interests. Here, as in national politics, we have observed two different attitudes to the election strategy since the beginning of the 1990s.

On the one hand, there is a widespread conviction that in order to be an influential local politician one must gain possibly broad election support, which boils down to **building the election base (electorate) over ethnic divisions**. Advocates of this strategy mostly refer to the interest of a given region as a whole, not to the interests of the Polish or the Czech nationality group. As a result, it happens that the Polish candidate wins more Czech than Polish votes in the election,

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

which may lead to the success in national elections.

However, some socially and politically involved Poles believe that they should, first of all, defend the interests of the Polish nationality group, aiming at **mobilising the electorate mostly among the Zaolzie Poles**, or additionally among other national and ethnic minorities (by referring to common, minority interests). They do notice the necessity to cooperate for the benefit of the region and the accomplishment of its over-ethnic interests, this, however, should be done from a position of a separate, Polish organisation, which possesses its own political identity.

It seems that in time the former strategy began to prevail over the latter one, especially as the number of people declaring themselves to be Polish, declines systematically. This does not mean in any way the "loosening" of the discipline among these local activists, who bet on "ethnic mobilisation" of the Poles inhabiting the Zaolzie region.

The statistical analysis of the first trend poses some challenges since Poles or people of Polish origin in local elections usually focus on the issues of interests of a particular region and do not expose their national identity. It often happens that they are very effective in winning election votes of Poles and Czechs, as well as people who declare another national identity (Silesian, Slovakian, Hungarian, Roma, etc.).

Referring to the second trend, for obvious reasons, it is much easier to conduct a statistical analysis. In this context we should pay more attention to the party called **Coexistencia-Wspólnota** (Coexistencia-Soužití – COEX), which, following the splitting of Czechoslovakia, transformed from a nationwide party representing several national and ethnic minorities to a party, or, to be more precise, a social movement operating locally and representing *de facto* only the Polish minority. As observed by Martyna Wasiuta, "this transformation can be described in a nutshell as a transformation of a multi-ethnic party of independent type into a mono-ethnic party of moderate protectionism. The main reason for this transformation was the change of the political system in 1993. Formally COEX remains a political movement; however, it performs functions of a political party."¹⁷ After the breakdown of Czechoslovakia, the leaders of this movement made a few unsuccessful attempts at obtaining seats in the parliament by forming coalitions with other entities which enjoyed low social support (1996 – the Independent movement – NEZÁVISLÍ, 2002 – with Rural Party – Strana venkova - spojené občanské síly). The same was also observed in regional elections.

In the Ostrava region of 2000, in the first election to the regional parliament, COEX won 2.31% of votes in the region, in the Karvina district – 5.85%, whereas in

¹⁷ Martyna Wasiuta, *Partie etniczne...*, p. 13.

Frydek-Mistek district – 5.64%. COEX did not stand for the next elections of this type. In 2006 it decided to resign from national and regional political activity finally to concentrate on the local economy.¹⁸ Taking into consideration the 1994-2018 period and the support enjoyed by COEX candidates in commune elections (those who stood under COEX name, not in coalition with other entities), we should note that the noticeable decrease in the number of votes, from nearly 85 thousand in 1994 to slightly over 33 thousand in 2018, does not translate into a proportional reduction in the number of won places: respectively 39 in 1994 and 32 in 2018). This may show that the election strategy was perfected and this allowed the party to radically reduce the number of the so-called wasted votes, which do not secure the seat for the representative of the analysed party (see figures: 1 & 2).

On COEX website we can find the list of all Polish councillors in the communes of the Czech part of Teschen Silesia (including those who do not belong to COEX); there are 105 of them (out of the total of 692 councillors) in the 2018-2022 term of office.¹⁹ Needless to say, we deal with some sort of discretion concerning the political importance of national identity, especially concerning people elected for councillor posts from outside COEX lists. Their Polish nationality was “confirmed” by COEX on the official website, which itself offers an exciting contribution to research on “top-down” determination of national/ethnic identity. Nevertheless, in all likelihood, we need to assume that these people identify themselves with the Polish national group since there were no objections to the content of the analysed list raised by the people whose names appear on it. We can assume, though, that the list of the Polish councillors on the official website of COEX is not complete, as not all Polish candidates, in the opinion of the list editors, deserved to be called “Polish councillors.” Therefore, the presented data should be treated with due caution (see table 5).

Taking into consideration three communes with the highest percentage of the population declaring Polish national identity (Gródek, Koszarzyska, Milików) it must be noticed that Coexistentia-Wspólnota has enjoyed the relatively stable support on the level of self-government (commune) elections since 1994 (see table 6). The table below also shows councillors with Polish surnames, elected from outside COEX lists. It should be clearly pointed out, however, that this does not determine their national identity, but only ethnic origin. It should also be noted that COEX has had robust and stable representation in the commune of **Milików**

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 14-15.

¹⁹ *Polacy w radach miast i gmin (2018 – 2022 r.) / Poláci v zastupitelstvech měst a obcí (2018-2022)*, <http://www.coexistentia.cz/2018wybor/polacy2018.htm> (30.01.2020).

since 1994 (approximately 40% of votes in the commune council). As a comparison, the table below shows the support for COEX in five other communes, in which Polish candidates (also not from COEX lists) in the 2018 self-government election received over 40% of votes. Such high support was possible then probably because Polish candidates were on various lists, often as independent candidates. In the communes presented below, only in **Vendryně** we can see stable and high support for COEX, oscillating, as in the case of Milików, around 40% (see table 7).

To summarise, the activity of Poles in **self-government elections** is characterised by powerful dynamics, which has two aspects. On the one hand, it is conducted within the COEX group, which is a specific substitute for the Polish ethnic party, and on the other – within other local groups. In the last election, 1/3 of all (that is 39 out of 105) Polish councillors were representatives of COEX. In total, Polish councillors in 2018 accounted for slightly over 15% of all commune councillors in Zaolzie, which reflects the ethnic potential of the Polish minority, though in some communes we can observe clear over-representation of the Polish councillors in comparison to the percentage of the Polish population, as measured in the public census.

NATIONAL (PARLIAMENTARY, PRESIDENTIAL) ELECTION IN ZAOLZIE (1990-2017)

As for the political activity, or more specifically, election activity of Poles inhabiting Zaolzie in national elections in the period after 1989, we must point out a few significant events and processes.

Firstly – only in the 1992-1996 period, the Polish minority did not have its representation in the Czech parliament (Lower Chamber, Senate). In 1990-1992 there were **three Poles in the People's Chamber of the Federal Assembly, and one – in the Czech National Council**. This was a record representation since the beginning of the Czechoslovakian parliament (that is since 1918). One should observe here that the election ordinance at that time did not provide for any concessions for national or ethnic minorities. (On the contrary, constituencies were designed in a way that would lower the chances of non-Czech national group representatives of becoming a member of parliament or a senator). In the discussed period, there emerged two political trends among Poles: the liberal one, connected with the Civic Forum, and the conservative one, oriented at rights of minorities, associated with the Coexistencia movement. On the other hand, since the election in 1996, in the 1996-2017 period, the Polish minority had **three representatives in the Lower Chamber of the Czech Republic**, and interestingly, none of them served

the full term. In the first case (Wawrzyniec Fójcik), this was due to the early election in 1998, in the second case (Marian Bieleś) the MP resigned from the post, and in the third case (Jiří Rusnok) – this was due to the shortened term of the parliament.

Secondly, despite the rather unfavourable division of Zaolzie into three constituencies, Poles were successful in the **election to the Senate**, since **three candidates declaring themselves to be Poles or openly admitting that they had Polish roots, won the Senator seats** (Andrzej Feber in 2000, Eduard Matykie-wicz in 2002, Jiří Cieńciała in 2016). Only a few votes more and this group would have been joined by Stanisław Czudek in 2010. **What is interesting, none of the Polish MPs won the Parliament seat from the list of two parties, most supported by Poles**, that is ČSSD and KDU-ČSL (see table 8).

Thirdly – contrary to the previously mentioned elections, **the presidential elections** did not practically have any influence on the situation (and the representation) of Poles inhabiting Zaolzie. However, we could observe much higher support for “fellow compatriot” Jiří Drahoš (who comes from Zaolzie, from a mixed Czech-Polish family) in communes with a significant percentage of the Polish population (see figure 3).

Fourthly – the results of the parliamentary elections, in particular, allow us to distinguish **two sub-regions – the northern one** (covering the territory of the Karvina district), dominated by supporters of left and centre-left parties (KSČM, ČSSD) and **the southern one** (the eastern part of the Frydek-Mistek district), in which apart from centre-left ČSSD, the Christian-democratic KDU-ČSL enjoys much greater popularity than in the north of the region (see figures: 4-6). Comparing these election preferences to the results of the elections from the period between world wars (1925, 1929, 1935), we can clearly see that despite the passage of time some patterns of political behaviour remain the same. The areas which once were decisively won by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Polish Socialist Workers’ Party (court districts of Frysztat/Fryštát and Bogumin/Bohumín) were “taken over” by the Communist Party of the Czech and Moravia Regions and the Czech Social Democratic Party. The regions in which before the World War II the Christian democratic Association of Silesian Catholics in Czechoslovakia (dominated by Polish Catholics) and Christian Democratic People’s Association in Czechoslovakia (dominated by Polish evangelicals) won (in various coalition configurations), still sympathise politically more with KDU-ČSL and ČSSD. In this system ČSSD may look like a specific „centre party”, enjoying comparable support in the northern and southern parts of Zaolzie, though recently this support has been gradually lost for the benefit of the populist ANO party.

Fifthly, as observed several times while analysing in detail the support for

particular political parties, **the inhabitants of the communes with a large percentage of the Polish population** demonstrate **greater inclination to vote for conservative parties** (especially KDU-ČSL). In contrast,²⁰ inhabitants of communes with negligible Polish population more often choose leftist parties (especially KSČM) (see figures: 7 & 8).

This may be connected with declared religiousness, which is much higher in the Polish community than in the Czech community, and far higher in the southern than in the northern part of Zaolzie. It is worth noticing that of all nationality groups living in the Czech Republic, Poles are at the top of the list of the most religious nations. In 2011 in the whole country 20.8% of its citizens declared their belief in God, with Poles being the most religious group (56.9%), followed by Silesians (47.4%) and Slovaks (40.2%), the least religious nationalities were Vietnamese (8.7%) and Czechs (22.6%). Moreover, we can observe a significant difference between the northern and the southern parts of Zaolzie concerning their religiousness. It is sufficient to compare the percentage of religious people in the commune of Orlova (12.3%) on the one hand, and in the commune of Jablunkov (51.8%) on the other²¹ (see table 9). As we can see, religiousness constitutes an essential independent variable determining the political choices of Zaolzie inhabitants.

And finally, **it is difficult to conclude that we are witnessing some weakening of political activity among the Poles which would coincide with the declining size of the Polish population in Zaolzie.** Poles, including Polish voters, constitute a relatively integrated community, aware of its identity, whose representatives understand well election mechanisms and principles of political representation. Poles also seem to be more determined to be politically active, usually on the local level, which is frequently manifested in “over-representation” of Poles in commune councils (compared to their population in a particular commune).

CONCLUSIONS

The Poles from Zaolzie do not have one strategy of gaining election support or building political structure. There is a clear division into those who pursue

²⁰ Český statistický úřad. Odbor statistiky obyvatelstva, *Náboženská víra obyvatel podle výsledků Sčítání lidu* [Population by religious beliefs and by size groups of municipalities, districts and administrative districts of the ORP - Moravian-Silesian Region], Praha, 2014, p. 14.

²¹ Český statistický úřad, *Sčítání lidu, domů a bytu 2011, Obyvatelstvo podle náboženské víry a podle velikostních skupin obcí, okresů a správních obvodů ORP - Moravskoslezský kraj* [Census of population, houses and flats], <https://www.czso.cz> (17.02.2020).

Polish interests within the groups voicing interests of minorities (especially COEX) and those who prefer to join the structures of the Czech political parties and thus obtaining certain concessions for the Polish minority. Simplifying this matter, we could define both models of political behaviour as, respectively, confrontation and cooperation models. However, the above does not entitle us to conclude that Poles living in Zaolzie are somehow “politically inconsistent”. On the contrary, we can propose a thesis that this election tactic, though probably not coordinated by any decision centre, ultimately brings measurable political benefits to the Polish minority. Neither closing themselves in the ethnic ghetto nor choosing the option of political activities within Czech political parties would provide the Polish minority with sufficient opportunities and chances for accomplishing their political interests. Paradoxically thus, these two vectors of political activity undertaken by the Poles living in Zaolzie seems a rational political strategy. However, taking into account permanent demographic trends, a namely regular decline of the percentage of the population who declare to be of Polish nationality in Zaolzie, in the future we might expect to see the gradual disappearance of the first election strategy and the reinforcement of the method consisting in joining structures of large, nationwide political parties. It is also possible that politicians coming from the Polish nationality group will more frequently declare themselves to be not Poles, but Czechs of Polish origin.

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
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
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Figure 1. The number of votes cast for COEX candidates in self-government (local) elections in 1994-2018




Source: elaboration on the basis of: Český statistický úřad, Volby.cz, <https://volby.cz>.

Figure 2. The number of seats won by COEX candidates in self-government (local) elections in 1994-2018




Sources: elaboration on the basis of: Český statistický úřad, Volby.cz, <https://volby.cz>.

Figure 3. The results of the election for the President of the Czech Republic in “Polish” and “Czech” communes in Zaolzie (2nd round, 2018, in %)




Source: elaboration on the basis of: Český statistický úřad, Volby.cz, <https://volby.cz>.


Figure 4. Support for ČSSD in the elections in 1996-2017 in Zaolzie (in %)



Source: elaboration on the basis of: Český statistický úřad, Volby.cz, <https://volby.cz>.


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Source: elaboration on the basis of: Český statistický úřad, Volby.cz, <https://volby.cz>.

Figure 6. Support for KDU-ČSL in the elections in 1996-2017 in Zaolzie (in %)


Source: elaboration on the basis of: Český statistický úřad, Volby.cz, <https://volby.cz>.

Figure 7. Support for KDU-ČSL in the elections in 1996-2017 in „Polish” and „Czech” communes in Zaolzie (in %)



Source: elaboration on the basis of: Český statistický úřad, Volby.cz, <https://volby.cz>.

Figure 8. Support for KSČM in the elections in 1996-2017 in „Polish” and „Czech” communes in Zaolzie (in %)



Source: elaboration on the basis of: Český statistický úřad, Volby.cz, <https://volby.cz>.

Table 1. Communes in Zaolzie with the highest percentage of the Polish population (above 15%, 2011)

Commune	% of Poles
Hrádek / Gródek	31.33
Milíkov / Milików	30.35
Košařiska / Koszarzyska	27.93
Vendryně / Wędrynia	27.12
Bukovec / Bukowiec	26.06
Dolní Lomná / Dolna Łomna	25.39
Bocanovice / Boconowice	24.16
Bystřice / Bystrzyca	24.13
Ropice / Ropica	22.42
Horní Lomná / Górna Łomna	21.71
Písečná / Pioseczna	19.39
Nýdek / Nydek	19.32
Smilovice / Śmiłowice	19.08
Stonava / Stonawa	18.99
Návsí / Nawsie	18.58
Albrechtice / Olbrachcice	17.63
Horní Suchá / Sucha Górna	17.1
Komorní Lhotka / Ligotka Kameralna	16.75
Chotěbuz / Kocobędz	16.45
Řeka / Rzeka	15.86

Source: own elaboration based on:

Český statistický úřad, *Sčítání lidu, domů a bytu*, <https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/scitani-lidu-domu-a-bytu>;
Mečislav Borák, Dan Gawrecki (editors), *Nástin dějin Těšínska*, Ostrava-Praha, 1992, p. 160-251.

Table 2. Communes in Zaolzie with the lowest percentage of Polish population (below 5%, 2011)

Commune	% of Poles
Soběšovice / Szobiszowice	0.93
Dobratice / Dobracice	0.99
Petřvald / Pietwałd	1.05
Horní Domaslavice / Domasłowice Górne	1.77
Dolní Domaslavice / Domasłowice Dolne	1.93
Hrčava / Herczawa	2.17
Dětmorovice / Dziećmorowice	2.18
Rychvald / Rychwałd	2.44
Bohumín / Bogumin	2.51
Havířov / Hawierzów	3.08
Orlová / Orłowa	3.6
Dolní Tošanovice / Toszonowice Dolne	3.74
Dolní Lutyně / Lutynia Dolna	3.91

Horní Tošanovice / Toszonowice Górne	4.02
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Source: own elaboration based on:

Český statistický úřad, *Sčítání lidu, domů a bytu*, <https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/scitani-lidu-domu-a-bytu>;
Mečislav Borák, Dan Gawrecki (editors), *Nástin dějin Těšínska*, Ostrava-Praha, 1992, p. 160-251.

**Table 3. Communes in Zaolzie with the highest percentage
of Polish population (above 58.3%, 1921)**

Commune	% of Poles
Košariska / Koszarzyska	97.5
Bocanovice / Boconowice	96.8
Bukovec / Bukowiec	94.9
Dolní Lomná / Dolna Łomna	94.2
Smilovice / Śmiłowice	92.8
Milíkov / Milików	91.9
Nýdek / Nydek	89
Mosty u Jablunkova / Mosty k. Jabłonkowa	85.4
Řeka / Rzeka	82.2
Horní Lomná / Górna Łomna	79.7
Hrádek / Gródek	78.7
Komorní Lhotka / Ligotka Kameralna	76.4
Bystrice / Bystrzyca	75.4
Petrovice u Karviné / Piotrowice k. Karwiny	70.1
Horní Suchá / Sucha Górna	67.7
Vendryně / Wędrynia	65.3
Písek / Piosek	65.1
Jablunkov / Jabłonków	62.9
Albrechtice / Olbrachcice	62.4
Vělopolí / Wielopole	58.8

Source: own elaboration based on:

Český statistický úřad, *Sčítání lidu, domů a bytu*, <https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/scitani-lidu-domu-a-bytu>;
Mečislav Borák, Dan Gawrecki (editors), *Nástin dějin Těšínska*, Ostrava-Praha, 1992, p. 160-251.

**Table 4. Communes in Zaolzie with the highest percentage
of Czech population (above 59.3%, 1921)**

Commune	% of Czechs
Dolní Domaslavice / Domasławice Dolne	99.8
Horní Domaslavice / Domasławice Górne	99.7
Soběšovice / Szobiszowice	97.7
Hrčava / Herczawa	97.5
Dolní Tošanovice / Toszonowice Dolne	96
Dobratice / Dobracice	95.1
Rychvald / Rychwałd	92.2
Petřvald / Pietwałd	91
Dětmorovice / Dziećmorowice	88

Orlová / Orłowa	81.6
Doubrava / Dąbrowa	80.7
Dolní Lutyně / Lutynia Dolna	79.4
Těrlicko / Cierlicko	65.5 (d) 43.1 (h)
Horní Tošanovice / Toszonowice Górne	65.5
Střítež / Trzycieź	59.4
Třanovice / Trzanowice	59.3

d – Dolní Těrlicko

h – Horní Těrlicko

Source: own elaboration on the basis of:

Český statistický úřad, *Sčítání lidu, domů a bytu*, <https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/scitani-lidu-domu-a-bytu>;
 Mečislav Borák, Dan Gawrecki (editors), *Nástin dějin Těšínska*, Ostrava-Praha, 1992, p. 160-251.

Table 5. Polish councillors in particular communes of Zaolzie
(local self-government elections in 2018)

Commune	Total number of councillor posts in the commune	COEX ⁽¹⁾	PL outside COEX	Total PL	% of councillor posts for PL	% of posts (Polish candidates) – % of the Polish population in the commune	% of Poles in the commune
Albrechtice / Olbrachcice	15	1	5	6	40.00	↑↑↑↑	17.63
Bocanovice / Boconowice	7	0	1	1	14.29	↓↓	24.16
Bohumín / Bogumin	23	0	0	0	0.00	●	2.51
Bukovec / Bukowiec	11	2	1	3	27.27	●	26.06
Bystrice / Bystrzyca	15	0	5	5	33.33	↑	24.13
Český Těšín / Czeski Cieszyń	27	0	7	7	25.93	↑↑	12.76
Chotěbuz / Kocobędz	15	2	1	3	20.00	●	16.45
Dětmarovice / Dzieńmorowice	15	0	0	0	0.00	●	2.18
Dobratice / Dobracice	9	0	0	0	0.00	●	0.99
Dolní Domaslavice / Domasłowice Dolne	15	0	0	0	0.00	●	1.93
Dolní Lomná / Dolna Łomna	7	1	2	3	42.86	↑↑↑	25.39
Dolní Lutyně / Lutynia Dolna	15	1	0	1	6.67	↑	3.91
Dolní Tošanovice / Toszonowice Dolne	9	0	0	0	0.00	●	3.74
Doubrava / Dąbrowa	15	0	1	1	6.67	●	5.67
Havířov / Hawierzów	43	0	4	4	9.30	↑	3.08
Horní Domaslavice / Domasłowice Górne	13	0	0	0	0.00	●	1.77
Horní Lomná / Górna Łomna	7	0	1	1	14.29	↓	21.71

Horní Suchá / Sucha Górna	15	0	5	5	33.33	↑↑↑	17.1
Horní Tošanovice / Toszonowice Górne	9	0	1	1	11.11	↑	4.02
Hrádek / Gródek	15	4	3	7	46.67	↑↑↑	31.33
Hrčava / Herczawa	7	0	0	0	0.00	●	2.17
Jablunkov / Jabłonków	21	1	2	3	14.29	●	14.6
Karviná / Karwina	41	0	4	4	9.76	●	9.73
Komorní Lhotka / Ligotka Kameralna	11	0	1	1	9.09	↓	16.75
Košařiska / Koszarzyska	9	2	1	3	33.33	↑	27.93
Milíkov / Milików	13	6	1	7	53.85	↑↑↑↑	30.35
Mosty u Jablunkova / Mosty k. Jabłonkowa	15	3	1	4	26.67	↑↑	13.42
Návsí / Nawsie	15	2	2	4	26.67	↑	18.58
Nýdek / Nydek	15	2	0	2	13.33	↓	19.32
Orlová / Orłowa	31	0	1	1	3.23	●	3.6
Petrovice u Karviné / Piotrowice k. Karwiny	21	0	1	1	4.76	↓	13.05
Petrvald / Pietwałd	15	0	0	0	0.00	●	1.05
Písečná / Pioseczna	7	0	3	3	42.86	↑↑↑↑	19.39
Písek / Piosek	9	1	0	1	11.11	●	14.88
Řeka / Rzeka	9	0	0	0	0.00	↓↓↓	15.86
Ropice / Ropica	15	3	0	3	20.00	●	22.42
Rychvald / Rychwałd	15	0	0	0	0.00	●	2.44
Smilovice / Śmiłowice	7	0	1	1	14.29	↓	19.08
Soběšovice / Szobiszowice	15	0	0	0	0.00	●	0.93
Stonava / Stonawa	7	0	3	3	42.86	↑↑↑↑	18.99
Střítež / Trzycież	9	0	0	0	0.00		13.66
Těrlicko / Cierlicko	15	1	1	2	13.33	↑	10.89
Třanovice / Trzanowice	15	0	2	2	13.33	●	15.74
Třinec / Trzyniec	33	0	4	4	12.12	●	13.17
Vělopolí / Wielopole	5	0	0	0	0.00	↓↓	13.94
Vendryně / Wędrynia	17	7	1	8	47.06	↑↑↑↑	27.12

Total (Zaolzie)	692	39	66	105	15.17	↑	7.80
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¹⁾ COEXISTENTIA independently or in coalition

Legend:

- difference up to 5%
- ↑ % of Poles in commune <% of councillor posts won by Poles (difference 5%-10%)
- ↑↑ % of Poles in commune <% of councillor posts won by Poles (difference 10%-15%)
- ↑↑↑ % of Poles in commune <% of councillor posts won by Poles (difference 15%-20%)
- ↑↑↑↑ % of Poles in commune <% of councillor posts won by Poles (difference above 20%)
- ↓ % of Poles in commune <% of councillor posts won by Poles (difference 5%-10%)
- ↓↓ % of Poles in commune <% of councillor posts won by Poles (difference 10%-15%)
- ↓↓↓ % of Poles in commune <% of councillor posts won by Poles (difference 15%-20%)
- ↓↓↓↓ % of Poles in commune <% of councillor posts won by Poles (difference above 20%)

Source: elaboration on the basis of: www.volby.cz, <http://www.coexistentia.cz/2018wybor/polacy2018.htm>

**Table 6. Polish councillors from Coexistentia-Wspólnota
in selected communes (1994-2018) part 1**

Commune % of Poles		YEAR OF SELF-GOVERNMENT (COMMUNE) ELECTION						
		1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	2014	2018
Hrádek Gródek 31.3%	Number of seats	9	15	15	15	15	15	15
	COEX	6	3	3	3	4	3	4
	Others with PL sur- name	3	7	7	10	7	3	4
	% COEX	66.7	20	20	20	26.7	20	26.7
Košařiska Koszarzyska 27.9%	Number of seats	7	9	9	9	9	9	9
	COEX	2	3	2	1	1	2	2
	Others with PL sur- name	3	3	4	2	3	2	1
	% COEX	28.6	33.3	22.2	11.1	11.1	22.2	22.2
Milíkov Milików 30.4%	Number of seats	13	13	13	13	13	13	13
	COEX	5	5	6	5	5	5	6
	Others with PL sur- name	3	5	2	4	2	2	3
	% COEX	38.5	38.5	46.2	38.5	38.5	38.5	46.2

Source: elaboration based on: www.volby.cz, <http://www.coexistentia.cz/2018wybor/polacy2018.htm>.

**Table 7. Polish councillors from Coexistentia-Wspólnota
in selected communes (1994-2018) part 2**

Commune % of Poles		YEAR OF SELF-GOVERNMENT (COMMUNE) ELECTION						
		1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	2014	2018
Albrechtice Olbrachcice 17.6%	Number of seats	17	17	15	15	15	15	15
	COEX	2	2	1	1	2	1	1
	% COEX	11.8	11.8	6.7	6.7	13.3	6.7	6.7
Písečná Piosieczna 19.4%	Number of seats	x	x	7	7	7	7	7
	COEX	x	x	0	0	0	0	0
	% COEX	x	x	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Vendryně Wędrynia 27.1%	Number of seats	x	17	17	17	17	17	17
	COEX	x	5	6	5	6	7	7
	% COEX	x	29.4	35.3	29.4	35.3	41.2	41.2
Dolní Lomná Dolna Łomna 25.4%	Number of seats	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	COEX	1	2	1	1	1	2	1
	% COEX	14.3	28.6	14.3	14.3	14.3	28.6	14.3
Stonava Stonawa 19.0%	Number of seats	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	COEX	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
	% COEX	14.3	14.3	14.3	14.3	0.0	0.0	0.0

Source: elaboration based on: www.volby.cz, <http://www.coexistentia.cz/2018wybor/polacy2018.htm>.

**Table 8. Representatives of the Polish national minority
in the Czechoslovakian/Czech parliament**

	Federal As- sembly People Chamber	Federal Assembly Nation Chamber	Czech Na- tional Coun- cil	Lower Chamber of Parliament	Senate
1990- 1992	Danuta Branna (FO) 15.111 Władysław Niedoba (COEX)		Tadeusz Wantuła (FO) 10.674		
1992- 1992	Stanisław Gawlik (COEX)				
1992- 1996					
1996- 1998				Wawrzyniec Fójcik (ODS) 5.471	
1998- 2002					Andrzej Feber (US-DEU) (od 2000) 10.734
2002- 2006				Marian Bielez (US-DEU) (until 2004) 5.490	Andrzej Feber (US-DEU) Eduard Matykie- wicz (KSČM) (since 2002) 9.469
2006- 2010					Eduard Matykiewicz (KSČM) (until 2008)
2010- 2013				Jiří Rusnok (VV/LIDEM) 2.952	
2013- 2017					Jiří Cieńciała (OSN) (since 2016) 10.804
2017- 2021					Jiří Cieńciała (OSN)
2021-					Jiří Cieńciała (OSN) (until 2022)

COEX Coexistentia–Wspólnota–Együttélés–

Spivžitja–Soužití

DEU Demokratická unie

FO Občanské fórum

KSČM Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy

LIDEM Liberální Demokraté

ODS Občanská demokratická strana

OSN Občané Spolu – Nezávislí

US-DEU Unie svobody – Demokratická unie

VV Věci veřejné

Next to the name, we provide the party-election list and the number of obtained votes; BR – lack of representation

Source: elaboration based on: www.volby.cz

**Table 9. Religiousness in Zaolzie in communes with extended competences
(*obcí s rozšířenou působností*) in 2011**

Religion/Commune	Jablunkov Jabłonków	Třinec Trzyniec	Český Těšín Cz.Cieszyn	Karv- iná Kar- wina	Havířov Haw- ierzów	Orlová Orłowa	Bo- humín Bogumin
Total inhabitants	22214	54627	25516	68024	91092	43020	28742
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Religious persons	11505	18849	8185	11388	13808	5294	4111
	51.8%	34.5%	32.1%	16.7%	15.2%	12.3%	14.3%
Non-religious persons	1945	9230	5457	20705	32398	15271	9101
	8.8%	16.9%	21.4%	30.4%	35.6%	35.5%	31.7%
Not determined	7556	21991	9933	30673	37891	19487	13362
	34.0%	40.3%	38.9%	45.1%	41.6%	45.3%	46.5%

Source: elaboration on the basis of: Český statistický úřad, *Sčítání lidu, domů a bytu 2011, Obyvatelstvo podle náboženské víry a podle velikostních skupin obcí, okresů a správních obvodů ORP - Moravskoslezský kraj*,
<https://www.czso.cz>.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN UKRAINE

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Abstract: *The article is aimed at analysing the constitutional basis of the separation of state powers in Ukraine. One of the guiding principles of the constitutional system, the separation of powers (legislative, executive and judicial), is enshrined in art. 6 of the Constitution of Ukraine. By strengthening the principle of separation of state powers according to constitutional norms, it is possible to balance the whole system of state bodies and delimit their competencies as clearly as possible. This means, firstly, that certain independence of each authority is secured; secondly, their competencies are clearly divided; and, thirdly, every state body can make its opinion known, by opposing the decision of another body and at the same time controlling its actions. Having investigated the constitutional basis for the separation of powers, the authors conclude that the Constitution of Ukraine contains appropriate mechanisms for interaction between the legislative, executive and judicial branches of power, but these require a more detailed application and implementation in practice.*

Keywords: *Constitution of Ukraine, state powers, branch of power, legislative, executive, system of “checks and balances”.*

Rezumat: *Bazele constituționale pentru separarea puterilor în Ucraina. Articolul are ca scop analiza bazelor constituționale pentru separarea puterilor în stat în Ucraina. Separația puterilor (legislativă, executivă și judecătorească), ca unul dintre principiile fundamentale ale sistemului constituțional, este consacrată de art. 6 din Constituția Ucrainei. Potrivit normelor constituționale, consolidarea principiului separației puterilor în stat permite echilibrarea întregului sistem al organismelor statului și delimitarea, cât se poate de clară, a competențelor acestora. De aici rezultă, în primul rând, asigurarea unei anumite independențe pentru fiecare autoritate în parte; în al doilea rând, competențele sunt clar distribuite, iar în al treilea rând, fiecare organ de stat are posibilitatea de a-și face cunoscută opinia, contrând decizia unui alt organism și controlând, în același timp acțiunile sale. În urma cercetării fundamentelor constituționale ale separării puterilor, autorii ajung la concluzia potrivit*

căreia Constituția Ucrainei conține mecanisme adecvate de interacțiune între ramurile legislativă-executivă-judecătorească ale puterii, impunându-se, totuși, o mai detaliată aplicare și implementare.

INTRODUCTION

In Ukraine, a unified system of state authorities is based on the so-called “principle of separation of powers”. In political and legal practice, there is no real separation of powers, but structural isolation and functional specialization of individual parts of the state mechanism. State power is integral, sovereign and indivisible. That is, it is not about the separation of powers, but the functions of the exercise of this power. Moreover, not only about the separation but also about the interaction of these functions. Therefore, the principle of separation of functions of power should be interpreted as recognition of the fact that the state power is implemented through certain types of state bodies.

By consolidating the principle of separation of state powers according to the constitutional norms it is possible to balance the whole system of state bodies and to delimit their competences as clearly as possible. This means, firstly, that certain independence of each authority is secured; secondly, their competence is clearly divided; and, thirdly, everybody has the opportunity to oppose the decision of another body, while controlling its actions.

Different forms of consolidation of this principle are used in constitutional practice. In the vast majority of developed countries, including Ukraine, it is expressed through the structural and functional determination of each of the higher authorities of the state: the head of state, the parliament, the government and the higher courts.

PROBLEM STATEMENT

Among the most important problems facing political science at present, the issue of the constitutional and legal regulation of relations between the supreme bodies of state power, namely the legislative, executive and judicial branches of power, is particularly topical.

The importance of the role of this problem is that it actually accumulates two key aspects of the development of the national state and the legal system. The first is a purely practical aspect, which is connected with the constitutional definition of the institution of state power foundations in Ukraine since the con-

struction of any system of state power implies the presence of mechanisms and means of strict regulation of relations between state authorities and their units. If this is not the case then, in essence, it can be said that the Constitution can claim that it does not perform any of its basic functions in terms of legal regulation of the most important relations in the organization of state power and its normal development and activity. The second is a theoretical aspect, because, firstly, the problem of the constitutional provision of separation of state powers refers to the most complex theoretical issues of constitutional and legal science. In fact, the essence of this aspect is not so much as to how to separate one branch of state power from the other and to divide their functions and responsibilities, but how, through the functional separation of powers, to maximize the state power from the threat of usurpation and from its excessive concentration in the hands of that or another body of state power. Secondly, the norm of separation of state power traditionally refers to a group of basic principles of democratic state integrity. Therefore, based on the transformation of Ukraine into a modern, developed and democratic state, it is necessary to consider the issues of constitutional support of precisely those fundamental conditions that distinguish a democratic state from others.

Of course, the idea of unity and integrity of state power is based on the modern understanding of the theory of separation of powers, which reflects the organic connection of the theory of separation of powers with the theory of popular sovereignty.

The classical theory of the separation of state powers is known to have been formed as a scientific justification for such a device of the state apparatus that provides full freedom. The modern stage of its development was marked by the recognition of the principle of separation of powers with the necessary institutional and power components of developed legal freedom. The construction of a law-governed state with the separation of its power is not an end in itself, but a form of ensuring the rights and freedoms of a man and a citizen. The state is organized and operates legally by the separation of powers because without that despotism comes.

ANALYSIS OF RESEARCHS AND PUBLICATIONS

The theory of the separation of state power, despite the long period of its development and practical implementation, continues to attract the attention of

scientists (T. Campbell¹, E. Carolan², D. Bilchitz and D. Landau³, V. S. Abashmad⁴, J. Locke⁵, Sh. L. Montesquieu⁶, T. E. Ziuzin⁷, O. Yu. Bulba⁸, I. V. Protsiuk⁹, T. Parsons¹⁰, M. V. Tsvik¹¹, et al.) on the issues that maintain the status of discussion, as indicated by the analysis of the works of classics of political and legal thought, along with modern tasks of state formation. Thus, one of the most problematic areas of contemporary scientific discussions about the theory of the separation of state powers is understanding its essence, organizing the interaction between the branches of power, which would preserve the state unity and state power, and the

¹ T. Campbell, *Separation of Powers in Practice*, Stanford University Press, 2004, 235 p.

² E. Carolan, *The New Separation of Powers: A Theory for the Modern State*, Oxford University Press, 2009, 300 p.

³ D. Bilchitz, D. Landau (Eds.), *The Evolution of the Separation of Powers. Between the Global North and the Global South*, Cheltenham – Northampton, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018, 288 p.

⁴ В.В. Абашмадзе, *Учение о разделении государственной власти и его критика* [The doctrine of the separation of state power and its criticism], Тбилиси: Сабчота сакартвело, 1972, 51 с.

⁵ Дж. Локк, *Сочинения: в 3 т. Т. 3* [Composition: in 3 v. V. 3], Мысль, Санкт-Петербург, 1985, 670 с.

⁶ Ш. Л. Монтескье, *О духе законов* [About the spirit of laws], Избранные произведения, Москва, 1955, 800 с.

⁷ Т. Е. Зюзина, *Единство государства и разделение властей в истории политических и правовых учений* [Unity of the state and separation of powers in the history of political and legal doctrines], Философия права, Ростов-на-Дону, 2009, № 6, с. 22; В.М. Соколов, *Форма правления и разделение властей: зарубежный опыт* [The form of government and the separation of powers: foreign experience], Актуальные проблемы российского права, Москва, 2010, № 4, с. 10-11.

⁸ О. Ю. Бульба, *Конституційно-правові аспекти реалізації принципу поділу влади в Україні: національна традиція та сучасність* [Constitutional and legal aspects of the implementation of the principle of separation of powers in Ukraine: the national tradition and the present], Інститут законодавства Верховної Ради України, Київ, 2008, 20 с.

⁹ І. В. Процюк, *Сучасні підходи до розуміння принципу поділу державної влади* [Modern approaches to understanding the principle of separation of state power], http://dspace.nlu.edu.ua/bitstream/123456789/2034/1/Protsyuk_3.pdf

¹⁰ Talcott Parsons, *An Outline of the Social System*, University of Puerto Rico, Department of Social Sciences, 1961, 118 p.

¹¹ М. В. Цвік, *Конституційні проблеми розподілу властей (деякі загально-теоретичні аспекти)* [Constitutional problems of the distribution of powers (some general theoretical aspects)], Вісник Академії правових наук України, Харків, 1993, № 1, с. 60-68.

factors that determine the choice of a particular model, the implementation of the investigated principle, an optimal definition of the ratio between branches of power in the newest stage of state formation, the specific implementation of the principle of separation of powers in the context of political and legal reform.

In fact, the theory of separation of powers in different ways is still being processed in various states. The reasons for such pluralism are “national specificity, as well as factors influencing the process of applying the theory of separation of powers in one or another country, conditioned by the peculiarities of the country's development, the nature, and level of development of its state mechanism, economy, and society”¹².

For example, V. Chirkin, analyzing the concept, explains that “the thinkers of the 17th – 18th centuries, who put forward the idea of separation of powers, did not define the very concept of the “branch of power”. They only used this term descriptively (branches of a single tree). To fill this gap the researcher provides the following features:

- each branch of power presupposes the existence of particular specialized and homogeneous state bodies that take their place in a holistic state apparatus and carry out certain work on the management of the state;
- each branch of power has autonomy. While performing specific tasks, it is not subordinated to any other bodies;
- the branch of power is not just a combination of bodies, but a structure in the state mechanism;
- the branch of power is the organizational and legal form (transformation) of a certain state apparatus of management in a society;
- each branch of power is characterized by specific forms, methods, and procedures for its activities. Based on these features, the scientist gives an option to determine the branch of power;
- it is “an isolated organizational and functional structure in the integrated mechanism of the implementation of state power”¹³.

Analyzing the criteria for the allocation of branches of power, defined by V. Chirkin, L. Golubeva points out that “the branch of state power is a combination of

¹² А. Б. Венгеров, *Теория государства и права: учебник для юридических вузов* [Theory of State and Law: a textbook for law schools], М.: Омега-Л, Москва, 2006, 608 с. http://lib.ysu.am/close_books/259207.pdf

¹³ В. Е. Чиркин, *Основы государственной власти* [Basics of state power], М.: Юристъ, 1996, 112 с.

state and government powers regulated by independent and homogeneous state bodies, which are a separate structure in the state mechanism and carry out their functions within the framework of specific forms, methods, and procedures to improve the efficiency of public administration. The fundamental point here is the exercise of the very powers of state power, which represent a set of rights and obligations to exercise a legal effect on social relations that arise in the public law sphere, with the purpose of their legal regulation"¹⁴.

Therefore, in a modern state, such a triad separation of state powers is inadequate. More often than not, we can talk about directly undetermined, but actually existing branches of state power, such as control-supervisory, presidential, and electoral.

CONSTITUTIONAL MODELS OF ORGANIZATION OF STATE POWER

The issue of constitution and constitutionalism has been the focus of historical, legal and philosophical science for a long time. From the etymological point of view, the word "constitution" comes from Latin. "constitutio", which means "order"¹⁵.

A. Hauriou states that: "The Constitution is a set of rules which govern the organization and functioning of the state"¹⁶. The author says that a constitution is essential in any state, that is, provisions that govern the organization and relations within the state power and establish relations between the state and a citizen¹⁷.

In the Ukrainian legal system, the Constitution is the Basic Law of the State, which defines and establishes the main principles of state and public life, the basic rights and duties of citizens, the principles of elections and referendum, the system and principles of organization and activities of state authorities, local self-government, foundations and the system of territorial organization, as well as the

¹⁴ Л. А. Голубева, *Сравнительное государственное устройство: учебник для высших учебных заведений* [Comparative State Studies: A Textbook for Higher Education Institutions], Институт внешнеэкономических связей, экономики и права, 2009, 556 с.

¹⁵ M. Safta, *Drept constitutional si institutii politice* [Constitutional law and political institutions], Vol. I. Editia a 3-a revizuita, Hamangiu, 2016, 328 p.

¹⁶ J. Gicquel, A. Hauriou, P. Gélard, *Droit constitutionnel et institutions politiques* [Constitutional law and political institutions], Paris: Editions Montchrestien, 1985, 978 p.

¹⁷ I. Rusu, *Drept constituțional și instituții politice* [Constitutional law and political institutions], Lumina Lex, 2004, 490 p.

state symbols of Ukraine¹⁸.

Analyzing the Basic Law of Ukraine, it should be mentioned that article 6 provides a clear definition: “The State power in Ukraine shall be exercised with the consideration of its separation into legislative, executive and judicial branches”¹⁹. However, a fact of constitutional consolidation of the separation of state power into three branches cannot be considered the achievement of the democratization process, which began with the proclamation of Ukraine’s independence. We believe that the unconditional value of this principle, as constitutional, has been manifested in the development of various projects of the Constitution of Ukraine. After all, in all projects (regardless of what form of organization of state power they were offered) the principle of separation of powers was passed as a separate article.

The state authorities in a legal democratic state, namely Ukraine (in accordance with Article 1 of the Constitution of Ukraine²⁰), form a system of state authorities in their entirety. The system of state authorities of Ukraine has the following features:

- the system of legally formed state bodies, that is, that have the competence (powers, subject, legal responsibility) and are engaged in the management of society on a professional basis as power holders;
- the system of state bodies, which is a well-established structural organization, based on general principles, the unity of the ultimate goal, interaction and focused on ensuring the realization of state functions;
- the system of state bodies is an organizational unit since the bodies are elected or created by others; some manage others; some are accountable to and controlled by others;
- national bodies in Ukraine act on the basis of the Constitution and laws of Ukraine. Acts adopted by higher authorities are mandatory for the lower ones. For example, the Acts of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine are mandatory for implementation by ministries, local state administrations etc. Thus, there is an organizational-legal link between the state bodies;
- the system of bodies, each of which has logistic means to carry out these functions. But within the framework of the state bodies, the activities of

¹⁸ УСЕ (Універсальний словник-енциклопедія) [ALL (Universal Dictionary-Encyclopaedia)], <http://slovopedia.org.ua/29/53402/13633.html>

¹⁹ Конституція України [Constitution of Ukraine], <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80>

²⁰ Ibid.

civil servants are strictly separated from the “property” of their subjects;

– the system of government is not unchangeable. It is modified by the influence of political, historical, economic, social and other factors. This system is changing with the development of the state. For example, the constitutional reform in modern Ukraine has led to changes in the powers of the authorities²¹.

During the period of independence in Ukraine four constitutional models of organization of the state power and separation of powers in the power triangle of Ukraine have been tested.

The first stage (1991-1995) was determined by the inherited Constitution of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1978 amended during 1991-1993. This model was characterized by the maintenance of the significant influence of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, in particular on personnel issues. The President of Ukraine led the system of state executive bodies. Thus, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, on the recommendation of the President of Ukraine, approved the candidacy of the Prime Minister, ministers of foreign affairs, defense, finance, justice, internal affairs and the chairmen of the State Committee for Protection of the State Border and the State Customs Committee. The Parliament appointed the judges of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, the Supreme Court of Ukraine, the judges of the regional and Kyiv City Courts, the arbitrators of the Supreme Arbitration Court of Ukraine, the arbitration courts of the regions, the city of Kyiv, the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, the Head of the National Security Service of Ukraine, the Head of the Board of the National Bank of Ukraine, Deputy Chairmen and State Commissioners of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine, the Presidium of the Supreme Arbitration Court of Ukraine, the Collegium of the General Prosecutor’s Office of Ukraine. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine may express a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister of Ukraine, individual members of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine or the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine as a whole, which would lead to their resignation²².

²¹ *Конституційний механізм розподілу державної влади в Україні* [Constitutional mechanism of distribution of state power in Ukraine], https://pidruchniki.com/16940928/politologiya/konstitutsiyniy_mehanizm_rozpodilu_derzhavnoyi_vladi_ukrayini

²² *Конституційні аспекти розподілу повноважень у системі вищих органів державної влади України* [Constitutional aspects of division of powers in the system of higher bodies of state power of Ukraine], http://old2.niss.gov.ua/content/articles/files/rozpodil_povnovazhen-b04c1.pdf

The second stage (1995-1996) was characterized by a presidential model of government, which was enshrined in the Constitutional Treaty between the President of Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the basic principles of organization and functioning of state power and local self-government in Ukraine for the period before the adoption of the new Constitution of Ukraine (since 8 June 1995²³). The President, in accordance with this act, was proclaimed the head of the state and the head of the state executive power, which he carried out through the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and other central executive authorities subordinated to him, as well as the system of local state administrations²⁴.

The third stage (1996-2014) is a system of governance formed by the 1996 Constitution, which many experts describe as a mixed presidential-parliamentary model. Following the provisions of the Constitution of 1996, the President of Ukraine appointed the Prime Minister of Ukraine (with the consent of the Parliament) and the entire structure of the Government, heads of other central executive bodies and heads of local state administrations (at the request of the Prime Minister). The head of the state, by his decision, terminated the powers of all these officials. It was the President who, on the proposal of the Head of the Government, decided to create, reorganize and liquidate the ministries and other central executive bodies. He had the right to cancel the acts of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Before the newly elected Head of State, the Cabinet of Ministers relinquished its duties. According to this model, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine was accountable to the President of Ukraine, but was controlled by and accountable to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine²⁵.

However, on December 8, 2004, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the

²³ Конституційний договір між Верховною Радою України та Президентом України про основні засади організації та функціонування державної влади і місцевого самоврядування в Україні на період до прийняття нової Конституції України від 8.06.1995 р. [Constitutional Agreement between the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the President of Ukraine on the Basic Principles of Organization and Functioning of State Power and Local Self-Government in Ukraine for the Period Prior to the Adoption of the New Constitution of Ukraine of June 8, 1995], <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1%D0%BA/95-%D0%B2%D1%80#Text>

²⁴ Конституційні аспекти розподілу повноважень у системі вищих органів державної влади України [Constitutional aspects of division of powers in the system of higher bodies of state power of Ukraine], http://old2.niss.gov.ua/content/articles/files/rozpodil_povnovazhen-b04c1.pdf

²⁵ *Ibid.*

Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine"²⁶, which provided for a substantial redistribution of powers between the head of the state, the parliament and the government, according to the logic of constitutional reform initiators, balancing the scope of powers assigned to the President of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

The main provisions of the draft law № 4180, which was later adopted as the Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine"²⁷, were once the subject of study of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, the Venice Commission, experts of domestic analytical centres and scientists, which, in turn, pointed out several shortcomings of the bill, the vast majority of which have not been corrected.

Later, in 2006-2010, the above-mentioned imperfections and conflicts of the updated Constitution of Ukraine caused several constitutional conflicts. This led to the fact that on September 30, 2010, the Constitution of Ukraine, as amended in 1996, was restored by a decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in compliance with the procedure for amending the Constitution on December 8, 2004²⁸.

The fourth stage (from 2014 to present) is characterized by the parliamentary-presidential constitutional model (first engaged in 2006, and in 2014 for the second time²⁹), which redistributed powers to form the executive branch in favour of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. The President retains the authority to submit to the parliament a candidate for the Prime Minister (who,

²⁶ Закон України "Про внесення змін до Конституції України" від 08.12.2004 р. № 2222-IV [Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine" of December 8, 2004], <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2222-15#Text>

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Рішення Конституційного Суду України у справі за конституційним поданням 252 народних депутатів України щодо відповідності Конституції України (конституційності) Закону України "Про внесення змін до Конституції України" від 8 грудня 2004 року N 2222-IV (справа про додержання процедури внесення змін до Конституції України): Конституційний Суд; Рішення, Окрема думка від 30.09.2010 № 20-пн/2010 [Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in the case on the constitutional petition of 252 People's Deputies of Ukraine on compliance of the Constitution of Ukraine (constitutionality) with the Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine" of December 8, 2004 № 2222-IV], <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v020p710-10>

²⁹ Закон України "Про відновлення деяких положень Конституції України" від 21 лютого 2014 року № 742-VII, <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/742-18#Text>

nevertheless, is still determined by the coalition of parliamentary factions), the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. All other members of the Government, as well as the Chairman of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine, the Chairman of the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine and the Chairman of the State Property Fund of Ukraine, are appointed by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine at the proposal of the Head of Government. The Parliament has the right to dismiss all of these officials independently. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine relinquishes its duties before the newly elected Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. At the same time, the President's influence on Government activity has been also limited. The President has the right to suspend the acts of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine only on the grounds of their non-compliance with the Constitution, at the same time appealing to the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. However, the President reserves the right to appoint and revoke the Heads of local state administrations (at the proposal of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine)³⁰.

Most experts evaluate positively the fact that Ukraine used the so-called mixed constitutional model of the organization of state power in one form or another, except the short transition period of 1995-1996. The mixed model is considered to be the most appropriate for countries that are in transit from an authoritarian regime to democracy. However, the presidential model is considered vulnerable to slipping into authoritarianism, and the parliamentary model (despite democracy and pluralism) threatens instability, and its application implies the presence of developed political parties, high political culture and stable democratic traditions³¹.

As in Ukraine, all implemented constitutional changes were, in fact, subject to the political circumstances in which they were made and the compromises that the politicians were able to achieve, and all the models of the organization of state power were characterized by some common disadvantages³².

Such disadvantages are:

- insufficient balance of authority and inefficiency of the system of checks and balances between the subjects of authority;

³⁰ *Конституційні аспекти розподілу повноважень у системі вищих органів державної влади України* [Constitutional aspects of division of powers in the system of higher bodies of state power of Ukraine], http://old2.niss.gov.ua/content/articles/files/rozpodil_povnovazhen-b04c1.pdf

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*

- the dualism of the executive power;
- the imperfection of the mechanisms of formation, responsibility, and resignation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine;
- excessive centralization of managerial functions;
- problems with the organization of the legislative process and the work of the parliament as a whole³³.

Moreover, the constitutional evolution in Ukraine is characterized by maintaining two main tendencies: 1) a centralized model of the organization of state power with a concentration of powers in the capital inherited from the Ukrainian SSR³⁴, and 2) a political struggle for the powers of the President of Ukraine and the procedure for the formation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

SEPARATION OF POWERS

The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, which is controlled by and accountable to the Verkhovna Rada (Article 113 of the Constitution of Ukraine), have multifunctional relations³⁵. The Verkhovna Rada consents to the appointment of the Prime Minister, considers and makes decisions on approving (not approving) the program of the Cabinet of Ministers, and oversees its activities.

At the proposal of at least one-third of the people's deputies of its constitutional composition, the Verkhovna Rada may consider the responsibility of the Cabinet of Ministers and adopt a resolution of no confidence with a majority of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada, which results in the resignation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine³⁶.

³³ *Конституційні аспекти розподілу повноважень у системі вищих органів державної влади України* [Constitutional aspects of division of powers in the system of higher bodies of state power of Ukraine], http://old2.niss.gov.ua/content/articles/files/rozpodil_povnovazhen-b04c1.pdf

³⁴ A law draft on the amends to the Constitution of Ukraine (regarding decentralization of power) No. 2217a dated 01.07.2015 was submitted to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by the President of Ukraine in order to eliminate the problems of the organization of state power connected with the concentration of powers in the capital.

³⁵ *Конституція України* [Constitution of Ukraine], <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80>

³⁶ *Ibid.*

The most important powers of the Verkhovna Rada regarding the Cabinet of Ministers and other bodies of executive power are the adoption of laws on the organization and activities of executive authorities, the basis of civil service etc.³⁷ The Parliament, as a legislative body, determines the judicial system, the legal proceedings, the status of judges, the basis of forensic examination, the organization and activities of the prosecutor's office by the laws of Ukraine. The interaction of the Parliament with the organs of justice in the process of parliamentary control is quite close³⁸.

It is also possible to distinguish the functions of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine according to two main criteria: the forms of activity and the objects of power influence. By objects of influence – political, economic, social, cultural, ecological, and by forms of activity there are the legislative, constituent and control functions of the parliament:

- legislative function. In general terms, it lies in the adoption of laws, amendments, their recognition as legally invalid, cancellation or suspension of their actions;
- constituent (state-building, organizational). The priority directions of the Parliament's activity in the exercise of this function are the formation or participation in the formation of executive and judicial bodies, as well as the formation of their own parliamentary structures and others;
- parliamentary control function. Control over the activities of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, parliamentary control over observance and protection of constitutional rights and freedoms of a man and citizen, budgetary and financial control, and others³⁹.

All of these functions and correspondent powers of the Verkhovna Rada have normative-legal consolidation, first of all constitutional.

³⁷ Конституція України [Constitution of Ukraine], <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80>

³⁸ Ф. Веніславський, *Взаємодія гілок державної влади як принцип основ Конституційного ладу України* [Interaction of the branches of state power as the principle of the foundations of the Constitutional system of Ukraine], Право України, 1998, №1, с. 34-38.

³⁹ Конституційний механізм розподілу державної влади в Україні [Constitutional mechanism of distribution of state power in Ukraine], https://pidruchniki.com/16940928/politologiya/konstitutsiyniy_mehanizm_rozpodi_lu_derzhavnoyi_vladi_ukrayini

A fundamentally new provision of the Constitution is as follows: the deputy powers are terminated ahead of schedule in case of non-fulfillment of the requirements of the people's deputy concerning the incompatibility of the parliamentary mandate with other types of activities. Unlike the current legislation on the status of a people's deputy, according to which the decision on early termination of authority is adopted by the Verkhovna Rada, according to the Constitution it should be adopted by a court⁴⁰.

According to the Constitution of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine is the supreme body in the system of executive bodies, which consists of central and local executive authorities. As a supreme collegiate body, it exercises power directly and through central and local executive authorities, directing and controlling their activities. As the supreme body of executive power, the Cabinet of Ministers heads a unified system of executive power in Ukraine; ensures, by the Constitution, the exercise of the functions and powers of the executive power on the territory of Ukraine; directs the activities of ministries and other executive bodies; independently decides the issues assigned to it by the Constitution of Ukraine, the laws of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the decrees of the President of Ukraine⁴¹.

However, certain difficulties arise in the organization of executive power carried out by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. They reflect the struggle between the legislative branch and the President. With the change of the status of the President of Ukraine, when he is the head of state by the new Constitution and does not belong to any branch of power, the question of the essence and legal principles of the executive power, as a separate power, have not been resolved completely.

Moreover, according to Art. 92, paragraph 12 of the Constitution of Ukraine⁴², only the legislative power represented by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine defines the laws and regulations of the executive body. Given the provisions of this paragraph of Art. 92 of the Constitution, it means that the legislature must adopt almost one hundred laws, including the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, ministries, and other central departments (and there are more than fifty of them); as well as local state administrations in the regions, districts, cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol.

⁴⁰ Конституція України [Constitution of Ukraine], <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80>

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Ibid.*

Hence, the powers of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in co-operation with the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and its bodies are:

- implementation by the Government of legislative initiatives in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine;
- participation of the Cabinet of Ministers in the process of consideration of the Verkhovna Rada issues;
- powers in connection with the approval and control over the implementation of the State Budget of Ukraine, preparation, approval, and implementation of general state programs;
- reporting to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on its activities⁴³.

Also, to strengthen the constructive cooperation between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, to increase the efficiency of work related to the preparation and decision-making process on important issues of state and public life, there is the Resolution “On Cooperation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine with the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine”⁴⁴.

By this Resolution, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine decides:

- to establish that one of the priority directions of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine is to ensure effective cooperation with the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine;
- if members of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and heads of central executive bodies, who are not members of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, are personally responsible for ensuring the interaction with parliamentary factions;
- to coordinate positions on the legislative settlement of urgent issues of socio-economic development of Ukraine, so that joint parliamentary-governmental working bodies may be formed with the consent of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and its bodies⁴⁵.

⁴³ Конституція України [Constitution of Ukraine], <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80>

⁴⁴ Постанова “Про співробітництво Кабінету Міністрів України з Верховною Радою України” від 7 вересня 2006 р. № 1284 [The Resolution “On Cooperation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine with the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine” of September 7, 2006 No. 1284], <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/ua/npas/47224183>

⁴⁵ Постанова “Про співробітництво Кабінету Міністрів України з Верховною Радою України” від 7 вересня 2006 р. № 1284 [Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of February 22, 2014 № 750-VII “On the Text of the Constitution of Ukraine as amended on June 28, 1996, as amended by the Laws of Ukraine of December 8, 2004 № 2222-IV, of February 1, 2011 № 2952 -VI, dated September 19, 2013 № 586-VII”], <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/750-VII>

And the Minister of Relations with the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and other public authorities is to:

- ensure regular meetings of the First Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine, Vice Prime Ministers with the parliamentary factions in accordance with the division of responsibilities at the beginning of each plenary week of the work of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine;
- formulate proposals for inclusion of the bills submitted by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine for consideration by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine;
- initiate the participation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to put the issues on the agenda of the regular session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine⁴⁶.

So, analyzing the distribution of powers in Ukraine, we can draw the following conclusions:

- the separation of powers in Ukraine is realized only for a formal purpose, but in reality, it is a redistribution of powers between the branches of power;
- The President of Ukraine, due to the powers vested in him, performs many functions and powers inherent to the executive power (in particular, paragraphs 1, 3, 17 of part one of Article 106 of the Constitution of Ukraine⁴⁷);
- Non-regulation at the level of the law of issues related to the organization, powers and order of the government causes a situation of external regulation and self-regulation of its activities.

We believe that solving these problems and reaching a stable performance of political institutions such as the Parliament, the President and the government is possible only with their agreement on a common interest in building a truly democratic rule of law. Therefore, in the opinion of O. O. Danylyak: "It is necessary to adopt laws such as "On the President of Ukraine", "On the Cabinet of Ministers" and "On the Central Executive Authority", which will define the mechanisms of interaction between the President, authorities, citizens, political parties, non-governmental organizations and local self-government bodies, which determines

⁴⁶ *Постанова "Про співробітництво Кабінету Міністрів України з Верховною Радою України" від 7 вересня 2006 р. № 1284* [Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of February 22, 2014 № 750-VII "On the Text of the Constitution of Ukraine as amended on June 28, 1996, as amended by the Laws of Ukraine of December 8, 2004 № 2222-IV, of February 1, 2011 № 2952 -VI, dated September 19, 2013 № 586-VII"], <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/750-VII>

⁴⁷ *Конституція України* [Constitution of Ukraine], <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80>

the prospects for further research"⁴⁸.

Also, most researchers of the modern Ukrainian system of organization of state power and the distribution of powers note that one of the most important problems of state power is irresponsibility. That is why neither the President of Ukraine with his powers, nor the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, or the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine is responsible for the results of the activity of the authorities. Thus, almost all proponents of amending the Constitution of Ukraine substantiate the need for such a reform, first of all, by imposing the responsibility of the state authorities for the results of their activities before the citizens and society⁴⁹.

It should be noted that according to the essence of the concept of separation of state power into legislative, executive and judicial, one of its main tasks and leading functional purpose is to ensure the highest efficiency of state power, joint highly professional activity of different branches of state power in the interests of the sovereignty holder and the sole source of power – the people, and ultimately – a responsible result. This necessitates not only the separation of functions and powers between all branches of state power but also their close interaction and cooperation. Therefore, the aim of any reform of the state power system should be to strive to eliminate contradictions and conflicts between state institutions, as well as to ensure their close cooperation and to establish real responsibility of the authorities for the results of their activity as a whole.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES IN UKRAINE BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1995-1996 AND 2010-2014)

The Constitutional Treaty (June 8, 1995⁵⁰) did not solve the problem of adopting a new Constitution of Ukraine. Therefore, on November 24, 1995, the

⁴⁸ О. О. Даниляк, *Принцип поділу влади: досвід України* [Principle of division of powers: Ukraine's experience], <http://academy.gov.ua/ej/ej2/txts/pol-prav/05doovdu.pdf>

⁴⁹ Ф. В. Веніславський, *Проблеми української моделі організації державної влади (порівняльно-правовий аналіз розподілу владних повноважень між гілками державної влади в Україні за чинною Конституцією України та законопроектом про внесення змін до Конституції України № 4105)* [Problems of the Ukrainian model of organization of state power (comparative legal analysis of the distribution of powers between the branches of state power in Ukraine under the current Constitution of Ukraine and the Bill on Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine No. 4105)], Конституційна реформа: експертний аналіз, Х.: Фоліо, 2004, С. 73-84.

⁵⁰ *Конституційний договір між Верховною Радою України та Президентом України про основні засади організації та функціонування державної влади і місцевого*

President of Ukraine proposed to the Constitutional Commission to create a new working group consisting of four representatives of the Verkhovna Rada, four representatives of the President and two representatives of the legislative authorities to finalize the draft constitution. The draft was designed by the first working group and finalized by the second, submitted for discussion to the Constitutional Commission on March 12, 1996, and recommended for consideration by the Verkhovna Rada. On March 20, the draft Constitution was examined during an extraordinary session of the Parliament. Although the co-chairs of the Constitutional Commission, L. Kuchma and O. Moroz, had assessed the draft differently, they were eager to adopt the Basic Law as soon as possible. On April 2, 1996, the Verkhovna Rada put the draft Constitution on the agenda and started to examine it on April 17.

The initial point of formation of the political system of independent Ukraine was the adoption of the Constitution of Ukraine in 1996⁵¹. Previously, the restructuring of the state power system was determined by the 1978⁵² Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR, with changes made after Ukraine proclaimed its independence. However, the changes in the country over the past five years and the prospects for its further development required not a partial adjustment of the Basic Law, but comprehensive and full-scale constitutional reforms.

First of all, the status of a new State required a constitutional definition, the foundations of its social system and its main attributes. Secondly, the introduction of a new institution of the presidency for Ukraine in 1991 required the coordination of functions and powers in the triangle of the President – Verkhovna Rada – Cabinet of Ministers (the last two bodies were inherited by the young state from the Ukrainian SSR). Third, it was necessary to create a new system of local

самоврядування в Україні на період до прийняття нової Конституції України від 8.06.1995 р. [Constitutional Agreement between the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the President of Ukraine on the Basic Principles of Organization and Functioning of State Power and Local Self-Government in Ukraine for the Period Prior to the Adoption of the New Constitution of Ukraine of June 8, 1995], <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1%D0%BA/95-%D0%B2%D1%80#Text>.

⁵¹ *Конституція України* [Constitution of Ukraine], <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80>

⁵² *Конституція (Основний Закон) Української Радянської Соціалістичної Республіки* [Constitution (Basic Law) of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic], <http://gska2.rada.gov.ua/site/const/istoriya/1978.html>

government, since the existence of a "vertical of councils" did not meet the new socio-political realities and needs of the country's development⁵³.

The specific objectives of the constitutional reform were caused by internal and external factors. The acute financial and economic crisis of 1992-1994 and the political crisis of 1994, as well as difficult relations with some neighbouring countries, required the creation of a strong state as a guarantor of national independence, socio-economic and political changes in the interests of the people. The 1996 Constitution was intended to legitimize such a State⁵⁴.

The process of drafting a new Constitution took place in the context of a fierce confrontation between the Verkhovna Rada and the President of Ukraine over the constitutional scope of powers of each of these institutions of power in the political system of Ukraine. The conflicting nature of the process was essentially a political confrontation between the institutions of state power⁵⁵. The adoption of the Constitution had both positive and negative consequences, which mainly determined the logic of further political reforms in Ukraine. The positive consequences include, first of all, the fact that the Constitution of Ukraine of 1996:

- finally consolidated the statehood of Ukraine and guarantees of the basic rights and freedoms of its citizens;
- declared Ukraine a democratic, social, and legal state;
- deprived the Verkhovna Rada of functions unusual for the Parliament, in particular, eliminated the "vertical of councils";
- noted a compromise between the President and the Parliament regarding the scope of powers of each of the subjects, which allowed to temporarily suspend the political conflict, which distracted the authorities from solving urgent problems of socio-economic development of Ukraine⁵⁶.

The negative consequences that had a systemic nature, and subsequently caused the need to reform the political system, include the following:

- the unbalanced nature of the state power system;
- reduction of the political influence of the Verkhovna Rada as a representative body;

⁵³ *Матеріали Аналітичної доповіді Центру Разумкова "Парламент в Україні: головні тенденції та проблеми становлення"* [Proceedings of the Razumkov Centre's Analytical Report "Parliament in Ukraine: Main Trends and Problems of Formation"], http://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/journal/ukr/NSD85_2007_ukr.pdf

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

- subordination of the executive power, the Government and local administrations in particular, to the President of Ukraine, who, however, was not responsible for the results of its activities;
- lack of effective mechanisms of influence of the Parliament on the system of executive power and political communication between the Verkhovna Rada (deputy majority) and the Government as a prerequisite for their constructive interaction;
- insufficiency and inefficiency of the system of checks and balances between the President and the Verkhovna Rada (lack of real opportunities for the dissolution of Parliament by the President and the implementation of impeachment procedures by the Parliament), lack of effective mechanisms of parliamentary control⁵⁷.

Scientists called the new model of state government that was established in Ukraine under the Constitution "the President-Parliamentary Republic". The model was much closer to unrestricted presidential rule than to the classic model of a President-Parliamentary Republic, which is, for example, the constitutional structure of France. According to the 1996 Constitution of Ukraine, the President gained almost complete control over the formation of the Cabinet of Ministers, the leadership of central executive bodies (even having assumed the powers not provided by the Constitution to appoint and dismiss deputy heads of these bodies), and the appointment and dismissal of heads of local executive bodies⁵⁸.

Besides, the Constitution of Ukraine of 1996 also granted the President significant organizational and personnel powers concerning:

- judicial authorities: creation and liquidation of courts, appointment of judges to positions for the first time, appointment of a one-third of judges to the Constitutional Court of Ukraine and de facto assigned and only later legitimized in the Law "On the Judicial System of Ukraine" appointment of judges to administrative positions in courts;
- military formations: leadership in the areas of national security and defence, appointment and dismissal of the high command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military formations;

⁵⁷ *Матеріали Аналітичної доповіді Центру Разумкова "Парламент в Україні: головні тенденції та проблеми становлення"* [Proceedings of the Razumkov Centre's Analytical Report "Parliament in Ukraine: Main Trends and Problems of Formation"], http://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/journal/ukr/NSD85_2007_ukr.pdf

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

– law enforcement agencies: appointment of the Prosecutor General to office with the consent of the Verkhovna Rada and dismissal at discretion⁵⁹.

In the presence of such a significant amount of Presidential powers, the provisions of the Constitution, which were supposed to play the role of deterrence mechanisms and prevent the full subordination of the Executive power to the President of Ukraine, have become ineffective.

Therefore, in practice, this model of state government ensured the implementation of management decisions of the Head of State and in this sense could be considered quite effective. However, this effect was significantly reduced when the Government could not implement certain policies or implemented political decisions without legislative authorization. Meanwhile, the formation of the Government without the participation of the Verkhovna Rada led to situations in which the attitude of the Parliament to the legislative initiatives of the Government largely depended on situational factors. Therefore, even if the President and his subordinate executive bodies dominated the country and had significant opportunities to influence the position of deputies, not all the decisions proposed by the Government have been translated into laws⁶⁰.

This was one of the stages of the constitutional processes in Ukraine. The next one started after the fourth President V. Yanukovich came to power (on February 25, 2010). This stage is important because on the initiative of the Head of State, on September 30, 2010, the Constitutional Court annulled the constitutional reforms adopted in 2004⁶¹. Since that time, the Constitution of

⁵⁹ Конституція України [Constitution of Ukraine], <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80>

⁶⁰ Матеріали Аналітичної доповіді Центру Разумкова "Парламент в Україні: головні тенденції та проблеми становлення" [Proceedings of the Razumkov Centre's Analytical Report "Parliament in Ukraine: Main Trends and Problems of Formation"], http://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/journal/ukr/NSD85_2007_ukr.pdf

⁶¹ Рішення Конституційного Суду України у справі за конституційним поданням 252 народних депутатів України щодо відповідності Конституції України (конституційності) Закону України "Про внесення змін до Конституції України" від 8 грудня 2004 року № 2222-IV (справа про додержання процедури внесення змін до Конституції України) [Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in the case on the constitutional petition of 252 People's Deputies of Ukraine on compliance of the Constitution of Ukraine (constitutionality) with the Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine" of December 8, 2004 № 2222-IV], <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v020p710-10>

1996 has come into force again. In the "Special Opinion" on this decision, judges V. Shishkin and P. Stetsyuk indicated that the Constitutional Court had the right to recognize violations in the procedure for adopting Law No. 2222 (Constitutional reform), but did not have the right to change the "existing structure of state power in Ukraine", and had only to instruct the Verkhovna Rada to decide on confirming the "Constitutional reform", or on its cancellation. Amendments to the Constitution should be made only through a vote in Parliament, because there is "the exclusive right of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the "final intervention" in the text of the Constitution of Ukraine, except chapters I, III, XIII, when such a right belongs directly to the Ukrainian people... This approach results from the provisions of part two of article 19 of the Constitution"⁶²; The Constitutional Court illegally assumed the functions of the Verkhovna Rada: "The Constitutional Court of Ukraine... having made a constitutional revision of the existing structure of power in the state, assumed the powers of the constituent power in the State (of the Verkhovna Rada and the President), which contradicts the second part of article 19 of the Constitution of Ukraine"⁶³. Well-known Ukrainian lawyers expressed their doubts about the legitimacy of this decision of the Constitutional Court even after several years⁶⁴.

Violations of the rather complex but democratic procedure for amending the Constitution of Ukraine have not been overlooked by civil society institutions, including experts, and the single body of constitutional jurisdiction, because you cannot build a truly democratic state by violating democratic principles and procedures. V. Kolesnik believes that this provision should be understood as follows: from this day on, all state authorities and their functionaries (including officials) must act by the powers granted to them by the first redaction of the Basic Law (i.e., before changes were made). It should be understood that all these bodies and officials are legitimate, as they were formed (elected, appointed) in the manner specified by the current Constitution of Ukraine at the time and by applicable law⁶⁵.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ *Важко сказати, яка Конституція зараз діє – Мусіяка. Сайт "Радіо Свобода". 28 червня 2013* [It is difficult to say which Constitution is in force now – Musiyaka. Radio Svoboda website. June 28, 2013], <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/25030891.html>

⁶⁵ В. Колісник, *Конституційні зміни та їх скасування як віддзеркалення роздоріжжя української демократії* [Constitutional changes and their abolition as a reflection of the crossroads of Ukrainian democracy], <http://khpg.org/index.php?id=1286780557>

For example, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, elected on September 30, 2007, was a legitimate body. Since the term of office of the Verkhovna Rada provided for in article 76 of the initial (first) version of the Constitution of Ukraine is "four years", this requirement should apply to the Parliament of this convocation as well. Some politicians and specialists reference the experience of 1996 when both the Parliament and the Head of State continued to exercise their state powers after the adoption of the Constitution, but this seems quite incorrect and unacceptable. The current situation was radically different from what it was then. First, the terms of office of the Parliament and the President provided for by the Constitution on the day of its adoption in 1996 fully coincided with the terms for which they were elected in 1994. Secondly, the Transitional Provisions defined the year and month of regular parliamentary and presidential elections. There are no transitional provisions now and there should not be, and the terms of the Parliament's offices before and after the termination of the constitutional changes do not coincide⁶⁶.

The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine is also legitimate. However, after the Law "On Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine" of December 8, 2004, it is declared unconstitutional and the office of the Cabinet is terminated, the appointment of a new composition must follow the procedure provided for in the first version of the Constitution of Ukraine of 1996. That is, if on September 29, 2010, the President of Ukraine did not have the rights to terminate the office of the Prime Minister of Ukraine, but only could initiate consideration of the issue of Government responsibility in the Verkhovna Rada (according to part 1 of article 87 of the Constitution as amended in 2004⁶⁷), then after the decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine of September 30, 2010, the Head of State could, without any consultations, at his discretion, terminate the powers of the Prime Minister and dismiss him. In this case, the entire Cabinet should resign. And the President, having accepted the resignation of the Government, must instruct it to perform its duties until the new Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine begins to function⁶⁸.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ Конституція України [Constitution of Ukraine], <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80>

⁶⁸ В. Колісник, Конституційні зміни та їх скасування як віддзеркалення роздоріжжя української демократії [Constitutional changes and their abolition as a reflection of the crossroads of Ukrainian democracy], <http://khpg.org/index.php?id=1286780557>

Subsequently, on February 1, 2011, the Verkhovna Rada adopted the Law № 2952-VI "On Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine regarding holding Regular Elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine, President of Ukraine, Deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Local Councils, City, Township and Village Mayors", previously approved by the Verkhovna Rada on 19 November 2010⁶⁹. The Law came into force on February 4, 2011.

Another step of constitutional change was the Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to Article 98 of the Constitution of Ukraine" (regarding the powers of the Accounting Chamber), adopted by the Verkhovna Rada on September 19, 2013. It came into force on October 6, 2013⁷⁰. It is worth noting that on February 21, 2014, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, without the decision of the relevant Committee and the conclusion of the Constitutional Court, adopted Law No. 742-VII "On the Renewal of certain provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine"⁷¹.

The next day, taking into account that the Law on restoring certain provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine was not signed by the President, the Parliament adopted a Resolution "On the text of the Constitution of Ukraine of June 28, 1996, with amendments and additions made by Laws of Ukraine dated December 8, 2004 No. 2222-IV, February 1, 2011 No. 2952-VI, September 19, 2013, No. 586-VII"⁷². On March 1, 2014, Law No. 742-VII was published in a special

⁶⁹ Закон України від 2 лютого 2011 року № 2952-VI "Про внесення змін до Конституції України щодо проведення чергових виборів народних депутатів України, Президента України, депутатів Верховної Ради Автономної Республіки Крим, місцевих рад та сільських, селищних, міських голів" [Law of Ukraine of February 2, 2011 № 2952-VI "On Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine Concerning Regular Elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine, President of Ukraine, Deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Local Councils and Village, Town and City Mayors"], <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2952-VI>

⁷⁰ Закон України від 19 вересня 2013 року № 586-VII "Про внесення змін до статті 98 Конституції України" [Law of Ukraine of September 19, 2013 № 586-VII "On Amendments to Article 98 of the Constitution of Ukraine"], <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/586-VII>

⁷¹ Закон України від 21 лютого 2014 року № 742-VII "Про відновлення дії окремих положень Конституції України" [Law of Ukraine of February 21, 2014 № 742-VII "On renewal of certain provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine"], <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/742-VII>

⁷² Постанова Верховної Ради України від 22 лютого 2014 року № 750-VII "Про текст Конституції України в редакції 28 червня 1996 року, із змінами і доповненнями, внесеними законами України від 8 грудня 2004 року № 2222-IV, від 1 лютого 2011 року № 2952-VI, від 19 вересня 2013 року № 586-VII" [Resolution of the Verkhovna

issue of the "Voice of Ukraine" newspaper, signed by the acting President, A. V. Turchinov, and came into force on March 2, 2014.

Therefore, starting from March 2, 2014, the Ukrainian Constitution adopted at the fifth session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on 28 June 1996 is in effect –with amendments and additions introduced by Laws of Ukraine, as stated above (No. 2222-IV of December 8, 2004, № 2952-VI of February 1, 2011, and № 586-VII of September 19, 2013, and № 742-VII of February 21, 2014).

Even so, these changes to the Constitution of Ukraine, which fundamentally change the rules of interaction between different branches of power, indicate that the period of transition from a totalitarian to a democratic regime and the rule of law is still far from completion. So far, no strong instruments and norms have been created at the state level that would not allow a political force to change the Constitution of Ukraine in the desired direction. It would be appropriate for such a tool to be a nationwide referendum, during which the population would have the opportunity to accept or reject the government's proposals. However, Ukraine has not adopted a law on the referendum yet, but the draft law is currently being developed and is being considered by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. And the second tool could be the Venice Commission, to which our state has often turned in various cases.

CONCLUSIONS

It may be concluded that the Constitution of Ukraine contains appropriate mechanisms for interaction between the legislative, executive and judicial branches of power, although they are not perfect and require more detailed study and implementation. Before the independence in Ukraine, society did not face the practical application of the principle of separation and interaction of the branches of state power. During the years of independence, four models of the organization of state power and its distribution have been tested in Ukraine. However, the problem itself is not solved either in theoretical or practical aspects, because at present in the state there are many cases of confrontation between the authorities, especially between the legislative and executive authorities, which does not help solve the rather complex problems faced by the Ukrainian state and society.

Rada of Ukraine of February 22, 2014 № 750-VII "On the Text of the Constitution of Ukraine as amended on June 28, 1996, as amended by the Laws of Ukraine of December 8, 2004 № 2222-IV, of February 1, 2011 № 2952 -VI, dated September 19, 2013 № 586-VII"], <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/750-VII>

The separation of state power is a necessary condition for a democratic political regime because totalitarian and authoritarian political regimes deny the separation of powers. Also, it should be remembered that the separation of state power is only one of many elements of the mechanism for the democratic exercise of power and is not a complete guarantee of democracy in any state. Moreover, for an unbalanced system of checks and balances, the strict separation of powers may lead to confrontation between the branches of state power.

Taking into account all the above, it can be argued that it is not necessary at all to confine to the most common allocation of the three branches when implementing the principle of separation of state power, as there may be other branches of power.

ACCESSION OF PART OF EASTERN GALICIA TO ROMANIA IN 1919: MILITARY AND POLITICAL ASPECTS

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Abstract: *The article deals with the military and political aspects of the accession of part of Eastern Galicia to Romania in 1919. The diplomatic and military plans of Romania, Poland, and the Entente for the capture of south-eastern Galicia are described; the course of the offensive Operation Pokutia led by the Romanian troops at the end of May 1919 shows the causes of the defeat of the Ukrainian armed forces; the peculiarities of the establishment of Romanian power in the region are revealed, and the uneasy relations between the Romanian and Polish military administrations concerning the seized lands were traced in June – August 1919.*

Keywords: *Eastern Galicia, Entente, Romania, Bukovina, military operation "Pokutia", Romanian military administration.*

Rezumat: *Aderarea unei părți din estul Galiției la România în 1919: aspecte militaro-politice. Articolul analizează aspectele militare și politice generate de ocuparea unei părți din estul Galiției de către trupele române în anul 1919. Articolul prezintă succint planurile diplomatice și militare ale României, Poloniei și Antantei privind ocuparea părții de sud-est a Galiției de către trupele române. Cursul operațiunii ofensive "Pocuția", condusă de trupele române la sfârșitul lunii mai 1919, indică motivele înfrângerii forțelor armate ucrainene. Autorii relevă particularitățile instituirii controlului autorităților române asupra regiunii, precum și tensiunile apărute în lunile iunie – august 1919 între administrațiile militare română și poloneză cu privire la ținuturile ocupate.*

INTRODUCTION

The burden of the Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918-1919 fell on the shoulders of the young state of the West Ukrainian People's Republic (West region of the

Ukrainian People's Republic). The Western Ukrainians' situation worsened in the spring of 1919 when radical changes in the deployment of forces took place on the Ukrainian-Polish front. From France, an 80,000 soldiers' Army of General J. Haller arrived, made up of Polish prisoners of war, former Austrian soldiers and officers. At the end of the spring of 1919, the Romanian troops' intervention on the south-eastern borders of Galicia and the occupation of Pokutia and Galicia Hutsul has complicated the situation.

An essential source for exploring this problem is memoirs. Among the works of this nature are the testimonies of eyewitnesses to the events and memories of Volodymyr Bemko¹, Lev-Mykola Burnadz², Ivan Veligorsky³ and others⁴, which covered in detail the first days of the accession of part of Eastern Galicia by the Romanian troops.

Some information was obtained from periodic publications, Central and county authorities and party and political life of West Ukrainian People's Republic and German-speaking newspapers in Bukovina: "Pokutskiy Vistnyk" (Pokutian Bulletin), "Nove Zhyttia" (New Life), "Ukrainskiy Prapor" (Ukrainian Flag), "Czernowitzer Morgenblatt" (Chernivtsi Morning Leaf), "Allgemeine Zeitung Tagblatt" (General daily newspaper). The original value of this corpus of documents lies in the fact that the materials on the causes and the course of the advance of the Romanian troops on the territory of the south-eastern part of East

¹ В. Бемко, *Напад румунів на Покуття 24 травня 1919* [Romanian attack on Pokutia May 24, 1919], in *Коломия й Коломийщина. Збірник споминів і статей про недавнє минуле* [Kolomyia and Kolomiyschyna. A Compendium of Memories and Articles on the Recent Past], Філадельфія, 1988, с. 819-824.

² М. Бурнадз, *На українсько-румунському пограниччю. Спомин* [At the Ukrainian-Romanian border. Memory], in *Відновлення Української Держави 1918 року. Збірник материялів із поясненнями та вступним словом зладив Михайло Бажанський* [Restoration of the Ukrainian State in 1918. Collection of Explanatory Notes and Introductory Words by Mikhail Bazhansky], Дітройт, 1979, с. 30-41.

³ І. Велигорський, *З Городенки під Нижнів* [From Gorodenka near Nyzhniv], in *Відновлення Української Держави 1918 року. Збірник материялів із поясненнями та вступним словом зладив Михайло Бажанський* [Restoration of the Ukrainian State in 1918. Collection of Explanatory Notes and Introductory Words by Mikhail Bazhansky], Дітройт, 1979, с. 11-14.

⁴ *3 днів тривоги на Покутті. Хроніка 23-28 травня 1919 р.* [From the days of Anxiety on Pokutia. Chronicle May 23-28, 1919], in *Відновлення Української Держави 1918 року. Збірник материялів із поясненнями та вступним словом зладив Михайло Бажанський* [Restoration of the Ukrainian State in 1918. Collection of Explanatory Notes and Introductory Words by Mikhail Bazhansky], Дітройт, 1979, с. 14-30.

Galicia, and the position of the region after the seizure, were placed here.

A significant source is the archival files of the Central State Archives of Higher Authorities and Administration of Ukraine (fond 2188), which provide information on the economic and political situation of part of Eastern Galicia during the capture of Romanian troops in the fall of 1919, the hostilities and the deployment of army units.

Ukrainian researchers Constantin Kroitor⁵, Volodymyr Kroitor⁶, Mykola Lytvyn⁷, Ivan Monolatii⁸, Oleksandr Novosiolov⁹, and Andrii Korolko¹⁰, Polish historians Henryk Walczak¹¹, Michał Klimecki¹² and Romanians historians Marin

⁵ К. Кройтор, *Проблема Покуття під час польсько-української війни* [The Problem of Attempts During the Polish-Ukrainian War], in *Україна: культурна спадщина, національна свідомість, державність* [Ukraine: cultural heritage, national consciousness, statehood], 2000, Vol. 6, с. 309-310; Idem, *Румунська історіографія про Покуття в часи ЗУНР* [Romanian historiography about Pokutia in the times of ZUNR], in "Ямгорів. Літературно-мистецький і краєзнавчий журнал" [Yamgoriv. Literary and Artistic and Local History Journal], 2000, Vol. 11-12, с. 84-90.

⁶ В. Кройтор, *Проблема Покуття у відносинах між Румунією і ЗУНР* [The Problem of Attempt at Relations between Romania and ZUNR], in "Таличина. Науковий і культурно-просвітній краєзнавчий часопис" [Galicia. Scientific and cultural-educational journal of local lore], 2001, Vol. 5-6, с. 231-235.

⁷ М. Литвин, *Українсько-польська війна 1918-1919* [Ukrainian-Polish War 1918-1919], Львів, 1998, 488 с.

⁸ І. Монолатій, *Коломия в часи Західно-Української Народної Республіки* [Kolomyia in the time of the West Ukrainian People's Republic], Коломия, 2000, 80 с.

⁹ О. Новосолов, *Румунська військова інтервенція на Покутті (травень – червень 1919 р.)* [Romanian military intervention in Pokutia (May – June 1919)], in "Карпатський край" [Carpathian region], 2019, No. 1-2 (12-13), с. 44-51.

¹⁰ А. Королько, *Румунська окупація Покуття й Галицької Гуцульщини (травень – серпень 1919 р.): передумови, перебіг, наслідки* [Romanian occupation Pokutia and Galician Gutsulshchyna (May-August 1919): background, course, consequences], in "Науковий часопис Національного педагогічного університету імені М. П. Драгоманова. Серія Історичні науки" [Scientific journal of National Pedagogical Dragomanov University. Historical sciences], 2016, Vol. 14, с. 195-210.

¹¹ H. Walczak, *Józef Piłsudski wobec sojuszu Polski z Rumunią w okresie międzywojennym* [Józef Piłsudsky on the Union of Poland with Romania in the interwar period], in "Przegląd Zachodniopomorski" [West Pomeranian Review], 2018, No. 3, p. 109-136.

¹² M. Klimecki, *Polsko-ukraińska wojna o wschodnią Galicję 1918-1919 r. Polskie spojrzenie* [Polish-Ukrainian war for eastern Galicia 1918-1919. Polish View], in "Україна: культурна спадщина, національна свідомість, державність" [Ukraine: cultural heritage, national consciousness, statehood], 2009, No. 18, с. 373-384.

Stănescu¹³, Ion Giurcă¹⁴, Alexandrina Cuțui¹⁵, Dumitru Preda, Vasile Alexandrescu, Costică Prodan¹⁶, Dumitru Seserman¹⁷, Valeriu Avram, Lucian Drăghici, Gabriel-George Pătrașcu, and Ion Rîșnoveanu¹⁸ were deeply engaged in studying this problem.

THE PROBLEM FORMULATION

The article is devoted to the examination of the political-military aspects of the Eastern Galicia part accession to Romania in 1919. The diplomatic and military plans of Romania, Poland, and the Entente for the capture of south-eastern Galicia are described as well as the course of the offensive Operation Pokutia, conducted by the Romanian troops in late May 1919. It also shows the causes of the defeat of the Ukrainian armed forces and the peculiarities of the establishment of the Romanian power in the region. The complex relations between the Romanian and Polish military administrations concerning the seized lands, which were traced in June – August 1919, are also revealed.

Romania's annexation of eastern Galicia, as well as Poland, Romania and the Entente, was the result of diplomatic relations between the Polish and Romanian military authorities.¹⁹ Researcher Mykola Lytvyn believes that Romania's aggressiveness towards Ukrainians was advantageous to Poland's military

¹³ M. Stănescu, *Operația Pocuția. Mai-august 1919* [Operation Pokutia. Mai – August 1919], in “Magazin istoric”, 1995, No. 1, Ianuarie, p. 10-14.

¹⁴ I. Giurcă, *Trei luni în Pocuția: acțiuni ale Diviziei 8 Infanterie (23 mai – 24 august 1919)* [Three months of staying on the Pokutia: acts of the 8th Infantry Division (May 23 – August 24, 1919)], București, 2019; Idem, *Armata Română în Pocuția* [Romanian Army on the Pokutia], in “Străjer în calea furtunilor”, 2019, No. 26, Decembrie, p. 26-34.

¹⁵ A. Cuțui, *Generalul Iacob Zadik și eliberarea Bucovinei de sub dominația habsburgică* [General Jacob Zadik and the liberation of Bukovina from the rule of the Habsburgs], in *Armata română și patrimoniul național*, București, 2010, p. 516-517.

¹⁶ D. Preda, V. Alexandrescu, C. Prodan, *În apărarea României Mari: Campania armatei române din 1918–1919* [In defense of Greater Romania: the march of the Romanian army of 1918–1919], București, 1994.

¹⁷ D. Seserman, *Divizia 8 Infanterie în Pocuția Mai 1919 – August 1919* [8th Infantry Division in Pokutia. Mai-August 1919], in “Buletinul Universității Naționale de Apărare”, III, 2004, p. 30-41.

¹⁸ V. Avram, L. Drăghici, G.-G. Pătrașcu, I. Rîșnoveanu, *Războiul de Întregire: (1916-1919): comandanți militari români* [War of Integration (1916-1919): Romanian Military Commanders], București, 2016.

¹⁹ H. Walczak, *op. cit.*, p. 109-110.

sphere, as it weakened the southern front of the Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918-1919 and diverted many of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic material resources.²⁰ Therefore, at the beginning of 1919, Warsaw established close military-diplomatic relations with Bucharest, where it directed the military mission of General S. Lamezan (Head), Major O. Bork (Military Attaché), and others. A Polish military mission was formed at the command of the Romanian Army in Bukovina. The Poles sought to draw Romania's military potential into joint action against the Ukrainians.

In turn, the Entente feared the export of the Bolshevik revolution to the west, and therefore considered Soviet Russia a destabilizing factor that prevented the post-war international order. In this regard, Ambassador of the Ukrainian People's Republic, K. Matsiievych, noted: "If the Entente surrenders to the Bolsheviks, it means the revival of Greater Russia, the great ruin of Poland and Romania, and the long delay of Ukraine's independence".²¹ The Entente leadership urgently took precautionary measures. At a meeting of the Council of Four on March 27, with the participation of Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd-George and Orlando, Commander-in-Chief of the Union Army Marshal Foch stated forcefully: "To stop the Bolshevism penetration, it is necessary to create a barrier from Poland and Romania, closing the Lemberg Pass (seizing Eastern Galicia. – *ed.*)".²² The leadership of the Entente states suggested that Romanian Prime Minister I. I. C. Brătianu agreed to create a joint Polish-Romanian anti-Bolshevik front. Also, in the complicated turmoil of the Ukrainian-Polish war, Poland sought from Romania to carry out decisive anti-Ukrainian military actions.²³

PREPARATIONS FOR MILITARY ACTION IN GALICIA

Romanian troops were preparing to capture south-eastern Galicia. On January 13, 1919, General Iacob Zadik ordered the introduction of the state of siege in Kitsman, Zastavna, Vashkivtsi, Storozhinets districts, that is, just in those Bukovinian lands that were directly adjacent to the south-eastern part of Galicia²⁴.

²⁰ М. Литвин, *op. cit.*, с. 368.

²¹ П., *Румунія і Україна. (Інтерв'ю з послом К. Мацієвичом)* [Romania and Ukraine. (Interview with Ambassador K. Matsievich)], in "Україна" [Ukraine], 1920, No. 128, с. 2.

²² М. Литвин, *op. cit.*, с. 369.

²³ *Західно-Українська Народна Республіка, 1918–1923: Ілюстрована історія* [Western Ukrainian People's Republic, 1918-1923: Illustrated History], Львів, Івано-Франківськ, 2008, с. 356.

²⁴ А. Cuțui, *op. cit.*, p. 516–517.

In preparation for military action against the Western region of the Ukrainian People's Republic, the Romanian government sought repressive measures against those who had moved to Galicia after joining Bukovina. During the second half of April – early May 1919, at the direction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, there were orders issued under no. 291 to all the posts, for each gendarme, in particular, to prepare lists of persons "...who participated in the political life of the region and... especially those who left for Ukraine, to determine if they joined the troops there, doing what they do ...".²⁵

More than a month before the start of the offensive in the south-eastern part of Galicia, the Romanian military administration carried out mobilization activities at the border with the Western region of the Ukrainian People's Republic. In a telegram to the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Galician Army dated April 27, 1919, the Ukrainian intelligence officer informed that on April 12-13, 1919, Romanian military units were on full alert on the right bank of the Dniester river and carefully made sure that no one appeared on the river bank. Previously, a similar situation could be observed on April 7, 1919, near the village of Ozeriany.²⁶ And on April 30, 1919, a telegram-phonogram with the following information was received from the District Military Command of Kolomyia to the Ukrainian Galician Army's Primary Command in Khodoriv: "On Tuesday, April 29, a message came from Bukovina that a new Romanian division had arrived in the Nepolokivtsi – Barbivtsi area. One hundred new planes have arrived in the outskirts of Vyzhnytschyna in Polish circles in Bukovina. It is believed that Romanians will advance all the way to Halych, where Poles from Lviv should meet".²⁷

²⁵ А. Королько, *op. cit.*, с. 198.

²⁶ Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України (ЦДАВО України) [The Central State Archives of Supreme Authorities And Governments Of Ukraine], ф. 2188 Начальна команда Галицької Армія Західної області УНР (м. Чортків, 1919–1920, 1924), оп. 1, спр. 42 *Оперативні зведення військових груп про хід воєнних дій та послаблення дисципліни і відомості про бойовий, продовольчий стан I корпусу Галицької армії. 27 квітня 1919 р. – 29 квітня 1919 р.* [Operational reports of military groups on the course of hostilities and the weakening of discipline and information on the fighting, food condition and corps of the Galician Army. April 27, 1919 – April 29, 1919], арк. 40.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, спр. 43 *Оперативні зведення військових груп про хід воєнних дій та відомості про бойовий та продовольчий стан II корпусу Галицької армії. 30 квітня 1919 р. – 3 травня 1919 р.* [Operational reports of military groups on the course of hostilities and the weakening of discipline and information on the fighting, food condition and II corps of the Galician Army. April 30, 1919 – May 3, 1919], арк. 52.

The Romanian prefects of the counties, which were directly adjacent to the territory of Eastern Galicia, were obliged to provide weekly written information on the condition and mood of the local population.²⁸ The Ukrainian newspaper "Pokutskiy Vistnyk" reported about the arrival in Kolomyia of transport of Bukovinian Ukrainians who, with the establishment of Romanian authorities in Bukovina, were forced to move to the territory of Eastern Galicia: "On Sunday, May 11, transport of Bukovina expatriates, made up of 52 wagons with 500 people, arrived in Kolomyia. From these brothers of ours, driven out of their native land by a Romanian rider, we learn how our Bukovinian brothers live in captivity. From this, we see what would happen to us if an enemy came to us. Many Ukrainian National Teachers were dismissed, and Romanians who did not speak our language were sent to their place ...".²⁹

The government of the Western Region of the Ukrainian People's Republic tried to insure itself against Romania's possible aggression through diplomatic channels. The State Secretariat has decided not to mobilize "for the purpose of speaking out against Romania ... with the desire of the same pledges from Romania".³⁰ But the anxiety of the Ukrainian authorities increased, as during the late winter – early spring of 1919 there was a concentration of Romanian troops at the border with Eastern Galicia, in particular in Pokutia. An attempt was made to reach an agreement through negotiations about the boundaries with the Romanian General Iacob Zadik. The following decision was made: "Ukrainian envoys should go to Bucharest and negotiate with the Romanian government for the purpose of managing temporary relations between the Ukrainian and Romanian states...".³¹

With the consent of the Entente, the Romanian government ordered the General Staff to develop a plan for a military operation to capture the land. Following his approval under the code name "Pokutia", King Ferdinand personally inspected the troops. According to the plan of the military operation, the Romanian Army had to cross the Galicia-Bukovina border and occupy the territory of Eastern Galicia between the Carpathians and the Dniester River, along the Nadvirna – Otinia – Nezvysko line. The Chief of the Romanian General Staff,

²⁸ В. Кройтор, *Проблема Покуття у відносинах між Румунією і ЗУНР...*, с. 232–233.

²⁹ *Життя Покуття. Буковинські гаразди* [The life of Pokutia. Bukovina affairs], in "Покутський вістник" [Pokutian Bulletin], 1919, No. 41, с. 1.

³⁰ В. Кройтор, *op. cit.*, с. 231.

³¹ *Засідання Ради Держ. Секретарів* [Meeting of the Council of State Secretaries], in "Нове життя" [New Life], 1919, No. 59, с. 2.

General Constantin Prezan, commanded the 8th Division that "... Romania is directly interested in controlling the Chernivtsi – Kolomyia – Horodenka, Kolomyia – Rakhiv – Sighet rail link between Bukovina and Transylvania ...".³² He demanded that Romanian troops avoid conflicts with the Army of the Western region of the Ukrainian People's Republic, arguing "Romania seeks to maintain friendly relations with its neighbours".³³

To carry out the operation, Romanian troops were divided into three groups. The first, central group, according to the plan of action, was to lead the offensive in the direction of Nepolokivtsi – Snyatyn – Kolomyia. The northern group attacked in the course of Kyseliv – Gorodenka – Nezvisko. The southern group, following the disposition of the command, was tasked with leading the offensive in the direction of Vashkivtsi – Zaluchchia – Vyzhnytsya – Kutu – Kosiv.³⁴

On May 13, 1919, the Polish attaché reported to the General Staff that Ukrainians had small forces on the Romanian border: about 1,000 bayonets, 4 double-barrelled guns and eight guns. Besides, in the catchment area in Zalishchyky districts – 1 000, in Snyatyn and Kolomyia – 500, in Stanislav – 2 000 bayonets, as well as 30 – 300 in the counties; together there were no more than 3 000 bayonets. The note specified that the 8th Romanian infantry division of General J. Zadik has three regiments (2 thousand knives) on the Bukovina front and a cavalry and a cannon (16 guns) regiment. In other areas, Romania has the 4th, the 9th and the 10th Infantry, and the 1st Cavalry Division.³⁵ On May 22, 1919, Bucharest informed the Polish General Staff that in the morning of the next day, the 8th Infantry Division would start its offensive and should reach the line Nadvirna – Otnia – Gorodenka in the first stage of the operation, as well as seize undamaged bridges on the Dniester river in Zalishchyky and the village Nizhniv.³⁶

On the eve of the advance of the Romanian troops, the Ukrainian border crossing the Sniatyn county regularly reported to the District Military Team of the city of Kolomyia about the revival on the opposite side of the border. On Saturday, May 3, 1919, a Romanian military reconnaissance aircraft spread leaflets printed in Polish, German and Ukrainian over Kolomyia that intimidated the population with the rapid arrival of the Bolsheviks "... if we would allow the development of

³² Покуття. Історико-етнографічний нарис [Pokutia. Historical and ethnographic sketch], Львів, 2010, с. 165.

³³ M. Stănescu, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

³⁴ *Західно-Українська Народна Республіка, 1918–1923...*, с. 357.

³⁵ М. Литвин, *op. cit.*, с. 370.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

Bolshevism in our country".³⁷ Five days before the onset of Romanian troops in the south-eastern part of Galicia, the Ukrainian border guard in Sniatyn informed about the mobilization of the Romanian forces – many cavalries appeared instead of border guards, and there was also a department of Polish lancers.³⁸

ROMANIAN ARMY IN POCUTIA

On May 22, 1919, in preparation for an armed speech against the Western region of the Ukrainian People's Republic, the Romanian General Staff demanded in an ultimatum form that the Kolomyia district military command liberate the territory from the Bukovina border to the Stanislav – Kolomyia railway line: "Forced by the need to establish a connection between the Bukovina and North Transylvanian fronts and given the fact that this connection can only be established through the control of the Kolomyia – Marmarosh-Siget railway line, our occupation forces in Bukovina received orders on the morning of the 24th of this month to move forward and take the railway line. At the same time, the high command of the Romanian Army has issued an instruction that in carrying out this purely military task, we will avoid confrontations with your troops".³⁹ Also, under the disguise of combating the Hungarian Communist regime, the Romanian government demanded that the Ukrainian railways be transferred to the Romanian Army within 24 hours (according to other sources – 12 hours⁴⁰) and transfer the railroad to the Romanian troops: "... to eliminate the Ukrainian troops from the railways (Sniatyn, Kolomyia, Khriplin, Deliatin, Yasinia) and the districts lying along these paths, as Romanian strategic plans against the Magyars require. The desire is justified by the Romanian commandant by order of his authorities with the consent of the Entente".⁴¹ On May 30, 1919, the State Secretary of Military Affairs of the Western region of the Ukrainian People's Republic, Colonel Viktor Kurmanovich noted that in these actions of the Romanian troops "we did not see ... any hostile intentions against us, and to avoid military strips with the Romanian

³⁷ *Життя Покуття. Румунські звідомлення* [The life of Pokutia. Romanian Announcements], in "Покутський вістник" [Pokutian Bulletin], 1919, No. 38, c. 4.

³⁸ В. Бемко, *op. cit.*, c. 821; М. Бурнадз, *op. cit.*, c. 33.

³⁹ О. Добржанський, В. Старик, *Змагання за українську державність на Буковині (1914–1921). Документи і матеріали* [Competition for Ukrainian statehood in Bukovina (1914–1921). Documents and materials], Чернівці, 2009, c. 411.

⁴⁰ *З румунської окупації* [From the Romanian occupation], in "Український прапор" [Ukrainian Flag], 1919, 8 серпня.

⁴¹ *З днів тривоги на Покуттію...*, c. 14; М. Литвин, *op. cit.*, c. 370.

units, we removed our units from that line". Moreover, after the capture of the railway branch on May 24, 1919, the Romanians assured the military command of the Western region of the Ukrainian People's Republic that they "had no intention of moving any further ...".⁴²

Contemporaries of the current events testify to the unwillingness of the Ukrainian military formations to stop the Romanian troops at the border, focusing on organizing the resistance to the Poles at the front in the Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918-1919: "From the beginning, all the attention of the District Military Team in Kolomyia was directed to organizing marching companies or hundreds for the Lviv front, thereby neglecting part of the Romanians' security".⁴³ Lieutenant Mykola Burnadz, who led the third hundred border guards in Sniatyn, reported that Ukrainian border guards were unprepared, Romanian border guards on the Bukovina side of Prut and Cheremosh were twice or three times more.⁴⁴

Contemporaries considered the unlawful military dictatorship of Teodor Primak, the head of the District Military Team in Kolomyia, as another reason for the lack of organization on the eve of the advance of the Romanian troops.⁴⁵ There was no shared position on the part of the local Ukrainian military command after Romanian troops were reported offensive. Discussions regarding the deployment of military units were different from the talks at the District Military Team meeting in Kolomyia. Some considered the immediate general mobilization of soldiers at the Ukrainian-Romanian border. Others, on the contrary, expressed their unwillingness to meet the enemy: "There are just over two companies on the entire Romanian front from Horodenka to Zhabogo (now the district centre of Verkhovyna, Ivano-Frankivsk region, Ukraine – *ed.*). In the trenches themselves recruits ...". Some advised to withdraw all the troops and go to the mountains where the Hutsuls should help, which others said: "We will starve there in a week because the Hutsuls are starving and dying themselves".⁴⁶ It was also challenging to choose the right step because the State Secretariat of Military Affairs of the Western region of the Ukrainian People's Republic did not make appropriate

⁴² ЦДАВО України, ф. 2188, оп. 1, спр. 50 *Оперативні зведення військових груп та розпорядження Начальної Команди Галицької армії про план і хід воєнних дій та розташування військ. 29 травня 1919 р. – 1 червня 1919 р.* [Operational reports of military groups and order of the Galicia Army Main Command on the plan and course of hostilities and deployment of troops. May 29, 1919 – June 1, 1919], арк. 62.

⁴³ В. Бемко, *op. cit.*, с. 819.

⁴⁴ М. Бурнадз, *op. cit.*, с. 32.

⁴⁵ *З румунської окупації...*

⁴⁶ *3 днів тривоги на Покуття...*, с. 15.

diplomatic or military-strategic decisions to solve the problem. The district military team agreed that the evacuation unit should be a village: Nyzhniv over the Dniester River (now the town of Tlumach district, Ivano-Frankivsk region, Ukraine). However, the military chaos could not be stopped: "From the Artillery Basket, two guns are almost out of service. It was hard to reach Nyzhniv. ... The Romanians ended up with a sapper warehouse with a lot of materials, a gunpowder warehouse, several other shops and warehouses, even grocery stores, because even in their dreams they could not have removed them, when the sub-seergeants and shooters left them early, picking up their carts and horses".⁴⁷

On May 24 1919, Romanian troops invaded eastern Galicia. The State Secretariat ordered the UGA (Ukrainian Galician Army) soldiers in Kolomyia not to resist and to start the evacuation. Romanian troops moved smoothly through the territory of the region and did not meet serious resistance. Only in Kolomyia and several villages between the invaders and the UGA there were minor clashes⁴⁸. The fate of the Snyatyn Cossacks dwelling at the border guard, which was the first to meet the enemy offensive, was extremely unfortunate. Instead of resisting his troops, on May 24, 1919, the centurion Nebylovets joined the mission of the State Secretariat of Defense, led by Stepan Vitwitsky, in talks with the leadership of the Romanian troops. That is why three hundred firearms were in the hands of the enemy. Only part of the warriors, led by Commander M. Burnadz, were able to escape from the enemy's grip and retreat to Kolomyia.

On the other hand, the detachment of military recruits of Lieutenant Golota, stationed in Zabolotiv (now Zabolotiv village of Snyatyn district, Ivano-Frankivsk region, Ukraine), was extremely coordinated. Going to Kolomyia, and then to Stanislav, this detachment was able to stop the looting of ammunition, weapons of Polish prisoners. They successfully broke through to the village. The Cossack dwelling of Gorodenka military outpost under the leadership of sotnik Svitlik and *Bukovynska sotnia* was successfully destroyed in the town Nizhniv.⁴⁹ Lieutenant Volodymyr Bemko commanded the military units in the village Nizhnev of Tovmach district.

News of an attack by Romanian troops caused panic among the population of Kolomyia, and Ukrainian military units were ordered to evacuate combat units and state property. The first to leave the city were the marching groups of the Kolomyia regiments, consisting of 15 officers and 295 shooters. Lieutenants

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, c. 16–17.

⁴⁸ О. Новосьолов, *op. cit.*, c. 46.

⁴⁹ *3 днів тривоги на Покуття...*, c. 19.

Maxim Mykytyuk and Kardash coordinated the assignment.⁵⁰

The telegram, signed by the Secretary of State for Military Affairs of the Western region of the Ukrainian People's Republic, Colonel Viktor Kurmanovich, dated May 26, 1919, indicated that Romanians had occupied Gorodenka and Kolomyia, and that the "Polish gangs" dominated the village Khotymyr of the Tovmach district.⁵¹ Although another official statement, signed by V. Kurmanovich, prepared on the night of May 26-27, 1919, indicated that on May 26, Romanian troops crossed the border near Sniatyn "without any hostile intentions" and moved further to Kolomyia and Gorodenka. The Romanian military command said, "they will not go beyond that line". According to V. Kurmanovich, the conduct of such a raid by enemy troops is conditioned by an attempt to ally with the Marmarosh-Siget Romanian task force. The Secretary of State for Military Affairs of the Western region of the Ukrainian People's Republic assured that Ukrainian soldiers controlled all crossings on the Dniester River in the Carpathian region.⁵²

By the end of May 1919, the Romanian troops practically occupied the entire territory of south-eastern Galicia (Pokutia and Galicia Hutsul). The Romanian periodical considered not be a hostile act the seizure of these territories. Still, a means to establish a rail link between Bukovina and Körösmező (now the village of Yasinia, Rakhiv district, Transcarpathian region, Ukraine), where Romanian troops should stop. Accordingly, a proclamation was prepared, which was scattered from aeroplanes in and around Kolomyia. The leaflet stated that the Romanian Army did not join Eastern Galicia to wage war with the Ukrainian Army or the local population. "Therefore, we request, as stated in the proclamation, that all soldiers and civilians from our occupied territory voluntarily surrender all weapons, ammunition and other military materials and continue to carry out their daily activities".⁵³ The occupying power guaranteed respect for the lives and property of all residents who would not commit acts of hostility; According to the old regional laws, the Romanian authorities will continue to be supervised by local

⁵⁰ В. Бемко, *op. cit.*, с. 822.

⁵¹ ЦДАВО України, ф. 2188, оп. 1, спр. 49 *Оперативні зведення військових груп та розпорядження Начальної Команди Галицької армії про план і хід воєнних дій і розташування військ. 20 травня 1919 р. – 22 травня 1919 р.* [Operational reports of military groups and orders of the Galician Army Initial Command on the plan and course of hostilities and deployment of troops. May 29, 1919 - June 1, 1919], арк. 167.

⁵² *Ibid.*, арк. 195.

⁵³ А. Королько, *op. cit.*, с. 202.

government officials under the authority/command of the Romanian Army.⁵⁴ The German-language newspaper "Allgemeine Zeitung Tagblatt" quoted a message from the "Vestea" newspaper saying that the real purpose of the occupation by the Romanian troops of Pokutia was to assist Poland in the war against the Western region of the Ukrainian People's Republic: "... This resulted in a long-awaited deployment of the Polish troops near Stanislaviv, not near Kolomyia. Thanks to the occupation of Pokutia, the connection between Bukovina and northern Marmorosh has been achieved, which is necessary for our future protection ...".⁵⁵

The real threat of an attack on the south-eastern borders of the Western Ukrainian state came as a surprise to the leadership of the Western region of the Ukrainian People's Republic and put it in a critical position. Even before the Romanian occupation of part of Eastern Galicia, at the State Secretariat meeting on May 21, 1919, various proposals were made to overcome the demanding military and political situation. In particular, S. Vitwitsky offered to capitulate to Romania, which "stands on the shoulders of the Entente", E. Petrushevich and K. Levitsky hoped to form a federation with Czechoslovakia, others – "to give orders to the local authorities to remain in place and to stand by".⁵⁶ Instead, the Ukrainian authorities of the Ukrainian People's Republic disagreed with the military move towards the Romanian occupation of south-eastern Galicia. This is evidenced by a protest note of the Ukrainian People's Republic Extraordinary Ambassador to Romania, Yuri Gasenko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, prepared on May 28, 1919.⁵⁷

To manage the occupied lands, a territorial Committee of Pokutia was set up by the Romanian authorities. Having conquered the south-eastern part of Galicia, Romanian troops joined forces in northern Transylvania. General Staff appointed J. Zadik as the commanding officer of a group of troops located in Bukovina, south-eastern Galicia (Pokutia) and north Bessarabia. After some time, on June 5, 1919, the headquarters of the 8th Division was relocated from Kolomyia to Chernivtsi.⁵⁸

On May 28 1919, after the meeting of the commander of the 8th Romanian

⁵⁴ "Czernowitzer Morgenblatt", 1919, 27 Mai; О. Добржанський, В. Старик, *op. cit.*, с. 413-414.

⁵⁵ "Allgemeine Zeitung Tagblatt", 1919, 4 Juni; О. Добржанський, В. Старик, *op. cit.*, с. 414.

⁵⁶ *Західно-Українська Народна Республіка, 1918–1923...*, с. 357-358.

⁵⁷ О. Карпенко, К. Мицан (упоряд.), *Західно-Українська Народна Республіка 1918–1923. Документи і матеріали: у 5-х томах* [West Ukrainian People's Republic 1918–1923. Documents and Materials: in 5 volumes], Івано-Франківськ, 2009, Vol. 5 (1) *Зовнішня політика і міжнародне становище. 1918–1919 рр.* [Foreign Policy and International Situation. 1918–1919], с. 491-492.

⁵⁸ V. Avram, L. Drăghici, G.-G. Pătrașcu, I. Rîșnoveanu, *op. cit.*, p. 220-221.

Division, General J. Zadik, with the Polish General Kralicek, the establishment of a joint military command in Kolomyia and a civilian administration was decided. At the end of May 1919, the Polish leadership sent troops to the territory of south-eastern Galicia. The districts were led by military commanders, who reported to the Territorial Committee. The Dniester River was divided into sectors. The order of retreat of the Romanian Army from Pokutia was also discussed.⁵⁹

Konstantin Kroitor claimed that the Romanian authorities tried to curb the illegal actions of the Poles. They in the course of the retreat of military units in Pokutia tried to take over local authorities and dismiss the administrative posts of Ukrainians. In response to the Romanian army leadership, Poles were appointed prefects in three counties of Pokutia and Galicia Hutsul region, and their deputies were Ukrainians. In the other three counties, the appointed prefects were Ukrainians and their deputies were Poles.⁶⁰ In particular, the head of the Ukrainian counties in Pechenizhyn was Genik, in Gorodenka – G. Martynets, in Kosovo – A. Lepky.⁶¹

The spheres of action of the Polish and Romanian soldiers were created. For example, when on May 31, 1919, a Polish commander requested Romanian general J. Zadik to be allowed to stay in Nadvirna, he was refused. The reason was that Polish troops were widespread in fear and panic, killing civilians, and Ukrainians asked the Romanian military "to protect the Ukrainian administration and its servicemen in Pokutia and part of the territory northeast of the Dniester". Due to the "... inexcusable behaviour of officers and lower ranks..." of the Polish Army, the local population asked the Romanian soldiers to protect the Ukrainian administration and its servants not only in Pokutia but also in part of the territory northeast of the Dniester River.⁶² An unknown contributor to the "Ukrainian Flag" reported that Zheligovsky's military brigade, assembled from the Polish army units of the A. Denikin Volunteer Army, carried out shameful robberies of the local population: "from the Bukovina border to the Romanian-Polish border, not a single border or one small town has been fortunate enough not to be robbed by the sons of "noble" people."⁶³ The author initially summarized "But this is nothing compared to the fact that there is no threat to the life of Ukrainians under Romanians. In the unhappiness Romanians

⁵⁹ К. Кройтор, *Проблема Покуття під час польсько-української війни...*, с. 309.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, с. 309.

⁶¹ "Український прапор" [Ukrainian flag], 1919, 15 серпня.

⁶² К. Кройтор, *op. cit.*, с. 310.

⁶³ "Український прапор" [Ukrainian flag], 1919, 15 серпня.

have brought to the Ukrainians, hitting them in the back, it is fortunate that Ukrainian citizenship did not suffer the hell that the Poles suffered from Poles in Sambir, Stryi, Stanislaviv, etc."⁶⁴

In turn, the Poles were dissatisfied with the Romanian military administration-of the occupied territory. In a memorandum dated June 27, 1919, addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, Polish Liaison Officer Lieutenant Horodinsky indicated that the Romanian authorities were treating the Polish population of south-eastern Galicia in the worst possible way. In particular, the commander of Kolomyia, Captain Mironescu, calls Polish soldiers bandits. Romanian officials are scared of the Ukrainians, so they are friends enrolled in the gendarmerie service. Poles are removed from office, Polish-language schools are closed. Pokutia is now a gathering place for demolished Ukrainian military units, which is dangerous for the Poles.⁶⁵

On the deployment of Romanian troops in the Horodenkovschyna and in the border villages of Bukovina in late May-early June 1919, we learn from the operational intelligence of the UGA Primary Command from June 10 and 14, 1919. Thus, at the end of May 1919, the Romanian artillery moved from Gorodenka and was stationed on the line of the village Korniv – village Semenivka. Small Romanian detachments were in the village Isakiv.⁶⁶ At the beginning of June, one hundred enemy troops and 15 "riders" were stationed in Gorodenka, 20 Romanians in the town of Potochyshche, 30 Romanians in the village of Semenivka and two high-speed cartridges, and 10 Romanians in the community Babin (now the village of Zastavna district of Chernivtsi region, Ukraine).⁶⁷ The village Semakivtsi of Horodenka district had a Romanian military headquarters.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ О. Карпенко, К. Мицан (упоряд.), *Західно-Українська Народна Республіка 1918–1923. Документи і матеріали: у 5-х томах* [West Ukrainian People's Republic 1918–1923. Documents and Materials: in 5 volumes], Івано-Франківськ, 2005, Vol. 3 (1), с. 126–128.

⁶⁶ ЦДАВО України, ф. 2188, оп. 1, спр. 50 *Оперативні зведення військових груп та розпорядження Начальної Команди Галицької армії про план і хід воєнних дій та розташування військ. 29 травня 1919 р. – 1 червня 1919 р.* [Operational reports of military groups and orders of the Galician Army Initial Command on the plan and course of hostilities and deployment of troops. May 29, 1919 – June 1, 1919], арк. 73.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, спр. 51 *Оперативні зведення військових груп та розпорядження Начальної Команди Галицької армії про план і хід воєнних дій і розташування військ. 3 червня 1919 р. – 12 червня 1919 р.* [Operational reports of military groups and orders of the Galician Army Initial Command on the plan and course of hostilities and deployment of troops. June 3, 1919 – June 12, 1919], арк. 155.

In addition to the ground forces, this village contained boats, pontoons and artillery. On June 14, 1919, many troops arrived from Gorodenka town from the west, sending separate units and special ammunition to Kitsman town.⁶⁸ It was also noted that the Poles from the occupied Roman settlements of the Carpathian region moved to Chernivtsi to "join the Polish army there".⁶⁹

The Romanian authorities have put into circulation their currency – lei, cancelling the obligatory exchange rate of the Ukrainian hryvnia. This led to the difficult financial situation of the population of the region: local exchanged hryvnia to Romanian lei at an unfavourable exchange rate (the monetary value of the hryvnia decreased by 35-50%)⁷⁰. The Romanian military requisitioned all the property after the retreat of the Ukrainian Galician Army troops (weapons depots, ammunition, food, railway trains), special commissions were set up in Kolomyia, Otyniia and Chernivtsi, to record and assess all fires. However, most of the food was distributed to the local population, and the rest was bought and exported to Romania. This is evidenced by a telegram from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to a representative in Bucharest on June 18, 1919, on the situation of the Ukrainian lands of Eastern Galicia annexed by Romania. It stated that the Romanian authorities could not suspend the Bolshevik and anti-Polish actions of the local population there, including the speeches in Pechenezhin and Kosiv. According to the Polish military attaché, Romanians are requisitioning military and agricultural vehicles and which are transported to Bukovina without registration. This was not in line with the intentions of the Polish-Romanian cooperation.⁷¹

At the time, the Ukrainian newspaper periodical critically described the arrival of the Romanian military administration in Eastern Galicia. An unknown correspondent for the "Volia" magazine of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party noted that the local Ukrainian population met with distrust and feared the arrival of the Romanian troops. Residents of the region have always suffered from thefts and requisitions by Romanian soldiers. In general, it was difficult to communicate with the Romanians, because few of them knew Ukrainian or any other Slavic language. Particularly annoying on the Romanian side was the "requisition" of horses from local peasants.⁷²

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, спр. 52, арк. 68.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, спр. 51, арк. 155.

⁷⁰ "Український прапор" [Ukrainian flag], 1919, 15 серпня.

⁷¹ О. Карпенко, К. Мицан (упоряд.), *op. cit.*, Vol. 3 (1), с. 121-122.

⁷² *Вісти з Покуття* [News from Pokutia], in "Воля. Орган української соціал-

During the Romanian occupation, the situation of the inhabitants of the mountain and foothills of the Carpathians worsened. An unknown contributor to "Volia" magazine complained: "The oldest people do not remember such a famine now in the mountains, nettles sprinkled with bagels or cereals made from decayed corn; this is the only food of the inhabitants of our mountains". Therefore, before the harvest, many Carpathian Hutsuls travelled to Bukovina to earn at least something to support their families in the winter.⁷³

The Romanian authorities saw no difference in their attitude towards the Poles and the Ukrainians, thus "cooling the enthusiasm and joy with which many Poles met the arrival of the Romanian liberators". The Romanian military administration has stopped publishing Ukrainian and Polish-language newspapers in Kolomyia. Only Chernivtsi German-language magazines were allowed to be distributed.⁷⁴

The views of contemporary Ukrainian historians are divided on whether to consider the Romanian occupation system should be regarded as cruel to the Ukrainians. Mykola Lytvyn believes that on the territory of the south-eastern part of Galicia, the Romanian authorities established a brutal regime, forbidding meetings and the carrying of weapons, restricting the movement of citizens, and censoring the press. An "educative" role was assigned to the Army, which allowed requisition and cruel punishment.⁷⁵ Instead, Constantine Kroitor argued that the Romanian administration had restored the railway movement, stimulated reopening of trade, ensured the normal functioning of medical institutions, facilitated the resumption of production by cancelling customs duties, and secured a loan from Romanian banks. Thanks to the political and administrative measures taken and their general actions, the Romanian Army maintained stability in the south-eastern part of Galicia for three months.⁷⁶

After the Polish troops launched an offensive against the ZUNR army on July 3, 1919, the Romanian command reviewed the deployment of soldiers in northern Bessarabia, Bukovina and Pokutia and during August 17-25, 1919, evacuated Romanian troops from Pokutia and Halytsia Hutsulia. On the basis of a preliminary agreement, a military border was established from the village

демократичної партії" [Will. Body of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party], 1919, no. 8, c. 2.

⁷³ Ibid, c. 2.

⁷⁴ Ibid, c. 2.

⁷⁵ М. Литвин, *op. cit.*, c. 370–371.

⁷⁶ К. Кройтор, *Румунська історіографія про Покуття в часи ЗУНР...*, c. 87.

Babin on the Dniester River (now the town of Sredny Babin in the Kaluga district of Ivano-Frankivsk region) to the Yablunytsya town on the White Cheremosh River (now, Yablunytsya village of Verkhovyna district, Ivano-Frankivsk region, Ukraine).⁷⁷ The territory of the south-eastern part of Galicia was in the hands of Poland.

CONCLUSIONS

Romania's accession to Eastern Galicia was in line with the Entente's plans to curb Bolshevism, and Poland was comfortable at the final stage of the Polish-Ukrainian war, as it diverted many military and material resources from the Western Front of the Ukrainian People's Republic to the southern front. Capturing the south-eastern part of Galicia was reasonably straightforward, as the Romanian military units have been prepared for such a move. The readiness of the Ukrainian army units to defend the land should also be acknowledged since the main focus was on the Polish-Ukrainian war on other fronts. The Ukrainian government has not taken firm diplomatic and military-strategic decisions to resolve the problem. The occupied territory was the centre of contradictions between the Romanian and Polish military command. Moreover, according to sources, the local Ukrainian population requested assistance from the Romanian authorities to suspend the robbery and extortion of Polish soldiers. However, after the end of the Polish-Ukrainian war during the Romanian-Polish agreements in the second half of August 1919, the south-eastern part of Galicia came under the Polish rule.

⁷⁷ В. М. Ботушанський (ред.), *Буковина в контексті європейських міжнародних відносин (з давніх часів до середини XX ст.)* [Bukovina in the context of European international relations (from ancient times to the middle of the twentieth century)], Чернівці, 2005, с. 497.

EVOLUTION OF THE WESTPHALIAN ORDER UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE WORLD WARS: HISTORICAL AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ASPECTS

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Abstract. *The two anniversaries – the centennial of the end of World War I, with the organization of peace conferences, and the 75th anniversary of the end of World War II, with the corresponding 1945 peace conferences and the creation of the United Nations, – have both led the historians to update their studies on the impact of the two global armed conflicts on the world order. The Great War of 1914-1918 and World War II of 1939-1945 have brought substantial transformations on the international arena. They led to the reformation of the whole system of international relations and initiated new structures of the post-war world. The Versailles-Washington system completed the post-war peaceful settlement process and the transition from war to peace, preparing the conditions for the stabilization of a democratic system in the field of international relations. Overall, this order was marked by severe internal contradictions and lasted only two decades. The Yalta-Potsdam Peace System was a significant global result of World War II. It became a key modernization of the Westphalian world order, and four and a half decades later ended the era of its almost 350-year existence. Studying these aspects is vital for minimizing the potential risks and threats in the evolution of the modern system of international relations.*

Keywords: *Westphalia, World Order, World War, International System, Versailles-Washington, Yalta-Potsdam, Propaganda, Manipulation, Post-Westphalian.*

Rezumat: *Evoluția sistemului de la Westfalia sub impactul războaielor mondiale: aspecte privind istoria și relațiile internaționale. Cele două aniversări – centenarul sfârșitului Primului Război Mondial, alături de organizarea conferințelor de pace, și aniversarea a 75 de ani de la încheierea celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial, cu aferentele conferințe de pace din 1945 și cu momentul creării Națiunilor Unite, – i-au determinat pe istorici să își actualizeze studiile privitoare la impactul celor două conflicte armate globale asupra ordinii mondiale. Marele Război din 1914-1918 și al Doilea Război Mondial din 1939-1945 au generat mutații importante pe arena internațională. Acestea au dus la reformarea*

întregului sistem de relații internaționale și la crearea unor noi structuri ale lumii postbelice. Prin instituirea sistemului Versailles-Washington au fost finalizate procesul de soluționare pașnică de după Marea Conflagrație și trecerea de la război la pace, pregătindu-se premisele pentru stabilizarea unui sistem democratic în domeniul relațiilor internaționale. În general, marcată de contradicții interne severe, această stare de lucruri a rezistat numai două decenii. Sistemul de pace Yalta-Potsdam a fost un rezultat major al celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial. El a devenit un instrument-cheie în modernizarea ordinii mondiale westfaliene, iar după patru decenii și jumătate i-a încheiat existența de aproape 350 de ani. Studiarea acestor aspecte este importantă pentru minimizarea potențialelor riscuri și amenințări în evoluția sistemului modern de relații internaționale.

INTRODUCTION

The 20th century came into history as a period of profound epochal change that affected almost all areas of social life. In less than a century, the international relations system has undergone dramatic shifts three times. The first two times happened at the dawn of the previous century, in the first half of the twentieth century. It was triggered by the world wars - the global conflicts of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945, which reshaped not only borders in Europe and the world, but also the fate of individuals and entire nations. And the final third time it happened at the end of the 20th century: the breakup of the communist system and the USSR, which have entirely changed the direction of political, economic, social, cultural development of several countries and, most importantly, the order of international relations as a whole. It is worth noting that the profound political transformations that took place in the twentieth century were incomplete, and the effects of the changes caused by the end of the Cold War and the formation of the post-Westphalian world are only noticeable at the beginning of the present century.

Not only have world wars become the next change in the Westphalian world order but they have also radically caused the globalization and transformation of international relations with the collapse of the USSR, the end of the communist era, the end of the Cold War and the bipolar world, the gradual crystallization of a multipolar international system at the end of the twentieth century. It is necessary to point out that during the "short" interval from 1914-1991 – to the 20th century, the state-centred multipolar international Westphalian system has undergone some crucial changes. For the first time, this happened under the influence of the First World War. First of all, we mean the collapse of empires and the rapid transformation of the world which led to its geopolitical structure change and the

emergence of several important international actors, including the USSR, Weimar Germany, Central and Southern Europe, Turkey, along with the existing ones (USA, UK, France, Italy, Japan). Second, the United States went beyond the frames of the policy of isolationism and became actively involved in international processes outside the Americas. Third, the globalization of international relations has led to the creation of the first world's international organization – the League of Nations. World War II led to a new change in the Westphalian world order. This manifested itself, first of all, in the transition from a multipolar to a bipolar world; the impact of a new nuclear factor on international policy; the collapse of the colonial system; the growing importance of regional and global integration processes; universalization and instrumentalization of international relations in the context of unprecedented influence on the global (such as the UN, October 24, 1945) and regional international organizations. Finally, the third amendment of the Westphalian world order under the influence of the collapse of the communist system, the collapse of the USSR, the end of the Cold War and the destruction of the bipolar international system led to the globalization of international relations and their structural changes in the genesis and formation of the modern post-bipolar world.

The centennial of the end of World War I and the 75th anniversary of the end of World War II became a significant informational occasion for a new, unbiased view in the context of a retrospective analysis of the problems of war and peace, war and politics, war and diplomacy, war and society, war and culture etc. The study of the causes, consequences and lessons of the world wars becomes especially relevant in the context of the threat of destruction of the international legal framework of the modern post-bipolar system of international relations, in particular, due to the emergence of new "hot" spots on the planet. These are, for example, the wars waged by the Russian Federation against Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (since 2014); the revolutionary and armed events of the so-called Arab Spring; the military, political, diplomatic, economic confrontation of various influential international actors of modernity (in particular, the United States, Russia, Turkey) in Syria, Libya and, in general, in the geopolitical space of the Great Middle East.¹ The causal relationships that connect local events to worldwide events and

¹ Володимир Горбулін (coord.), *Світова гібридна війна: український фронт* [World Hybrid War: The Ukrainian Front], Київ, НІСД, 2017, 496 с.; Євген Магда, *Гібридна війна: вижити і перемогти* [Hybrid War: Survive and Win], Харків, Біват, 2015, 304 с.; Jurij Felsztynski, Michał Stanczew, *Trzecia wojna światowa? Bitwa o Ukrainę* [The Third World War? Battle for Ukraine], Warszawa, Wyd-wo Dom Wydawniczy REBIS, 2015, 432 s.; Marcel H. Van Herpen, *Wojny Putina. Czeczenia, Gruzja, Ukraina*

processes, first clearly identified on the eve of the Great War (the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the outbreak of World War I in 1914) remain relevant today. It is clear that these processes have aroused and will continue to bear an objective interest for researchers and experts since their practical implications are tangible for the vast majority of the inhabitants, from both relevant sub-regions and the global world community as a whole.

The main trends identification of socio-political development of the century is impossible without a turn to the events of the past century, first of all – the world wars. They established several megatrends of global development and international relations in the 20th century, some of which have become modern. That is why among contemporary researchers, the problems of the First and Second World Wars remain more than relevant. Proof of this is the recent publication of some new studies by local and foreign scientists. In last years, several scientific conferences, seminars, and round tables have taken place on the beginning, the course and the end of the world wars. Major collective monographs were published, including *The Great War of 1914-1918: Origins, Character, Consequences*, *World War I in the Focus of History*, *World Wars in the History and Destiny of Humanity (to the centennial of the end of World War I and the 75th anniversary of the end of World War II)* and others.² The works of historians from

2014 [Putin's wars. Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine 2014], Warszawa, Wyd-wo Prószyński Media, 2014, 408 s.; Agata Kleczkowska, *Wojna hybrydowa – uwagi z perspektywy prawa międzynarodowego publicznego* [Hybrid war – remarks from the perspective of public international law], in "Sprawy międzynarodowe", 2015, No. 2, S. 93 – 110.

² Олександр Рєєнт (coord.), *Велика війна 1914–1918 рр. і Україна* [The Great War and Ukraine], in 2 Books, Book 1, *Історичні нариси* [Historical Essays], Київ, ТОВ «Видавництво «КЛІО», 2014, 784 с.; *Первая мировая война, Версальская система и современность* [The First World War, the Versailles system and modernity], Санкт-Петербург, 2012, 350 с.; Сергей Троян (coord.), *Мировые войны в истории человечества (к 100-летию начала Первой и 75-летию начала Второй мировых войн)* [World Wars in the History of Mankind (on the 100th Anniversary of the Beginning of the First and 75th Anniversary of the Beginning of the Second World War)], Київ, НІКА-Центр, 2016, 256 с.; Сергій Троян (coord.), *Перша світова війна і революції: вектори соціокультурних трансформацій* [The First World War and the Revolutions: Vectors of Sociocultural Transformations], Київ, Кондор-Видавництво, 2017, 212 с.; Сергій Троян (coord.), *Перша світова війна у фокусі «плинної нестабільності»: міжнародна і внутрішня політика* [World War I in the Focus of "Volatile Instability": International and Domestic Politics], Київ, Видавничий дім «Кондор», 2019, 280 с.; Сергій Троян (coord.), *Перша світова війна у фокусі історії (дипломатичні та політичні колізії Великої війни)* [World War I in the Focus of History (Diplomatic and

different countries and scientific schools (such as Colin Gray³, Antony Beevor⁴, Marius Volos⁵, Eric Hobsbawm⁶, Mykhailo Koval⁷, Florin Constantiniu⁸, Jörn Leonard⁹, Hart Liddell¹⁰, Rees Laurence¹¹, Andrii Martinov¹², Herfried Münkler¹³,

Political Conflicts of the Great War]], Київ, Кондор-Видавництво, 2016, 296 с.; Сергій Троян (coord.), *Світові війни в історії та долі людства (до 100-річчя початку Першої і 75-річчя початку Другої світових воєн)* [World Wars in the History and Destiny of Humanity (to the 100th Anniversary of the First and 75th Anniversary of the Second World War)], Київ, ДП «Пріоритет», 2014, 312 с.; Сергій Троян (coord.), *Велика війна 1914–1918 рр.: витоки, характер, наслідки* [The Great War of 1914–1918: Origins, Character, Consequences], Київ, Видавничий дім «Кондор», 2018, 536 с.; Constantin Hlihor, Grigory Davidovich Shkundin, Vasile Soare, Alexander Sergeevich Stikalin (eds.), *Rusia și România în timpul Primului Război Mondial* [Russia and Romania during the First World War], București, Ed. Top Form, 2018, 501 p.

³ Colin Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations. An Introduction to the Strategic History*, London and New York, Routledge, 2007, 306 p.

⁴ Энтони Бивор, *Вторая мировая война* [The Second World War], Москва, Колибри, 2014, 992 с.

⁵ Мариуш Волос, Григорий Шкундин (coord.), *Народы Габсбургской монархии в 1914 – 1920 гг.: от национальных движений к созданию национальных государств* [Peoples of the Habsburg Monarchy in 1914-1920: from National Movements to the Creation of National States], Vol. 1, Москва, Квадрига, 2012, 456 с.

⁶ Эрик Хобсбаум, *Разломанное время. Культура и общество в двадцатом веке* [Broken time. Culture and Society in the Twentieth Century], Москва, Издательство АСТ: CORPUS, 2017, 384 с.

⁷ Михайло Коваль, *Друга світова війна 1939–1945* [The Second World War 1939-1945], Київ, В-во «Наукова думка», 2004, 688 с.

⁸ Florin Constantiniu, *1941. Hitler, Stalin și România: România și geneza Operațiunii „Barbarossa”* [1941. Hitler, Stalin and Romania: Romania and the genesis of Operation "Barbarossa"], București, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, 2002, 215 p.

⁹ Jörn Leonhard, *Die Büchse der Pandora. Geschichte des Ersten Weltkrieges* [Pandora's Box. History of the First World War], München, Verlag C. H. Beck, 2014, 1157 s.

¹⁰ Гарт Лиддел, *История Первой мировой войны* [History of the First World War], Москва, АСТ, 2014, 574 с.

¹¹ Піз Лоренс, *Друга світова війна за зачиненими дверима* [World War II behind the Closed Doors], Київ, Темпора, 2010, 444 с.

¹² Андрій Мартинов, *Перша світова війна в сучасній німецькомовній історіографії: теми й концептуальні ідеї досліджень* [World War I in Contemporary German Historiography: Topics and Conceptual Ideas of Research], in "Міжнародні зв'язки України: наукові пошуки і знахідки", 2016, Вип. 25, с. 397 – 423.

¹³ Herfried Münkler, *Der Große Krieg. Die Welt 1914 bis 1918* [The Great War. The World 1914-1918], Berlin, Rowohlt, 2013, 928 s.

Michael S. Neiberg¹⁴, Dumitru Preda¹⁵, Ioan Scurtu¹⁶, Timothy D. Snyder¹⁷, Serhiy Troyan, Volodymyr Fisanov¹⁸, Peter Hart¹⁹, Andrzej Hvalba²⁰, Max Hastings²¹ and many others²²) were dedicated to virtually all aspects of the 20th-century global

¹⁴ Michael S. Neiberg, *Taniec furii. Wybuch pierwszej wojny światowej oczami Europejczyków* [Dance of Fury. The outbreak of the First World War through the eyes of Europeans], Kraków, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2013, 352 s.

¹⁵ Dumitru Preda, *România și Antanta. Avatarurile unei mici puteri într-un război de coaliție 1916–1917* [Romania and Antanta. The avatars of a small power in a coalition war 1916–1917], Iași, Institutul European, 1998, 224 p.

¹⁶ Ioan Scurtu, *Marea Unire din 1918 în context european* [The Great Union of 1918 in the European context], București, Editura Academiei Române, 2003, 447 p.; Ioan Scurtu (coord.), *Istoria Românilor (1918-1940)* [History of the Romanians (1918-1940)], Vol. VIII, București, Editura Enciclopedică, 2003, 856 p.; Ioan Scurtu, *Declarația privind unirea Basarabiei cu România* [Declaration regarding the union of Bessarabia with Romania], in "Studii și Comunicări/DIS", 2018, No. 11 (XI), P. 45-56.

¹⁷ Тимоті Снайдер, *Криваві землі. Європа між Гітлером і Сталіном* [Bloody Lands. Europe between Hitler and Stalin], Київ, Лауріс, 2018, 492 с.

¹⁸ Владимир Фисанов, Сергей Троян, *Немецкая Mitteleuropa: историческая ретроспектива (немецкие планы создания Серединной Европы конца XIX — начала XX века)* [German Mitteleuropa: historical retrospective (German plans for the creation of Mid-Europe of the late XIX - early XX centuries)], Saarbrücken, LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, 2013, 96 c.

¹⁹ Peter Hart, *I Wojna Światowa 1914–1918. Historia militarna* [World War I 1914-1918. Military history], Poznań, Dom Wydawniczy REBIS, 2014, 603 s.

²⁰ Andrzej Chwalba, *Samobójstwo Europy. Wielka wojna 1914–1918* [Suicide of Europe. Great War 1914-1918], Kraków, Wyd-wo Literackie, 2014, 656 s.

²¹ Макс Хейстингс, *Первая мировая война. Катастрофа 1914 года* [World War I. The Disaster of 1914], Москва, Альпина нон-фикшн, 2017, 604 с.

²² Андрей Болтаевский, *Первая мировая война: дипломатическая предыстория, крупнейшие военные операции и внешнеполитические итоги* [First World War: Diplomatic Pre-History, Military Operations and Foreign Policy Results], Москва, Издательство Спутник+, 2016, 258 с.; Андрій Галушка, *Змова диктаторів. Поділ Європи між Гітлером і Сталіном 1939-1941* [Conspiracy of Dictators. The Division of Europe between Hitler and Stalin 1939-1941], Харків, Клуб сімейного дозвілля, 2018, 368 с.; Вахтанг Кіпіані, *Друга світова Непридумані історії (Не) наша жива інша* [Second World War True Stories (Not) Ours Living Other], Київ: Віват, 2019, 304 с.; Nicolae Enciu, *Marea Unire din 1918: o strălucită victorie a geografiei asupra istoriei nedrepte* [The Great Union of 1918: a brilliant victory of geography over the unjust history], in "Revista Limba Română", 2018, No. 1-2, anul XXVIII, P. 216-231.; Petre Otu, *Pace și război în spațiul românesc. Secolul al XX-lea* [Peace and War on the Romanian Territory. The 20th Century], București, Editura Militară, 2016, 435 p.; Stanisław Łoś, «Świat się w mych oczach dwukrotnie zawałił...»: wspomnienia [„The

armed conflicts, including the regional dimension of Central and Eastern Europe.

In the context of the suggested scientific exploration, the fundamental researches of Western authors are essential, in particular those of Bear F. Braumoeller²³, Barry Buzan and George Lawson²⁴, Gary Goertz, Paul F. Diehl and Alexandru Balas²⁵, Amitav Acharya²⁶, Bertrand Badie²⁷, Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan²⁸, dedicated to the systems of international relations and the peculiarities of their changes during the 17th-20th centuries (from Westphalia to post-Westphalia). At the same time, we generally follow the approaches of the noted scholars to the understanding and essential characteristics of these world systems, their changes under the influence of the military, economic, colonial, political, regional and target processes. In particular, "within this model, the international system is characterized by cooperation and conflict between viable and rational states in an anarchic environment, which reflects the pluralist norms of interaction in diplomacy, law and multilateralism. A Westphalian system is, therefore, said to rest upon the sovereignty of political units, territoriality, and non-intervention."²⁹ At the same time, it is necessary to take into account a very valid remark or clarification by Benno Teschke, a British researcher: "The logic of inter-dynastic relations structured early modern European politics until the regionally very uneven 19th-century transition to international modernity."³⁰

world has collapsed twice in my eyes...": memories], Kraków, Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej; Warszawa, Muzeum Historii Polski, 2017, 683 s.

²³ Bear F. Braumoeller, *The Great Powers and the International System: Systemic Theory in Empirical Perspective*, Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press, 2012, 276 p.

²⁴ Barry Buzan, George Lawson, *The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of International Relations* (Cambridge studies in international relations; 135), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015, 396 p.

²⁵ Gary Goertz, Paul F. Diehl, Alexandru Balas, *The Puzzle of Peace. The Evolution of Peace in the International System*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2016, 247 p.

²⁶ Amitav Acharya, *Constructing Global Order: Agency and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press, 2018, 215 p.

²⁷ Bertrand Badie, *New Perspectives on the International Order. No Longer Alone in This World*, London, Palgrave Maximilian, 2019, 140 p.

²⁸ Amitav Acharya, Barry Buzan, *The Making of Global International Relations. Origins and Evolution of IR at its Centenary*, Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press, 2019, 383 p.

²⁹ Edward Newman, *Failed states and international order: constructing a post-Westphalian world*, in *Contemporary security policy*, 2009, Vol. 30, No. 3, p. 422.

³⁰ Benno Teschke, *Theorizing the Westphalian system of states: international relations from absolutism to capitalism*, in "European Journal of International Relations", 2002, 8(1), p. 6.

The purpose of scientific exploration is to study the impact of the First and Second World Wars on the dramatic changes in the systems of the Westphalian world order. In general, this article highlights the current emphasis in the study of complex and sometimes very contradictory issues of the period, outlined by the British Prime Minister W. Churchill as "An era of the New Thirty Years War 1914–1945", and expands the field of fruitful scientific discussion of this issue. The purpose is to inspire new scientific research on the history, politics, international relations etc. of the First and Second World Wars and their impact on the modern world and the features of the evolution of international relations.

THE GREAT WAR AND THE NEW CONFIGURATION OF WORLD POWERS

The fateful events that radically affected the modernization shifts in international relations, which were based on the state-centric paradigm of the Westphalian world order, were the world wars of the 20th century.

The Great War of 1914–1918 entered history as the first global armed conflict of two coalitions of states at war, the results of which in turn led to dramatic changes of an international nature. World War I of 1914–1918, known to the contemporaries as the Great War, was a reflection of profound modernization transformations of a global and internal nature in different countries. It should be emphasized that the changes brought by the world war of 1914–1918 remain noticeable to this day, which is especially evident in the field of propaganda and manipulation of the public consciousness. Preparation of the population for war began almost simultaneously with the creation of military-political coalitions at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. At the beginning of the twentieth century, in the countries of the future world conflict, the genre of the military-utopian novel became very popular. The authors, according to national (state) affiliation, portrayed the coming war as an inevitable conflict that would lead to the renewal of the existing system and victory of a particular state. In the military utopias of that time, the war was a prerequisite for the improvement of future life, and the moral superiority of one of the parties was the key to victory. In fact, these novels served several purposes: promoting war as a way of resolving conflicts of interest, as a pledge to renew the world order, as well as performing some propaganda function. They created the necessary image of the enemy and the moral opposition between "we" and "they", "ours" and "strangers", and this is just the tip of the iceberg of war and political propaganda launched on the eve of World War.

The Great War of 1914-1918 was the first major crisis of the modern era, much larger and more destructive than previous wars. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan aptly noted that it was not provoked by ideological tensions or the direct economic crisis: "Its main driving force was the balance of power."³¹ It was a growing confrontation in the struggle for the redistribution of colonies in the situation of the increasing power and searching for their "place under the sun" of Germany, Japan and the USA.

The creation of two triple military-political alliances - the German Empire, Austria-Hungary and Italy in 1879-1882 (the Triple Alliance) and the coalition of France, the Russian Empire and Great Britain (the Entente) during 1893-1907 testified for the moral readiness of the governments of these states for the future open confrontation.³² Domestic politics aimed at popularizing specific ideas, including the superiority of one "civilization" over another, only confirms this thesis. The political and economic confrontation between these blocs against the background of the struggle for the redistribution of the world quickly led to the exacerbation of contradictions in almost all regions of the world, and especially in Europe. It was here that a symbolic powder keg exploded - a political-diplomatic struggle in the Balkans escalated into an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. The Kaiser of Germany came to the side of the Danube monarchy, and Serbia was supported by the Entente states. The crisis of July 1914, a "cold" phase of the bloc confrontation in early August, went into the "hot" period of a long war, best known as the Great War or the World War I.

The first global armed conflict ended in the defeat of the states of the German bloc. On September 29, 1918, Bulgaria capitulated and concluded a truce with the Entente command. On October 30, Turkey surrendered and signed the Armistice of Mudros. At the time of the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire under pressure from national liberation movements and due to war failures, on November 3, 1918, the Habsburg dynasty signed the terms of the truce. On October 4, 1918, German Chancellor M. Badensky sent the first proposal for a ceasefire to President W. Wilson. The German government proposed a "democratic peace" based on "14 points" by US President W. Wilson. However, the winning states

³¹ Amitav Acharya, Barry Buzan, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

³² René Girault, *Diplomatie européenne : Nations et impérialisme* [European Diplomacy: Nations and Imperialism, 1871-1914], 1871-1914, Paris, Masson/Armand Colin, 1979, 253 p.; Френсис Берти, *За кулисами Антанты. Дневник британского посла в Париже, 1914-1919* [The diary of Lord Bertie of Thame, 1914-1918], Москва, Государственная публичная историческая библиотека России, 2014, 400 с.

demanded the complete surrender of Germany. In November, a revolution began in the country, and the monarchy was overthrown.

The Union Forces of Commander-in-chief Marshall Ferdinand Foch signed the armistice, which ended World War I, in the forest of Compiègne on November 11, 1918. A 36-day Compiègne Armistice resulted, whose main conditions were: evacuation of German troops from Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Alsace and Lorraine within 15 days; occupation by the Entente of the cities of Mainz, Koblenz, Cologne; disarmament and removal to ports of Allied or Neutral States of the entire German Navy; Germany's rejection of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty; the transfer of all German weapons to the victors and the return of prisoners to their homeland³³ was signed by the representatives of the Allies and the German Generality, under the leadership of the Reichstag MP M. Herzberger. It is symbolic that the end of World War was announced at 11 o'clock on the same day by 11 artillery rounds. This is how World War I ended. In all, 38 countries with a population of more than 1 billion people took part in it. The total number of armies reached 70 million. During the war, there were 20 million deaths and 21 million wounded. The total number of deaths includes 9.7 million military personnel and about 10 million civilians. The Entente Powers (also known as the Allies) lost about 5.7 million soldiers while the Central Powers lost about 4 million.³⁴

The World War I of 1914–1918 was characterized by several fundamental features that were visible for hundred years and which witnessed a new major modernization of Westphalia after the Napoleonic wars and the decisions of the Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815. The Great War revolutionized the world on an unprecedented scale, Europe in particular. It led to the explosion of revolutions and revolutionary movements in Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Finland, Ukraine, India, China, and Mexico. One of the results of the Great War was the collapse and demise of four empires - Russian, German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman. The former imperial periphery, or some of its cores, first became a revolutionary mobile segment of the post-war world order (e.g. Finland, Ukraine, Hungary etc.), and then either acquired national and international entities (e.g. Poland, Czech Republic, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes etc.) or became part of other states (Ukraine) or an element of the League of Nations' mandate system (former colonies of the German and Ottoman empires).

³³ *Международная политика новейшего времени в договорах, нотах и декларациях* [International Politics of Modern Time in Agreement, Notes and Declarations], ч. 2, М., 1926, с. 194-197.

³⁴ Nadège Mougel, *World War I casualties*, REPERES, CVCE, 2011, p. 1.

The first global armed conflict confirmed the dominant trend at that time: the change in the international system was only the result of a large-scale war. Given this, the Great War of 1914–1918 was a logical extension of a chain of events: Thirty Years' War – Westphalian System of International Relations – Napoleonic Wars – Vienna International System – World War I – Versailles-Washington international world, but had a different reputation as compared to its predecessors.³⁵ Definitely, the first post-war global international organization, the League of Nations, has assumed the obligation and responsibility of preserving, securing and maintaining world peace, preventing a new global war as a means of resolving conflicts and contradictions of an interstate nature. However, due to the imperfection of the proposed mechanism for the prevention of military conflicts, it failed to achieve its objectives. This eventually led to its elimination after the end of World War II and the creation of a new international UN organization, whose activities today are often criticized for the inconsistency of existing mechanisms for prevention and resolution of global and local conflicts with contemporary realities.

World War I is organically combined, because of the nature of trends in the evolution of the world and the development of international relations, with the interwar twentieth century with its numerous wars, armed conflicts and annexations, and with World War II. It is reasonable to speak not about two world wars, but about a single Thirty Years' world war of the 20th century, which has also covered the years from 1914 to 1945. Despite all the tragedy, the Great War created the conditions for new transformational shifts in almost all spheres of society. At the same time, it has deepened the rifts between the victors and the vanquished and in the camp of the victorious states - the discontent and opposition of the peoples who have only partially or completely failed to realize their state aspirations. In addition, the end of the world war was the beginning of the confrontation with Soviet Russia, and then the USSR, etc., which as a result quickly

³⁵ Colin Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations. An Introduction to the Strategic History*, London and New York, Routledge, 2007, 306 p.; Bear F. Braumoeller, *The Great Powers and the International System: Systemic Theory in Empirical Perspective*, Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press, 2012, 276 p.; Barry Buzan, George Lawson, *The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of International Relations* (Cambridge studies in international relations; 135), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015, 396 p.; Gary Goertz, Paul F. Diehl, Alexandru Balas, *The Puzzle of Peace. The Evolution of Peace in the International System*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2016, 247 p.; Amitav Acharya, Barry Buzan, *The Making of Global International Relations. Origins and Evolution of IR at its Centenary*, Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press, 2019, 383 p.

signalled the instability of the new world order.

In general, the end of the Great War brought the world to a new stage in the development of economic and financial relations, the political and international system. The hundred-year-old Vienna's international system was replaced by the Versailles-Washington international order. Generally, with some modifications, the Westphalian model of the world was still preserved. It was based on the following fundamental laws: 1) the Westphalian world consists of sovereign states and lacks a supreme planetary authority; 2) Westphalia's international order functions to respect the sovereign equality of the states and their non-interference in each other's affairs; 3) in the Westphalian world order, the sovereign state has all the power in its territory; 4) in Westphalia's model framework, international law acts as the law of treaties between sovereign states; 5) in the structure of the Westphalian world, only sovereign states are subjects of international law and recognized international actors.

It became the least lengthy chronological segment of the evolution of international relations and entered the annals of history as an Interwar Period.

The aggravation of the contradictions between the leading states of the interwar period after the global economic crisis, the dissatisfaction of several great powers with the results of World War I (first of all, the USSR, Germany, Italy, Japan), the condemnation of the aggressive policies of Germany, Japan, Italy by the victorious states, the failure of the League of Nations to secure peace and to prevent slipping into another global armed conflict resulted in a struggle for a re-division of the world again. Marshal Ferdinand Foch's prophetic words about the system of treaties that resulted from the consolidation of the victory of the Entente states in World War I were prophetically correct: "This is not a peace, but a truce for twenty years."³⁶

UNSECURE SECURITY: INTERWAR PEACE

The World War II of 1939–1945 became the most significant and most devastating conflict in human history – hostilities took place in the territory of 40 states, and the military expenditures of the participating countries amounted to \$1 trillion 117 billion.³⁷ Among the causes of World War II were the contradictions

³⁶ Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: The Gathering Storm*, Vol. 1. Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948, p. 113.

³⁷ Борис Скрынченко, *Развитие военной экономики в 20-м веке* [The Development of Military Economy in the 20th Century], in "Вестник Московского университета

of the interwar world, embedded in the Versailles-Washington system. These deep contradictions were expressed in the confrontation between the two groups of states plus one: the victorious nations of the First World War, that found themselves in the camp of the losers, and the Soviet Union.

The principles of international politics declared after the end of World War I, first consecrated by the Charter of the League of Nations, have been violated in the next decade. Since the late 1920s, the world community has been following the tactical political steps of Germany and the USSR, designed to conceal their strategic goals: spreading their influence to the rest of the world. It is worth noting that, at the same time, the victorious countries of World War I were not fully aware of the threat to the entire international security system in general of those states.

In late 1933, the Soviet government outlined the basic principles of its foreign policy.³⁸ They provided for compliance of neutrality, non-interference in any military conflicts, a pacification policy towards Germany and Japan (to certain limits) and concrete steps to create a collective security system in Europe under the auspices of the League of Nations.

In November 1933, the USSR received recognition from the United States. Diplomatic relations were established between the two countries. In September 1934, the Soviet Union was accepted into the League of Nations, which created favourable conditions for its integration into international politics. The USSR responded to the proposal made by the French Foreign Minister, L. Barthes, to conclude a collective security system in Europe.³⁹ On May 2, 1935, a Franco-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance in case of aggression was signed in Paris. But even at the formal level, its effectiveness was limited by the absence of a separate military convention. In the same year, the USSR signed a similar treaty with Czechoslovakia, but here, too, a separate article made the USSR's military aid dependent on France's assistance.

Despite the declared "openness" of the USSR, the idea of collective security was not fully realized. The Western powers were wary of the Soviet Union. Strengthening authoritarianism, the personal power of Stalin and the consolidating one-party rule provoked the opposition of traditional Western politicians, some of whom saw Nazi Germany as a bastion against Bolshevism. At that time, ideological

имени С.Ю. Витте", Серия 1, *Экономика и управление*, 2015, № 1 (12), с. 59.

³⁸ *Документы внешней политики СССР* [Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR], Vol. 16, 1 января – 31 декабря 1933 г., М., 1970, pp. 318, 349.

³⁹ "Правда" [Truth], 1934, 28 мая; *Документы внешней политики СССР* [Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR], Vol. 18, 1 января – 31 декабря 1935 г. М., 1973, p. 309-312.

differences between the political regimes of these countries were more evident than their similarities. Therefore, in March 1938, when the USSR initiated an international community conference to devise practical measures to prevent the threat of a new war as an answer to suggestions of Great Britain and France, Britain refused to participate. An explanation was that such measures could lead to the formation of blocs in Europe and undermine the prospects for peace. Instead, the USSR approached Germany and, in March 1938, signed an economic agreement on trade exchange with it⁴⁰ that had devastating consequences for the mass consciousness of the Soviet population, which at the beginning of the German-Soviet War in 1941 could not understand how the ally turned into the main enemy. The mass repression of the 1930s played a negative role for the reputation of the Soviet Union in the eyes of the Western counterparts, which led to concerns about the Red Army's fighting capacity and the reliability of the Soviet regime.

The precariousness of the international security system compelled states to take more decisive steps to prevent the recurrence of the tragedy of 1914-1918. In 1939, the last attempt was made to create a collective security system in Europe. The USSR, after much hesitation, annexed the guarantees of the Western powers to Poland. In April 1939, Great Britain and France proposed to begin trilateral negotiations and invited Germany to establish close relations. Not too far behind was Great Britain, which at the same time negotiated with Hitler in Moscow. In such a situation, in April 1939, negotiations began between Great Britain, France and the USSR.

The Soviet side offered to conclude a tripartite agreement on mutual assistance, including military, in the case of an aggressor's attack on any of the three parties. Western powers have avoided solving this issue, promising to think. It was not possible to sign a separate military convention, and the responsibility for disrupting the negotiations fell on all participants. At the same time, at the end of July 1939, talks between the USSR and Germany were resumed. The Soviet side sought to sign an economic agreement, through the mediation of Germany to resolve the armed conflict with Japan in the Far East, and both sides were also not opposed to a mutually beneficial solution of territorial issues in Europe. On August 19, 1939, a Soviet-German trade agreement was signed, which, in addition to providing credit, expanded the Soviet Union's capabilities in exporting food products and importing new equipment. Also, during the official Soviet-German talks in Moscow, the German side stated that any economic, political, and territorial

⁴⁰ Walter Laqueur, *Russia and Germany. A century of conflict*, Boston, Little, Brown & Company, 1965, p. 174.

interests of the USSR would be satisfied. Representatives of Germany also informed Moscow of plans to launch hostilities against Poland after August 25, 1939. On August 23, 1939, German Foreign Minister J. von Ribbentrop arrived in Moscow with an agreed text of the treaty. It was signed on the night of August 23-24, 1939 and published the next day. The Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression between the USSR and Germany was to regulate relations between the two states for ten years. An essential part of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was the Secret Protocol on the Delimitation of German and Soviet spheres of influence in Eastern Europe.

Contrary to Soviet aspirations, the Treaty of August 23, 1939, did not create a reliable and effective barrier against Hitler's aggression against the Soviet Union. On the contrary, if before 1939–1940 there were several states from the Barents to the Black Sea that acted as a kind of buffer between Germany and the USSR, a confrontation between their armed forces happened on the eve of the German attack on June 22, 1941. In fact, neglecting the security of other countries led to severe and unpredictable consequences: the Soviet army and the Soviet society were utterly unprepared for such events. The latter had colossal losses, both territorial and human, in the first months of the war. The signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact and a secret protocol was one of Stalin's most controversial and ambiguous political steps. However, he considered the agreement a victory because he allegedly managed to outplay Hitler politically. By the way, the Nazi elite considered the deal a great win. Hitler even said that now the whole world was in his pocket. Despite the state importance of the agreement of August 23, 1939, the Soviet Union, answering to the request of the German side and accelerating its ratification, went so far as to reduce the share of this agreement from interstate to intergovernmental documents. On August 31, the Supreme Council of the USSR, and on September 1, the German Reichstag ratified the treaty.

World War II began on September 1, 1939, with Nazi Germany's attack on Poland. According to the "Fall Weiss" (Plan White) plan, approved in early April 1939, Germany threw 62 divisions against Poland, including 7 of tanks and 2,000 aircraft. The Polish army numbered 1 million 750 thousand soldiers and 400 aircraft.⁴¹ On September 6, the Polish government fled Warsaw and, on September 17, it moved to Romania. On September 28, the Nazi captured Warsaw. As British historian B. H. Liddell Hart wrote, "in the East, a hopelessly outdated army was quickly dismembered by tank units operating under the guise of superior aviation

⁴¹ Б. Г. Лиддел Гарт, *Вторая мировая война* [The Second World War], Москва АСТ, СПб.: Terra Fantastica, 1999. с. 37-38.

forces using new methods of warfare."⁴²

On September 17, under the terms of a secret protocol of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, the Soviet troops crossed the border and began advancing through Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. This day became the day of the Soviet Union's entry to World War II. The Polish state virtually ceased to exist (by analogy with the end of the eighteenth century, when the Rzecz Pospolita was liquidated as a result of three divisions, the 1939 September events are famous as the "fourth division of Poland"). The Treaty of Friendship and Borders signed with Germany on September 28, 1939, became a legal consolidation of the Soviet-German borderline, which was formed as a result of the implementation of the secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. During the second half of September-November 1939, the USSR officially legalized the entry of new territories, which were transferred to the Ukrainian and Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republics.

WORLD WAR II AS THE FACTOR OF GEOPOLITICAL CHANGES

World War II began as an invasion. Germany, Italy and Japan sought to expand their territories, to conquer new markets and sources of raw materials. In these circumstances, the USSR tried to subordinate the spheres of influence that the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty of August 23, 1939, provided. Since June 22, 1941 - from the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR - World War II has entered a new phase. The three historical, political, military and diplomatic processes that would be considered central were the following: first, the collapse of the Soviet-German military-political, diplomatic and economic union and the war between Germany and the USSR; second, the creation of an anti-Hitler coalition, the cornerstone of which was the joint action of the countries of the Great Trinity - Great Britain, USSR, USA; third, the war against militaristic Japan and the fighting of anti-Hitler coalition states in the Asia-Pacific region.

The military and political actions of the countries participating in World War II were supported by the widespread use of propaganda aimed at involving the population in support of ideological postulates to win the war.

For more than six years of war, the governments of the belligerent countries have used various means of manipulating collective consciousness, actively engaging visual, textual and audio messages. The development of the film industry, the emergence of colour films and photography had only contributed to the affirmation in the minds of the masses of the enemy's image. For almost 75 years

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 54.

after the end of WW II, the terms "Fascism" and "Nazism" are abusive for most of the population of the world, including the people of the post-Soviet republics.

It should be emphasized that the defeat of Germany and Japan and their satellites were the result of concerted and victorious foreign policy, diplomacy and military interaction of the great powers that were embodied in the decisions of several international conferences, in particular those of Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta, San Francisco, and Potsdam. This played a unique role in creating the foundation for the post-war system of international relations in the world and its peaceful settlement.

International relations were still set up as the system of states, and many of the primary institutions remained in force. By contrast, the Second World War generated several significant changes to the material and ideational structure of global international relations. At the same time, after the end of WW II, changes have occurred in the international arena and in the nature of the evolution of international relations to bipolar in the context of the widespread Cold War. Those changes indicated the further development of the Westphalian world under the influence of political, economic and cultural globalization. The United States and the Soviet Union were the big winners of the Second World War. They functioned as the two dominant centres of military power and ideological competition.

According to leading Western scholars, the Cold War order that emerged quickly in the years after 1945 is commonly summed up by the term "bipolarity", and in some ways, there is a good case for doing so. The United States and the Soviet Union were the big winners of the Second World War. These two states quickly transformed into the two dominant centres of military power and ideological competition. It can be emphasized that the ceasefire lines between them in Europe and Northeast Asia have become the boundaries that defined the new world order. This was an East-West formation defined as a global ideological competition between liberal-democratic capitalism and a totalitarian communist economy. The development of large arsenals of nuclear weapon quickly differentiated these two 'superpowers' from great powers. The traditional set of great powers all faded into the second rank of merely great powers, or even worse. The two superpowers occupied, disarmed and subordinated Germany and Japan. While they quickly recovered economic strength, during the first decades after the war, they mostly lost not only the political will and the international legitimacy but also the political independence from the great powers. The so-called "German problem" was solved by dividing the country between the Soviet and US blocs. Britain was also among the winners and briefly played a role as the third superpower. However, GB's great power status was quickly reduced by its economic weakness and the loss of the empire. Europe fell from the core of world

politics and the balance of power, becoming the main prize in the rivalry between the superpowers. The main focus of the remaining powers in Western Europe has shifted from playing the game of global empires to finding a path for regional integration and keeping the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to protect them. Japan became America's subordinate ally and forward base in the western Pacific.⁴³

There is also a case against using bipolarity. The polarity theory distinguishes only between great powers and the rest; it neglects the distinction between great powers and superpowers, which arguably remains of considerable consequence to how GIS works. Following this thinking, during the Cold War GIS had two superpowers and several great powers: China, the European Community, arguably Japan. The same error was repeated after the implosion of the Soviet Union. Unipolarity was widely declared, but in fact, the structure consisted of one superpower and four great powers. There is a massive structural difference between a system with only superpowers and minor or regional powers and one in which great powers are standing between the superpower(s) and the rest.⁴⁴

However, while bipolarity tells a compelling story, it was not the only story that defined this era. In a long historical perspective, bipolarity may not even be the main story. The key developments were the bipolarity package, the Cold War and nuclear weapons on the one hand, and decolonization on the other. The first of these played a significant role in the core of IR, but the second did not. Decolonization severely affected IR at the periphery. While bipolarity defined two superpowers and their camps, and two rival ideologies for the future of modernity, decolonization defined a Third World, and a position of non-alignment, outside the bipolar structure. Bipolarity mainly tells the story of the core powers, privileging the core and marginalizing the periphery. However, to be honest, since 1945 decolonization changed global international relations: the international society remained the core of the periphery in terms of dominant and subordinate economic positions, but the so-called colonial periphery now had its proper political status and voice. After 1945, the sharp separation between international relations, as happened among the states of the "civilized" core, and the colonial ties, as happened between the metropolitan core and the colonial periphery, collapsed, and these two elements increasingly merged into a single story. The determining factor in the international relations of the second half of the 20th century was the peaceful and armed struggle for independence.

⁴³ Amitav Acharya, Barry Buzan, *op. cit.*, p. 113-114.

⁴⁴ Barry Buzan, *The United States and the Great Powers*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004, 222 p.

Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan aptly remarked, "The Cold War and the decolonization occurred side by side and have crossed each other in a myriad of ways"⁴⁵. Nevertheless, during this period, the periphery remained broadly weak and dependent on the core. During this time, international relations became truly global in the sense that all peoples – or, more accurately, all governments – now participated independently. However, international global ties were still dominated by the West, and the Third World was still weakly placed at the centre-periphery of the global economy.

However, though there were many significant changes, there were changes in the system of international relations, not changes to the system itself. International relations were still set up as a system of states, and many of the primary defining institutions remained in force.

Radical changes in the system of international world order took place only at the end of the twentieth century. Further development of the world community showed the absence of resistance to internal and external challenges within the system itself, which ended with the collapse of the socialist system and the USSR in the late 1980s - early 1990s, drawing a line under the Cold War era. It has also shown the fundamental impact of globalization on all world processes and in such context on the international sphere by the entry of the world into the era of post-Westphalian international relations. New challenges for today's global community and the post-Westphalian world, in particular, are the threats posed by international terrorism, hybrid / unconventional wars, the disruption of the balance of power and the principles of international law globally. The "rethinking of the sovereignty"⁴⁶ as the primary category of classical Westphalia along with its above-noticed characteristics, the essential evolution under the influence of the world wars of the 20th century eventually led to the transformation of the international world order into a modern post-Westphalian world system.

CONCLUSIONS

The end and consequences of the First and Second World Wars resulted in substantial transformations in the international arena. They led to the reformation of the entire field of international relations and laid the foundations first

⁴⁵ Amitav Acharya, Barry Buzan, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

⁴⁶ Trudy Jacobsen, Charles Sampford, Ramesh Thakur (Eds.), *Re-envisioning Sovereignty: The End of Westphalia?*, Hampshire, Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2008, 357 p.

of the Versailles-Washington (1919–1939) and then of the Yalta-Potsdam (1945–1991) systems. Although both armed conflicts led to another modification of the Westphalian order and marked the beginning of its severe erosion, the Westphalian model of the world has generally survived.

At the same time, after the Second World War, several factors testified to the obvious structural and systemic changes in the Westphalian world order. First, the tendency to limit the field of activity of states as leading international actors in the context of the organizational instrumentation of world politics, which began as a result of the First World War, has been preserved and strengthened. An essential place in the international arena is occupied by international organizations of both global and regional nature. First of all, it is about the creation of the UN on October 24, 1945, which for 75 years has remained the main international and organizational instrument in compliance with the principles of international law by all players of world politics, and also, the strengthening of peace. Secondly, the role of integration processes in different regions of the world has increased. For example, European states created in the 1950s three Communities - coal and steel, nuclear energy, and a common market, which has already become the basis for the organizational integration of twelve Western European countries into the European Union in a post-bipolar world order. For the next decades, it expanded and nowadays it became one of the leading international actors in the world.

Even though, after the end of World War II, the new world of international relations was not, for the first time, the result of a major/global armed clash of hostile coalitions of states, changes in the nature and manifestations of international threats and conflicts in the post-bipolar era confirm the relevance of the lessons of the world wars of the twentieth century to minimize the risks and threats in the evolution of modern systems of international relations.

MAIN DYNAMICS OF NAME DISPUTE: NORTHERN MACEDONIA AND GREECE

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Abstract: *Macedonia is a critical region in terms of stability in the Balkans, its territory experienced many conflicts throughout history, some of which have still remained unsolved. For example, the dispute with Greece over the country's name has been a major problem for Macedonia's integration into the international community. This study aims to identify important historical factors in the relations between Greece and the Republic of Northern Macedonia, which have facilitated, inter alia, the settlement of the name dispute and the reasons for finding such solutions in a time of power gap separating the two countries. Undoubtedly, frictions between neighboring states had to be resolved to ensure a stable and secure environment in the Balkans. When resuming the analysis of the historical process, it is clear that despite some progress in the dialogue, no concrete results have been achieved. Lately, by taking decisive action and making some concessions, the governments of the two countries have taken an open position in the negotiations and tried to reduce the tension by concluding certain agreements. In this context, the authors identify six different factors that have facilitated the mediation of these issues between the two countries, trying to explain why this solution could be found today and not at some other time in history.*

Keywords: *Greece, Republic of Northern Macedonia, Name Conflict, Reconciliation, Peace, Integration*

Rezumat: *Principalele dinamici ale disputei pentru denumire: Macedoniei de Nord și Grecia. Macedonia este o regiune critică în ceea ce privește stabilitatea în Balcani, teritoriul său cunoscând de-a lungul istoriei numeroase conflicte, unele dintre acestea rămânând nerezolvate până în prezent. De exemplu, disputa cu Grecia pentru denumirea țării a constituit o problemă semnificativă în procesul de integrare a Macedoniei în comunitatea internațională. Acest studiu își propune să identifice factorii istorici importanți în relațiile dintre Grecia și Republica Macedoniei de Nord, care au facilitat, între altele, lămurirea controverselor privind denumirea, precum și motivele găsirii acestor soluții într-o perioadă de decalaj de putere între cele două țări. Fără îndoială că fricțiunile dintre statele*

vecine trebuiau rezolvate pentru a asigura un mediu stabil și sigur în Balcani. La o reluare a analizei procesului istoric se poate vedea că, în pofida unor progrese în dialog, nu s-a ajuns la rezultate concrete. În ultimul timp, făcând pași decisivi și anumite concesii, guvernele celor două țări au adoptat o poziție deschisă la negocieri și au încercat să diminueze tensiunea prin încheierea unor acorduri. Într-un astfel de context, autorii identifică șase factori diferiți care au facilitat medierea acestor probleme între cele două țări, încercând să explice de ce soluția respectivă ar fi oportună acum și nu într-o altă perioadă din istorie.

INTRODUCTION

As of June 2018, the disputes between Greece and the Republic of Northern Macedonia, which have been among the most critical issues in the Balkans since the end of the Cold War and led to many other problems due to the name dispute, have come close to being solved. The gradual resolution of these conflicts has not only affected the two countries but also made significant contributions to the economic, political, and social life of the Balkans and to the potential peace, which is much sought after in the region. Although decision-makers want to resolve issues quickly, it takes longer for societies to benefit from the outcomes of these efforts. Besides, pressure from supranational organisations such as the European Union (EU) and NATO plays a significant role in resolving problems. The Republic of Northern Macedonia wants to achieve its long-awaited membership in the EU and NATO, while Greece intends to recover from long-standing economic struggles with its concessions.

Since the declaration of the independence of the Republic of Northern Macedonia, Greece has raised several objections. As a result, tensions have increased between the two countries. Throughout the process, successive Greek governments have acted uncompromisingly, by blocking Northern Macedonia's accession to regional organisations and demanding numerous concessions. Throughout the process, the governments of the Republic of Northern Macedonia have traditionally been the weak party. It is worth considering that Greece had not raised issues, particularly the name dispute, with Macedonia when the country was relatively weak but has only sought to solve the problem when it became relatively more robust. This article focuses on the changing attitudes of the two countries and evaluates two main topics. In the first part, the emergence and evolution of the problems between the two countries are discussed. In the second part, we examine why reconciliation is occurring now and not in the past decades with examples.

EMERGENCE OF PROBLEMS

Independence Process of Macedonia

Slovenia and Croatia gained independence from the Yugoslav Federation on June 25, 1991. Meanwhile, Serbia's efforts to dominate the region led by S. Milosevic made the Macedonians fear Serbian rule. Although Macedonians had various concerns about the disintegration of Yugoslavia, they were also influenced by the wave of nationalism that came along with this disintegration. For instance, some leaders, such as the president of the Republic of Macedonia Kiro Gligorov and the president of Bosnia and Herzegovina Alija Izetbegovic, advocated for the preservation of the integrity of Yugoslavia. However, citizens demanded independence. In the previous years, the Republic of Macedonia had been defined in the constitution as the "Republic of Macedonian, Albanian, Turkish, and other ethnic groups." In 1989, it was amended in the revised constitution to be the "Republic of Macedonians and other people and ethnic groups".¹ Subsequently, a referendum for independence was held on September 8, 1991, with voters considering the prospect of a "Sovereign and Independent Macedonia." Albanians boycotted the referendum because they were not given the status of a "constituent nation" and their socio-cultural rights were limited. In total, 71.85% of the eligible voters participated in the referendum, equating to 1,495,625 people, and 95.09% of them voted for independence. Following the referendum, the Skopje administration declared its independence under the name of the "Republic of Macedonia" on September 17, 1991. Furthermore, the constitution, which was adopted on the same date, clearly states that the Republic of Macedonia belongs to the Macedonian nation by highlighting the phrase "founder nation." Other ethnic groups, such as Albanians and Turks, are mentioned as minorities.²

Following the referendum, the Macedonian parliament did not immediately declare independence. It decided to observe the developments and

¹ Tahir Kodal, *Makedonya'nın Bağımsızlığını Kazanması ve Türkiye* [The Macedonia's Achieving its Independence and Turkey], in "Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi" [Journal of Modern Turkish History Studies], 2014, Vol. 17, p. 381.

² Cenk Özgen, *Balkanlarda Güvenliğe Yönelik Bir Tehdit: Yunanistan-Makedonya Anlaşmazlığı* [A Threat to Security in the Balkans: Greece-Macedonia Dispute], in "U.Ü Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi" [U.U Faculty of Arts and Sciences Journal of Social Sciences], 2013, Vol. 25, p. 334–335.

take a realistic and cautious approach. During this period, the parliament realised that Federal Yugoslavia couldn't continue, and declared independence on the date mentioned above, and went forward with the referendum. After the declaration of independence, Kiro Gligorov made a speech in the parliament where he said, Macedonia has followed the developments in Yugoslavia carefully, and after the assessment of the situation, it is seen that there is no other choice but to declare independence. In his speech, he clearly stated that independence was the last resort.³ Unlike other Balkan countries, Macedonia declared independence without a violent struggle. However, a United Nations (UN)-led preventive force (United Nations Preventive Force/UNPREDEP) consisting of American and Scandinavian troops arrived in the region to prevent a possible Yugoslavian attack. Turkey was one of the first countries to recognise Macedonia under its constitutional name.⁴

After independence was declared, the most significant reaction came from Greece. Their objections focused on the name, flag, and national coat of arms of the new country, and Greece referred to Macedonia as the "Republic of Skopje". The Greek government, which did not even want to use the word "Macedonian", decided to call the Macedonians "Skopjans".⁵ This fierce reaction from the Greek government included refusing to recognise its neighbouring country, and alleging that it was violating its security. Greece also pressured other states and the international community not to recognise the Republic of Macedonia. Additionally, the Greek government pursued a policy of economically isolating the Macedonian administration. The Republic of Macedonia, despite its peaceful independence process, suddenly became the centre of a potential Third Balkan War.

Moreover, in the early stages of its foundation, the country had to resist the hostile policies of Greece while dealing with its own economic and political issues. These pressures from Greece prevented Macedonia from being included in the international platform under its constitutional name. Its inclusion in the UN was only possible under the name of the "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" (FYROM) since the Greek government took advantage of its veto power.⁶

³ Kodal, *Makedonya'nın Bağımsızlığını...*, p. 384.

⁴ Nedim Emin, *Makedonya Siyasetini Anlama Kılavuzu* [A Guide to Understanding Macedonian Politics], in SETA Yayınları, İstanbul, 2014, Vol. 43, p. 15.

⁵ Kodal, *Makedonya'nın Bağımsızlığını...*, p. 385.

⁶ Özgen, *Balkanlarda Güvenliğe...*, p. 335.

Historical Process of the Name Dispute

The problems between the two countries began in the sixth century with the arrival of Slavic tribes in the region of Macedonia, which was under Byzantine control at that time.⁷ The term "Macedonia" was used only to refer to a geographic area in the nineteenth century. Also, Macedonians were not considered a separate nation from Greeks, Serbs, Albanians, and Bulgarians. At the 1876 İstanbul Conference and Congress of Berlin, the great powers involved believed that the region is of mixed ethnic composition with Bulgarians being the first, and the Greeks being the second major ethnic groups.⁸ In the following decades, with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the competition began for Macedonia's population and territory, and new Balkan states emerged. The problems continued to grow during the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 and between the two world wars. Competition between the two countries was based on nationalist norms and minority problems in the Balkans—rooted in the fact that none of the newly established states could unite within a territory that included only a single ethnic population. This problem became a vital issue in Macedonia involving various ethnic communities, such as Greeks, Bulgarians, and Slavs, as they objected to the existence of Macedonia.⁹

There was a significant difference between the nationalist perceptions of Greeks, Macedonians, Serbs, and Bulgarians in the territory. Because of these different perceptions and a clash of national ideologies like the Megali idea of a Great Serbia, Great Macedonia, and Greater Bulgaria, there was a constant confrontation among ethnic groups; each looking for a "proper" solution, and finding justification for the promotion of its historical rights. Macedonian people who used the Greek language and were under the influence of Greek culture were claimed to be "Greek" by the Greek side. They were also called the Hellenized population of Macedonia. Hellenism and the Megali Idea, meaning the recreation of the Byzantine Empire, claimed Macedonia as part of Greece based on cultural and historical rights and was the main Greek approach in the Balkans.

⁷ Fotis Mavromatidis, *The Role of the European Union in the Name Dispute between Greece and FYR Macedonia*, in "Journal of Contemporary European Studies", 2010, Vol. 18, No. 1, p. 48.

⁸ Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century*, Vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 91.

⁹ Mavromatidis, *The Role of...*, p. 48.

On the other hand, Serbia also claimed rights to Macedonia based on "Ancient Serbia". According to this view, Vardar Macedonia was a part of the Serbian state, and the re-establishment of Ancient Serbia was the primary demand of Serbian nationalists. Bulgaria was also one of the states to claim rights to Macedonia based on its historical state rights over the country and the Slavic people of Macedonia. Also, they claimed that the Macedonians were speaking the western dialect of the Bulgarian language. Bulgarian interests in Macedonia derived from two historical events: first, the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870 by the Ottomans, and second, the creation of Great Bulgaria in the 1878 St. Stefano Peace Treaty by Russia and the subsequent Russian attempt to incorporate Macedonia into Bulgaria. These two historic events underpinned Bulgarian nationalistic aspirations in Macedonia.¹⁰

The year 1830 was an important date, as it witnessed the establishment of an independent Greek state. News of independence led to widespread repercussions in the Balkans, which were still under Ottoman rule. The Macedonian people under Ottoman rule backed the idea of establishing a free and independent Greek state. Yet almost 120 years later, when Macedonia gained its independence, the Greeks reacted oppositely. When Macedonians demanded recognition for an independent state, Greece replied by violating Macedonian airspace with military aircraft and organising military training in the region. Protests in Greece had an anti-Macedonian character. However, no one in Greece reacted negatively to Croatia and Slovenia when they announced their separation from Yugoslavia.¹¹ Hence, it could be assumed that Greece's reactions were not based on anti-separatist ideas per se, or from concern about the dissolution of its neighbours. In 1992, the Greek government and the Greek diaspora held demonstrations in various cities, including Thessaloniki and Melbourne, under the slogan "Macedonia is Greek."¹²

The problems between Greece and Macedonia can be categorised into three stages. The first stage starts with the establishment of the modern Macedonian state in 1991 and ends with the Interim Accord signed between the two states in 1995. This stage can be described as "great denial". It is characterised by two

¹⁰ Vladislav B. Sotirović, *Macedonia between Greek, Bulgarian, Albanian, and Serbian National Aspirations, 1870-1912*, in "Serbian Studies: Journal of the North American Society for Serbian Studies", Vol. 23, No. 1, 2009, pp. 28-39.

¹¹ Dejan Marolov, *The Relations between Macedonia and Greece in the Context of the Name Issue*, in "Balkan Araştırma Enstitüsü Dergisi", 2013, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 24-25.

¹² Victor Roudometof, *Collective Memory, National Identity and Ethnic Conflict: Greece Bulgaria, and the Macedon Question*, Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT, 2002, p. 31.

economic sanctions against Macedonia, the first in 1992 and the other in 1994. The second stage of the problem emerged after the signing of the 1995 Interim Accord, following the normalisation of bilateral economic and diplomatic relations. During this period, Macedonia struggled to be recognised by the international community with its constitutional name. The chances of peace in the second phase came to an end as Greece possessed veto power in two vital organisations: NATO and the UN. This led to the third and the final stage, the process which continues till the present day.¹³

In a different analysis¹⁴, it is stated that Greece uses three key methods of putting pressure on Macedonia. Firstly, as mentioned above, the economic pressure method was used; secondly, political pressure was applied and thirdly, military methods were employed. To persecute the Macedonian government economically, Greece implemented an economic embargo, which meant keeping Macedonia away from the port of Thessaloniki¹⁵. With this policy, the Greek government hugely impacted the Macedonian economy, which was going through a transition period. Macedonia was deprived of important energy sources, especially oil, through the embargo. However, essential items such as food, medicine, and fuel for hospitals were excluded. Under these circumstances, Macedonian foreign traders were forced to find different access routes through Albania and Bulgaria, and consequently, their costs increased exponentially. Besides, the embargo imposed by the UN on Serbia made the situation in Macedonia even more complicated. These circumstances increased smuggling, and the weak economic situation increased the tensions between ethnic groups and strengthened nationalism in Macedonia. At the same time, the embargo prevented foreign investments. Therefore, it created a vicious cycle that prevented the Macedonian economy from developing.¹⁶ As a result, with the Interim Accord signed in New York on September 13, 1995, through

¹³ Danailov Ljubomir Frčkoski, *The Character of the Name Dispute between Macedonia and Greece*, Progres Institute for Social Democracy, Skopje, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2009, p. 11–13.

¹⁴ Marolov, *The Relations ...*, p. 28.

¹⁵ The Macedonian Prime Minister wrote a letter to the Greek government and stated that they could sign a border guarantee agreement, otherwise they would apply to the UN Security Council. Also the EU has requested they remove the embargo. *8 Eylül 1991 Makedonya'nın Bağımsızlığı* [September 8, 1991 Macedonian Independence], in <https://www.21yyte.org/tr/merkezler/8-eylul-1991-makedonyanin-bagimsizligi> (Accessed on 11.07.2020).

¹⁶ Marolov, *The Relations...*, p. 28.

the mediation of the United States (US) and the UN, Greece lifted the embargo on Macedonia.¹⁷

In addition to economic pressure, Greece's political pressure was incredibly strong. This pressure stemmed firstly from Greece's EU and NATO membership and secondly from the strong Greek lobby abroad. Macedonia faced political pressure when it applied for recognition under its constitutional name. The Greek state explicitly stipulated that Macedonia should change its legal name to gain recognition. Using its EU membership, despite the opinion of the Badinter Commission, Greece managed to determine the EU's position on this issue. Thus, the Lisbon summit clearly stated that Macedonia would not be recognised as long as the word "Macedonia" was mentioned in its constitutional name. Greece also ensured that it did not become a member of the UN under its constitutional name. As a result, the country became a member of the UN under the name "The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" (FYROM).¹⁸

In the end, Greece used military-psychological techniques by way of threat and repression. As stated earlier, the demonstration of Greece's military power was achieved through repeated military exercises at the Macedonian border and the occupation of Macedonia's airspace in the early 1990s. Greece has never used direct military force against the Republic of Macedonia, but it has used displays of military power as a means of intimidation.¹⁹

The Greek side claimed that Macedonia did not represent a unified whole, and it remained only a geographical name, not representing the population living there. Greece based its claims on the thesis that Alexander the Great and all Macedonians were Greek. According to the Greek point of view, the territory was a part of modern Greece as it was a part of ancient Greece, not only geographically but also in ethnic, linguistic, and cultural terms. Hence, only the Greeks have the right to identify themselves as Macedonians. Greek nationalists went even further and said, "Everything about Macedonia is Greek except its people, who are the people of Skopje [Skopians]". According to these allegations, the establishment of the Republic of Macedonia resulted in Greece experiencing problems with

¹⁷ Fatih Fuat Tuncer, Burcu Demir, *Makedonya'dan Kuzey Makedonya'ya: Bir Ulus Devletin Dönüşümü Üzerine Sosyal İnşacı Bir Analiz* [From Macedonia to North Macedonia: Social Constructivist Analysis of The Nation-State's Transformation], in "OPUS Uluslararası Toplum Araştırmaları Dergisi" [International Journal of Society Researches], 2020, Vol. 15, p. 5352.

¹⁸ Marolov, *The Relations...*, p. 28.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

"three S's": *sintayma* (constitution), *simvola* (symbols), and *simaia* (flag). Greek opponents also claimed that the "so-called Macedonians" stole Greek national values and claimed possession of Greek lands by using the Macedonian name in their constitution, using a drawing of the Tower of Thessaloniki on their money, and using the Greek symbol of the 16-ray Vergina on their flag.²⁰

Greece rejected not only Macedonia's name, flag, and constitution, but also the existence of the Macedonian nation as a whole. This is because of the Greek belief that the groups that call themselves Macedonian are the Greek-speaking "Slavophone Greeks" who belong to Greek history.²¹ The Greeks see them and their history as part of the Greek sphere of influence because of their historical affinity, relations, and ties with the ancient Macedonians. Thus, Greek historiography considers Macedonian historiographers, in laying claim to the ancient Macedonians, as occupiers or thieves.²²

From the perspective of the Macedonian government, the objections of Greece constituted an unacceptable situation. Macedonia tried to prove to the international community and Greece that it had no revisionist purpose and amended some of the articles in its constitution. The basic argument is that each country has the right to choose its name, and similar issues are experienced in other places and do not lead to regional threats.²³ They also argued that, contrary to Greek claims, they had their history and culture, and that their relations with the Greeks had been that of neighbours rather than sharing the same ancestors. However, due to both the disadvantage of being a newly established country and the problems experienced on a regional and global basis, they could not make their voices heard as much as the Greeks and could not effectively express their claims.²⁴

²⁰ Özgen, *Balkanlarda Güvenliğe...*, p. 336–337.

²¹ Şule Kut, *Balkanlarda Kimlik ve Egemenlik* [Identity and Sovereignty in the Balkans], İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005, p. 129.

²² Mehmet Hacısalıhoğlu, *Makedonya Güncel Tarih Kitaplarında Balkan Savaşları* [Balkan Wars in Macedonia's Current History Books], Uluslararası Balkan Sempozyumu: Balkan Savaşlarının 100. yılı, 2012, p. 174.

²³ Mavromatidis, *The Role of the European Union...*, p. 49.

²⁴ Yunus Çolak, *Makedonya'nın İsim Sorunu: Sebepleri ve Türkiye'nin Balkanlar Politikasına Olan Etkileri Bakımından Bir İnceleme* [Name Problem of Macedonia: Causes And Influence On Turkey's Balkan Policy], in "Hoca Ahmet Yesevi Yılı Anısına Uluslararası Türk Dünyası Eğitim Bilimleri ve Sosyal Bilimler Kongresi" [International Turkic World Educational Sciences and Social Sciences Congress, held in memory of Hodja Ahmet Yesevi year 2016], 2016, p. 233.

Two crucial factors lie at the heart of the problems between the two countries: historical symbols and figures; and Greece's policy on minorities in the country. Greek historiography accepted Alexander the Great and, to a certain extent, the Macedonian state founded before Christ as part of the history of the Greek nation-state.²⁵ The Republic of Macedonia objected to the claim that Greek historiography possessed Alexander the Great and that Macedonianism was a part of Greek culture and belonged to it. In addition to their opposition, Macedonians stated that the original Macedonian nation came from Slavic roots and never spoke Greek.²⁶ Another important point that should be emphasised is the confusion over what serves as a legitimate basis for claims in the region. As nationalism theory argues, community members have the right to live where they first appeared and to expect other groups to respect that right. However, this is also a problem in the Balkans in general, because all community members claim that they were there first. When looking at the claim between Greece and Macedonia, it is not easy to say which one was there first. The demands of both sides' are another aspect that further confuses the issue.²⁷

Greece's policy toward minorities living in the country is another factor that needs attention. The Greek government mostly perceived these minorities as a security problem, being concerned that minorities would identify themselves primarily with the states they regarded as their homelands. The importance of this issue can be better understood when the existence of the Macedonian minority in northern Greece is taken into consideration. Greece does not regard this minority in a positive light and suspects that they want to unite with Macedonia in the future, which inevitably leads to its refusal of the Macedonian nation as they are concerned about losing territory to this reunited Macedonian country. Also, the adoption of a constitution that was open to expansion after Macedonia gained independence alarmed Greece and turned the existing issues into more significant problems.²⁸

²⁵ Çolak, *Makedonya'nın İsim...*, p. 234.

²⁶ Halis Ayhan, *Makedonya ile Yunanistan Arasındaki İsim Sorununun Çözümünde Arabuluculuğun Etkisi* [Effect of Mediation for Resolution of Name Dispute between Macedonia and Greece], in "Kırıkkale Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi" [Kırıkkale University Journal of Social Sciences], 2019, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 227.

²⁷ Gül Tuğba Dağcı, Asiye Şimşek, *Makedonya ile Yunanistan Arasındaki 'İsim Sorunu'nda Rol Oynayan Temel Parametrelerin Analizi* [The Analysis of the Basic Parameters that Have Role in the Name Issue between Macedonia and Greece], in "Yalova Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi", 2014, Vol. 10, p. 181-182.

²⁸ Çolak, *Makedonya'nın İsim...*, p. 234.

FACTORS FACILITATING RECONCILIATION

With the agreement signed by the foreign ministers of the two countries on June 17, 2018, in the Greek village of Psarades on the border with Macedonia, the name dispute, which had continued since 1991, came to a partial end. Both sides reached this compromise in different ways. Greece accepted the retention of the word "Macedonian" in the name of the newer state, which it had objected to from its foundation. Before this agreement was reached, Greece had consistently applied pressure, including embargoes and isolation, sought legal remedies, and offered incentives. For example, it imposed an embargo by denying Macedonia transit to the sea. Greece has always opposed Macedonia's constitutional representation in both international conjecture and sports competitions. As an example of an incentive, the Greek foreign minister Dora Bakoyani proposed that if Skopje accepted a new name that did not contain the word "Macedonia," he would offer 75m euros in aid for the construction of a highway across Macedonia. Noting that Greece was in an economic downturn at the time, this offer should highlight the importance of the name dispute for the Greek government.²⁹

Greece has been using legal remedies and propaganda effectively. On the official page of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greece published an explanation of the name dispute in English with its arguments, thus bringing the issue to a broader audience, and listing Macedonia's infringements of law (from the Interim Accord).³⁰ Macedonia, on the other hand, usually remained on the defensive. The main reason for this was its inability to determine its name or flag because of the pressure coming from the Greek government and the international community. On the other hand, the official page of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Northern Macedonia contains the Prespa Agreement and several other informative documents. However, these are comparatively insufficient to the Greek efforts.³¹

It has already been mentioned that Macedonia is a member of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the UN under the name of the "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia." However, the UN Security Council decided that

²⁹ *Yunanistan'ın İsim İnadı* [Name Stubbornness of Greece], in www.batitrakya.org/yazar/ayhan-demir/yunanistanin-isim-inadi.html (Accessed on 03.14.2019).

³⁰ *The Issue of the Name of North Macedonia*, in www.mfa.gr/en/the-question-of-the-name-of-the-republic-of-north (Accessed on 03.14.2019).

³¹ *Prespa Agreement – Media Guidelines*, in <https://www.mfa.gov.mk/en/page/8/post/1695/prespa-agreement-media-guidelines> (Accessed on 03.14.2019).

this name was temporary. For this reason, it was agreed that the first task would be to determine the permanent name during the negotiations to be held. It should also be noted that the UN has played a mediating role in resolving this dispute. Matthew Nimetz has served as a special representative of the UN Secretary-General. With the agreement signed on June 17, a "carrot-stick approach" was used in addition to mediation and soft power. The role of supranational organisations such as the UN, EU, and NATO, as well as those involved in the process as an individual state, such as the US, has contributed significantly to resolving the problem.³²

Governments' Attempts

Left-wing governments in both countries expressed their commitment to finding a solution to the problem in 2018. Political will, in favour of a solution, always plays a significant role in problem-solving. Between 2006 and 2017, the nationalist Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-National Democratic Union of Macedonia (VMRO-DPMNE), which was the primary partner in Macedonian coalition governments, was at the heart of Macedonian nationalism.³³ The party's nationalist rhetoric aimed at the neighbouring countries that did not recognise the national identity of the Macedonians and that of the Albanian minority dissatisfied with their position, gathered around a common ideology. This discourse focused on two fronts, found a positive response in Slav-Orthodox society. VMRO-DPMNE, as one of the partners in the government, was around the negotiating table with Athens because it supported Euro-Atlantic integration, but was very reluctant to change the country's name. The Greek side was disturbed by the fact that it continued to emphasise Macedonian identity and also continued to advocate for Macedonian identity through major architectural projects such as "Skopje 2014." As part of this project, Nikola Gruevski, the prime minister and VMRO-DPMNE leader, placed sculptures of important Macedonian figures at central points in Skopje, in a move that was more about making Macedonian identity more visible in this cosmopolitan city than it was about giving the city a monumental appearance.³⁴ In contrast to the Interim Accord of 1995, the

³² Ayhan, *Makedonya ile...*, p. 228.

³³ Çiğdem Aydın Koyuncu, Samet Yılmaz, *Makedonya'daki İstikrarın Sürdürülebilirliğinin Ohrid Çerçeve Anlaşması Bağlamında Analizi*[Analysis of the Sustainability of Stability in Macedonia in terms of the Ohrid Framework Agreement], in "International Journal of Social Inquiry", 2018, Vol. 11, Issue 1, p. 171.

³⁴ *Tarihten Günümüze Makedon Milli Birliği Demokratik Partisi: VMRO DPMNE*[From

Macedonian side's objections to Greece's obstruction of Macedonia's membership of NATO and the EU were not enough to change the Greek side's decision or to convince the international community.³⁵

On the other hand, the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) severely criticised the VMRO-DPMNE rule. SDSM, which received support from different parts of the country, especially Albanians, achieved a great victory in the 2017 local elections. VMRO-DPMNE suffered a major defeat in the face of the success of the SDSM.³⁶ Zoran Zaev, the prime minister of the SDSM government, regarded the solution of the name dispute as a priority and proved that his intention was an actual solution to the problem. As a sign of his sincerity, Zaev changed the ancient Macedonian names given to the airports, highways, and stadiums in Skopje by the previous government. This type of goodwill demonstration did not remain unnoticed by the EU and the US and received intense support. The Western world encouraged the resumption of negotiations between the two countries, which were suspended for various reasons.³⁷ This encouragement gave Zaev a unique opportunity. Zaev believed that these problems that had lasted for years harmed the country's integration with the EU and NATO and led to the impoverishment of the country due to economic and political embargoes. Therefore, he attempted to solve problems with all neighbours. The negotiations accelerated and ended after Zaev came to power.³⁸

On the Greek side, Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras could not remain indifferent to these demonstrations of goodwill and stated that resolving the problem was among his priorities. Tsipras said that as a result of prolonged negotiations, the two countries had reached an agreement on resolving the name dispute.³⁹ At this point, it should be noted that this agreement initiative does not

History to Present: VMRO DPMNE], in www.academia.edu/31999876/Tarihten_G%C3%BCn%C3%BCm%C3%BCze_Makedon_Milli_Birli%C4%9Fi_Demokratik_Partisi_VMRO_DPMNE (Accessed on 03.14.2019).

³⁵ Mehmet Uğur Ekinci, *Makedonya İsim Sorunu Çözülüyor (mu?)* [(Is) Macedonia Resolving the Name Problem?], in "SETA Perspektif", 2018, Vol. 204, p. 2.

³⁶ Sevba Abdula, *Makedonya'da Yerel Seçimler ve Siyasal Değişim* [Local Elections and Political Change in Macedonia], in "SETA Perspektif", 2017, Vol. 183, p. 2.

³⁷ Ekinci, *Makedonya İsim...*, p. 3.

³⁸ Ayhan, *Makedonya ile...*, p. 231.

³⁹ *Macedonia Agrees To New Name after 27-Year Dispute with Greece*, in <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/12/macedonia-agrees-to-new->

only eliminate a problem for Greece with its neighbours; more than that, if the problem was solved in accordance with the Greek thesis, Tsipras would increase his prestige both in domestic and foreign policy. The Greek side's red line in the negotiations that began in January 2018 was that the new name would not cover the historical Macedonian geography and that it would be used only after the agreement was valid. Thus, Greece expressed its opinion that the new name should be a unified name in the form of "Northern Macedonia" or "New Macedonia."⁴⁰

EU and NATO Embargo

The ongoing problems with Greece were the major obstacle to Macedonia's accession to the EU and NATO. A large number of Macedonians have now agreed to a name change, believing that this removes a major barrier in the path to EU membership. From the EU's perspective, Macedonia's membership is of great importance for the stability of the region. Having made its first application on February 26, 2004, FYROM received a positive opinion from the European Commission on November 9, 2005. Subsequently, six times – in 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014 – the EU Commission gave a positive opinion on the accession negotiations.⁴¹ However, each time Greece used its veto in the Committee of Permanent Representatives. The desire of Macedonia to resolve the existing problems and to become a full member of the Union is another factor facilitating the resolution of the problem.

Joining NATO is another stage of participation in international organisations. As Macedonia wanted to resolve the disputes with Greece by the Interim Accord, the government of Macedonia also wanted to open its way to NATO membership and wanted to eliminate the problem permanently. After The Accession Protocol was signed in February 2019, a meeting was held on March 19, 2019, between Prime Minister Zoran Zaev and NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg. This meeting is regarded as a historic moment for both NATO and Northern Macedonia, emphasising the importance of their relations. Stoltenberg also expressed his satisfaction with the agreement saying, "You have shown how

name-after-27-year-dispute-with-greece (Accessed on 03.14.2019).

⁴⁰ Ekinci, *Makedonya İsim...*, p.3.

⁴¹ *The Republic of North Macedonia: Current Situation, 2005—EU Candidate Status*, in <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/enlargement/republic-north-macedonia/> (Accessed on 03.20.2019).

courageous you are by working in partnership with Athens."⁴²

The Impact of Russia and Turkey

Turkey and Russia's more active role in the Balkans as they seek to increase their influence in the region have disturbed both NATO and the EU. The most obvious example of this was an article published in the British magazine *The Economist* in May 2017, which emphasised that "NATO should be concerned about Turkey and Russia's friendship."⁴³ Russia, on the other hand, doesn't want to lose a region that is under its political and historical influence. At every opportunity, it tries to prevent the countries of the region from joining international institutions. The latest example of this was Montenegro's integration into NATO. In a statement, US Vice President Mike Pence stated that Russia had deliberately tried to halt Montenegro's integration into NATO, but had failed to do so. Also, Russia aims to stabilise the Balkans while at the same time pushing the countries in the region away from the Euro-Atlantic alliance.⁴⁴

According to Turkey, Balkan issues were shaped under the influence of a sense of Ottoman heritage. In the context of its changing foreign policy attitudes, Turkey began to take an active role that contrasted with its previous passive-onlooker status. It sought to be active at the regional level—militarily, by taking up a position in NATO; and culturally and politically, through the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), Turkish Maarif Foundation, and the Yunus Emre Institute. The European countries perceived these efforts as a concerted attempt on Turkey's part to appeal to the Balkans, as demonstrated by a speech given by Emmanuel Macron at the European Parliament: "We need to be pragmatic and make sure they [the Balkans] are brought closer to Europe and do not drift away to Russia or Turkey or simply collapse."⁴⁵ In his speech, Macron warned about the

⁴² *NATO Secretary General Welcomes the Prime Minister Zoran Zaev of North Macedonia*, in www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_164671.htm (Accessed on 03.20.2019).

⁴³ *Turkey and Russia Cosy Up over Missiles*, in www.economist.com/europe/2017/05/04/turkey-and-russia-cosy-up-over-missiles (Accessed on 03.25.2019).

⁴⁴ *Rusya AB-NATO İttifakı Karşısında Karadağ'ı Kaybetti* [Russia Loses Montenegro Across EU-NATO Alliance], in <https://ankasam.org/rusya-ab-nato-ittifaki-karsisinda-karadagi-kaybetti/> (Accessed on 03.25.2019).

⁴⁵ *Emmanuel Macron to EU Parliament: "We Need a European Sovereignty"*, in www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/news/emmanuel-macron-eu-parliament-we-need-european-sovereignty (Accessed on 08.19.2019).

need to avoid Russian and Turkish influence in the Balkans. The reason that NATO and, indirectly, the EU is so interested in the issue is that unstable Balkan geography threatens the whole of Europe.

The Process of Win-Win Policy

This conflict has triggered many other problems, large and small, emerged in 1991 and continued in various ways for roughly 28 years. As a result, Macedonia has had to live with a disputed name and endure numerous troubles. In a statement issued in 2018, Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Northern Macedonia Bujar Osmani stated that both countries were tired due to the long-standing problem.⁴⁶

Another factor that facilitated the solution of the problem is the gains that both parties stood to make from this agreement. The Macedonian side sees the retention of the Word "Macedonia" in the country's name as an achievement, even though "Northern" is added. The Greek side views the addition of the word "Northern" as a gain thinking that it will lead to the disappearance of the claim over the entire Macedonian geography. Furthermore, Article 14/4 the "economic cooperation" section of the agreement-guarantees cooperation on issues such as the construction and development of oil and gas pipelines between the two countries.⁴⁷ This is also a joint gain for the two countries.

These two countries are considered to be an alternative route for transporting natural gas from the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe. One of the objectives of the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), which is a donor of the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe (CDRSEE), is to create a regional energy market in southeast Europe. In this context, one of the reasons that the problems between Greece and Macedonia needed to be solved urgently was the establishment of this institution as soon as possible.⁴⁸

EU and NATO Enlargement

The continuation of the NATO enlargement process seems vital to the US

⁴⁶ *UN Envoy: "Positive Momentum" in Macedonia Name Dispute*, in www.rferl.org/a/macedonia-un-envoy-positive-momentum-greece-name-dispute/28977137.html (Accessed on 03.25.2019).

⁴⁷ *The Full Text of the Greece-FYROM Agreement*, in www.thenationalherald.com/204203/the-full-text-of-greece-fyrom-agreement-pdf (Accessed on 08.29.2019).

⁴⁸ Ayhan, *Makedonya ile...*, p.233.

and its allies. During the Bush-era, the desire to extend the membership to Albania, Macedonia, Croatia, Ukraine, and Georgia was at its peak. Still, Macedonia could not be included in the alliance due to the veto of Greece, which is one of the long-standing members of the organisation. Thus, the enlargement process was interrupted.⁴⁹ One of the reasons that made NATO's enlargement process so important was the idea of sharing the budget burden by diffusing the organisation's budget from the US to other states. Also, extending the common stance against Russia was another reason. Besides, US President Bush's pressure on Greece -during the NATO Bucharest Summit (2008)- to lift its veto and stop preventing the enlargement process was an indication of the importance of a resolution.⁵⁰

For the EU, the process of resolving the problem between Greece and Macedonia must be read together with the enlargement policy toward the Western Balkans, which had been postponed due to the immigration crisis but has recently been revived. Similar to NATO, the EU, which aims to keep Russian activity in the region at a limited level, attach importance to the inclusion of Macedonia in the Union. The fact that China has become active in the region is a further reason that the EU has turned its face to the Western Balkans. The fact that Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, has stated that the Balkans could easily be transformed into a chessboard on which the great powers of the world are players, shows the importance attributed to this issue.⁵¹

CONCLUSIONS

From the Greek perspective, the name dispute meant the usurping of its cultural and historical heritage by Macedonia. Macedonia's approach to the

⁴⁹ Şener Aktürk, *NATO Neden Genişledi? Uluslararası İlişkiler Kuramları Işığında NATO'nun Genişlemesi ve ABD-Rusya İç Siyaseti* [Explaining NATO Enlargement: International Relations Theories and the Dynamics of Domestic Politics in Russia and the United States], in "Uluslararası İlişkiler" [International Relations], 2012, Vol. 9, No. 34, p. 91.

⁵⁰ Bush: "NATO tüm Balkanlar'a açık" [Bush: NATO is open to all the Balkans], in www.cnnturk.com/2008/dunya/04/05/bush.nato.tum.balkanlara.acik/445425.0/index.html (Accessed on 08.26.2019)

⁵¹ *İsim sorununu çözen Makedonya NATO ve AB üyeliği yolunda* [Macedonia, which solves the name problem, is on the way NATO and EU membership], in <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/isim-sorununu-cozen-makedonya-nato-ve-ab-uyeligi-yolunda/1377634> (Accessed on 08.26.2019)

problem; on the other hand, was that as a sovereign country, it had the right to determine its name. The origins of the problem go back to the independence process, and the current problems not only affect the relations between the two countries but are transmitted to international organisations such as the EU and NATO, and result in the involvement of different decision-makers in the region. Historically, the two countries followed different approaches at different times. When Greece was weaker, it created barriers to solving the problems between the two countries. In a period when it was relatively more robust, Greece stated that the problems should be ended and that rapport between the two countries should prevail in the region. The research question of the study focused on this contradiction, and the aim was to find out why the governments of the two countries pursued different policies in different periods.

Since the end of the Cold War, particularly on the name dispute, the leaders of the two sides have worked hard to solve the problems that have continued between the two countries. Since the name agreement came into force, the name of the country of Macedonia has changed to the Republic of Northern Macedonia, and one of the problems between the two sovereign countries has been resolved. However, although an apparent agreement was reached, neither the Macedonian people nor the Greek people were fully satisfied with this agreement. Nevertheless, it is true that even though the societies are not fully satisfied, the elimination of the problem appears to be closer than ever. And it is clear that both countries will benefit from the resolution of the problems. Macedonia's accession to the EU is closer than ever. Also, the country became the 30th member of NATO on March 27, 2020. Hence, the agreement helped to overcome years of instability and uncertainties in the enlargement of the Euro-Atlantic front towards the Balkans.

AN UNWILLING COMMITMENT: TRUMP'S FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

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Abstract: *Since his surprising election as president of the United States, in November 2016, Donald Trump's foreign policy sent shockwaves around the world, especially in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) where America's traditional allies felt uneasy about the "America First" strategy. Nevertheless, in spite of a nationalist president who has questioned America's leadership role in global affairs and his country's commitment to the protection of allies, the security cooperation between the United States and the CEE countries increased in the first three years of the Trump administration. The paper explains this continuity on the base of the American alternative foreign policy mindsets in the decision-making process. It is arguing that despite the president's opinions, those administration members who share a common, traditional understanding of American primacy in the world provided the continuity in American foreign policy in the CEE region by advocating for power competition against Russia. Therefore, the article shows that an individual-level analysis is more appropriate for understanding American foreign policy today than a state- and a system-level analyses.*

Keywords: *Donald Trump, American foreign policy, Central and Eastern Europe, individual-level analysis, nationalism, traditionalism, organizational balancing.*

Rezumat: *Un angajament forțat: strategia de politică externă a lui Trump în Europa Centrală și de Est. De la alegerea surprinzătoare a lui Donald Trump în funcția de președinte al Statelor Unite, în noiembrie 2016, politica externă a acestuia a trimis unde de șoc în întreaga lume, în special în Europa Centrală și de Est (CEE), neliniștindu-i pe aliații tradiționali ai Americii în legătură cu strategia "America First" („Întâi, America”). Cu toate acestea, în ciuda unui președinte naționalist care a pus sub semnul întrebării rolul de lider al Americii în afacerile globale și angajamentul țării sale cu privire la protecția aliaților, cooperarea Statelor Unite cu țările CEE în materie de securitate s-a intensificat în primii trei ani ai administrației Trump. Articolul explică această continuitate pe baza modului alternativ de a gândi politica externă americană în procesul de luare a deciziilor. Se susține că, în pofida opiniilor președintelui, acei membri ai administrației care împărtășesc o*

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înțelegere comună și tradițională a primatului american în lume au asigurat continuitate politicii externe americane în regiunea CEE, pledând pentru contrabalansarea puterii Rusiei. Prin urmare, articolul arată că o analiză la nivel individual este astăzi mai potrivită pentru înțelegerea politicii externe americane decât analizele la nivel de stat și de sistem.

INTRODUCTION

Since his surprising election as the forty-fifth American president in November 2016, Donald Trump has sent shockwaves around the world with his untraditional foreign policy choices. Examples abound in this regard. His decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital and the Golan Heights as Israeli territory, the justification of the Israeli right to keep settlements in the occupied territories, and the administration's pro-Israeli peace plan from January 2020¹ fundamentally changed the traditional American policy on the Palestinian question. Meanwhile, the president's "madman" strategy of challenging nuclear-aspiring powers with military threats² raised nerves in the international arena as the president's "rocket-man" speech to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un or his order to assassinate Iranian military leader Qasem Suleimani increased the rumours of a nuclear exchange between the United States and these countries. Last but not least, Trump's negligence of the traditional alliance relations of the United States³ and his positive approach to authoritarian leaders, most especially Vladimir Putin, led other countries to question American commitments and leadership in the international system.

¹ For the peace plan, see *Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People*, in <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Peace-to-Prosperity-0120.pdf> (Accessed on 02.03.2020).

² Nikki Haley, the former U.S. ambassador in the United Nations, reported that Trump asked her to make Chinese negotiators think that he is crazy and he can take any measures, including military ones if the Chinese government does not help the United States to solve the North Korean problem. Nikki R. Haley, *With All Due Respect: Defending America with Grit and Grace*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 2019, e-book edition.

³ In a Pentagon meeting that aimed to draw the president to the traditional preferences of the foreign policy establishment, Trump defined the U.S.-led alliance system as "one big monster created over several years" and believed that the economic costs to keep the alliance relations was unfair to the American people. Guy M. Snodgrass, *Holding the Line: Inside Trump's Pentagon with Secretary Mattis*, New York, Sentinel, 2019, e-book edition.

One of the consequences of Donald Trump's untraditional grand strategy was the loss of confidence in American leadership. A Pew Research Center report released in January 2020 shows that several considerable policies of the Trump administration (including U.S. withdrawal of climate change agreements, immigration policies, mercantilist policies that increase tariffs and fees on imported goods, etc.) were quite unpopular around the world. As a result, the confidence in American leadership during the Trump administration significantly dropped in some countries, including major U.S. allies such as Germany, France, and Canada. On the question as to which leader could be trusted to do the right thing in world affairs, Trump also remained behind Angela Merkel, Emmanuel Macron, and even Vladimir Putin and barely passed the Chinese leader Xi Jinping.⁴ These findings are in parallel to the views of those who speak of the Trump administration's abdication of global leadership in world affairs.⁵ Nevertheless, the report also shows that although the confidence towards the United States is low among some key allies, Washington still receives positive reviews in several Central and Eastern European (CEE) nations as 79% of Poles, 70% of Lithuanians, 66 % of Hungarians and 73% of Ukrainians have a favourable opinion of the United States. Besides, in Poland (51/39) and Ukraine (44/37), those who have confidence in Donald Trump are more than those who have not.⁶

Why do CEE nations continue to have confidence in the American global leadership despite an untraditional president who openly questions the value of alliances and has promised to change the way the traditional elements in the U.S. decision-making system conduct foreign policy? Without neglecting the value of systemic realist explanations (if the Russian political and military influence represents the main threat, and the European Union does not offer strong security guarantees, then the alliance with the United States remains the sole option for the CEE governments), I argue that, in the last three years, the individual-level variables in the United States played an important role in the close relations between the two sides. Indeed, the nationalist feature of the president's "America First" strategy could have a terrifying outcome on the security of the CEE

⁴ Richard Wike et al., *Trump Ratings Remain Low Around Globe, While Views of U.S. Stay Mostly Favorable*, in <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/01/08/trump-ratings-remain-low-around-globe-while-views-of-u-s-stay-mostly-favorable/> (Accessed on 02.03.2020), p. 6-14.

⁵ For example, see Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay, *The Empty Throne: America's Abdication of Global Leadership*, New York, Public Affairs, 2018, e-book edition.

⁶ Richard Wike et al., *Trump Ratings Remain Low Around Globe*, pp. 11, 14.

countries. Yet, I argue, over time traditional elements in the American foreign policy decision-making system balanced the “America First” strategy and policy choices took the shape of “business as usual” in the CEE region.⁷ With the lack of strong opposition within the Trump administration against this policy continuity in the CEE, we observe increasing levels of cooperation between the United States and regional governments. As the American president was unwilling to criticize the countries on the grounds of democracy and human rights, and security cooperation was not interrupted, the CEE governments did not have much reason to be terrified of an untraditional American president. In fact, Trump may be the ideal president that they would prefer to see in the White House.

The article will continue as follows: First, I will explain the main characteristics of Trump’s “America First” strategy and how it presented risks for the security of the CEE countries at the beginning. Then I will outline the actual developments on the ground to point out the continuity of cooperation between the United States and the CEE countries during the Trump administration. To explain the inconsistency between Trump’s rhetoric and actual relations, I will analyse the views of some traditionalist members within the administration. The final section will conclude the findings and present a picture for the future of American policies in the area.

“AMERICA FIRST”: LIBERAL LEADERSHIP OUT, AMERICAN NATIONALISM IN

When Donald Trump announced his bid for the presidential race, most people believed that it was mainly a PR campaign that the business tycoon and television personality did to increase his fame rather than entering the Oval Office.⁸ Trump’s candidacy did not hit the headlines at the beginning not only because he was quite inexperienced in politics but also his lifestyle and former political behaviours challenged the conservative values of the Republican Party

⁷ G. Murphy Donovan, *National Security in the Trump Era: Business as Usual?*, in <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/national-security-in-the-trump-era-business-as-usual> (Accessed on 02.03.2020).

⁸ Michael Wolff points out that in the pre-election campaign Trump himself was talking about being “the most famous man in the world,” but not being the president. Michael Wolff, *Fire and Fury: Inside the Trump White House*, New York, Henry Holt and Company, 2018, e-book edition.

and its voters.⁹ Yet, Donald Trump surprisingly won first the Republican Party primary and then the presidential race as he followed a unique strategy by refusing to follow the rules of traditional forces in American politics and giving a voice to the regular people. Steve Bannon, Trump's main adviser for the elections, told him that Hillary Clinton was "the tribune of a corrupt and incompetent status quo of elites" and if Trump wanted to defeat her against all odds he would have to be "the tribune of the forgotten man who wants to make America great again."¹⁰

Trump's election motto, "Make America Great Again," found its foreign policy equivalent in another term "America First." For a long time, the American public has not been content with the grand strategy of liberal hegemony that the traditional political elite followed ambitiously since the beginning of the Cold War. As Walt argues, although Americans generally rejected isolationism, they did not favor "costly, ambitious and burdensome foreign policy" which relies on a global leadership role for the United States. The majority of Americans believed that the United States should not play the role of "world policeman" while arguing that their country was doing "too much" in global affairs. Indeed, many Americans want their leadership to focus on domestic problems instead of foreign policy. Traditional foreign policy elites told them that liberal hegemony was "necessary, feasible, and affordable,"¹¹ but Trump organized his election campaign and then presidency with an opposing message.

In fact, Trump has opposed liberal leadership and its traditional alliance ties since his first public foreign policy message published in three major U.S. newspapers in 1987. In this message, Trump urged the political leadership to stop

⁹ For example, Trump's multiple marriages, little knowledge about the Bible and pro-choice position were hard to accept for the white conservative evangelicals, one of the main voting blocs of the Republican Party. Until Trump won the Republican ticket, the Christian Right supported other presidential candidates, especially Ted Cruz. Frances Fitzgerald, *The Evangelicals: The Struggle to Shape America*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 2017, p. 627. Similarly, Trump's former donations to the Democratic Party until he considered the presidential race led many Republicans to question his political allegiances. In an interview in 1990, Trump said that he would "do better as a Democrat than as a Republican." Danielle Kurtzleben, *Most of Donald Trump's Political Money Went to Democrats – Until 5 Years Ago*, in <https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/07/28/426888268/donald-trumps-flipping-political-donations> (Accessed on 04.03.2020).

¹⁰ Bob Woodward, *Fear: Trump in the White House*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 2018, p. 15.

¹¹ Stephen M. Walt, *The Hell of Good Intentions: America's Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy*, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018, p. 133-136.

providing money to countries that can protect themselves. His main criticism was against Japan, whom he blamed for taking advantage of the United States and costing the nation in terms of deficit and taxes. As an example, Trump gave the Gulf region where Washington was spending its military and economic resources to protect the oil interests of Japan and other nations while the area was “of only marginal significance to the United States for its oil supplies.” “The world is laughing at America’s politicians,” Trump said, “as we protect ships we don’t own, carrying oil we don’t need, destined for allies who won’t help.”¹²

Three decades later, President Trump’s mentality was quite the same. His “America First” campaign promised to restructure the alliance relationships by starting from zero with all countries, friends and foes alike. During his presidency, Trump repeatedly called for Japan to renegotiate the post-Second World War defence treaty that, he believed, was unfair to the United States and argued that Japan could protect itself from regional threats by not relying on American security guarantees but instead by buying American military equipment worth billions of dollars.¹³ In addition, Trump asked for more money from Japan and South Korea for the U.S. troops stationed in these countries to balance China and North Korea threats.¹⁴ Trump also criticized the European countries on the same grounds by calling for them to increase their defence spending for their own military protection. “If you look at how much we spend on [NATO] and how much countries in Europe pay, who really gets more of the benefit from that,” Trump asked, implying that European countries have simply been free-riding by relying on the United States to carry the burden of the military alliance.¹⁵ Although criticism against European free-riding policies is not new, Trump strengthened the rhetoric by suggesting that American military aid should be dependent on the allies’ ability to keep their promises to increase their defence spending.¹⁶ The

¹² John Shanahan, *Trump: U.S. Should Stop Paying to Defend Countries that Can Protect Selves*, in <https://apnews.com/05133dbe63ace98766527ec7d16ede08> (Accessed on 05.03.2020).

¹³ Mark Landler, Julie Hirschfeld Davis, *Trump Tells Japan It Can Protect Itself by Buying U.S. Arms*, in <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/06/world/asia/trump-japan-shinzo-abe.html> (Accessed on 05.03.2020).

¹⁴ Lara Seligman, Robbie Gramer, *Trump Asks Tokyo to Quadruple Payments for U.S. Troops in Japan*, in <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/15/trump-asks-tokyo-quadruple-payments-us-troops-japan/> (Accessed on 05.03.2020).

¹⁵ *Trump: What Does the US Contribute to NATO in Europe?*, in <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44717074> (Accessed on 05.03.2020).

¹⁶ *Transcript: Donald Trump on NATO, Turkey’s Coup Attempt and the World*, in

president also questioned the worth of defending small European countries with the risk of starting a war with Russia.¹⁷ What is more important is that the threat to leave the allies to their own devices in the face of threats was not just rhetoric. In December 2018, Trump announced a military withdrawal from Syria by arguing that the only objective to be in the Middle East, the ISIS threat, was eliminated. Not only did this decision shock France and the United Kingdom who had troops in Syria, but also pushed the Syrian Kurdish groups – the principal partner of the Pentagon on the ground – into the arms of the Syrian regime as they felt betrayed.¹⁸

Trump's determination to change America's traditional liberal leadership policies as well as his nationalist rhetoric and actions were especially troublesome for the CEE countries. Russia's annexation of Crimea and pro-Russian military forces in Eastern Ukraine had already made most of the regional countries feel unsafe, and the possibility of American abdication of global leadership rang the alarm bells more loudly. Furthermore, Trump's lukewarm messages to Russian president Vladimir Putin and his desire to reset relations with Russia¹⁹ was the most worrisome development for the CEE region. Shortly after Trump became president, the former European leaders, mostly from Eastern Europe, wrote a joint letter to the president-elect and urged him not to make a mistake by ending the sanctions against Russia and accepting the division and subjugation of Ukraine. "Have no doubt: Vladimir Putin is not America's ally," the letter warned, "Putin does not seek American greatness. As your allies, we do." The letter also pointed out that the Russian leader "views concessions as a sign of weakness" and if given, concessions would destabilize Eastern Europe economically and feed "ex-

<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/us/politics/donald-trump-foreign-policy-interview.html> (Accessed on 05.03.2020).

¹⁷ Daalder, Lindsay, *The Empty Throne*, e-book edition.

¹⁸ Julian Borger, Martin Chulov, *Trump Shocks Allies and Advisers with Plan to Pull US Troops Out of Syria*, in <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/dec/19/us-troops-syria-withdrawal-trump> (Accessed on 05.03.2020); Ben Hubbard, *Syria's Kurds, Feeling Betrayed by the U.S., Ask Assad Government for Protection*, in <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/28/world/middleeast/syria-kurds-turkey-manbij.html> (Accessed on 05.03.2020).

¹⁹ Jenna Johnson, Karen DeYoung, Elise Wiebeck, *Trump and Putin Speak by Phone, Say They'll Work Together to Improve Relations*, in https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-and-putin-speak-by-phone-say-theyll-work-together-to-improve-relations/2016/11/14/242f44c2-aa90-11e6-977a-1030f822fc35_story.html (Accessed on 09.03.2020).

tremist, oligarchic and anti-Western elements there.”²⁰ The fear was also felt at the public level as in December 2016 and January 2017 the people in the Baltic countries started making contingency plans, in case they would have to leave the country at short notice after a possible Russian invasion. Some Lithuanians and Estonians even started training themselves for guerrilla warfare in the forests.²¹ When Trump questioned Article 5 of NATO, which recognizes that an attack against a NATO member is an attack against all, and blamed the Montenegrin people for being so aggressive that they may cause the World War III²², or when he was reluctant to criticize Russia after the latter showed aggression against Ukrainian ships on the Kerch Strait,²³ CEE governments and publics understandably felt uneasy about American security guarantees.

CONTINUITY IN SECURITY COOPERATION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CEE COUNTRIES

Despite President Trump’s self-interested nationalist tendencies and the initial fear about the lack of leadership against the Russian threat, the security cooperation between the United States and the CEE countries did not diminish, and even grew in the first three years of the Trump administration. In 2017, the United States signed defence cooperation agreements with each of the Baltic states, and the Trump administration authorized a security assistance program to improve these countries capacities to deter and resist aggression. In 2018 and 2019, the United States and Baltic countries also signed roadmaps that organized bilateral security cooperation over the next five years. These agreements aimed at strengthening the partnership on multiple military issues, including multilateral operations, maritime security in the Baltic Sea, intelligence-sharing,

²⁰ *Letter to President-elect Donald J. Trump from America’s Allies*, in https://www.washingtonpost.com/r/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2017/01/10/Editorial-Opinion/Graphics/Letter_to_Trump.pdf?tid=a_inl (Accessed on 09.03.2020).

²¹ Aliide Naylor, *The Shadow in the East: Vladimir Putin and the New Baltic Front*, New York, I.B. Tauris, 2020, p. 34.

²² *Very Aggressive’: Trump Suggests Montenegro Could Cause World War Three*, in <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jul/19/very-aggressive-trump-suggests-montenegro-could-cause-world-war-three> (Accessed on 09.03.2020).

²³ Nicole Gaouette, *Trump Refuses to Condemn Russian Aggression Against Ukraine*, in <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/11/26/politics/russia-ukraine-trump-silence/index.html> (Accessed on 09.03.2020).

cybersecurity capabilities and early warning systems. During this period, Congress also mandated the Secretaries of State and Defence to jointly work on the security requirements of the Baltic countries to deter and resist Russian aggression.²⁴ After the meeting with the leaders of Baltic countries in April 2018, Trump stated that Baltic countries' fulfilling their defence spending obligations should be an example to other NATO members and these countries "can trust the United States will remain a strong, proud, and loyal friend and ally."²⁵ Although Baltic leaders were concerned about Trump's criticism of NATO and his moderate tone towards Vladimir Putin, they appreciated the administration's effort, even if it is in the form of "unpredictable leadership," to reform military cooperation against Russia.²⁶

The "business as usual" approach also continued in the American policies towards the Balkans. Although the president repeatedly demonstrated his unwillingness to fight against Russia for the safety of small Balkan countries, the administration supported Montenegro's accession to NATO despite Russian opposition. In his visit to Montenegro in August 2017, Vice President Mike Pence assured the Balkan states that the United States is committed to their defence against Russian attacks and called on them to look westward for peace and stability. During the visit, Pence also accused "Moscow-backed agents" of attempting to attack the Montenegro parliament and even to assassinate the prime minister Milo Djukanovic, to dissuade the country from NATO membership. Yet he stated that NATO's doors are open to all European countries who "share our values, contribute to the common defence, and strive to achieve security, prosperity, and freedom for their people."²⁷ Despite the fears that the United States will not be interested in regional developments, officials in the Trump administration also played an active role in mediating some political crises in the

²⁴ Derek E. Mix, *Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania: Background and U.S.-Baltic Relations*, in "Congressional Research Service", Report No. 46139, 2020, p. 9-10.

²⁵ *Remarks by President Trump and Heads of the Baltic States in Joint Press Conference*, in <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-heads-baltic-states-joint-press-conference/> (Accessed on 10.03.2020).

²⁶ David Jackson, Gregory Korte, *Donald Trump to Baltics: I've Been Tough on Russia, But Want Better Relations*, in <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/04/03/donald-trump-meets-baltic-leaders-worried-russia/480957002/> (Accessed on 10.03.2020).

²⁷ *Mike Pence in Montenegro Urges Balkans to Turn Away from Russia*, in <https://www.dw.com/en/mike-pence-in-montenegro-urges-balkans-to-turn-away-from-russia/a-39943571> (Accessed on 10.03.2020).

Balkans such as the government formation in Macedonia, the controversial elections in Albania, and political disagreements in Kosovo over the establishment of a military and border agreement with Montenegro. The United States also offered its support for the debated friendship agreement between Bulgaria and Macedonia²⁸ and for the territorial exchange between Kosovo and Serbia to resolve the long-term dispute between these countries.²⁹

In Central Europe, the fears about American isolationism also proved false. During the July 2017 visit of the President of Poland, Andrzej Duda, Trump stated that the United States is “committed to maintaining peace and security in Central and Eastern Europe” while emphasizing that “NATO remains critical to deterring conflict and ensuring that war between great powers never again ravages Europe.”³⁰ Throughout the Trump administration, defence cooperation with Poland remained close and extensive, and Warsaw became the focus of the administration’s Central European strategy. The administration decided to strengthen its military presence in Poland by continuing the construction of an Aegis-Ashore missile defence site although problems with contractors and construction delayed the project until 2022. Being part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach with other military sites in Spain, Turkey and Romania,³¹ it was announced that Aegis-Ashore would target Iran, North Korea, and Hezbollah in Lebanon, not Russia.³² Still, the missile system raised the nerves in Moscow as Russian officials called it “a direct threat to global and regional security” while warning that the host countries might turn to “smoking ruins” in a possible nuclear confrontation in Europe.³³

²⁸ Matthew Rhodes, *The Trump Administration and the Balkans*, in “Security Insights”, 2017, No. 22, p. 2-3.

²⁹ Petrit Selimi, *This is How Donald Trump Can Win in the Balkans*, in <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-donald-trump-can-win-balkans-31227> (Accessed on 10.03.2020).

³⁰ Snodgrass, *Holding the Line*, e-book edition.

³¹ Jen Judson, *Poland’s Aegis Ashore Delayed to 2022 with New Way Forward Coming Soon*, in <https://www.defensenews.com/smr/federal-budget/2020/02/18/polands-aegis-ashore-delayed-to-2022-with-new-way-forward-coming-soon/> (Accessed on 12.03.2020).

³² John Grady, *Ambassador: Aegis Ashore Program Focused on the Rogue States, not Russia*, in <https://news.usni.org/2018/04/18/ambassador-aegis-ashore-program-focused-rogue-states-not-russia> (Accessed on 12.03.2020).

³³ Andrew E. Kramer, *Russia Calls New U.S. Missile Defense System a Direct Threat*, in <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/13/world/europe/russia-nato-us-romania->

The Trump administration also agreed to send 1000 additional troops to Poland and strengthen the “enhanced forward presence” in the country to deter military aggression from Russia. In the meeting between Trump and Duda in June 2019, both sides agreed to increase American logistical, administrative and training facilities, strengthen special operations forces, and establish a unit of aerial reconnaissance drones in Poland.³⁴ In these growing alliances, Polish leadership learned what Trump prioritizes in bilateral relations. As Trump approaches foreign policy as a businessman, he likes to sell American products to foreign countries while criticizing hegemonic leadership policies of guaranteeing the security of other countries in return for no tangible benefits. When the Polish leadership was eager to increase military purchases from the United States in order to intensify its military modernization, they gained President Trump’s favour and strengthened the bilateral ties. In the last three years, Poland bought air-to-air missiles, F-16 support and sustainment services, and air and missile defence system batteries worth more than five billion dollars combined. In February 2019, Poland announced plans to buy twenty High Mobility Artillery Rocket System launchers and requested to purchase thirty-two F-35 fighter jets in May 2019.³⁵ Most importantly, the Polish government sought to establish a permanent U.S. military base in Poland with an offer Trump would not turn down: paying “billions” for the facility. Duda’s suggestion to name the facility as “Fort Trump” may have been a joke, but it is possible to interpret it as a strategic move on the Polish part to feed the American president’s ego, which is critical for increasing bilateral relations during the Trump administration.³⁶

Finally, Ukraine was another CEE country that benefited from close security cooperation with the United States during the Trump administration. Although Ukraine was at the top of the list of countries under threat from Russia and was concerned about Trump’s non-traditional foreign policy strategy, according to some analysts, the Trump administration was more devoted to the protection of Ukraine in terms of military assistance than the former Obama administration. For example, in April 2018 the administration agreed to deliver Javelin anti-tank

missile-defense.html (Accessed on 12.03.2020).

³⁴ Derek E. Mix, *Poland: Background and U.S. Relations*, “Congressional Research Service”, Report No. 45784, 2019, p. 12.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

³⁶ Melissa Hooper, *Duda’s Ego Trip*, in <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/06/10/dudas-ego-trip/> (Accessed on 12.03.2020).

missiles to the Ukrainian army to resist Russian aggression. The Obama administration rejected to provide these weapons to Ukraine for a long time with the concern that Russia may have acquired intelligence about the weapon's sensitive technology.³⁷ The administration sent lethal defensive weapons and non-lethal defensive aids worth millions of dollars to Ukraine, while the American soldiers participated in several military activities with the Ukrainian army, including the Rapid Trident air exercise in September 2017 and the Clear Sky exercise in October 2018.³⁸

Although the president was criticized when he did not adopt any punitive action against Moscow, choosing to remain silent after the Russian navy seized three Ukrainian ships and arrested twenty-four sailors in November 2018,³⁹ the administration supported the territorial integrity of the country and frequently pointed out Russia's human right violations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. In the Crimea Declaration announced in July 2018, the Secretary of State Mike Pompeo blamed Russia for "act[ing] in a manner unworthy of a great nation" by occupying Crimea and choosing to isolate themselves from the international community by violation the main principle in international law: using force against the territorial integrity of a state. Similar to the Welles Declaration of 1940 which provided the U.S. refusal to recognize the Soviet Union's annexation of the Baltic States, the Crimea Declaration and following statements by the administration pointed out that the United States "does not and will not ever recognize Russia's claims of sovereignty over the peninsula."⁴⁰ Likewise, on the Eastern Ukraine issue, the administration regularly updated the public about the conflict status, settlement programs and humanitarian issues while criticizing Russia for its "continued failure" to meet international commitments. As with other CEE countries, the

³⁷ Ken Dilanian, *Former CIA Director: We Worried Arming Ukraine Would Hand Technology to Russian Spies*, in <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/former-cia-director-we-worried-arming-ukraine-would-hand-technology-n1089926> (Accessed on 13.03.2020).

³⁸ Robert D. Blackwill, *Trump's Foreign Policies are Better than They Seem*, in "Council on Foreign Relations", Report No. 84, 2019, p. 37-38.

³⁹ Nathan Hodge, *Donald Trump's Silence on Ukraine Could Make a Bad Situation Worse*, in <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/11/26/europe/russia-trump-analysis-hodge-intl/index.html> (Accessed on 13.03.2020).

⁴⁰ Michael R. Pompeo, *Crimea Declaration*, in <https://www.state.gov/crimea-declaration/> (Accessed on 13.03.2020); Michael R. Pompeo, *Crimea is Ukraine*, in <https://www.state.gov/crimea-is-ukraine-3/> (Accessed on 13.03.2020).

Trump administration kept supporting Ukraine against Russia's aggressive intentions in the region.⁴¹

ORGANIZATIONAL BALANCING: TRADITIONALIST ELEMENTS IN THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION

As it is clear, Donald Trump's "American First" strategy and his discomfort with liberal leadership and traditional alliance relations significantly contradict with his administration's actual policy choices in the CEE region since he became the president. This inconsistency between rhetoric and practice can be explained with the balancing forces in the administration. As mentioned, Trump's victory in the presidential election was not expected⁴² and even Trump himself was not willing to think about whom he would hire in the administration once he was elected.⁴³ Although a list of possible candidates for the administration positions was prepared by Chris Christie during the campaign, Trump and his advisers ignored his work after the victory and they started to form the administration from square one.⁴⁴ As a result, Trump did not surround himself with like-minded people who would share his American First strategy and, except for Steve Bannon, he did not have a support force that would help him to change traditional liberal leadership policies. Although the Republican Party did not really embrace Trump during the election,⁴⁵ soon traditional elements of the party who favoured American global leadership

⁴¹ Cory Welt, *Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and U.S. Policy*, "Congressional Research Service", Report No. 45008, 2020, p. 26-27.

⁴² A few days before the election, the New York Times only gave a 15 percent chance for Trump to win the election. Josh Katz, *Who Will Be President?*, in <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/upshot/presidential-polls-forecast.html> (Accessed on 15.03.2020).

⁴³ Trump was against the transition preparation because he believed that Mitt Romney lost the 2012 presidential election against Obama since he focused on transition meetings instead of the election campaign. Woodward, *Fear*, p. 42.

⁴⁴ Daalder and Lindsay, *The Empty Throne*, e-book edition.

⁴⁵ Once Trump became the presidential nominee of the Republican Party, several party members, as well as conservative policy experts and intellectuals, formed a phenomenal movement called Never Trump as they promised not to work in the administration if Trump would be elected. For recent works on the movement, see Robert P. Saldin, Steven M. Teles, *Never Trump: The Revolt of the Conservative Elites*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2020.

filled important posts in the administration. Like a Trojan Horse, these officials strongly resisted the nationalist tendencies of the president, whether they personally liked Trump or not.

Both Secretaries of State during the Trump administration, Rex Tillerson and Mike Pompeo belong to this group whom I will call traditionalists. Although Tillerson's business ties with Moscow during his job as the CEO of ExxonMobil created some questions about his nomination at the beginning,⁴⁶ as the secretary of state Tillerson remained committed to America's traditional alliance ties and its leadership role in the world. As in other parts of the world, Tillerson was more interested with continuity in the CEE region than with change. Soon after assuming the administration position, Tillerson urged the NATO countries to improve the security situation in eastern Ukraine and "push Russia to end its aggression against its neighbours."⁴⁷ Unlike the president who wanted to follow a balanced approach between Russia and the CEE countries, Tillerson argued that NATO members in Eastern Europe were right to be alarmed by Moscow's aggressive moves⁴⁸ and he believed that Russian aggression is the biggest threat to European security. In November 2017, Tillerson blamed Russia for using "malicious tactics" against the United States and European countries and stated that relations with Russia will not be normal until the Ukraine issue is resolved. In this speech, he also gave the guarantee that if a NATO ally is attacked, the United States will be the first to respond.⁴⁹ During his tenure as the secretary of state, Tillerson generally gave harsher messages to Russia than the president he served

⁴⁶ "I don't know what Mr. Tillerson's relationship with Vladimir Putin was, but I'll tell you it is a matter of concern to me," late Senator John McCain, who was quite influential as the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, publicly said. Rebecca Morin, *McCain: Tillerson Relationship with Putin a 'Matter of Concern'*, in <https://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/john-mccain-rex-tillerson-putin-secretary-state-232467> (Accessed 15.03.2020).

⁴⁷ *On Secretary Tillerson's Upcoming Travel to Brussels, Belgium for the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting*, in <https://www.state.gov/on-secretary-tillersons-upcoming-travel-to-brussels-belgium-for-the-nato-foreign-ministers-meeting/> (Accessed on 15.03.2020).

⁴⁸ Theodor Tudoroiu, *Brexit, President Trump, and the Changing Geopolitics of Eastern Europe*, Cham, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, p. 155.

⁴⁹ Carol Morello, *Tillerson Has Harsh Words for Russia's 'Malicious Tactics'*, in https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/tillerson-has-harsh-words-for-russias-malicious-tactics/2017/11/28/f3136426-d465-11e7-a986-d0a9770d9a3e_story.html (Accessed on 15.03.2020).

and most often tried to soften the president's messages that could have been regarded as a lack of commitment for European security.

Tillerson had significant foreign policy disagreements with the president, and in March-April 2018, he was replaced by Mike Pompeo. Although Mike Pompeo was more in line with the president than his predecessor and friendlier to the America First strategy, he can also be counted as a traditionalist as he prioritizes balancing global and regional competitors such as China, Iran and Russia. As the head of Central Intelligence Agency in the first year of the administration, Pompeo contradicted the president about Russian meddling in the American elections and warned Trump that Putin is a dangerous leader.⁵⁰ After coming to State, Pompeo continued his negative assessments of Russian foreign policy. During his visit to the CEE region in February 2019, Pompeo warned that post-communist countries are vulnerable to Russian and Chinese political and economic influence and blamed Moscow for using economic initiatives, especially the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, to make aggressive inroads in the regional countries. Pompeo defended American alliance ties in the region by claiming that American "disengagement" in Central and Eastern Europe created a vacuum that Russia and China exploited.⁵¹ According to Pompeo, it was "crazy talk" to claim that the administration was not tough on Russia as, he argued, American military spending was raising the costs for Russian foreign policy in its neighbourhood.⁵² In terms of economic balancing, Pompeo recently announced the Three Sea Initiative that committed \$1 billion in CEE countries to develop cross border energy, transport and energy infrastructure between the Baltic, Black and Adriatic Seas.⁵³

Another person who saw Russia as a threat and believed in the importance of alliance relationships in the administration was James Mattis, the Secretary of Defence between January 2017 and January 2019. As a former four-star military

⁵⁰ Mike Pompeo: Trump's Loyalist Diplomat and Ex-spymaster, in <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38029336> (Accessed on 16.03.2020).

⁵¹ Matthew Lee, *Pompeo Warns Eastern Europe on Chinese and Russian Meddling*, in <https://apnews.com/d6639caddbde74b6d8bf2acc0e86c4550> (Accessed on 16.03.2020).

⁵² Everett Rosenfeld, *It's 'Crazy Talk' to Say the US Isn't Tough on Russia: Mike Pompeo*, in <https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/12/mike-pompeo-crazy-talk-to-say-the-us-isnt-tough-on-russia.html> (Accessed on 16.03.2020).

⁵³ *US Commits \$1 Billion Dollars to Develop Central European Infrastructure*, in <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/press-releases/us-commits-1-billion-dollars-to-develop-central-european-infrastructure/> (Accessed on 16.03.2020).

general, Mattis looked at world affairs through a *realpolitik* perspective. When he was the CentCom Commander in 2010-2013, Mattis contradicted President Obama about the Iranian issue as he regarded the Islamic regime as “the greatest threat” to American interests in the Middle East and did not agree with the president’s moderate approach toward Iran.⁵⁴ This *realpolitik* mindset also showed itself against Russia when Mattis assumed the post of Defence Secretary in the Trump administration. Mattis personally mistrusted Putin and believed that the trust will not be recovered while Putin was in power. Yet, more than Russia’s actions, his main concern was that Trump’s policies caused a rift between the United States and European allies and pushed Europe to take a pro-Russia position. “The European Union has embraced Putin,” Mattis complained by emphasizing that the German Chancellor Angela Merkel “talks to Putin two times a week, for one to two hours at a time.”⁵⁵ Unlike the president who gets along with Putin well while alienating allies, Mattis sought to follow the traditional balance of power policy by cooperating with allies in Europe. As a former military officer, Mattis especially remained interested in the military dimension of the problem, especially on the fast movement of NATO troops in the CEE region. With his request, NATO developed a “European Readiness Initiative” – “Four Thirties” in its popular name – which asked member countries to be able to deploy 30 battalions, 30 battleships, and 30 squadrons within 30 days or less.⁵⁶ Like other traditionalists in the administration, Mattis was in favour of American-led rules-based world order and believed that the diminished authority of the United States would create a vacuum that other countries such as China, Russia and Iran would eagerly fill.

Nikki Haley, the former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, also played a significant role in shaping the administration policies toward Russia. Like Pompeo, Haley was also sympathetic to the president’s foreign policy agenda (more than Tillerson or Mattis), yet her vigorous disagreement with Trump took place over issues concerning Russia. Haley criticized the Russian activities in the United Nations severely as she claimed that Moscow was using its veto power to protect authoritarian regimes while opposing human rights resolutions for political interests. “The Russians aren’t our friends. They will never be our friends,” Haley told Trump when the president wanted to reset relations with Russia and

⁵⁴ Woodward, *Fear*, p. 52-54.

⁵⁵ Snodgrass, *Holding the Line*, e-book edition.

⁵⁶ Teri Schultz, *NATO’s ‘Four Thirties’ Plan – Does It Add Up?*, in <https://www.dw.com/en/natos-four-thirties-plan-does-it-add-up/a-44357190> (Accessed on 16.03.2020).

avoid publicly criticizing Putin.⁵⁷ In her first official statement as ambassador, Haley used her entire speech to criticize Russian acts in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea and pointed out that “the dire situation in Eastern Ukraine is one that demands clear and strong condemnation of Russian actions.”⁵⁸ Haley also tried to assure the European allies that the United States will not leave them alone against the Russian threat. “[G]reater cooperation with Russia cannot come at the expense of the security of our European friends and allies,” Haley said in an attempt to mollify concerns about Trump’s relations with Putin.⁵⁹ All in all, without publicly clashing with the president, Haley used her post to balance Russian power in the United Nations while frequently warning the president about Russian intentions.

It is possible to add more names to the list of traditionalists within the Trump administration such as John Bolton, Mike Esper or Robert O’Brien. Some of these traditionalists left the administration frustrated, as Mattis did after Trump announced the withdrawal from Syria. In his resignation letter, Mattis pointed out that his disagreement about the treatment of America’s allies is one of the main reasons for his leaving and urged the president to treat allies with respect and be “clear-eyed about both malign actors and strategic competitors.”⁶⁰ Tillerson and Bolton also resigned after serious confrontations with the president over foreign policies. Yet, these traditionalists were replaced by people who also have a traditional mindset albeit with different personal characteristics.⁶¹ Despite their differences in personality and their relationship with the president, all traditionalists believe that American leadership in the world is necessary; some strategic com-

⁵⁷ Haley, *With All Due Respect*.

⁵⁸ *Remarks at a UN Security Council Briefing on Ukraine*, in <https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-a-un-security-council-briefing-on-ukraine/> (Accessed on 18.03.2020).

⁵⁹ *Washington Committed to Europe Alliances, Says U.S. Envoy to UN*, in <https://www.rferl.org/a/nato-haley-un-ambassador-european-allies/28323321.html> (Accessed on 18.03.2020).

⁶⁰ *James Mattis’ Resignation Letter in Full*, in <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-46644841> (Accessed on 18.03.2020).

⁶¹ For example, Robert O’Brien, the president’s National Security Adviser, was less confrontational with the president than his predecessor John Bolton, but he also believed the American leadership role in the global affairs. For more information on O’Brien’s foreign policy views, see Robert C. O’Brien, *While America Slept: Restoring American Leadership to a World in Crisis*, New York, Encounter Books, 2016, What is more illuminating for our subject is that O’Brien starts the book by explaining Hitler’s occupation of Czechoslovakia and Putin’s aggression in Ukraine with the same excuse: to protect ethnic kinship ties.

petitors and enemies need to be balanced; alliance ties are vital to protect American interests around the world. As a result, all of them, with different level of success, try to convince the president to follow traditional leadership policies by curbing the self-interested characteristics of the America First strategy.

Unlike the Western European countries that are quite critical of Trump's rhetoric and unilateral actions, the CEE countries have no reason to oppose the American president as long as security cooperation continues. They also do not have many options. For many years, the European Union has proved incapable of preventing security problems in the CEE region. The organization was slow not only in responding against Russian aggression but also to other non-traditional security problems including the refugee crisis, economic problems and finally the recent coronavirus pandemic.⁶² While the organization is still popular in the CEE region mainly because of its economic benefits,⁶³ the security cooperation with the United States and NATO is difficult to neglect for these countries as long as Russian aggression in its neighbourhood continues. In addition, the growing power of right-wing parties in the CEE countries also makes cooperation with the United States more attractive, especially during the Trump administration. The right-wing political parties are prone to criticize the European Union both on political and economic grounds. The supporters of these parties believe that the organization hurts national economies while the democracy and human rights standards of the EU contradict with some policy choices of these parties. As Trump is not willing to judge the countries according to liberal values, it is possible to argue that for those countries which have right-wing parties in power – not only in Poland and Hungary but Baltic countries as well – Trump is the ideal politician to occupy the White House, as long as security cooperation continues, of course.

CONCLUSIONS

This article argues that in spite of a nationalist president who has questioned America's leadership role in global affairs and his country's commitment

⁶² Daniel Boffey, *Italy Criticises EU for Being Slow to Help Over Coronavirus Epidemic*, in <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/11/italy-criticises-eu-being-slow-help-coronavirus-epidemic> (Accessed on 19.03.2020).

⁶³ *European Public Opinion Three Decades After the Fall of Communism*, in <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2019/10/Pew-Research-Center-Value-of-Europe-report-FINAL-UPDATED.pdf> (Accessed on 19.03.2020), p. 52.

to the protection of allies, the security cooperation between the United States and the CEE countries increased in the first three years of the Trump administration. This finding is interesting as there are several researchers and analysts who argue that America has abdicated its global leadership position and paint an apocalyptical picture about the future of great power politics. These fears were not baseless. Trump's pre-election promises, his America First strategy and his intention to build good relations with strategic competitors and enemies – Russia, China and even including Iran⁶⁴ – all indicated that American grand strategy would have fundamentally changed if Trump had been elected. These fears can be observed with the growing concern within the CEE countries after Trump declared victory in 2016.

Yet, the fears did not materialize. Opposite to expectations, the political and military ties between Washington and the region increased even more than before. How can we understand the contradiction between the rhetoric and action then? If we look at the system level, we will see that there was no fundamental change in the power dynamics between the United States and Russia. At the individual level of analysis, we also do not see a transformation in Trump's personality. The state-level is the most appropriate level of analysis to explain the increasing relations between the United States and the CEE countries. Similar to the bureaucratic politics model,⁶⁵ I argue that the interactions among government members are critical in shaping American policies towards the CEE region during the Trump administration. Trump came to the presidency with specific political thoughts. However, because he was not able to surround himself with like-minded people who would share his "America First" strategy, he was soon influenced by traditionalists who were determined to pursue the American global leadership role. These officials formed the majority of the administration and provided for the continuity of American competition with Russia in the CEE region.

The future is not as uncertain as it was at the time Trump came to power. Although traditionalists leave the administration one by one, other traditionalists replaced them. As a result, even if Trump will be re-elected in 2020, it is unlikely that he would cause a fundamental change in American grand strategy in the CEE region. The other likely presidential candidate, Joe Biden, represents the views of the traditional elements in American foreign policy, so his election would not hurt

⁶⁴ Anonymous, *A Warning*, New York, Twelve, 2019, e-book edition.

⁶⁵ For more information, see Graham T. Allison, Morton H. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications*, in "World Politics", 1972, Vol. 24, p. 40-79.

American security commitments as well. The only presidential candidate that may cause a significant change in American foreign policy is Bernie Sanders who, like Trump, resists the traditional power structure in American politics but from the Democratic Party side. If he comes to power, the United States may focus on domestic reforms and social welfare more than costly commitments abroad. Yet, as the Trump case shows, the traditional elements in American politics are quite powerful, and they would resist whoever wants to change the direction of American foreign policy away from a global leadership role.

THE IDEA AND PRACTICE OF THE SLOVENIAN STATE-FORMATION PROCESS AFTER WORLD WAR I¹

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Abstract. *The complex and contradictory processes of Slovenian state formation in 1918–1941 became subject of scientific research in a monograph written by Doctor of Historical Sciences Kateryna Malshyna. Chronologically, the work covered the period from the establishment of the "August" National Council in Ljubljana within the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (1918) to the completion of the legal activities of the "April" National Council (September 1941). Based on the study of a set of written sources, it proves that under the influence of external and internal factors, the process of Slovenian state formation at this time had a wave-like character. The author scientifically verified the position that in the interwar period, Slovenia lost the chance to protect its culture from Yugoslav uniformization and to gain autonomy within the authoritarian state. The German-Yugoslav April War of 1941 and the initial period of the Nazi-Fascist control over Slovenia led to its division into four zones of occupation, thus ending the Slovenian statehood.*

Keywords: *Slovenia, national revival, state formation, First and Second World Wars, interwar period, Central and South-Eastern Europe.*

Rezumat. Ideea și practica procesului de formare a Statului Sloven după Primul Război Mondial. *Procesele complexe și contradictorii legate de formarea Statului sloven au devenit subiectul cercetării științifice prezentate în cadrul volumului semnat de Kateryna Mal'shyna, doctor în științe istorice. Cronologic, studiul acoperă perioada cuprinsă între constituirea Consiliului Național din „August” în Ljubljana în cadrul Statului Slovenilor, Croaților și Sârbilor (1918) și încheierea existenței legale a Consiliului Național*

¹ К. В. Мальшина, *Тернистый шлях словенського державотворення (1918-1941)* [The Thorny Path of Slovenian State-Formation (1918-1941)], Київ: ІУАД НАНУ, 2018, 565 с.

din „August” (1941). Întemeiată pe analiza unui set de izvoare scrise, lucrarea demonstrează că, sub impactul unor factori externi și interni, procesul de formare a Statului sloven în acea perioadă a avut un caracter sinusoidal. Autoarea a verificat critic ipoteza conform căreia, în perioada interbelică, Slovenia a ratat șansa de a-și proteja cultura în fața uniformizării iugoslave și de a dobândi autonomia în cadrele unui stat autoritar. Războiul german-iugoslav din aprilie 1941 și instituirea controlului nazisto-fascist asupra Sloveniei au condus la divizarea acesteia în patru zone de ocupație, punând capăt statalității slovene.

The centennial of the World War I and seventy-fifth anniversary of the World War II became a significant informational occasion for a new, unbiased view in the context of a retrospective analysis of the problems of war and peace, war and politics, war and diplomacy, war and society, war and culture, etc. The Great War of 1914–1918 came into history as the first global armed clash of two warring coalitions of countries, which brought about dramatic changes, including state-formation ones. These processes developed especially rapidly after the Great War of 1914–1918 on the territory of Central, Eastern, and South-eastern Europe. The territorial changes were primarily due to the national liberation aspirations of the peoples, the collapse of the powerful imperial formations, and the peaceful arrangement of the post-war world.

All factors of the process of Slovenian state formation in 1918-1941, from the creation of the "August" National Council in Ljubljana within the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in 1918 to the ending of the legal activity of the "April" National Council in September 1941, became an actual subject of scientific analysis of historical research of Ukrainian historian and translator, an employee of the Institute of Ukrainian Archeography and Source Studies n. a. M. Hrushevsky, Doctor of Historical Sciences Kateryna Malshyna. Since the most activities of Slovenian national liberation organizations happened in the last stage of World War I, we agree that the lower chronological boundary of the dissertation is logically distinguished in August 1918, the time when the first Slovenian state body – the National Council in Ljubljana – was created. The upper chronological boundary of the work is 1941, meaning the German-Yugoslav April War (April 6-10) and the initial period of Nazi-fascist control over Slovenia directly linked to its division into four occupation zones. At this time, the last Slovenian self-governing body – the National Council of Slovenia – was created and operated. For almost

two and a half decades, the intense process of Slovenian state formation continued between the two dates.

The author of the monograph reasonably mentioned that the restoration of the formation of the Slovenian state took place in the last months of 1918, but did not end because of indecision of the Slovenian national and political program, which was caused by the split of the Slovenian Politum into two tendencies: Yugoslavism and "Slovenism". The set of external and internal factors has developed in such a way that the process of Slovenian state formation had a wave-like nature. It recovered and accelerated in times of internal political chaos, primarily related to the collapse of the multinational state formations (Austria-Hungary, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes / Yugoslavia) in which the Slovenes lived. In other words, it was an increase in the external threat along the entire length of the Slovenian northern border by those states created by linguistically unrelated populations (Italians, Austrians, Hungarians), especially on that (greater) part of the Slovenian lands which have become component of a common political body with the related Slavonic peoples (Croats and Serbs). At the same time, the process of Slovenian state formation was slowing down under conditions of stable existence in multinational countries with authoritarian regimes.

The monograph proves that in the history of South-eastern Europe in general and of Slovenia in particular, the crucial role belonged to the interwar period. It decisively influenced the fate of the peoples of the Western Balkans who, after World War I, lived in a multinational state (First and Second Yugoslavia) for seventy years. Particular attention is paid to the fact that Slovenia, from all the small Western Balkan countries, experienced the most difficult trials after the end of the Great War of 1914-1918. On the one hand, its lands and people have been divided between four states; on the other hand, Slovenian ethnic groups in neighbouring countries are still unable to enjoy the rights guaranteed to national minorities in the European Union. It is mentioned that in the interwar period, Slovenia lost the opportunity to unite, protect its culture from Yugoslav unification, and gain autonomy in the conditions of an authoritarian state.

We note that the decision of Kateryna Malshyna to choose a political history of Slovenia during the interwar period as an object of scientific research is dictated primarily by considerations of a historiographical nature. The point is that the Slovenian historiography approached the problems of the Slovenian state-formation in the interwar period to a lesser extent, while the Ukrainian and East Slavic historiography has not addressed them at all. Communists, who

created Second Yugoslavia, also avoided a detailed study of this period, in particular, because of their minor role in the public and social life of First Yugoslavia. The bloody repression in Slovenia during and after World War II intended to change the historical memory of the people conceptually. The French historian Bernard Gene wrote: "A social group, a political community, or a civilization are determined first and foremost by their memory, that is, their history, but not by the history that was in reality, but by one created for them by historians." As a result, Slovenia's interwar political history has long been the subject of numerous twists or simplified schemes.

Only from the turn of the XX-XXI centuries the EU accession process to address the issue of borders with EU neighbours has forced the national-scientific institutes of Slovenia to immerse themselves in virtually unexplored historical times. Significant results have been achieved in recent years in the study of Slovenia's interwar history, and the publication of archival materials continues. However, it is too early to speak of a full understanding of the complex and contradictory process of Slovenian state-formation: Slovenian historians do not consider the interwar period as a significant time of genesis, evolution, and consolidation of the state aspirations of Slovenian society.

The author of the monograph thoroughly substantiated another essential point: the study of this topic opens a wide field for comparativism in many issues, in particular through the prism of the similarities of historical processes in Slovenian and Ukrainian lands during the Middle Ages, modern, and present times. In her opinion, the Eurasian civilization crossroads at which the Ukrainian people were formed has its "mini-version" in the western Balkans, where ethnic Slovenian lands lie from lake Balaton to Venice. The general historical process of strengthening nationalism and the collapse of empires after World War I became the background for the restoration of state formation by both Slovenians and Ukrainians. Obviously, there were both similarities and significant differences in character and direction between these processes. However, the solution of many urgent issues of Slovenian history, the content, orientation, and results of state-formation phenomena, the construction and mechanisms of functioning of the historical memory of the people, the essence and principal characteristics of foreign and domestic policy during the interwar decades will be useful for researchers to understand Ukrainian historians problems.

The logical structure of the work contributes to the achievement of the set goals and objectives of scientific research. The study is based on a wide variety of

sources: published and unpublished documentary, nonfiction and narrative materials created both during the mentioned period and later, within and beyond the borders of the Republic of Slovenia. The researcher offered a thoughtful and valid classification of the source materials used. Documentary sources are categorized chronologically into documents of World War I, the interwar period, and World War II. In content and origin, they can be divided into materials of the central government bodies (legislation, statistics) of the State of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes / Yugoslavia, the Slovenian authorities in 1918-1941, churches, documents regarding diplomatic battles for borders in 1919-1920, development of social and political movements and parties, different works of party figures, foreign materials.

The author reasonably noted that the documents of central and Slovenian authorities (legislation, minutes of meetings, statistical materials), parties, political figures, and the church provide an opportunity to comprehensively cover the main categorical vectors: features, stages, driving forces, the sequence of events and the results of Slovenian state formation in the interwar period. In turn, very important, foreign documents provide a multifaceted historical background for research on Slovenian state-building. First of all, these are reports written in terms of the political interests of each country. At the same time, the balanced observations and judgments contribute to a deeper understanding of Slovenia's political heritage during the period under review.

Kateryna Malshyna utilized newspapers and magazines from 1918 to 1941 that belonged to all political camps in Slovenia and published both editorial and author articles, state and party news. The information spectrum of these materials is vibrant and diverse, which is why they could solve almost all the tasks of scientific research.

The narrative group of sources from the history of Slovenia of the first half of the twentieth century is vital for the verification of scientific provisions and conclusions. By chronological criterion, it is differentiated as memoirs of the First World War and other significant events and crises in political life, including the creation of the first Slovenian authorities in the "State of the CBS" and the "Kingdom of the CBS", the dictatorship, and the Second World War. The author divided the narratives into the following complexes: memoirs of political figures on the internal situation in Slovenia and the international scene in the interwar period, memoirs of political prisoners of 1930 - 1940s, memoirs of emigrants and refugees of the early XX century and the years of the First and Second World Wars.

The content of narrative materials, on the one hand, is factually rich, and on the other, marked by sharply one-sided party orientation. Political aggression led to individual notes and diaries being published either outside the borders of socialist Slovenia or later in the 21st century. Anti-communist memoirs can be found in American and British libraries, while (with a few exceptions) they are missing from Slovenian bookstores.

The author used a collection of archival documents on the political history of Slovenia in the first half of the twentieth century, which significantly increased the scientific level of the monograph. This chronologically-meaningful collection includes documents of three essential periods: World War I, the interwar years and World War II. However, it should be noted that unpublished materials on the history of Slovenes of the interwar period are very fragmented. Depending on the state of archival sources on the interwar history of the Slovenes, the low degree of orderliness and partial inaccessibility prevents a closer examination of the individual, often minor, problems of the period. At the same time, due to the thematic work of individual researchers, the copying of sources from archives outside Slovenia, as well as focused efforts that were reflected in sophisticated scientific works, sufficient documents were accumulated to carry out in-depth studies of conflicting issues in Slovenian interwar history. The dissertation work, in particular, was built on the use of archival funds of the Slovenian authorities (1918) and self-government (1927-1929). Mainly due to the use of a robust set of sources, the findings of the historical study are well-vetted, fully scientifically sound, well-reasoned, and logical.

In conducting the research and presenting its results, Kateryna Malshyna followed the principles of historicism and objectivity. According to these, the phenomena and processes in the history of Slovenia during the interwar period are presented not from the standpoint of static, but from the perspective of analysing their dynamic development, exploring their relationship and interdependence. The author has successfully used several general, scientific, and primarily historical methods. We pay particular attention to system-structural, problem-chronological, comparative-historical, historical-genetic, historical-typological, temporal modelling, historical-retrospective, and comparative-analogue ones.

In our view, the scientific novelty of this work lies in several aspects. The reviewed study is a complex one, which means that the process of Slovenian state formation in 1918-1941 became the subject of holistic scientific research for the first time, particularly in Ukrainian historiography. The author specified the pre-

requisites for the restoration of the process of Slovenian state formation in 1848-1918. She developed, for the first time, the periodization of the Slovenian state formation in 1918-1941, determining the characteristics of each stage and distinguishing the driving forces and factors of this process. She also presented the conceptualization and definitions of the terms "Slovenism", "Yugoslavism", and "Balkanism" in the vision of Slovenians. As for the dynamics of the Slovenian state-formation process, they were studied in conjunction with the ideological aspects, through the prism of the struggle of "Slovenism" with "Yugoslavism" in the personal expression of the conservative (clerical) and liberal camps, with the fluctuations of different directions of labour (socialist/communist) camps.

In the context of a robust conceptualization of the problem of historical research, the use and development of a scientific approach to the consideration of a dynamic or "wave-like" state-formation progress through the evaluation of "windows of opportunities" is essential. Based on the involvement of source data and specific historical facts, it was proven that the crisis moments of the centralist and unitarist policies of the centralist government of Belgrade (when the "Slovenism" was favoured) opened corresponding "windows of opportunities" for the intensification of Slovenian state-formation efforts. The author considers that the dynamics of the historical events were also determined by the relations of "national" - "state" - "political" ideas. That is, they represent a way for the Slovenians to understand their full interconnection as one of the crucial criteria for identifying the stages, peculiarities, and "windows of opportunities" for the development of the Slovenian state-formation process.

Kateryna Malshyna actualized the scientific discussion around the essence and content of the theory of national revival, in the context of which she clarified several concepts. For instance, the simplistic understanding of the idea of "national revival" as a secondary consequence of the industrial revolution or as a transition to the industrial stage of production does not fully correspond to the historical reality. Ethno-processes are much more complex and far from directly dependent on changes in the material base of production or the system of social and economic relations. Ethno-evolution has more to do with cultural change than with production. Critical analysis of categories and established conceptual apparatus, however, does not imply a nihilistic denial of the earlier achievements of Slavic studies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the research of the problem. The process of Slovenian revival is rightly explored not as regional, but mainly as pan-European, pan-Slavic, as well as specific historical, cultural, and

civilizational shifts. This approach made it possible to reasonably and in chronological sequence reveal the meaning, nature, and focus of the movement for national-revival on Slovenian lands.

The processes of formation and activity of the first Slovenian national state-administrative bodies and Slovenian armed forces, the establishment of state borders and the features of the international position of Slovenia within the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs prove that the state created on Slovenian lands within the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs in August-December 1918 has all signs of full national autonomy.

The text of the monograph indicates that its author has thoroughly studied the system of actions of the Slovenian governments in the struggle against the central Belgrade authority for the preservation of national autonomy in December 1918 – June 1921. On this basis, she systematized a set of military and administrative-informational efforts of the governments in the conditions of threatened integrity of the Slovenian nation and national territory at the end of 1918 – first half of 1919, investigated the activities of the Slovenian delegation in Paris in January-September 1919, as well as the preconditions, course, and results of the Carinthia plebiscite in October 1920. She analysed the administrative and territorial status of Slovenian land according to the constitutions of 1921 and 1931, the legal frame-work for the operation of new units of government and local elections. The main features and directions of activity of self-governing bodies in 1927-1941 (in particular, the Ljubljana and Maribor regional assemblies in 1927-1929, the Banovina Council of the Drava Banovina in 1930-1941) are outlined for the respective periods. The connection between the Concordat crisis of 1935-1937, the creation of Croatia's Banovina, and the efforts of the *Slovenian politicum* to create the Slovenian Banovina were revealed. The pages of the monograph analyze the attempts to restore Slovenian national autonomy at the beginning of World War II and during the initial period of the Nazi occupation of Slovenia (April-September 1941).

The practical importance of the monograph lies primarily in the possibility and appropriateness of using the results of the study in the preparation of thematic summaries, textbooks and synthetic works on the history of South-eastern Europe and individual countries, in the development of primary and specialized courses in the social and political past of Slovenia and other Balkan states to investigate the regional section of international relations in the interwar period. Also, the Slovenian experience of building its statehood, fighting for the unification of

its people, parliamentarism, and democracy, developing strategies and tactics in achieving its goals, dedication to human values and political behaviour in the catastrophic moments of its history will be useful examples for state and public figures, historians-theoreticians and applied politicians in the context of understanding the practice of Ukrainian state formation in the XX-XXI centuries.

At the same time, we observed some aspects and subjects of the monograph, which – in our opinion – either need further elaboration or are debatable. For example, it would have been useful as a more detailed and in-depth analysis of the impact of the two global armed conflicts on the genesis and evolution of state-formation processes in Central, Eastern, and South-Eastern Europe.

Special attention should be paid to the historical, intercultural character to strengthen the methodological tools of scientific research. Given the conceptual understanding of the process of formation of the Slovenian state in the interwar period, it would have been appropriate to present it not only through the prism of the "window of opportunity", but also from the perspective of the complex of "structural pressures". After all, according to Professor Leslie A. Pal, each country is influenced by deep structural conditions that are enshrined in history, politics, and economics or, in other words, by "a specific structural pressure that cannot be ignored".

In our opinion, the international factors of influence on the processes of Slovenian state-formation within the chosen chronological limits also deserved a separate in-depth scientific analysis. In particular, it is essential both in the context of studying their influence on the Slovenian state-formation at the stages of specific "windows of opportunities" and in terms of comparing their role in the respective processes in the adjacent territories.

The appeal of the author of the monograph to numerous biographies of statesmen, politicians, and military figures should encourage her to use the biographical method. In particular, we refer to the application of its cognitive potential through the study of the transformation of the "biographical trajectory", focusing on various aspects of the state-formation activity of individuals, groups, and organizations.

In general, the noted comments, wishes, and recommendations do not significantly affect the proper professional, scientific, and theoretical level of the historical research conducted. Kateryna Malshyna's monograph has a complete, original, complex character. A wide range of historians and anyone interested in the

problems of state formation in the countries of Central and South-East Europe under the influence of the two World Wars should read the monograph, become familiar with its provisions and conclusions.

A CRITICAL WAY OF APPROACHING CONTEMPORARY ROMANIAN GEOPOLITICS¹

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Abstract: *The scientific novelty of the study consists of the unique, organic, integrative, synchronous and diachronic approach of this topic in the Romanian academic space after 1990. The author uses a diverse scientific methodology – inductive, deductive, cartographic, historical, statistical-mathematical, and analytical – from the intersection of political geography, geopolitics, geoeconomics, geostrategy, geo-culture and history. From the beginning of the book, he reveals an interdisciplinary vision, presenting his perspective through the complicated kaleidoscope of the main schools of geopolitics (American, German, French, British). Following in parallel, chronologically and thematically, the relations between post-totalitarian Romania and the USA, Germany and Russia, the author builds his conceptual, scientific and methodological edifice on a series of pillars, present in all five chapters: frontier, history, geopolitics, geostrategy, geoeconomics, geoculture. Benefiting from an impressive bibliography, the author offers an original and surprising view of the Romanian, American, German, and Russian geopolitical realities, managing to detach himself from prejudices, taboos, stereotypes, and leaving the sphere of official, formal and dull language, so often used in the Romanian space by politicians, journalists, and by some pseudo-specialists in geopolitics, security, etc.*

Keywords: Romania, Germany, USA, Russia, political geography, geopolitics, geoeconomics, geostrategy, geoculture, border/frontier.

Rezumat: *O modalitate critică de abordare a geopoliticii românești contemporane. Noutatea științifică a studiului constă în abordarea unică, organică, integrativă, sincronă și diacronică a acestui subiect în spațiul academic românesc de după 1990. Autorul folosește o metodologie științifică diversă – inductivă, deductivă, cartografică, istorică, statistică-matematică și analitică – aflată la intersecția geografiei politice cu geopolitica, geoeconomia, geostrategia, geo-cultura și istoria. De la începutul cărții, el dezvăluie o viziune interdiscipli-*

¹ Review on: Florin Pintescu, *Politicile SUA, Germaniei și Rusiei în spațiul românesc (1990-2018)* [The US, German and Russian policies in the Romanian space (1990-2018)], Târgoviște, Editura „Cetatea de Scaun”, 2019, 316 pp, note, bibliografie, indice.

nară, prezentându-și perspectiva prin caleidoscopul complicat al principalelor școli de geopolitică (americană, germană, franceză, britanică). Urmând, în paralel, cronologic și tematic, relațiile dintre România post-totalitară și SUA, Germania și Rusia, autorul își construiește edificiul conceptual, științific și metodologic pe o serie de piloni, prezenți în toate cele cinci capitole: frontieră, istorie, geopolitică, geostrategie, geoeconomie, geocultură. Beneficiind de o bibliografie impresionantă, autorul oferă o viziune originală și surprinzătoare a realităților geopolitice românești, americane, germane și ruse, reușind să se detașeze de prejudecăți, tabuuri, stereotipuri și părăsind sfera limbajului oficial, formal și plictisitor, atât de des utilizate în spațiul românesc de politicieni, jurnaliști și de unii pseudo-specialiști în geopolitică, securitate etc.

International relations in the 21st century, besides the national interests, international law, alliances and adversities, are strongly influenced by geography, the location or proximity of a “hot” zone, or the existence or absence of the natural resources, the appearance of “frozen” conflicts in some regions etc. After the end of the Cold War, in the new security context, Romania’s positioning in the extended Black Sea region becomes an object of the great powers interest, but also offers it a chance to impose itself as an important subject of the regional international relations. Florin Pintescu’s study tries to sketch the picture of the complex interferences of great powers’ actions and strategies in Eastern Europe and the way Romania relates to the challenges of the Third Millennium.

Florin Pintescu’s book is based on the principle of interdisciplinarity, having various methodological and conceptual approaches. The author uses a wide range of research methods, such as inductive, deductive, cartographical, statistical and mathematical, historical, analytical, and synthetical. They reflect not only the complexity of his thinking but also a very efficient working technique.

In the first chapter entitled *Geopolitics of the “frontiers” and the influence spheres. Introductory considerations*, the author describes comparatively, using the method of analysis and synthesis, a few significant directions exercised by the representative of the American, British, German, French, and Romanian geopolitical schools. Approaching a dynamic and flexible vision, he defines geopolitical concepts such as *border*, *frontier*, *sphere of influence*, *frontier phenomenon*, *horigenesis* (frontier genesis), etc. The conceptual introspection applies to the relations of Romania with the USA, Germany, and Russia. Pintescu also pays special attention to the geopolitical relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova. From the very beginning, the author announces his intention to base his study on the following pillars: political geography, geopolitics, geoeconomics, geostrategy, and geoculture.

The second chapter reveals in a comparative and holistic modus operandi,

the weaknesses and strengths of Romania on the international stage, in the year 1989 as a *turning point* from the communist totalitarianism to democracy. Thus, Florin Pintescu considers that the situation of Romania in terms of geopolitical, geoeconomic, geostrategic and geocultural realities, was quite precarious, but not catastrophic. The numerous and various statistical data critically interpreted, allowed the author to identify the several vulnerabilities of the Romanian political space, on its way to integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.

The third chapter – *Policies of the United States of America in the Romanian space after events of December 1989* – includes the following subdivisions: “Geohistorical aspects”, “Geocultural considerations”, “Geoeconomic aspects”, “Geostrategic considerations and Case study: NATO and the geopolitical issues of Romania”. In his analysis, Pintescu starts from the premise of the geostrategic and geoeconomic domination of the great powers over the small and medium states. He recalls two axiomatic elements of international relations: “1. Small states cannot be truly independent, as they depend at least geoeconomically speaking (if not geostrategically too) on great powers. 2. In case that a great power collapses, its place will be taken automatically, or shortly after, by another great power. Consequently, the small state will not become «independent», but will only change the master” (p. 298).

In a nuanced manner, professor Pintescu states and supports the idea that the USA – although it was the major winner of the Cold War – preferred first to consolidate its cultural influence over Romania instead increasing its economic impact. After 2004, the American superpower chose to integrate Romania within its geostrategic vision, to fade or cancel a possible Russian influence. The US policy towards Romania after 2007 (Romania’s acceptance in the EU) preserved the same geostrategic and geocultural coordinates. The US’s sole power was undermined after 2007 by the rise of China, Germany and the Russian Federation. The geoeconomic influence of the USA in Romania, after 1989, is lower than that of Germany and the Russian Federation. This situation proved to be unfavourable for Romania because it still maintains multiple dependencies on the great powers: geostrategically is depending on the USA, and geoeconomically on Germany and the Russian Federation. After 2008, the collaboration between Russia and the European Union (*condominium* in Central and Eastern Europe between Russia and Germany) imposed the need for a permanent American intervention (as a balancing power). Therefore, there is the possibility that Romania will become either an EU colony or a Russian colony.

The fourth chapter – *Germany and Romania post – 1989. Geohistorical, geocultural, geoeconomical, geopolitical, and geostrategic aspects* – issues various problems, such as the pressure of integration into the European Community (EU),

the geocultural presence of Germany in Romania, the advantages and disadvantages of the German geoeconomic influence in the Romanian space. Unlike some countries in central Europe (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia), the cultural proximity between Romania and Germany has remained quite narrow or elitist, because Romanians usually prefer to learn English, a language more accessible, than German. In terms of geoeconomics, Germany imposed itself in Romania quite effortlessly, a situation that generated a series of advantages: German investments (in 2019 there were over 20,000 companies with German capital, with a turnover of almost 5 billion euros). At present, Germany remains the largest trading partner of Romania. However, the Romanian-German economic relations also have a series of disadvantages: the lack of complementarities between the Romanian and the German economy; the possibility of partial subordination of some Romanian economic branches to the German economy; the economic proximity of Germany to Russia and Hungary, countries whose elites have constantly shown their hostility towards Romania.

Since the modern era (18th – 19th centuries), the domestic and international political evolution of the Romanian space was, more or less, influenced by the rise, stagnation or decline of Russia. The coagulation of the Romanian nation-state often intersected with Russian geopolitical and geostrategic interests in South-Eastern Europe and the Black Sea basin. After the Great Powers recognized the Independence of Romania at the Peace Congress in Berlin (1878), the Romanian authorities and public opinion situated towards Russian state on positions that oscillated “between either anti-Russianism often obsessive or (at best) recklessness and ignorance of the realities of Russia. The reception of Russian culture, as well as the image of Russia in the Romanian space (problems related, from a scientific point of view, with the history of mentalities), are aspects either little studied or distorted by the past heritage. Wrongly, Russian culture is seen today by Romania’s public opinion as inferior to Western culture, even inferior to Romanian culture. To this contributes a poor knowledge of the Russian language in Romania and the cultural westernization of Romania, achieved after 1990, in which the Russian Federation has declined for a decade and could not influence the realities of Romania” (p. 302).

In the fifth chapter entitled *The Policies of the Russian Federation in Romania post - 1991*, Pintescu reviews the following elements: the geopolitical importance of Russia on a global level; geohistorical, geocultural, geoeconomic and geostrategic considerations on Romanian-Russian relations, adding at the end of the chapter a captivating case study on the geopolitical interdependencies between Romania, Russia and the Republic of Moldova. According to the author, the geoeconomic presence of the Russian Federation in Romania is not as relevant as that

of Germany (although it surpasses that of the USA), manifesting itself especially in some economic branches, such as the energy or steel industry. From a geo-strategic point of view, the Romanian-Russian collaboration is influenced by the position towards NATO. The US strategy to combat Russia's aggressive objectives in Eastern Europe includes the process of transforming Romania into a buffer region at NATO's external border.

Likewise, Romania's relationship with the Russian Federation reflects the measures adopted in domestic and foreign policy by the Republic of Moldova. Thus, in political, economic, military, cultural terms, the cooperation between Moldova and Romania is closely linked to Moscow's often unpredictable and oscillating attitude. Unfortunately, the fifth chapter of Pintescu's book, dedicated to Romanian-Russian relations, does not benefit from a bibliography in Russian, a weakness somehow compensated by using translated works of well-known Russian geopolitical specialists, as well as government web sources, which offer an objective image of the main directions of the Russian foreign policy.

Also, some statements, although logical, are insufficiently covered from a documentary point of view and the author's diatribes towards the Romanian political class may seem subjective and partisan, especially in a scientific paper.

The author also inserts in the text a series of paragraphs written in a familiar language, with a strong aesthetic and stylistic effect, but quite inappropriate with the rigour imposed by a scientific text.

By participating in numerous conferences and publishing valuable specialized studies, Florin Pintescu has proven, in the last decade, profound knowledge of Moldavian's domestic and foreign policy. In his opinion, the bilateral relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova are frequently under the influence of a set of factors, which act synchronously: historical, cultural, religious, linguistic affinities established for several hundred years between the neo-Latin ethnic group in Romania and the Republic of Moldova; the influence of the regional and transnational policies of the EU; the positioning of these two states at the intersection of geostrategic, geopolitical and geoeconomic interests of the EU, NATO and Russia.

In such a context, the author considers that the EU cooperation's agreements with the former Soviet republics (including the Republic of Moldova) are under the influence of the following coordinates: the gradual inclusion of these states in the EU economic sphere, by creating free trade areas, and by signing bilateral treaties; concluding "mobility and security pacts" dedicated to the fight against illegal migration; creating integrated border management structures; increasing the legal mobility of the labour force; improving the energy security of

the EU and its partners in the agreement called the European Neighbourhood Policy (2007-2010). European Union promotes, continuously, relations with the Republic of Moldova and Romania, implementing *multilateralism*, *soft power policy*, and persuasion. Therefore, the author emphasizes that the bilateral relations between the two *sister states* must be strengthened based on pragmatic and not sentimental principles. He recalls a series of landmarks, such as: capitalizing on the complementarity between the economies of the two countries; approaching international relations from a multilateral geopolitical perspective; the avoidance by both states of their transformation into mere “chair legs” of the EU, NATO or Russia; maintaining current statehood of the Republic of Moldova or uniting this country with Romania.

The appendices of Florin Pintescu’s book completes the interdisciplinary vision on the topic under discussion. They consist of a series of analytical and comparative tables, regarding the demographic and economic evolution of Romania, in relation to developed or developing countries. The author also includes several maps on various topics: the spheres of influence and interest of Germany and France; redistribution of the areas of the political ascendancy of the Russian Federation; Germany in Europe, from the late 90’s to the first decades of the 2000s. Pintescu also provides within appendices a list of legal instruments regarding bilateral cooperation between Romania and the Republic of Moldova.

The work of Professor Pintescu was based on his doctoral thesis in Geography, completed and defended at the University “Al. I. Cuza” from Iași in 2015. In our opinion, the fundamental objective of the book (finding the truth, *sine ira et studio*) was, successfully, achieved, both formally and informally. The author used a wide range of research methods, as well as a vast conceptual universe, in an original and multidisciplinary vision. Without claiming that he will reach absolute truths, impossible to achieve through an epistemological approach, Florin Pintescu has managed to open new directions in analysing of the contemporary relations of Romania with the USA, Germany, and Russia.

This scientific achievement on the vast realm of geopolitics would not have been possible and feasible without the use of information from very diverse and different fields: history, geography (economic and human), demography, political economy, sociology, cultural studies. The book is worthy of appreciation not only for the author’s intellectual effort over several years of diligent research but especially for his original vision and courage to go beyond public, official statements or questionable scientific approaches on a subject that can sometimes become too sensitive.

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3. Richard Little, Barry Buzan, *Sistemele internaționale...*, p. 79.
4. Stelian Tanase (coord.), *Cioran și Securitatea* [Cioran and Securitatea], Iași, Editura Polirom, 2009, p. 14.
5. Christine Sylvester, *Empathetic Cooperation: A Feminist Method for IR*, in "Millennium: Journal of International Studies", 1994, Vol. 23, no. 2, p. 315-334.
6. Richard Little, Barry Buzan, *Sistemele internaționale...*, pp. 148, 155, 239.
7. *Australia-NATO Joint Political Declaration*, in http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_94097.htm (Accessed on 12.11.2012).
8. А. И. Деникин, *Путь русского офицера* [The Way of a Russian Officer], Москва, Современник, 1991, с. 58.

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